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  INTRODUCTION
In  general  terms  this  thesis  examines  India's  foreign  policy  during  the  second 
government of Indira Gandhi (1971-1977). It is possible to argue that during this 
period of time India became, and was also recognized as, the dominant power in 
South Asia1 both in military and political terms.  Power in international relations is 
generally  regarded  as  a  combination  of  the  economic,  geographic,  political  and 
military factors2. In reality, India had always benefited from being the hegemonic 
state in South Asia in terms of territory, population and economic dimensions since 
emerging as an independent state on the ashes of the British Empire. However, after 
the humiliating defeat India suffered  against China in 1962, its hegemonic position 
was challenged. As a result, soon after the 1962 war New Delhi adopted a military 
and political strategy aimed to strengthen its military capabilities. In the following 
decade it successfully exercised and asserted its power in the South Asian region. 
From 1971 to 1977, India in fact won a war against Pakistan for the future of East 
Pakistan;  exploded  an  atomic  bomb  becoming  the  sixth  state  in  the  world  to 
demonstrate the possession of such technology; and resolved the question of Sikkim 
in its favour, an Indian protectorate of great strategic importance due to its location 
on  the  border  with  China,  annexing  the  state  and  ending  its  aspirations  of 
independence.  Therefore,  although  the  Indian  economy  was  stagnant  in  the 
Seventies, and that it would have started to grow only later, in the Eighties3, during 
1 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldive, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal are generally 
considered as part of South Asia. The region is therefore circled in the north by the Himalayan  
mountains and in the south by the Indian Ocean. Kishore C. Dash,  Regionalism in South Asia:  
Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 45.
2 On this  topic see for  example:  Felix  Berenskoetter  and Michael  J.  Williams,  Power in  World  
Politics (Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
3 India’s economy grew from 1951 until 1965 at a rate of 4%, then it entered a period of stagnation  
during which the Indian economy only grew at the rate of 2,9%. This ended period only in 1980. 
Several explanations for such a trend are provided by literature. For an interesting analysis of them 
see:  Matthew McCartney,  India:  The Political  Economy of  Growth, Stagnation and the State,  
1951-2007 (London: Routledge, 2009), 45.
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the second government of Indira Gandhi (1971-1977) New Delhi was able to clearly 
demonstrate its political and military power in the regional context, and not only. 
As  a  consequence,  it  is  interesting  to  focus  on  the  causes  that  allowed  this 
development, on the ways in which the international position was affirmed, and the 
consequences that it brought. The historical analysis which will be carried out in this 
thesis aims to shed light on events through a critical study which resorts to archival 
primary sources. The aim is to evaluate how much the rise of India as a regional 
power was the result of a specific expansionist foreign policy formulated by the new 
Indian executive that took power in 1971, and how much the consequence of politics 
adopted previously, or of those external events favoured such an ascent.  The final 
objective is to contribute to a much larger study of how the new power position held 
by New Delhi had effective consequences also on the regional and global balance of 
power. 
The  study of  India's  foreign  policy during  the  second  government  of  Indira 
Gandhi has to be contextualised within the larger picture in which the history of the 
Seventies  and international relations has recently been re-evaluated by historians. 
The Seventies  represented  a  complex  phase  of  transition  both  for  the  developed 
countries and for the developing ones. The United States was facing a serious period 
of crisis at the political and cultural level, as well as socio-economic, which reached 
its apex with the Vietnam war, and caused them to revise their role in the world. In 
the second half of the Sixties the Soviet Union had initiated the dialogue with the 
West, inaugurating the phase known as of détente of the Cold War, in a phase when it 
was still appearing as economically solid and militarily strong. In 1972 the SALT I 
agreements were signed. In addition to regulating the development of the military 
forces of the two states, these agreements also sanctioned the strategic parity between 
them for the first time in world history. Therefore, if in the West the Seventies meant 
a period of détente, in Asia the situation was different. The Cultural Revolution in 
China in 1966, and the parallel definitive erosion of Sino-Soviet relations had opened 
a  new  political  phase  of  growing  tension  in  Asia.  The  rise  of  China  and  India 
respectively, as global and regional powers, marked the beginning of a reorganization 
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of  international  relations.  The  opening  of  a  dialogue  between  Beijing  and 
Washington was one sign. Another was the rearrangement of relations within the 
South Asian region between New Delhi and its neighbours, and between India and 
the superpowers. As this thesis demonstrates, in the Seventies India, exploiting Cold 
War rivalries and changing its historical position in the international realm, indeed 
seized the opportunity presented to them by the civil war that had erupted in East 
Pakistan to reinforce its position and to weaken its old rival Pakistan. Moreover, New 
Delhi did not hesitate to explode a nuclear bomb to demonstrate first of all to China, 
and secondly to the rest of the world, its technological, military and political power, 
even  at  the  cost  of  eroding  international  relations  with  its  nuclear  commercial 
partners of the West. Lastly, India exercised its power over the small Himalayan state 
of  Sikkim.  It  vanished  its  ambitions  for  independence  and  annexed  it,  thus 
demonstrating its military and political power to all the other small states of South 
Asia. All these events took place under the government of Indira Gandhi who, after 
strong  internal  tensions  inside  the  Congress  party,  in  1971  emerged  as  the  new 
national leader. 
The aim of this doctoral thesis is therefore to offer a new contribution to the 
discipline of the History of International Relations posing India as the centre of the 
analysis.  Focussing  on  India  indeed  allows  the  formulation  of  new  reflections 
particularly useful today since the global political context is no more characterised 
by a unipolar structure, but by a multipolar system where India assumed an important 
position among new emerging powers. From this point of view this thesis allows to 
argue  that  the  Cold  War  détente  was  not  only characterised  by the  superpowers' 
willingness to recognise their strategic parity in order to keep the status quo intact, 
but also by the rise of new international actors, like for example China and India in 
Asia,  which  exploited  superpowers'  rivalry  for  their  own  interests.  The  Italian 
historiographical  context  regarding  the  discipline  of  the  History  of  International 
Relations on the Asian continent, and specifically in India, is extremely limited. Only 
few and isolated works have been done until  today, such as for example Mariele 
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Merlati's study on Indo-American relations during Carter's years4. In its introductory 
part  Merlati's  study  only  briefly  resumes  the  literature  assessment  of  the  Indo-
American  relations  during  the  government  of  Indira  Gandhi,  without  however 
specifically focussing on it. More generally, some studies of Prof. Michelguglielmo 
Torri  have  been  focussed  on  India's  foreign  policy,  such  as  for  example  Asia 
Major/Asia  Maior5,  which  traces  on  an  annual  basis  domestic  and  international 
policies  in  Asian  countries  and  thus  also  in  India,  and  few other  contributions6. 
Beyond some contributions of a more general nature, among which Torri's book7, the 
attention has instead been mainly given to India's domestic political dynamics, such 
as  India's  cultural  traditions8,  and  socio-economic  and  political  development9. 
Therefore,  the  historiographical  context  to  which  this  research  refers  is  the 
international  one.  Largely dominated  by British,  American  and Indian  works  the 
international literature on India's foreign policy is rich and original. Nevertheless, it 
is  characterised  by  two  important  limits.  First,  the  scarce  presence  of  works  of 
historical character, in favour of an abundance of works of a political nature, such as 
4 Mariele Merlati,  Gli Stati Uniti tra India e Pakistan: gli anni della presidenza Carter  (Roma: 
Carocci, 2009).
5 See for example the articles written annually by Michelguglielmo Torri on India's foreign policy, 
which are almost all available at: http://www.asiamaior.org/.
6 See  for  example:  Michelguglielmo  Torri,  “L’India  indù,  potenza  nucleare,”  Giano 29/30 
(December  1998):  47–63;  Michelguglielmo  Torri,  “Ondeggiamenti  e  continuità  della  politica 
estera indiana,” Giano 39 (December 2001): 165–184.
7 Michelguglielmo Torri, Storia dell’India (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2007).
8 See for example: Michelguglielmo Torri, “I musulmani nell’India indipendente,” in A oriente del  
profeta. L’islam in Asia oltre i confini del mondo arabo, by Paolo Affatato and Emanuele Giordana 
(Milano: Obarra, 2005), 37–48; Enrico Fasana, Il problema tribale in India (Torino: Giappichelli, 
1967);  Enrico  Fasana,  Riforma  sociale  e  conversione  nella  comunità  musulmana  del  
subcontinente  indiano (Napoli:  Istituto  Orientale,  1976);  Enrico  Fasana,  Mandal  e  Mandir:  
Religion and Society in Independent India (Roma: Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, 2002).
9 Michelguglielmo Torri,  “Origine,  evoluzione e  trasformazione  della  democrazia  indiana,” in  Il  
subcontinente  indiano  verso  il  terzo  millennio.  Tensioni  politiche,  trasformazioni  sociali  ed 
economiche,  mutamento  culturale,  by  Elisabetta  Basile  and  Michelguglielmo  Torri  (Milano: 
Centro Studi per i popoli extraeuropei Cesare Bonacossa dell’Università di Pavia/Franco Angeli, 
2002),  77–145,  http://dex1.tsd.unifi.it/juragentium/it/index.htm?surveys/rol/;  Michelguglielmo 
Torri, “L’India  ha  sessant’anni. Dimensioni e  limiti  di  un  successo,”  Afriche e Orienti 3, no. 4 
(2007):  116–123;  Michelguglielmo  Torri,  “La  trasformazione  del  sistema  politico  indiano,” 
Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali 7 (2008): 18–29; Michelguglielmo Torri, “I costi sociali dello 
sviluppo,”  in  L’elefante  sul  trampolino.  L’India  fra i  grandi  della  terra (Bologna:  Il  Mulino, 
2009); Matilde Adduci,  L’India  contemporanea: dall’indipendenza  all’era  della  globalizzazione 
(Roma: Carocci, 2009); Antonella Rondinone, India: geografia politica (Roma: Carocci, 2008).
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those  afferent  to  the  discipline  of  Political  Science  and International  Relations10. 
Second,  the  historical  literature  on  India's  foreign  policy  is  especially  limited  if 
compared to material which specialises in China's foreign policy, for instance. This is 
particularly true with regards to the period of time analysed in this thesis. Academic 
attention has indeed been largely focused on the Sino-American rapprochement11, 
rather  than  on events  in  the South Asian  region.  Although international  attention 
towards India and its foreign policy increased in the years after the Nineties, much 
remains  to  be  done.  The fact  that  India  internationally  opened  its  economy,  and 
India's  economic weight  became relatively more important  in  the world,  fostered 
international  attention  to  India's  history.  In  order  to  understand  how  the 
historiographical context is articulated and how this thesis tries to contribute to it, 
here four distinct sections of literature related to the principal events of the Seventies 
are briefly presented. 
The first specific literature to which this thesis aims to contribute is related to 
10 See for example: Kanti P. Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu,  International Relations in India:  
Bringing Theory Back Home (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2005); Kanti P. Bajpai and Siddharth 
Mallavarapu,  International Relations in India:  Theorising the Region and Nation (New Delhi: 
Orient Blackswan, 2005); Barry Buzan, “South Asia Moving Towards Transformation: Emergence 
of  India as a  Great  Power,”  International  Studies 39,  no. 1  (February 1,  2002):  1–24; Shashi 
Tharoor,  Reasons  of  State:  Political  Development  and  India’s  Foreign  Policy  Under  Indira  
Gandhi, 1966-1977 (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House, 1982).
11 See for example: John W. Garver,  China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States,  
1968-1971 (Boulder:  Westview  Press,  1982);  John  W.  Garver,  The  Sino-American  Alliance:  
Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); On 
this  topic  more  recently several  works  had  been  published  based  on  archival  research  in  the  
American archives, such as: Y. Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao 
Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,”  Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21–52; Robert S. 
Ross  and  Changbin  Jiang,  Re-Examining  the  Cold  War:  U.S.-China  Diplomacy,  1954-1973 
(London: Harvard Univ Asia Center, 2001); W. Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-
Soviet Border War and Steps Towards Rapprochement,”  Cold War History 1, no. 3 (2001): 73–
112; Evelyn Goh, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the ‘Soviet Card’ in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–
1974,”  Diplomatic History 29, no. 3 (2005):  475–502; Chris Connolly,  “The American Factor: 
Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–72,”  Cold War 
History 5,  no.  4  (2005):  501–527;  Zhihiua  Shen,  “The  Great  Leap  Forward,  the  People’s 
Communes and the Rupture of the Sino-Soviet Alliance” (Parallel History Project on NATO and 
the  Warsaw  Pact,  The  Cold  War  History  of  Sino-Soviet  Relations,  June  2005), 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-
a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=108645; Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between 
Revolution and Détente:  Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969–
1976,”  Diplomatic History 34,  no.  2  (2010):  395–423;  Lorenz M. Lüthi,  “Restoring Chaos to 
History: Sino-Soviet-American Relations, 1969,” The China Quarterly 210 (2012): 378–397.
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India's  positive  resolution  of  the  East  Pakistani  crisis  of  1971,  which  led  to  the 
Pakistani  defeat  and to the emergence of Bangladesh.  It  can be divided into two 
sections.  The first  one is  based on press reports,  direct  accounts,  interviews, and 
reconstructions of events12. Among these works, of different academic values, some 
contributions are of crucial interest still today, such as the books written by Sisson 
and Rose (closer to New Delhi's point of view), Jackson (more neutral) and Zaheer (a 
critical account written by a Pakistani). More recently a second wave of contributions 
were published on the 1971 South Asian events13 that rely on the analysis  of the 
American documents recently declassified by the government of the United States. 
However, no Indian or other international archival sources have been consulted yet in 
addition  to  those  from American.  Thus,  the  accuracy  of  the  interpretations  that 
emerged from the study of the American sources have not been checked. Similarly, 
12 Marta R. Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg,  Bangladesh: The Birth of  a Nation; a Handbook of  
Background  Information  and  Documentary  Sources (Madras:  M.  Seshachalam,  1972);  D.  R. 
Mankekar,  Pakistan Cut to Size: The Authentic Story of the 14-day Indo-Pak War (New Delhi: 
Indian Book Co., 1972); Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” Asian Survey 
13, no. 5 (May 1973): 482–495; Golam Wahed Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the  
Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New Delhi: Free Press, 1975); Robert Victor 
Jackson,  South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1975); Nilkanta Krishnan, No Way but Surrender: An Account of the Indo-Pakistan War in  
the Bay of Bengal, 1971 (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1980); Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose,  War and 
Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991); Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali  
Muslim Nationalism (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994); F. R. J. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca:  
Birth of a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1997).
13 Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,” 
Asian Survey 20, no. 4 (April 1980): 339–361; Roedad Khan, The American Papers: Secret And  
Confidential  India-Pakistan-Bangladash  Documents,  1965-1973 (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1999);  F.  S.  Aijazuddin,  The White House & Pakistan: Secret  Declassified Documents,  
1969-1974/selected  and  Edited  by  FS  Aijazuddin (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2002); 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005); FRUS, Volume E–7, Documents on South 
Asia,  1969–1972 (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing Office,  2005);  FRUS, Volume E–8, 
Documents  on  South  Asia,  1973-1976 (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing Office,  2007); 
Kalyani Shankar,  Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond (New Delhi: MacMillan, 2010); 
Geoffrey Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” International Affairs 81, 
no.  5  (2005):  1097–1118;  Itty  Abraham,  “South  Asian  Events  of  1971:  New  Revelations,” 
Economic  and Political  Weekly 40,  no.  28  (July 9,  2005):  2994–2995;  Gary R Hess,  “Grand 
Strategy and Regional Conflict: Nixon, Kissinger, and Crisis in South Asia,”  Diplomatic History 
31, no. 5 (2007): 959–963; Robert J. MacMahon, “The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, 
Kissinger, and the South Asia Crisis of 1971,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations,  
1969-1977, by Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
249–268.
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also the specific literature related to India's nuclear programme can be divided in two 
sections:  the  first  and older  one based on press  sources,  interviews and personal 
accounts of events, largely of Indian origin14; and the second and more recent one 
based on declassified American documents, thus having a much more international 
character15. Again no other archival sources have been consulted: neither Indian ones, 
nor British and the Canadian ones, which was one India's more important nuclear 
commercial partners. Differently the literature on Sikkim's merger with India in 1975 
is  largely biased  and  partial:  on  one  hand,  there  is the  official  Indian  account 
provided during and after the events16, which depict India as  taking only a passive 
role; and on the other hand, there are the critical accounts produced by sources linked 
14 See  for  example:  Shyam  Bhatia,  India’s  Nuclear  Bomb (Sahibabad:  Vikas,  1979);  Brahma 
Chellaney, “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security 16, no. 1 (1991): 43; 
Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-Indian Conflict (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 
1993);  Bhabani  Sen  Gupta  and  Cāṇakya  Sena,  Nuclear  Weapons?:  Policy  Options  for  India 
(Delhi: Sage Publications, 1983); J. P. Jain, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974); 
Ashok Kapur,  India’s  Nuclear  Option:  Atomic  Diplomacy  and Decision  Making (New Delhi: 
Praeger, 1976); G. G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 
1968); K. Subrahmanyam, “Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964-98: a Personal Recollection,” in Nuclear  
India, by Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1998), 26–53; A. G.  
Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey 7, no. 7 (July 1, 1967): 490–502; 
A. G. Noorani, “Indo-U.S. Nuclear Relations,” Asian Survey 21, no. 4 (April 1, 1981): 399–416; 
Kanwal Kishore Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: a Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali 
Prakashan, 1980); T. T. Poulose, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” in Perspective of India’s Nuclear Policy 
(Young Asia,  New Delhi, 1978); Raja Ramanna,  Years of Pilgrimage, an Autobiography (New 
Delhi: Viking, 1991); Narasimhiah Seshagiri,  The Bomb!: Fallout of India’s Nuclear Explosion 
(New Delhi: Vikas, 1975); Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand, 
1971).
15 George  Perkovich,  India’s  Nuclear  Bomb:  The  Impact  on  Global  Proliferation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press,  1999); Itty Abraham,  The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb:  
Science,  Secrecy  and the  Postcolonial  State (London and New York:  Zed  Books,  1998);  Raj 
Chengappa,  Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power (New 
Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000); Itty Abraham, South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic  
Publics  and the State in India and Pakistan (New York:  Indiana University Press,  2009);  Ian 
Anthony, Christer Ahlstrom, and Vitaly Fedchenko,  Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: What  
Future for the Nuclear Suppliers Group? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); B. Banerjee 
and N. Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2008); Ashok 
Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Merlati, Gli Stati Uniti tra India e Pakistan.
16 See the Indian press in  almost  all  its  entirety,  and also:  Awadhesh Coomar Sinha,  Politics  of  
Sikkim: a Sociological Study (Delhi: Thomson Press, 1975); Ranjan Gupta, “Sikkim: The Merger 
with India,” Asian Survey 15, no. 9 (September 1975): 786–798; P. Raghunadha Rao, Sikkim, the  
Story of Its Integration with India (New Delhi: Cosmo, 1978); the account provided by the Indian 
ex-Chief Executive of Sikkim: Brajbir Saran Das, The Sikkim Saga (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983); G. 
S.  Bajpai,  China’s  Shadow  Over  Sikkim:  The  Politics  of  Intimidation (New  Delhi:  Lancer 
Publishers, 1999).
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to  the  defeated  royal  family  of  Sikkim17,  which  instead  accuse  India  of  having 
arranged  1973 demonstrations,  and  later  forcibly  annexing Sikkim.  The  more 
impartial  and  authoritative  literature  mediates between  these  two  different 
interpretations, and states that India seized the opportunity of popular discontent to 
intervene in Sikkim and to annex it18.  However, no archival sources of any country 
have been  consulted  yet  on  this  topic,  leaving  therefore  space  in this  thesis  to 
formulate  a  new contribution.  The  last and  more general  literature  related to  the 
broader analysis of India's foreign policy during the government of Indira Gandhi is 
more heterogeneous. Although initially the academic contributions on India's foreign 
policy during the Seventies were few and largely focussed on the role played by 
Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi19,  works  on  this  topic later increased  and  became 
centred on India's rise as an emerging power in the international system20. However, 
a large  part  of  these new  works  have remained  mainly  related  to  the  specific 
influence  of  the  personality of  the  Prime Ministers on the  formulation of  India's 
foreign  policy21.  Although  some  of  them are  works  of  crucial  importance,  these 
contributions only partially consider other important perspectives, such as the nature 
of the external challenges to India's power existing in the Seventies, or the influence 
of the Cold War dynamics. Therefore, there is the need to cover these analytical gaps 
and to produce an interpretation of this period that will be more complete, and also 
based on the archival sources available today. 
As it clearly appears from this brief and concise analysis of the historiographical 
17 N. Ram, “Sikkim Story: Protection to Absorption,” Social Scientist 3, no. 2 (September 1974): 57; 
the account provided by the Chogyal’s wife: Hope Cooke, Time Change: An Autobiography (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim 
(Delhi: Vikas, 1984); the account provided by the ex-Dewan and Chogyal’s friend: Nari Rustomji, 
Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987); Jigme N. Kazi, Inside Sikkim,  
Against the Tide (Gangtok, Sikkim: Hill Media Publications, 1993).
18 Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: 
Pan Macmillan, 2011), 483–484.
19 Tharoor,  Reasons of State; Surjit Mansingh,  India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign  
Policy, 1966-1982 (London: Sage Publications, 1984).
20 See for example: A. D. D. Gordon,  India’s Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond 
(Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Stephen P. Cohen,  India: Emerging Power (Washington 
D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). See also these more general works: Francine R. Frankel,  
India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004: The Gradual Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Guha, India After Gandhi.
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context, in order to contribute to the further development of the literature knowledge, 
this  doctoral  research is  based on the analysis  of the recent  archival  declassified 
documents. Since the literature already considered in large measures the American 
archival sources, it has been decided to consult Indian, and British archives on the 
specific issue of India's foreign policy, which had not yet been consulted. This choice 
was taken on the consideration that India, in recent years, had begun to declassify 
documents from the Seventies, and that the archives of the United Kingdom could 
also provide an interesting account of the events posed at the centre of this thesis. As 
a  consequence,  the  Indian National  Archives in New Delhi were visited,  and the 
available declassified documents of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
collected22.  Moreover,  the Archives of the  Nehru Museum and Memorial Library  
(NMML),  which  store  private  documents  of  important  Indian  politicians,  were 
consulted. Here the papers of P. N. Haksar, who was the Principal Secretary of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi,  were identified as crucial  and thus collected23.  The MEA 
21 George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: Rand, 1992); 
James Manor, “Innovative Leadership in Modern India: M. K. Gandhi, J. Nehru and I. Gandhi,” in  
Innovative Leaders,  by Gabriel  Sheffer (New York: SUNY Press, 1993); Sumit Ganguly, “The 
Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” in Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing Office  
of Prime Minister in India, by James Manor and B. D. Dua (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 
1994), 138–160; George Kilpatrick Tanham, Kanti P. Bajpai, and Amitabh Mattoo, Securing India:  
Strategic Thought and Practice (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1996); Jaswant 
Singh, Defending India (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Jyotindra Nath Dixit, Makers of  
India’s  Foreign Policy:  Raja Ram Mohun Roy to  Yashwant Sinha (New Delhi:  HarperCollins, 
2004); K. Subrahmanyam and Arthur Monteiro, Shedding Shibboleths: India’s Evolving Strategic  
Outlook (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2005); Ashok Kapur, India: From Regional to World Power (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2006); Harish Kapur, Foreign Policies Of India’s Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer 
Publishers, 2009); Sumit Ganguly,  India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: 
OUP India, 2012).
22 MEA,  HI:  HI/121/3/70,HI/121/11/70,  HI/121/1/72-8,  and  HI/121/6/72;  MEA,  PP  (JS): 
PP/JS/4/8/70,  PP/JS/4/2/74,  PP/JS/3/3/74-I,  PP/JS/4/3/74,  and  PP/JS/4/1/75;  MEA,  AMS: 
WII/103/2/71,  WII/104/13/70,  WII/103/25/71,  WII/104/14/70,  WII/104/15/71,  WII/104/17/41, 
WII/104/26/71,  WII/109/1/71-II,  WII/109/13/71-V,  WII/109/13/71-VI,  WII/109/13/71-VII, 
WII/109/17/71,  WII/121/68/71,  WII/504/3/71,  WII/504/4/71,  WII/504/6/71,  WII/121/1/72, 
WII/103/4/73-I,  WII/104/1/73-II,  WII/109/1/73-I,  WII/307/2/73,WII/103/20/74-I WII/103/20/74-
II, WII/103/21/74, WII/103/27/74-I, WII/151/5/74, WII/504/2/74, WII/121/71/75, WII/162/36/75-
I, WII/162/36/75-II, WII/202/6/75, WII/202/8/75, WII/125/28/76, WII/125/29/76, WII/125/31/76, 
WII/125/37/76,  WII/104/10/77,  WII/104/28/77,  and  WII/504/3/77-II,  National  Archives,  New 
Delhi, India.
23 P. N. Haksar private papers (III instalment), Sub. F. N. 160, 164, 167, 170, 173, 174, 180, 181, 182, 
183, 184, 179, 180, 200, 203, 210, 217, 220, 227, 231, 234, 235, 238, 257, 258, 259, 269, 290, 
292, and (I&II instalment), Sub. F. N. 31, 55, 57, 58, Nehru Museum and Memorial Library, New  
Delhi, India.
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documents allowed the analysis of the relations India had with the superpowers and 
its regional neighbouring states through the exchange of communications between 
New  Delhi  and  the  various  Indian  Embassies  and  Consulates.  The  documents 
collected at the NMML allowed, instead, to better understand how decisions were 
taken by the Indian leadership. The latter demonstrated to be more revealing than the 
MEA ones, especially in relation to India's policy towards Sikkim since they disclose 
new important details about the events. On this latter topic of crucial importance the 
documents declassified by the British Government have also been collected at the 
National Archives at Kew Gardens, in London24. British documents25 also permitted 
to  enrich  the  analysis  of  the  1971  Indo-Pakistani  war,  and  of  India's  nuclear 
programme.
The research done in order to write this thesis has also been largely based on the 
analysis of the secondary sources available. Therefore, at the initial phase research 
was also done at the libraries of the University of Florence and of Turin in Italy. 
Later the vast secondary sources available at the libraries of the major Universities of 
London in the United Kingdom were consulted from September 2010 to September 
2011. Therefore, the library of the  School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), 
the Senate House Library, the British Library (BL) and that of the London School of  
Economics (LSE) were visited. At the British Library the author also carried out an 
analysis of the major Indian newspapers of the period, such as The Hindu (Madras), 
Economic Times,  The Times of India, and The Hindustan Times (Delhi). In London 
some  South  Asian  specialists  were  also  contacted  and  met,  such  as  Prof.  James 
Manor (School of Advanced Studies, University of London), Prof. Mushtaq Khan, Dr. 
Matthew  McCartney,  Dr.  Rochana  Bajpai,  Dr.  David  Taylor  and  Dr.  Rahul  Rao 
24 About Sikkim the documents collected about the political situation in Sikkim are: FCO 37/532, 
982, 1181, 1533-1534 and 1672-1674.
25 AB 48/1613; DO 133/ 200; FCO 37/755-756, 813, 819, 829, 835, 837, 843, 990, 996, 1093-1096, 
1166, 1196, 1281, 1285, 1287, 1290-1294, 1401, 1454, 1457, 1461, 1465-1466, 1474-1477, 1604-
1605, 1613-1618, 1623, 1633, 1714-1716, 1719, 1720, 1723-1727, 1734, 1737-1744, 1932, 1934-
1939,  1946-1947,  1949,  1972-1973,  1984,  2050  and 2056;  FCO 49/ 341-343,  and  717;  FCO 
51/249;  FCO 66/743-745 and  922-924;  FCO 82/367;  OD 27/309 and  387;  PREM 15/445;  T 
317/1643,  1738,  1912,  2074  and  2080;  T  354/314-315,  in  National  Archives,  Kew  Gardens, 
London, United Kingdom. 
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(SOAS),  and  Dr.  Rahul  Roy-Chaudhury (Fellow at  the  International  Institute  for  
Strategic Studies – IISS).  From October to December 2011 the research was then 
carried on in India at the major libraries of New Delhi, such as the libraries of the 
Jawaharlal  Nehru  University  (JNU),  Delhi  University,  Institute  of  Peace  and  
Conflict  Studies (IPCS),  and  Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA).  In 
New Delhi the author of this thesis also carried out some interviews to those who, in 
the Seventies, held positions of importance in the political, intellectual and military 
sphere in India. Thus, for example, B. N. Tandon, who had worked in the Indian 
bureaucracy in the Prime Minister's Office in close contact with the Prime Minister, 
was interviewed. Some retired military officers,  such as Gen. Ashok Mehta,  Gen 
Jacob, and Gen. Shergill, were also met. Similarly, diplomats like M. K. Rasgotra 
(former  Deputy  Ambassador  in  Washington,  1969-1972,  and  London  High 
Commissioner, 1972-1973), and Salman Haidar (Foreign Secretary, 1995-1997) were 
consulted.  Also intellectuals working as journalists  or editors at  the major Indian 
national newspapers in the Seventies, such as Subhash Chakravarty (The Times of  
India), K. K. Katyal (The Hindu), Inder Malhotra (The Times of India and The Indian 
Express), Kuldip Nayar (The Indian Express) were also interviewed, together with 
contemporary political  analysts  like  Subhash Agrawal  (India  Focus),  and  Sanjay 
Baru (IISS). Lastly university professors like Prof. P. R. Chari (former civil servants 
at  the  Ministry of  Defence  in  the  Seventies,  by then  a  research  professor  at  the 
Institute of Peaceful and Conflict Studies – IPCS), Dr. Siddharth Mallavarapu and 
Prof. Sucheta Mahajan (JNU), Prof. Ashis Nandy (Senior Professor at the Centre for  
the  Study  of  Developing Societies  –  CSDS),  Prof.  Eswaran Sindharan  (Academic 
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India  
–  UPIASI),  Prof.  Mahendra  Singh,  Prof.  Achik  Vanaik  and  Dr.  Rekha  Saxena 
(University of Delhi), Dr. V. Krishnappa, Dr. Smruti Pattnaik, Dr. Rajiv Nayan and 
Dr. Vinod A. Kumar (research fellows at the  IDSA), and Prof. Bharat Wariavwalla 
were consulted. These interviews were useful since the interviewees generally had 
detailed and fresh recollections of that historical period. Therefore, they helped the 
author of this thesis to understand how the decision-making process was organized in 
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Indira Gandhi's government, and what are the perceptions and evaluations shared by 
the Indian political and intellectual elite were with reference to the events analysed in 
this thesis. 
The research developed in this thesis has allowed the author to provide some 
interesting results in relation to the literature consulted, which are illustrated in each 
chapter of the thesis, and also restated in the conclusion. The first one is that this 
thesis, analysing 1971 events, demonstrates that India decided to take a supporting 
position  towards  the  East  Pakistan  rebels  from March  1971,  when  the  civil  war 
began. It also re-dimensions the importance given by the literature regarding Nixon's 
announcement of Kissinger’s trip to China in July 1971 in triggering the Indo-Soviet 
alliance, arguing that the decision by that time had been already taken and that this 
news only confirmed the necessity to continue on that path26. The consultation of 
Indian  archives  indeed  had allowed the  discovery that  the  Indian  leadership  had 
considered signing a treaty with the Soviets even before Nixon's announcement. In 
fact,  to  solve  the  complex  situation  created  in  East  and  West  Bengal  India  had 
realized that a  war had to take place,  and that a treaty with the Soviet was thus 
necessary  to  avoid  the  risk  of  a  UN  intervention.  In  relation  to  India's  nuclear 
program this thesis again permits the re-dimension the United States' role recognised 
by some literature27 in influencing India's nuclear program and its decision to explode 
a bomb in 1974. The analysis developed here suggests instead that the rivalry with 
China was the more realistic and far more important factor that led India to take the 
decision to develop the technology necessary to explode a nuclear device. Moreover, 
in  relation  to  Sikkim's  merger  with India  in  1975,  the research developed in  the 
following pages allows one to cast serious doubts about the official version provided 
by India which depicts the merger as a spontaneous and democratic choice made by 
26 See for example the literature cited in note 13.
27 See for example: Dennis Kux,  India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993); Merlati, Gli Stati Uniti tra India e Pakistan. Similarly also 
some press articles tends to overrate the importance of Nixon’s tilt towards Pakistan and China in  
leading  India  to  its  first  nuclear  test  misinterpreting  the  online  available  American  archival 
sources. See for example: “Nixon’s tilt towards Pak, China led India to 1st nuclear test” in Times  
of  India,  6  December  2012,  available  at:  http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-12-
06/us/30481315_1_nuclear-test-nuclear-device-nuclear-capability.
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the people of Sikkim. The documentation consulted at the Indian and British archives 
indeed reinforces those critical interpretations that talk of New Delhi's manipulation 
of the events. Finally, in a much broader manner this doctoral thesis also allows the 
identification of those elements that mainly influenced India's foreign policy during 
the period analysed (1971-1977). The more influential factor appears to be the Sino-
Indian rivalry. It had indeed led India to adopt a plan of military modernization after 
the defeat inflicted by the Chinese in the 1962 war, and to formulate a project for the  
explosion of the first Indian nuclear device (even if only for peaceful purposes) in the 
wake of the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. External factors were also of 
crucial  importance,  such  as  the  East  Pakistan  crisis,  and  the  opposition  of  the 
Sikkimese royal family in favouring a democratization of the political institutions of 
the state. These events created the opportunity for India to intervene in these issues, 
to  exploit  the  weaknesses  of  its  neighbouring  states,  and  to  take  advantage  by 
exercising its military and political power. Also the new international developments 
and  Cold  War  dynamics  had  their  importance,  allowing  India  to  balance  the 
Pakistani-Chinese-American  axis,  which  would  have  meant  real  isolationism  for 
New Delhi, through the alliance with the Soviet Union in 1971. Lastly, the small 
political group of advisers that circled the Prime Minister played a crucial role in 
formulating  India's  foreign  policy,  which  also  clearly and directly  influenced the 
events due to the highly centralised and authoritarian decision-making process. 
The analysis  of this  thesis is  organised  in four chapters  in  which  events  are 
evaluated in a chronological order. Therefore, the first introductory chapter presents 
the  domestic and foreign situation that the new government of Indira Gandhi  was 
facing in 1971. The aim of this chapter is to help the reader to contextualise India's 
political  dynamics in  a historical perspective,  highlighting the challenges and the 
opportunities that the new government had to deal with in 1971. The second chapter 
analyses the East Pakistan crisis that ended with a war between India and Pakistan. 
The aim is to underline the role played by India in the events since by, winning the 
war and resolving the East Pakistani crisis in its favour, India demonstrated its new 
political  and  military power within  South  Asia  and  beyond.  The  third  chapter 
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focusses on the Indian nuclear programme and on New Delhi's decision to explode 
the first Indian nuclear device in 1974. The aim here is to evaluate the reasons behind 
which  led  New  Delhi  making that  choice.  Although  defined  as  peaceful,  the 
explosion was a clear demonstration of power both at the regional and at the global 
level that triggered several punitive actions against India. The fourth chapter analyses 
the last important event of the Seventies for India's foreign policy, the 1975 merger 
of Sikkim with India. Again the aim of the chapter is to focus on the role played by 
New Delhi  in such an event.  From being an autonomous protectorate of India  but 
with some  independence  ambitions  and  situated along  the  most  important 
communication route with China, Sikkim was annexed by India in a short lapse of 
time without anyone in the international community seriously questioning the event. 
Annexing the small Himalayan state, India again indeed demonstrated to all the other 
small neighbouring states of the region its major military and political power. Finally 
the  conclusion aims to  resume  the analysis  developed in  all  four chapters  and  to 
suggest  some  conclusive  remarks  about  India's  rise  as  a regional  power  in  the 
Seventies. An evaluation of the innovative contributions formulated by this thesis in 
relation to the literature, and of its limits, is also proposed.
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  FIRST CHAPTER: 
THE CONGRESS' RISE TO POWER AND INDIA'S 
POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
  1. Introduction
The study of a country's foreign policy is always a walk on slippery terrain, since 
both the international constraints that influence the state's behaviour, and the roots of 
the domestic policies undertaken must be taken into consideration. The analysis of 
India's foreign policy during Indira Gandhi’s second government, such as all other 
studies of this  type,  requires a precise political  and historical contextualisation in 
order  to  be  carried  out  correctly.  This  introductory  chapter  will  sketch  out  the 
political  situation,  including  its  constraints  and  opportunities,  facing  the  Indian 
government in 1971. The goal is to draw a broad picture that will allow a focus upon 
specific themes in the following chapters. Therefore in this chapter, the eagle eye 
view will  first span across the electoral victory of the Congress party and on the 
domestic political situation. The Congress, gaining an absolute majority in the Lok 
Sabha (the lower chamber of the Parliament), installed itself in a powerful position 
strong enough to freely determine both the domestic politics and the national foreign 
policy. However, the new government suffered because of some weaknesses that will 
be also highlighted in this chapter through a brief historical presentation of India's 
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domestic  political  evolutions  from 1965.  In  the  second  part  of  this  chapter,  the 
international situation India was facing in 1971 will then be presented. The growing 
collaboration with the Soviet Union will be also analysed as the result, firstly, of the 
Cold  War  dynamics  that  were  shaking  the  political  equilibrium  in  Asia  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Seventies  (e.g.  the  Sino-Soviet  split  and  the  Sino-American 
rapprochement); and secondly, of the specific challenges and opportunities India was 
facing in its relations with its regional rivals.
  2. The new Congress government and the domestic situation
Led by Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, the Indian National Congress 
won the 1971 elections with the largest majority since 1962. It obtained 43,05% of 
the votes and 350 seats out of the 518 in the Lok Sabha. Nehru's daughter emerged as 
the  first  national  leader,  and  as  the  real  inheritor  of  the  historical  Congress' 
leadership,  which  had  led  the  fight  for  Independence  against  British  rule1.  The 
landslide  victory  put  the  word  end  to  the  rivalry  between  the  two  parties2 that 
emerged from the  division  of  Congress  in  1969,  which,  still  in  1971,  were both 
claiming to be the real heir of the historical Indian party. The Congress led by Indira 
Gandhi harshly defeated the opposition organized in a large anti-Congress coalition 
(the so called Fourth Party Alliance), and freed itself from the necessity to rely on 
the support of other parties3. The communist parties in the 1971 elections, despite 
their positive electoral performance, indeed lost the strategic political position they 
1 David H. Bayley, “India: War and Political Assertion,” Asian Survey 12, no. 2 (February 1972): 87.
2 Congress (R – for Revisionist, later called I – for Indira) led by Indira Gandhi, and the Congress 
(O – for Organisation) led by Moraji Desai, a conservative senior politician. To simplify naming 
conventions in this document, the Indira Gandhi – led Congress Indira Gandhi will be referred  
simply as “Congress”.
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had been detaining for two years4. In 1969 the split in Congress had indeed left an 
Indira Gandhi-headed national government without the numbers to control the Lok 
Sabha, and without any option but to resort to the external support from other parties 
in  order  to  continue  governing.  The  decision  to  go  to  the  polls  was  taken  in 
December 1970 by Indira Gandhi and her advisers, fourteen months before the end 
of the governmental regular term, with the precise aim to gain broader support from 
the people that would allow the Congress to rule in autonomy. The success of this 
strategy was confirmed by the electoral results that ensured the Congress an absolute 
majority. Therefore, the new government took office in a strong position that seemed 
to free up its hands to govern and implement the policies it promised during the 
electoral campaign.
In spite of its large parliamentary majority, the Congress government was faced 
with some weaknesses. The first  naturally came from the fact that it  won with a 
political program of radical social changes that was difficult to be put into practice. 
There was a legitimate  belief  that such programme had been put in place  to gain 
electoral  support  rather  than  promote  redistributive  policies.  This  perception  was 
reinforced by the fact that among the groups that gave their support to the Congress 
in  the  1971 elections,  there were also some sections  of  Indian society that  were 
clearly not interested in the radical social reforms it promised. The second challenge 
was represented by the fact that the new government was an example of a weak 
3 The coalition regrouped the three Indian “right” parties, the Congress (O), the Swatantra Party (a 
classical political liberal party founded in 1959 by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari and N. G. Ranga),  
and the Jan Sangh (a right-wing Hindu party founded in 1951, later succeeded by the Bharatiya 
Janata Party – BJP), together with the only left party to directly run against the Congress, the  
Samyukta Socialist Party – SSP (a socialist party born by a split with the Praja Socialist Party – 
PSP in 1964, which later  reunited to the PSP in 1972).  At the polls,  Congress  (O) suffered a  
significant loss, gaining less than 10% of the votes and passing from 65 to only 16 seats. The  
Swatantra and the SSP similarly registered a poor result; the Jan Sangh contained the losses and 
passed from 35 seats to 22. Bayley, “India.”
4 Among the left parties, the Communist Party (Marxist) – CPM – became the second national party 
in  the  Lok  Sabha  with  its  25  seats,  though  its  base  was  just  limited  to  West  Bengal.  The 
Communist Party of India (CPI) confirmed its previous position, winning 23 seats and losing just 
one, but its support was secured just in those areas where it was not opposed by the Congress W.  
H. Morris-Jones, “India Elects for Change -- and Stability,” Asian Survey 11, no. 8 (August 1971): 
735–737 The existence in India of the Communist Party (Marxist) – CPM – and of the Communist  
Party of India (CPI) reflects the ideological division then existing in the international communist 
movement: the CPM supported China, the CPI the Soviet Union.
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party, the Congress with its frail structure and organization. It had emerged just two 
years  before  from a  split  that,  although  was  formally  justified  as  the  results  of 
ideological divergences, was principally due to the struggle for power between Mrs. 
Gandhi and the old guard of the party. An additional weakness was represented by 
the fact  that,  since Indira Gandhi rose to power in 1966, the Congress had been 
interested in the centralisation of power that further undermined its organizational 
strength and the representative character of the party. The 1971 elections witnessed a 
further acceleration of this  process caused by Indira Gandhi’s decision to  de-link 
national  elections  from  the  state  ones5,  and  to  personally  supervise  the  party 
candidate selections. For understanding this situation it is necessary to contextualise 
the 1971 elections and to briefly consider the political events that took place from 
1965.
The Indian National Congress had been the main actor on the stage of the Indian 
“dominant party system” since independence in 19476. However, the party’s political 
strength  and  its  solidity  began  to  decline  at  the  beginning  of  the  Sixties  when 
growing  frictions  emerged  within  the  party  between  a  group  of  conservative 
politicians  and  the  congressmen  loyal  to  Nehru.  In  1963  Nehru’s  government 
suffered  its  first  no-confidence  motion  in  Parliament7,  leading  to  what  was  then 
called the  Kamaraj Plan: a political purge carried out at the highest offices of the 
5 From Independence until 1967 national and state elections had been held at the same time. The 
decision made by Indira Gandhi to go to the polls in 1970, anticipating the scheduled elections by 
almost one year, broke the mechanism. In 1971 in just 3 states the elections were held together 
with the national one: West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Orissa. This happened because West Bengal 
was under President’s Rule and elections had to be held, and the chief minister of Tamil Nadu 
dismissed its government in parallel to Mrs. Gandhi’s national decision to anticipate elections at 
the  national  level.  Francine  R.  Frankel,  India’s  Political  Economy,  1947-2004:  The  Gradual  
Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 457–459.
6 Although this system could appear undemocratic in the eyes of a person unfamiliar with Indian 
politics,  it  is interesting to note that, according to literature,  India’s party system in 1964 was  
described  as  one  where  “political  competition  was  internalized  and  carried  on  within  the 
Congress” and where “... an intricate structure of conflict, mediation, bargaining, and consensus 
was  developed  within  the  framework  of  Congress”,  assuring  a  certain  level  of  democratic 
confrontation. Rajni Kothari, “The Congress ‘System’ in India,” Asian Survey 4, no. 12 (December 
1964): 1163. 
7 The non-confidence motion was, on one hand, the visible result of the emerging of a growing 
opposition within the party on the socio-economic policies implemented in the agrarian sector 
during  the  first  three  five-year  plans  by  the  Indian  governments.  Frankel,  India’s  Political  
Economy, 1947-2004, 223.
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government8. The following year, the death of Nehru – considered the father of the  
nation –  left  the  Congress,  and  the  entire  Indian  political  system in  a  dramatic 
political  vacuum, opening the scene for a direct fight for the political  succession 
between  the  group  faithful  to  Nehru,  called  the  Syndicate,  and  the  conservative 
wing9. The purge fostered by the Kamaraj plan had put the Syndicate in a dominant  
position,  allowing it  to select as Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri,  a politician 
close to  Nehru’s  group. Following Shastri’s  sudden death in  1966, the Syndicate 
decided to replace the deceased Prime Minister with Indira Gandhi in order to oppose 
the emergence of a figure from the conservative wing again10. Nehru's daughter was 
perceived as  a weak political  figure,  easy to  manipulate11,  but  useful  for  gaining 
consensus because of her family affiliation to Nehru could provide some means of 
continuity with Congress' politics.
During these years the political struggle within the Congress was fought more on 
personal  rivalry,  than  on  ideological  bases.  Clear  evidence  of  this  can  be 
demonstrated by the fact that both the Shastri (1964-1966) and Indira Gandhi (1966-
1967) governments, which opposed the conservative and liberal position, according 
to Frankel, took “exactly the opposite route that the one chartered by Nehru in the 
last years of his life” in the field of planned economic policies, promoting liberal 
policies,  and  moving  away  from the  socialist  Nehruvian  path12.  The  two  Prime 
8 The  Kamaraj  plan,  exhorting  first-ranking  ministers  and  the  Chief  Ministers  to  leave  their 
positions of government for taking care of the revitalization of the party organization, was the 
evidence that an internal struggle was already on going in the Congress party. The plan had been  
conceived  in  the  wake of  the  negative  by-elections  results  of  the  previous  spring in  order  to 
contrast  the  growing internal  dissent.  Partha  Chatterjee,  State  and Politics  in  India (Calcutta: 
Oxford University Press,  1998),  14. Its  aim was to favour the formation, around the figure of 
Kamaraj, who later became the Chief Minister of Madras and the party president of the Congress  
of a group of politicians loyal to the Prime Minister Nehru. Accepted by the All India Congress 
Conference in August 1963, the plan was hence the instrument with which the Prime Minister 
purged its Cabinet, and the state level politics from his most powerful conservative critics. Frankel,  
India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 229. 
9 Chatterjee, State and Politics in India, 22.
10 Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: 
Pan Macmillan, 2011), 404.
11 She started her political career in 1955 when she inducted in the Congress Working Committee, 
the  Central  Election  Committee,  and  the  Central  Parliamentary Board.  In  1959 she  was  also 
elected Congress president, although she did not have any independent base of power either inside 
or outside the party.
12 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 246.
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Ministers  faced  a  serious  economic  crisis,  linked  to  the  scarce  agricultural 
production13 and to the dramatic food crisis of 1965-6614. Responding to the pressure 
from the aid-donors, like the World Bank (WB), and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), they indeed recurred to a new set of “technocratic” policies, later called the 
Green  Revolution15,  without  associating  them  with  any  social  reforms  aimed  to 
reduce  rural  economic  imbalances. Moreover  in  1966,  in  order  to  immediately 
contrast  the  deepening  economic  crisis  that,  in  some  parts  of  the  country,  had 
triggered a situation of famine, the Indian government turned to the United States 
asking for a further increase in their assistance under the existing PL480 legislation. 
The  American  aid  allowed  New  Delhi  to  weather  the  crisis16,  but  it  attached 
conditions to it, such as the devaluation of the currency, and the liberalisation of the 
trade regime that were in harsh contrast with the Nehruvian policies undertaken until 
that time17.
13 The  crisis  was  probably  the  consequence  of  the  fact  that  the  agrarian  production  had  been 
neglected during the first two Five-Year economic plans, due to the fact that public investments 
had gone largely to sustain the industrial sector. For further information on this topic see: Jagdish 
N.  Bhagwati,  India  in  Transition:  Freeing  the  Economy (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1993); 
Sukhamoy Chakravarty,  “On the Question of Home Market and Prospects for Indian Growth,” 
Economic  and Political  Weekly 14,  no.  30/32  (August  1,  1979):  1229–1242;  Frankel,  India’s  
Political  Economy,  1947-2004;  Stuart  Corbridge  and  Dr  John  Harriss,  Reinventing  India:  
Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy (London: John Wiley & Sons, 2000); 
Matthew McCartney,  India: The Political Economy of Growth, Stagnation and the State, 1951-
2007 (London: Routledge, 2009).
14 Two consecutive years of severe drought indeed caused a serious shortage of food that in turn  
resulted in a rise in food prices of 32%, which dramatically hit the poor sections of Indian society, 
worsening the already difficult economic situation. The national GDP annual growth diminished 
by 4-5%, while the  food crisis  also highlighted  the vulnerability of  the Indian economy,  still  
heavily dependent on foreign import of food grains. Frankel,  India’s Political Economy, 1947-
2004, 293.
15 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991 (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1993), 244.
16 India imported 15 million tonnes of American wheat during both 1965 and 1966. Guha, India 
After Gandhi, 409.
17 Sumit Ganguly, “The Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” in Nehru to the Nineties:  
The Changing Office of Prime Minister in India, by James Manor and B. D. Dua (London: C. 
Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1994), 147; although Johnson promised annual commitments, during 1966 
the release of the food aid was made on a monthly base,  annoying and frustrating the Indian  
government. Kux,  India and the United States,  255–259. Moreover,  the help would have been 
contingent  to  the  ending  of  India’s  criticism  over  the  American  position  in  Vietnam,  to  the 
devaluation of  the over-rated Indian rupees,  to the adoption of  some policies  to boost  India’s 
economy like the opening of the domestic market to foreign competition, and the continuation of 
the agrarian reforms already initiated by Shastri’s government.
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It is possible to argue that the specific economic crisis that hit India in the second 
half of the Sixties and the impact of those policies implemented by the Congress to 
face it in 1965-66 partially favoured the return of the Congress toward left.  They 
indeed exacerbated the socio-economic tensions already present in the Indian society, 
and enhanced the general awakening of the Indian society, already triggered by the 
modest but constant economic growth India had experienced since Independence18. 
Social  aspirations  and  interests  for  political  spoils  grew  among  all  ranks  of  the 
society that became more active and organised. Moreover, growing disparities, food 
shortages, and rising prices degraded the political stability achieved. The impact of 
the  Green Revolution stressed some existing inequalities in the Indian society and 
enhanced the mobilization strategies of some groups19. In order not to damage the 
interests of the landed groups, which were the mainstay of the Congress system of 
power, the new agricultural strategy did not dictate any redistribution of land to the 
poor, but only provided incentives and subsidies for technical innovation in some 
specific areas and productions. Therefore, although agricultural production increased 
overall soon after these policies were introduced20, only the large and middle sized 
landowning groups benefited from them21. The growing disparities in the countryside 
fuelled social aspirations and popular discontent among those who remained at the 
edge of development. Therefore, sections of the population, normally quiescent, were 
mobilized  along  several  and  different  regional,  communal,  socio-economic,  and 
ethnic  cleavages.  In  addition,  the  devaluation  of  the  rupee,  decided  by  Indira 
Gandhi's government in 1966 to face the growing deficit of the Indian balance of 
payment  and to  answer  the  American  pressures,  worsened  the  domestic  political 
situation because it had a catastrophic impact on the inflation rates and on the prices 
18 Since Independence and up to Sixties the GDP grew at  a rate of 3,5%, which was significant 
especially if compared with the negative growth registered during the British rule. McCartney, 
India.
19 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 336.
20 World Bank data registered a percentage increase in agricultural production of 6 and 7% during the 
1969 and 1970 years. Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
21 Frankel,  India’s  Political  Economy,  1947-2004,  275–276.  The  majority  of  the  farmers  lagged 
behind and, according to some studies, the overall rate of people under the poverty line remained 
unchanged.
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of  first  necessity  goods. This  damaged  the  political  position  of  the  Congress 
government,  and  the  opposition  parties  benefited  from the  popular  discontent  in 
several states: communist parties saw their consensus growing, as well as regional 
and communal parties22. This resulted in the Congress' worst performance ever in the 
1967 national  and state  elections:  not  only was  the  Congress  returned to  central 
power with a much reduced majority, but it lost to the coalitions of opposition parties 
representing  eight  Indian  states23.  Also,  the  frequency  of  defections  from  the 
Congress party reached a new and impressive level24. In a situation where growing 
sections  of  the  Indian  society  were  asking  for  more  redistributive  policies,  and 
opposition  parties  were  augmenting  their  consensus,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
Indira Gandhi led government decided to turn to leftist policies to contrast this trend, 
and to re-gain popular consensus soon after the 1967 elections. The Indian Prime 
Minister started depicting herself as a socialist, and adopting a much more leftist and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric that anything she had ever used before25.
However, it has also to be noted that Indira Gandhi’s decision to politically move 
towards the left was also functional to the struggle which had developed within the 
Congress,  soon after  Mrs.  Gandhi’s  appointment  as  Prime Minister  in  1966,  and 
triggered by the Prime Minister’s unwillingness to follow the Syndicate’s political 
indications.  This  struggle  had  taken  the  shape  of  a  generational  rivalry  between 
Indira Gandhi and the Syndicate, which from that moment began to represent the old 
22 North-East  border  regional  groups,  tribes,  and  minorities  became  also  organised,  while  the 
communal oriented Jan Sangh started to gain consensus among the Hindus majority thanks to its 
specific cultural and political programmes. On this topic see, for example: Ibid., 341–387; Guha, 
India After Gandhi, 405–408.
23 Guha, India After Gandhi, 416–437.
24 In the entire 1957-1966 decade, the defections of politicians from one party to another were 542; 
however in 1967 they shot up to 438. Chatterjee, State and Politics in India, 17 It is important to 
note that  the growth of  the regional  parties  was not  only a sign of  the new weakness  of  the  
Congress, but also of the emergence of a more pluralistic political system in India. However, 1967  
did not mark the end of the Congress dominance since regional parties were not able to produce a  
real organizational alternative at the national level, and the governments they formed did not last. 
After several changes in the composition of the coalitions governing 10 of the 17 states in which 
the  Indian  Union was  then  divided,  President’s  rule  was  imposed in  5 states  (Haryana,  West  
Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab).
25 Zoya Hasan, “The Prime Minister and the Left,” in Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing Office of  
Prime Minister in India, by B. D. Dua and James Manor (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers,  
1994), 216.
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guard of the Congress. The rivalry was further enhanced by the 1967 election results 
due to the fact that the Syndicate representatives within the Congress registered a 
clear set back, as many of them, including Kamaraj, the acknowledged leader of the 
group, lost his seat at the Parliament. Indira Gandhi, on the contrary, strengthened her 
political position as, for the first time, she rallied in a constituency, winning, and 
emerged as the national leader of the party, shaking the unstable equilibrium existing 
within  the  Congress26.  Feeling  strong as  a  result  of  her  personal  electoral  result, 
Indira Gandhi continued in her policy of asserting her autonomy vis-à-vis the  old 
guard, which she had already undertaken during her first term 27. The old guard of the 
party  promptly  reacted  by  promoting  a  rapprochement  with  the  conservative 
members of the Congress. Indira Gandhi, in turn, responded by gradually aligning 
herself with the Socialist Forum, an internal organization of the Congress historically 
regrouping long standing socialists and Gandhians, but dominated at that time by a 
group of young radicals28. In doing that, Indira Gandhi tried to build her personal 
base of power, and to gain support among the people. In this way the generational 
rivalry  between  her  and  the  Syndicate,  the  old-guard  of  the  Congress,  was 
transformed into an ideological struggle.
This resulted in several political advantages for Indira Gandhi. On one hand, this 
political shift allowed Nehru’s daughter to reassert herself as the progressive leader 
within  the  Congress.  On  the  other,  this  political  manoeuvre  allowed  the  Prime 
Minister to repair the damaged political relations with the left parties, and to enlarge 
her  political  support  inside  the  Parliament.  All  these  evolutions  made  Nehru's 
daughter strong enough to declare an open war to the Syndicate which eventually 
caused the Congress to split in 1969. The Congress led by Indira Gandhi remained 
indeed in power, while the other wing of the Congress, led by the Syndicate and the 
conservatives, joined the opposition. In order to keep the majority of the Parliament 
and  to  be  able  to  continue  governing,  Indira  Gandhi’s  Congress  turned  to  other 
26 Katherine Frank,  Indira: The Life of  Indira Nehru Gandhi (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2010), 305–6.
27 Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Hodder, 2010), 52.
28 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 404.
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parties, receiving the support of both the Communist Party of India (CPI), willing to 
share  the  power  with  the  new  socialist Congress,  and  the  Dravida  Munnetra 
Kazhagam  (DMK),  a  regional  Tamil  party  founded  in  1949  in  the  Madras 
constituency. In this way, Indira Gandhi’s government remained in power for around 
one year, during which it was able to carry out some of its highly publicised social 
project reforms: the promotion of some special credit  policies in the wave of the 
nationalisation of the 14 larger commercial Indian banks done in July 1969, the legal 
battle for the abolition of the privy pursues29, and the imposition of the state control 
over  larger  private  industries30.  In  December 1970,  Indira  Gandhi  called for new 
elections. Campaigning with a political program of radical social reforms and with 
the  political  slogan  “Garibi  Hatao  –  Let  us  get  rid  of  poverty”  Mrs.  Gandhi's 
Congress  won the  support  of  the  masses  and gained an absolute  majority in  the 
Parliament31.
With this broad picture clear in mind, it is now easier to comprehend what were 
the factors challenging the new Congress government, which emerged from the 1971 
elections.  The observation that the  shift  to the left  of the Congress was probably 
more  of  a  strategic  calculation  used  to  win  the  elections  can  now  be  better 
appreciated. Legitimate doubts emerge about her and her party’s new commitment 
towards socialist politics. Moreover, the fact that the 1969 split was not triggered by 
a mobilization from the lower ranks of the party,  proves the unimportance of the 
ideological factors in that political process32. The shift towards the left could be done 
to seize the opportunity to enlarge the Congress support among the masses, which 
were asking for redistributive policies, and to win the power struggle of Mrs. Gandhi 
against  the old guard of the party.  The fact that the reforms implemented by the 
Indira  Gandhi  government  in  the  years  1967-1970  were  not  so  radical  as  they 
29 These  were  the  allowances  that  the  Indian  government  had  offered  to  the  princes  after 
Independence, in exchange for the merging of their states in the Republic of India.
30 This  was  done  in  1969  through  the  promulgation  of  the  Monopolies  and  Restrictive  Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP), a law that re-established the obligation for 41 larger national industries to 
obtain state licenses to carry on with their economic activities.
31 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 638.
32 Michelguglielmo Torri, Storia dell’India (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2007), 670.
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appeared  further  reinforces  the  doubts  about  the  real  political  intentions  of  the 
Congress  government.  The  socialist  policies  implemented  by  Indira  Gandhi's 
government until 1971, such as the nationalisation of the banks, the credit politics, 
the  abolition  of  privy  purses,  and  the  imposition  of  the  control  over  private 
industries, indeed did not damage the interests of those influential groups that had 
supported  the  Congress  since  Independence  –  such  as  the  middle  and  large 
landowners and entrepreneurs, in spite of their  socialist  appearance33.  Despite the 
new aggressive  and populist  rhetoric,  it  is  therefore credible  to  argue  that  Indira 
Gandhi in 1971 had not lost the support of the historical social base of the Congress 
party34.  However,  using  the  new  socialist  image  to  appear  “as  the  party  of  the 
progress, against an alliance of reaction” the Congress also gained the votes of the 
poor, the landless and the lower castes35. The fact that the interests of those groups 
that actually supported the Congress in 1971 were not uniform, but rather in conflict 
among each other,  casts  further doubts on the possibility of the new government 
maintaining its electoral promises of social change.
The second aspect that challenged the ability of the new government to carry out 
its programme of social change was the process of growing centralisation of power, 
on-going  within  the  Congress  since  Mrs.  Gandhi's  rise  to  power  in  1966.  The 
concentration of power in the hands of the Congress leader indeed contributed to 
eroding the party structure and organization,  making it  less  able  to  represent  the 
Indian society and to respond to its needs36. The same Mrs. Gandhi conduit of the 
1971 electoral campaign, which decided to de-link national elections from the state 
ones,  and  to  centralise  the  selections  of  party  candidates,  further  reinforce  that 
33 Michelguglielmo  Torri,  “Factional  Politics  and  Economic  Policy:  The  Case  of  India’s  Bank 
Nationalization,” Asian Survey 15, no. 12 (December 1975): 1090–1096; Torri,  Storia dell’India, 
667–679.
34 Although the Congress traditionally represented a vast range of interests within the Indian society,  
in the party some interests were more important than others. James Manor, “Anomie in Indian 
Politics: Origins and Potential Wider Impact,” Economic and Political Weekly 18, no. 19/21 (May 
1, 1983): 725–726; the urban middle classes and the dominant rural groups were over-represented, 
since their support was indeed a key element in strengthening the political power of the Congress 
at  the  national  and  the  local  level.  Frankel,  India’s  Political  Economy,  1947-2004,  28–70. 
Accordingly, the need to obtain their support had directly influenced the political choices of the 
party since Independence.
35 Guha, India After Gandhi, 446.
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process weakening the organizational strength of the party. The fact that the fifth Lok 
Sabha elections were indeed the first ones in the Indian history de-linked by the state 
elections explains the adoption of a populist appeal by all the contestant parties. This 
specific aspect made indeed all the political parties suddenly less dependent from the 
state level politics, personalities, issues and structures for their electoral campaign37. 
As a result, during the electoral campaign the Prime Minister’s image was directly 
used by Congress to win votes from the population of the vast Indian rural areas, 
instead of the party organization itself with its local leaders. Its entire campaign was 
thus organized to trigger an emotional wave: for example through the extensive use 
of posters and political  propaganda in  both large urban centres  and villages,  and 
through Indira Gandhi's electoral tour, impressive in its length (41 days) and numbers 
of public meetings38. Transformed into the symbol of a generational change, Indira 
Gandhi's figure enabled her Congress party to gain the support of the poorest classes, 
and of the youth39. The same electoral slogan adopted by the opposition – “Garibi 
Indira/get rid of Indira” – perfectly represents the high level of personalisation of the 
political campaign40. Only running at the national level allowed Mrs. Gandhi to by-
36 See for example: Stanley A. Kochanek, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid: The New Congress,” in Indira 
Gandhi’s India: a Political System Reappraised, by Henry Cowles Hart (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1976), 95–102; Atul Kohli,  Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1991);  Hasan,  “The  Prime  Minister  and  the  Left”; 
Manor, “Anomie in Indian Politics.”
37 Rajni  Kothari,  “Voting  in  India:  Competitive  Politics  and  Electoral  Change:  Introduction,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 3/5 (January 1, 1971): 229–230.
38 Romesh Thapar, “The Election Scene,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 9 (February 27, 
1971): 514.
39 The Statesman, 26th February 1971.
40 The game of bargaining with the alliances further complicated the capabilities of the opposition to 
run a convincing political campaign, resulting in direct opposition to Indira Gandhi as a person, 
which further contributed to the personalisation of politics. In addition, Indira Gandhi’s decision to 
go to the polls in 1971 caught the opposition parties by surprise, though they had been asking for  
elections since 1969, when the split of the Congress occurred. Moreover, the short notice given for 
the electoral campaigns (two months), gave yet another advantage to the party in power, thanks to 
its greater organizational and financial capability to rapidly organise its electoral campaign. The 
1971  elections  were  characterised  by  probably  the  most  expensive  electoral  campaign  since 
independence (The Statesman, 9th March 1971). It was reported that the Congress spent more than 
all the other parties put together and that, facilitated by its advantageous position in power, abused 
of  the  government  machinery  and  facilities,  even  recurring  to  illegal  methods,  like  offering 
industrial licences in exchange for votes. Morris-Jones, “India Elects for Change -- and Stability,” 
723–724.
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pass the hostile intermediate structure of the party, which at the state and local levels 
was still independent from the control of the new leadership which emerged from the 
1969 split,  and to centralise the power into her hands41. Moreover,  the short time 
given for the electoral campaigns further favoured the centralization of power within 
the  Congress.  In  fact,  the  party’s  machine  did  not  work  properly  during  the 
candidates’ selections, and the selection was rather made from above, personally by 
Indira Gandhi42. This dramatically damaged the party’s organization and structure, 
especially at the grass roots and regional levels, since mechanisms different from the 
representational  ones  were  adopted.  Several  explanations  had  been  provided  to 
explain this phenomenon: some relate it to Mrs. Gandhi’s personality, others to the 
same  organizational  crisis  of  the  Congress  party,  others  to  the  socio-economic 
context that facilitated the rise of a strong man in politics43. What is important here is 
to  highlight  that  in  the  short  run,  these  centralising  manoeuvres  favoured  the 
Congress's victory, but they also clearly undermined the long term party capability to 
properly work like a representative structure of the Indian political system. 
41 Hindustan Times, 14th January 1971.
42 Indira Gandhi was “believed to have had the decisive voice” in the selection of the candidates in 
the United Provinces, Punjab, Haryana, and Kashmir, whereas Jagjivan Ram, a man close to her, 
who had been the Union Minister for Defence in her previous government, was held to have taken  
care of the Bihari selection and of the lists of scheduled candidates in all the states. Morris-Jones,  
“India Elects for Change -- and Stability,” 724.
43 All these explanations will  be carefully analysed later in this thesis since the centralisation of 
power in the Prime Minister's hands became evident during the 1971 even in the foreign policy 
decision-making process. 
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3. The international situation: the Cold War and the South Asian  
context
At the beginning of the Seventies South Asia was significantly pervaded by Cold 
War tensions. Since the second half of the Sixties the global order had indeed taken a 
new  shape.  Although  the  dominant  interpretations  among  the  historians  of 
international relations tend to view this period as being characterised by a general 
phase of détente, referring to the relaxation of the United States' relations with Soviet 
Union and China44,  in Asia this definition appears debatable.  Instead,  those years 
were  tumultuous.  A lot  of  tension  emerged  among the  states,  while  the  political 
equilibrium was being completely re-designed.
Clear evidence of this re-organization of the regional and global relations was 
the Soviet Union being the first country in the world to welcome Indira Gandhi's 
electoral victory in 197145. Radio Moscow celebrated the electoral result as a clear 
shift to the left, declaring: “the elections in India should be regarded as the beginning 
of  a  real  change to  do  away with  the  remnants  of  feudalism inherited  from the 
colonial era, to end the economic and political domination of Indian monopolies and 
to improve people's living standard”46. India and the Soviet Union had always had a 
good relationship, but in 1971 they were closer than ever. Two important historical 
44 On the Cold War politics in general see for example: John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (London: 
Penguin Books Limited, 2011); Ennio Di Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni internazionali: dal 1918 ai  
giorni nostri (Bari: Laterza, 2008); Walter LaFeber,  America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-
2002 (London: McGraw-Hill, 2004); John W. Young and John Kent, International Relations Since  
1945: A Global History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); John W. Mason, The Cold War:  
1945-1991 (London: Routledge, 1996); Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski,  The World  
Since 1945: A History of International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2009); Federico 
Romero,  Storia  della  guerra  fredda:  l’ultimo  conflitto  per  l’Europa (Torino:  Einaudi,  2009); 
Robert S. Ross, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in  
the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).
45 Golam Wahed Choudhury,  India,  Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  and the  Major Powers:  Politics  of  a  
Divided Subcontinent (New Delhi: Free Press, 1975), 203.
46 Hemen  Ray,  The  Enduring  Friendship:  Soviet-Indian  Relations  in  Mrs.  Gandhi’s  Days (New 
Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989), 34.
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events contributed to the Cold War tensions during the second half of the  Sixties, 
triggering this evolution even if it was in different ways: the Sino-Soviet rupture, and 
the  Sino-American  rapprochement.  The  closer  relationship  with  Moscow  can  be 
considered a positive evolution for New Delhi that, since the war lost against China 
in 1962 was in a situation of international isolationism, due to its eroded relations 
with the other Asian giant and its neutral position with both the superpowers.
However, the Indo-Soviet rapprochement was also posing a direct challenge to 
India's historical position of non-alignment. Moreover, the same new Soviet position 
was  indeed  contemporary  to  the  Sino-American  rapprochement  that  involved 
Pakistan.  From 1969 Islamabad was a  crucial  strategic  player  in  the eyes  of  the 
American  administration,  representing  the  secret  channel  through  which  the 
diplomatic relations with Beijing were established and carried out. Even if India, in 
the  spring  of  1971,  was  not  aware  of  the  role  played  by Pakistan  in  the  Sino-
American  rapprochement47,  the  convergence  of  the  Sino-American-Pakistani 
interests represented a potentially dangerous situation for New Delhi, as consecutive 
events then clearly demonstrated.
In order to understand the challenging situation India was facing in March 1971, 
in the next paragraphs the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American rapprochement 
will be analysed, and later,  attention will be given to how these events affected the 
South Asian context.
  3.1 The Sino-Soviet split and staging of the Sino-American rapprochement
Divergences  between  the  two  most  populous  countries  of  the  communist  world 
already surfaced in the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) in 1956 when the new Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev promoted 
47 See “Note on China's relations with superpowers dated 1968”, “Note on East Asian Division to JS 
(PP) sent on the 21th Feb 1970”, in MEA, PP(JS)/3/3/74-I; and “Note on Sino-American relations 
made on the 30th of July 1971”, in MEA, AMS, WII/104/34/71, National Archives, New Delhi.
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the  process  of  de-Stalinisation,  and  proclaimed  the  possibility  of  a  peaceful  
coexistence with the West48. Some years later diversity between the two countries 
became increasingly significant even in the economic field49. Tensions then also grew 
on  military  projects  of  cooperation,  as  in  the  case  of  nuclear  cooperation,  the 
construction  of  a  radio  station  transmission  centre  in  the  Pacific,  and  the 
establishment of a joint submarine fleet50, and at the ideological level. While in 1960, 
People's Daily published “Long Live Leninism”, which was a clear attack on the 
theoretical and practical Soviet communism, on the pages of Pravda condemnations 
of China had become common since 196351.  It  was therefore not  surprising that, 
during the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Soviet Union did not support China, but 
48 The political decision taken by Khrushchev to question the principles of authority, in that context 
represented by Stalin, worried Beijing since the Chinese political elites feared the risks this actions 
could rise, not only in the Soviet Union (where growing protests were already taking place), but in  
the entire communist bloc, and therefore also in China. Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War 
(Chapell Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 67–71. The angles at which 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union were looking towards the West at the 
end of Fifties were also different. China perceived the United States as a threatening presence in 
Asia, whereas the Soviet Union was aiming at enhancing the dialogue with them in order to freeze 
the distribution of power in the world and to be recognised as an equal at a strategic level by the  
United States.  In  reality the United States intended the process of détente more like a way to  
contain the economic costs of the nuclear and space competition between the two superpowers Di 
Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 1164; More in general on Soviet Union foreign policy 
see Geoffrey K. Roberts,  The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution, and Cold  
War,  1945-1991 (London:  Routledge,  1999);  Clement  J.  Zablocki,  Sino-Soviet  Rivalry:  
Implications U.S. Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966); Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 64–84; 
William V. Wallace, “Sino Soviet Relations: An Interpretation,”  ‐ Soviet Studies 35, no. 4 (1983): 
457–470; Lorenz M. Lüthi,  The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, 
New Jersey:  Princeton  University Press,  2010);  John King Fairbank,  Albert  Feuerwerker,  and 
Denis  Crispin  Twitchett,  The  Cambridge  History  of  China:  Republican  China  1912-1949 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
49 In  1958,  Beijing  promoted  the  Great  Leap  Forward  campaign,  which,  being  focused  on  the 
development of the countryside diverged completely from the Soviet policies, which, in line with 
orthodox Marxist  thinking,  considered  the industrial  sector  as  the motor of  development.  The 
Great Leap Forward was conceived and carried out with the use of an aggressive rhetoric, which 
included some ideological attacks towards the Soviet strategy of growth and development. This, in  
turn,  resulted  in  harsh  criticism from  Moscow Zhihiua  Shen,  “The  Great  Leap  Forward,  the 
People’s Communes and the Rupture of the Sino-Soviet  Alliance” (Parallel  History Project on 
NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact,  The  Cold  War  History  of  Sino-Soviet  Relations,  June  2005), 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-
a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=108645.
50 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 73–75.
51 Wallace, “Sino Soviet Relations,” 466. The People’s Daily is the official newspaper of Communist‐  
China, and the Pravda was an official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and 
one of the leading newspapers of the Soviet Union. Thus they can be considered quite reliable 
sources for interpreting the two government’s stands.
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preferred  to  remain  neutral.  The  Chinese  nuclear  test  in  1964  further  boosted 
tensions  and suspicions  between the  two countries,  which  had cooperated  in  the 
technological nuclear field since 1959. Beijing was indeed identified by Moscow as a 
direct  challenge  to  the  conservation  of  the  bipolar  world  the  Soviet  Union  was 
instead interested in keeping.
The nadir of the relations between Beijing and Moscow was reached during the 
first years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)52, when Moscow was blamed for its 
“counter-revolutionary” character, and accused of “social-imperialism”53. Then the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 spurred China to view the Soviet Union 
as a hegemonic and imperialistic power threatening the Chinese national security. It 
also  enhanced  concerns  over  the  modernization  program  of  the  Soviet  Army 
undertaken by Moscow with the aim of reaching strategic parity with the United 
States. In 1968 Beijing's choice to re-open the border dispute with the Soviet Union, 
denouncing the past treaties as unequal, further deteriorated the bilateral relations54. 
Both  the  Soviet  Union  and  China  started  deploying  troops  along  their  common 
border during the spring and summer of 1969, resulting in several clashes along the 
frontier and making the division of the communist bloc obvious to the whole world. 
A new era began, where the international system was characterised less rigidly by 
bipolarism, and more with a new emerging multipolarism55.
After 1969 border clashes, China's fear of the Soviet Union became the platform 
on  which  the  Chinese  political  elites  conceived  their  move  towards  the  United 
States56. China indeed began to consider the political détente with the United States 
52 Although the Cultural Revolution was mainly a domestic political phenomenon and a struggle for 
power within the Communist party, it led China to an almost complete international isolationism. 
53 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 243.
54 On the Sino-Soviet border clashes see: Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: 
Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 
66, no. 4 (December 1972):  1175; Y. Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From 
Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21–52; W. 
Burr,  “Sino-American  Relations,  1969:  The  Sino-Soviet  Border  War  and  Steps  Towards 
Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 3 (2001): 73–112.
55 China and the Soviet Union during the Seventies supported different factions and were opposed to 
each other in several African contexts, such as Rodhesia, Ogaden, Angola and Zimbabwe.
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as  an  option  that  could  bring  several  advantages  to  Beijing57.  This  policy  was 
gradually conceived during  1969 also  thanks  to  the  United  States'  contemporary 
reformulation of their entire Asian strategy58.
The United States had started experiencing an economic crisis in the second half 
of Sixties, which peaked in the following decade, when the dollar was de-linked by 
the  gold  standard59.  From  1965,  Washington  gradually  came  to  realize  the  un-
sustainability of the containment strategy that had moved the American role into the 
Third  World  for  almost  a  decade  and  found  expression  in  the  developmental  
strategy60. The economic growth experienced by the European states and Japan after 
the Second World War thoroughly started to cause competitiveness problems in the 
56 Although the border dispute was brought to an end the year after, when the leaders of the two 
countries found an agreement on the settlement of their borders, the Sino-Soviet rivalry did not  
end  there.  For  the  Sino-American  opening  see:  Kuisong  Yang  and  Yafeng  Xia,  “Vacillating 
Between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 
1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (2010): 395–423; John W. Garver, China’s Decision for  
Rapprochement with the United States,  1968-1971 (Boulder:  Westview Press,  1982);  Kuisong, 
“The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969”; Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969.”
57 This rapprochement could have several positive outcomes for Beijing: the withdrawal of the Seven 
fleet of the United States, and thus also of the Soviet fleet, from its seas, the possibility to be 
accepted within the United Nations, and technological advantages that the opening of commercial 
links with Japan and the United States would bring.
58 Lorenz  M.  Lüthi,  “Restoring  Chaos  to  History:  Sino-Soviet-American  Relations,  1969,”  The 
China Quarterly 210 (2012): 378–397; Wallace, “Sino Soviet Relations,” 467.‐
59 On this topic see: Romero, Storia della guerra fredda, 188–196; Di Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni  
internazionali, 1195–1210. 
60 During the “decade of development” the United States engaged themselves actively in Third World 
policies in order to contain the Soviet influence over the area. The Third World indeed became the 
arena of the rivalry between Moscow and Washington and their different models of development 
and world visions. Di Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 257. According to the definition 
by (Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our  
Times [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 3), the Third World is considered to be 
those states that were previously subjected to European or Pan-European (Russian and American). 
In theory, the American strategy consisted of the attempt to bring the new independent countries  
towards the  path  of  freedom and democracy,  away from the  socialist  model  of  development,  
through the injection of large capitals for promoting the socio-economic development. John Lewis 
Gaddis,  Strategies of  Containment: A Critical Appraisal  of  American National Security Policy  
During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 224. This idealistic vision was 
however translated in policies that ended with supporting authoritarian regimes in order to restrain 
the internal revolutionary forces, and in a search for stability even at the cost of development, like  
for example in the Pakistani case where a military regime was actively supported by the United  
States. David F. Schmitz,  Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-wing  
Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 264.
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American  economy61.  As  a  result  the  United  States  gradually  became  unable  to 
balance between the growing costs of its global strategy with its reduced revenue 
from  exports.  The  balance  of  payment  worsened  and  gold  reserves  became 
inadequate to maintain trust in the dollar62. In addition, the war in Vietnam further 
weighted  both  in  terms  of  high  military expenditures,  and in  terms  of  declining 
popular  support.  Indeed  the  protracted  conflict  had  also  unmistakeable  political, 
social,  and cultural  aspects that  favoured a growing dissent  among the American 
youth63.
The  new  American  administration  led  by  Richard  Nixon  –  who  won  the 
presidential elections in 1968 and began his mandate in 1969 – tried to formulate an 
answer  to  this  profound  crisis.  From  the  first  months  of  his  presidency,  Nixon 
presented a new strategy based on the disengagement from much of the previously 
undertaken  world  commitments.  As  a  consequence  a  withdrawal  from  direct 
involvement in the politics of the US allies was decided. This strategy was based on 
commissioning  the  political  stability  of  peripheral  regions  to  regional  friendly 
powers, such as Brazil in Latin America, and Iran in the Middle East. In Asia this 
policy,  known generally as  the  Nixon doctrine,  was  enunciated  by the  American 
president in Guam on the 26th of June 1969. Based on the gradual retreat of the 
American troops from the Asian continent, and on the decision to leave more space 
to  the  American-Asian  allies  for  dealing  with  their  own  internal  politics  and 
problems,  in  1969  this  strategy  led  the  United  States  recognising  China  as  the 
61 On the European growth see: Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo,  Economic Growth in Europe  
Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Herman Van Der Wee,  L’economia 
mondiale  tra  crisi  e  benessere  (1945-1980) (Milano:  Hoepli,  1989);  Barry  Eichengreen,  The 
European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton,  New Jersey: 
Princeton  University  Press,  2008);  Shigeto  Tsuru,  Japan’s  Capitalism:  Creative  Defeat  and  
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
62 On  the  monetary  system  see:  Francis  J.  Gavin,  Gold,  Dollars,  and  Power:  The  Politics  of  
International  Monetary  Relations,  1958-1971 (Chapel  Hill:  UNC Press  Books,  2004);  Harold 
James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Oxford: International Monetary 
Fund, 1996); Barry Eichengreen, La globalizzazione del capitale (Milano: Dalai Editore, 1998).
63 On the social protest see: Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War  
of  the 1960s (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  2000);  Arthur Marwick,  The Sixties:  Cultural  
Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, C.1958-c.1974 (Oxford: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2011); Jeremi Suri,  Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente 
(Cambridge, Massachuttes: Harvard University Press, 2005).
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regional actor with which they had to deal and could not ignore any longer64. The 
real aim of the American actions in Asia was to  free the United States from the 
Vietnam crisis and its costs65, to try to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry in order to 
boost  the  process  of  détente  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  to  obstruct  the  Soviet 
influence in Asia66. Therefore, in this scenario the Sino-Soviet rupture made room for 
an opening towards Beijing which could have been strategically quite advantageous 
for Washington.
Nixon's  intention  to  open  up  the  dialogue  with  China,  had  already  been 
contemplated by him in an article he wrote in 196767, when he was not yet the United 
States president. Also in his first presidential address in 1969, once again, Nixon had 
stated his intention to develop relations with all countries, thus also China68. During 
the same year, pushed from specific interest of the American business, and cultural 
circles, some first concrete steps were taken by the Nixon administration to relax 
Sino-American relations: for example the American travel and trade restrictions on 
64 MEA, AMS, WII/104/13/70, 1-4, in National Archives, New Delhi. On the topic of Sino-American 
relations see: Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War; John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance:  
Nationalist  China and American  Cold War  Strategy  in  Asia (New York:  M.E.  Sharpe,  1997); 
Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang,  Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-
1973 (London: Harvard Univ Asia Center, 2001); Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week  
That Changed the World (Paw Prints, 2010).
65 On Nixon’s administration policy towards Vietnam see: Jeffrey P. Kimball,  Nixon’s Vietnam War 
(Lawrence:  University  Press  of  Kansas,  1998);  Larry  Berman,  No Peace,  No  Honor:  Nixon,  
Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); Evelyn Goh, “Nixon, 
Kissinger, and the ‘Soviet Card’ in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974,”  Diplomatic History 
29, no. 3 (2005): 475–502; Jussi Hanhimaki, “Selling the ‘Decent Interval’: Kissinger, Triangular 
Diplomacy, and the End of the Vietnam War, 1971-73,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, no. 1 (2003): 
159–194;  Ken  Hughes,  “Fatal  Politics:  Nixon’s  Political  Timetable  for  Withdrawing  from 
Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (2010): 497–506.
66 “Memorandum from Nixon to Kissinger, 1st February 1969”, in FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. XVII, p. 
7.  On  the  American-Soviet  relations  see:  Raymond  L.  Garthoff,  Détente  and  Confrontation:  
American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
1994); Wilfried Loth,  Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950-1991 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). On Nixon’s strategy see the documents in FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. 1, 
Foundation of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972 (available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i, 
consulted on 14 June 2012), William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in  
the Nixon Presidency (New York: I.B.Tauris,  1998); Melvin Small,  The Presidency of Richard  
Nixon (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,  2003);  Jussi  Hanhimaki,  The Flawed Architect:  
Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Robert J. 
MacMahon, “The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Asia Crisis of 
1971,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, by Fredrik Logevall and 
Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 249–268.
67 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967): 111–125.
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China, which since the Korean War had been imposed, were suppressed69. However, 
it  was  only  after  the  Sino-Soviet  border  clashes  of  the  summer  of  1969  that 
America's efforts to favour the establishment of a direct communication channel with 
China became consistent70.
The ambassadorial talks between the United States and China, which had been 
held in Warsaw since 1954 and suspended in 1968 by the Chinese government due to 
the Cultural Revolution, were renewed in late 1969 thanks to the mediation of Yayha 
Khan,  the  Pakistani  president  (one  of  America's  closest  allies  in  Asia)71.  The 
consultations, however, did not last since Nixon, in February 1970, decided to try to 
bring the contact to a higher political level (namely to the governmental top level) in 
order to by-pass the bureaucratic nature of the talks72. On that occasion, the American 
president  conveyed  again,  through  Yahya  Kahn,  the  United  States'  intention  and 
availability to establish a secret direct contact with the Chinese political authorities in 
Beijing. Also Mao who, like Nixon, “was not happy with the ‘formalistic’ nature of 
68 The  Chinese  political  elites  did  not  ignore  the  speech  since  they  ordered  its  translation  and 
reproduction  in  the  local  Chinese  newspapers.  Chris  Connolly,  “The  American  Factor:  Sino-
American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–72,” Cold War History 
5, no. 4 (2005): 501–527; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 238–239 The text of the speech 
pronounced  by  Nixon  on  20  January  1969  is  available  at: 
http://www.nixonfoundation.org/clientuploads/directory/archive/1969_pdf_files/1969_0001.pdf.
69 “Note of 16 March 1971 from Indian Embassy in Washington” attached to “Letter written by K. K. 
D. Joshi, First Secretary of India's Embassy in Washington, to V. V. Paranjpe, Director (East Asia) 
MEA, dated 23 March 1971”, in MEA, AMS, WII/104/6/1971, National Archives, New Delhi. See 
also “Note on Sino-American relations of MAE made on the 30th of July 1971”, in MEA, AMS, 
WII/104/34/71, National Archives, New Delhi.
70 Lüthi, “Restoring Chaos to History,” 378–397.
71 Chen,  Mao’s China and the Cold War,  252.  In  a  “Memorandum of conversation between the 
American secretary and the Ministry of Information and National Affairs of Pakistan dated 30th  
September  1969”,  in  Roedad  Khan,  The  American  Papers:  Secret  And  Confidential  India-
Pakistan-Bangladash Documents, 1965-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 286–289, 
the  American  secretary  asked  the  Ministry  his  opinion  on  the  fact  the  Chinese  had  not  yet  
answered.  The  Pakistani  minister  expressed  his  hopes  the  Chinese  would  answer  soon.  So  it  
happened.
72 Dallek demonstrated by his recent analysis based on the American declassified documents the fact 
that  Nixon administration generally acted independently from the State Department  in  foreign 
policy, concentrating all the powers in the hands of the President, of his aide, Kissinger, and of the  
National Security Council  (NSC).  Not surprisingly,  Dallek defines Nixon administration as  an 
“Imperial  Presidency”.  Robert  Dallek,  Nixon  and  Kissinger:  Partners  in  Power (New  York: 
Harper Collins, 2007), 51. On the specific question of South Asia it is important to note that the 
State Department was against  the more inclined India,  while Nixon and Kissinger preferred to 
“tilt” towards Pakistan. All these aspects will be better analysed in the second chapter where the 
American policy towards South Asia in 1971 will be presented.
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the  Warsaw channel”,  was interested  in  fostering a  much more  direct  dialogue73. 
However,  in  1970  bilateral  tensions  grew  again  in  Indochina74,  delaying  the 
possibility for Washington and Beijing to officially re-open their communication75. 
Therefore, on the 14th of November Mao finally answered Yahya Khan, who was 
officially visiting  Beijing,  conveying the  availability of  China  to  receive  the  US 
president's representative in case Washington was willing to solve the Taiwan issue76. 
However, the message, as requested by the Chinese leadership, reached Washington 
only on the 9th of December 197077. In turn, the first American reaction only arrived 
in February 1971, when President Nixon in his  State of the World message to the 
Congress restated not only the need to establish a dialogue with Beijing, and to admit 
China to the United Nations, but for the first time called China with its official name, 
namely: “the People's Republic of China”78. In the spring of 1971 the scene was thus 
ready for the policy makers of both countries to really foster a direct dialogue.
Although these global evolutions did not directly involve India they significantly 
influenced India's relations with the superpowers and with South Asian countries: in 
73 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 254.
74 In the spring of 1970 American and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia.
75 Nixon reiterated his intentions later on in October 1970 in Washington to Yahya Khan who was 
invited to the White House for a dinner with several heads of state on the wave of the meeting of  
the UN General Assembly in New York Kalyani Shankar,  Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and  
Beyond (New Delhi: MacMillan, 2010), 101.
76 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 254.
77 The  same  message  was  also  delivered  to  the  Romanians,  who  were  the  other  channel  open 
between Beijing and Washington. However, Romania was even slower than Pakistan to convey the 
information and its message only reached Washington on 11 January 1969. The delay was due, as 
noted by Chen, to Mao’s attempt during those months “to create a new image of the United States” 
among Chinese people. Ibid., 256.  American journalist Edgar Snow was invited to visit China.  
President Mao decided to grant him an interview in which he explained the new political situation  
China was facing both at the domestic level, where the Cultural Revolution was approaching its 
end, and internationally declaring China ready to receive the visit of president Nixon. Warren I. 
Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 217. Even if the interview was published in the United States only in 
April 1971 by Snow, the message was immediately received by Washington in the fall of 1970 and 
interpreted as a sign of opening launched by the Chinese establishment. Richard Nixon, Memoirs 
of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 547.
78 “Note from Indian Embassy in Washington dated 16 March 1971” attached to “Letter from K. K.  
D. Joshi, First Secretary of India's Embassy in Washington, to V. V. Paranjpe, Director – East Asia,  
MEA, dated 23 March 1971”, in MEA, AMS, WII/104/6/1971, National Archives, New Delhi.
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1971 the relations between India and the United States ended up estranged, whereas 
those with the Soviet Union became closer than ever. 
  3.2 India, the superpowers and the regional context: new challenges
The  relations  between  India  and  the  United  States  had  been  characterised  by 
suspicion  since  Independence79.  The  fact  that  India  had been one  of  the  leading 
countries of the Afro-Asian cooperation, and later of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), which was refusing colonialism,  racism and imperialism,  made relations 
with Washington complicated. Embarking on a path of non-alignment, India chose to 
assume a neutral position as far as the Cold War dynamics were concerned, and to 
adopt  an  economic  strategy  of  import  substitution  for  industrial  products80.  The 
Indian policy had always been considered ambiguous by Washington and likely to be 
closer  to  socialism  than  to  the  United  States.81 Therefore,  “an  area  of 
misunderstanding  was  growing  between  Washington  and  New  Delhi”82. 
Nevertheless,  there  were  no direct  national  conflicts  of  interest  between the  two 
countries. From its neutral position India established and maintained good relations 
with the superpowers, gaining aid from both of them83. Since the American foreign 
policy in South Asia was aiming at contrasting the risk of a communist evolution 
79 Although, at least initially, the Indian people considered president Franklin Roosevelt as a model  
for freedom and democracy, the Soviet Union came rapidly to be perceived as the anti-colonial  
power, whereas the United States gradually came to be seen as the ally of the old colonial powers  
because  of  the  connections  between  them  within  the  NATO.  Choudhury,  India,  Pakistan,  
Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 73. Strains with Indo-American relations emerged concerning 
the Korean  War,  the  issue  of  the  Chinese  admission  at  the  United  Nations,  and  the  Kashmir 
question.
80 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 117.
81 Non-alignment  was  presented  as  a  path of  official  neutrality between the  two global  powers; 
however,  it  has to be noted that  India was actually less sympathetic to the United States than  
Soviet  policies.  In  return,  the  URSS  and  its  satellites  expressed  open  support  for  the  Non-
Alignment Movement (NAM), when it was set up in 1961, differently from the Western countries 
Rajni Kothari, Politics In India (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 1970), 424.
82 Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 75.
83 McCartney, India, 94.
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within  India's  economy,  the  economic  support  to  India  was  of  higher  priority. 
Already in 1950, with the signature of the first bilateral economic pact (result of the 
Point  Four  Program)  American  technical  assistance  aimed  at  supporting  India's 
economy began to flow84.
What  really  affected  Indo-American  relations  was  the  Pakistani  factor.  The 
violence of Partition, namely the division of British India into two hostile countries – 
India and Pakistan – worsened the already difficult relationship between Hindus and 
Muslims85, and strained the relations between the two new states86. Born as the state 
for Indian Muslims, Pakistan, the smaller state among the two87, chose a strategy of 
arming in order to answer the perceived Indian threat to its security. The vigorous 
process of armament required a flux of foreign support, which was not obstructed by 
the bipolar international context. The United States, already sponsoring the formation 
of political and military alliances in Asia and in the Middle East, such as the South 
East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), indirectly 
responded to  the  Pakistani  needs88.  Although America's  sponsored  alliances  were 
officially  directed  to  the  communism  containment,  Pakistan  actually  used  its 
84 “Note from K. Rukmini Menon, JS (AMS), to Foreign Secretary, dated on 8 th July 1971”, in MEA, 
AMS, WII/103/2/71, 2, National Archives, New Delhi.
85 S. J. Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999), 13. British rule 
emphasized  the  differences  between  the  two communities,  and  transformed  them through  the 
introduction of the separate electorates, into competing political platforms. Mazhar Aziz, Military 
Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (New York: Routledge, 2008), 13–14.
86 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 57.
87 The asymmetry of power between India and Pakistan brought the latter to develop a perception of 
constant threat. Sumit Ganguly, India as an Emerging Power (London: Psychology Press, 2003). 
The asymmetry was basically defined by the difference in population and economic size: India  
accounts for more than 70% of the population and the land of South Asia. Surjit Mansingh, India’s  
Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (London: Sage Publications, 1984), 
271. Its GDP in 2010 is almost ten times the Pakistani one, while in 1960, when the Bangladesh  
was still a part of Pakistan, it was however much bigger, around five times greater (World Bank,  
2011,  http://data.worldbank.org,  retrieved  on  6  June  1012).  Moreover,  the  lower  level  of 
industrialization of the Pakistani territories in comparison with the Indian ones, and therefore also 
the domestic lower capabilities  of Pakistan to  produce not  only goods,  but  also weapons and 
military equipment, enhanced the perception of insecurity. In addition, the fact that Pakistan was 
divided in two wings thoroughly separated by India contributed to the perception of threat. On this 
topic see for example: Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, “Political Economy of National Security,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 37, no. 44/45 (November 2, 2002): 4545–4549; Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan:  
The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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strategic  position  in  the  area  to  pursue its  security interests  against  India89.  This 
clearly lead to India's disenchantment towards American policies, however without 
India feeling compelled either to enter similar alliances with the Soviet Union, or to 
abandon its non-alignment strategy.
It was only with Kennedy’s presidency that American foreign policy towards 
South Asia became inspired by a new spirit of neutrality and collaboration90.  The 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru welcomed the new set of policies promoted 
by the Kennedy administration for the development of India, initiating a phase where 
relations  became more  friendly91.  When  a  full-scale  armed  war  erupted  between 
India and China in October 1962, Nehru deemed it natural to send urgent requests of 
military aid to both Britain, and the United States. In order to show their support, the 
Western allies did not waste time and promptly reacted, and the shipment of the first 
weapon supplies indeed reached India shortly after, by the beginning of November. 
However,  when  the  Chinese  troops  victoriously invaded  the  Indian  territory,  the 
Western governments had no time to answer the desperate requests for help launched 
by Nehru92. In the following years American and British provisions of armaments 
continued to flow to New Delhi93, though in volumes low enough not to infringe the 
special relations that Washington and London, at the same time, were keeping up 
88 After  the first  years  of  proclaimed Non-Alignment,  Pakistan in  1953 welcomed the American 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ proposal to establish military groupings in the Middle East  
and South East Asia aimed at containing the international threat of communism. Choudhury, India,  
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 82. Since 1954 the United States started providing 
Pakistan with weapons and two years later it became one of the closest American allies in Asia,  
joining CENTO and SEATO.
89 R. B. Rais, “Pakistan in the Regional and Global Power Structure,” Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (1991): 
378.
90 India’s  American  friends,  such  as  Chester  Bowles,  Under  Secretary  of  State  in  the  Kennedy 
government,  and  professor  J.  K.  Galbraith,  Kennedy’s  economic  advisor,  later  appointed  as 
Ambassador to India, were in a position of power in the new administration. Choudhury,  India,  
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 101.
91 Kux, India and the United States, 186–190.
92 Nehru required the provision of 15 bomber squadrons to contain the Chinese attack on its Western 
friends. However, Beijing declared the unilateral withdrawal before any decision could be taken in 
London or Washington, leaving India and the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru humiliated. 
93 The price paid by India was the acceptance of the presence of the American Seven Fleet in the  
Indian Ocean, The Times, Dec 27, 1969 cited in: Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the  
Major Powers, 116.
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with Rawalpindi94. In 1963 coordinated air defence exercises were carried out with 
the United States,  whereas  in  the following year  the American Defence Minister 
went  to  India  for  an  official  visit,  and  the  two  states,  under  the  aegis  of  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, began to collaborate for the development of the 
nuclear  station  of  Tarapur  in  the  Indian  state  of  Maharashtra95.  The  economic 
assistance continued to flow without limits, reaching the level of 1 billion dollars 
annually from the United States alone96.
As a result of this growing collaboration Washington remained neutral when the 
second Indo-Pakistani conflict exploded in 1965, imposing an embargo on weapon 
supplies and economic assistance to both Pakistan and India, without supporting its 
regional Pakistani ally.  This decision indeed hit  Pakistan much harder than India. 
Islamabad in 1971 had in fact received 1,5 billion dollars of military supplies since 
1954 that covered nearly the entire stock of equipment of the Pakistani Forces. New 
Delhi instead got only 75 million dollars that were covering not more than 10% of its 
equipment97.  As  a  consequence,  during  the  1965 war  and onward,  the  Pakistani-
American relations reached their lowest level since Independence: in 1967 Pakistan 
did not participate in SEATO and CENTO activities, and instead started to rely more 
on the Chinese weapon supplies98 and even evaluate a rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union.
However,  the  embargo  hit  India  as  well,  even  if  indirectly  and  more  at  an 
economic level. As already mentioned, the bad harvests of 1965 and 1966 had put 
94 Rawalpindi had been the capital of Pakistan until 1967, when Islamabad replaced it.
95 “Note on Indo-American relations from the Historical Division of MAE, dated 11th January 1973”, 
in MAE, AMS, WII/103/4/73-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
96 Kux, India and the United States, 230–232. According to the report of the Agency of International 
Development, New Delhi sent to Rukmini Menon, American Division, MEA, on 22nd June 1970, 
India received the 56.4% of the total foreign aid for development from the United States. The 
Soviet Union contributed just for the 5.6%. “Letter from J. Saccio, Agency of the International  
Development, New Delhi, dated 22nd June 1970”, in MAE, AMS WII/204/2/70, National Archives, 
New Delhi.
97 Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 122.
98 In 1966 Rawalpindi signed a deal worth 120 million dollars with China for the provision of tanks 
and aircraft Robert H. Donaldson, “India: The Soviet Stake in Stability,”  Asian Survey 12, no. 6 
(June 1972): 478. For a brief but clear resume of Sino-Pakistani relations see: John W. Garver, 
Protracted Contest (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 187–215. 
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India in a difficult position, which was worsened by the restrictions (due to the 1965 
war) imposed by Washington on the food trade. It was in this context that Prime 
Ministers Shastri and Gandhi agreed with the United States on a new set of economic 
and  developmental  policies  in  exchange  for  the  resumption  of  the  food  aid.  As 
already analysed, the negative effects of the devaluation of the rupee, which was one 
of the policies imposed in exchange for the continuation of the aid, resulted in a 
harsh  rise  in  the  inflation  rate  that  damaged  the  political  consensus  towards  the 
Congress government among the Indian people99. This episode  directly soured the 
Indo-American  relations  and  contributed,  as  already  shown,  to  Indira  Gandhi’s 
decision to shift to the left. 
Therefore, after 1967 the Indo-American collaboration froze and India began to 
openly criticise the American policies, especially concerning the Vietnamese issue, 
irritating Washington100. The estranged relation further deteriorated when Nixon rose 
to power in 1969. The new president had in fact emerged since the time he was vice-
president  of  the  United  States  as  the  one  that  “more  than  anybody  else  in  the 
American  hierarchy,  sympathized  with  Pakistan's  urgent  problem of  security  and 
defence”101.  Nixon's  ascent  to  power  obviously  had  the  effect  of  strengthening 
American relations with Pakistan102. The estranged relations soon improved due to 
the fact that, as already explained, Pakistan became the strategic channel through 
which the Nixon administration decided to carry on the opening towards Beijing103. A 
clear sign of this strategic shift was the adoption in 1970 of a  one time exception 
policy  to  the  commitment,  which  had  been  imposed  during  the  1965  war,  of 
prohibiting the export of lethal weaponry systems to India and Pakistan. Thanks to 
this  new policy,  the American weapon sales  were promptly resumed,  and in fact 
Pakistan,  pleased,  immediately  accepted  the  offer  of  three  hundred  armoured 
99 Kux, India and the United States, 251.
100See  for  example:  “Letter  from the  American  ambassador  to  the  Foreign Minister,  dated 17th 
September 1970”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III. Inst., f. n. 259, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
101Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 86.
102Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 2–12.
103Nixon, during his visit to Pakistan in 1969, conveyed his message of opening towards China to  
Yahya Khan. Ibid., 4.
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personnel  carriers  and some aircrafts  made by the American President104.  On the 
contrary,  New Delhi  openly  demonstrated  its  irritation  towards  this  behaviour105, 
without  even  fully  appreciating  the  fact  that  the  weapon  sales  to  Pakistan  were 
functional  for the construction of the strategic  dialogue between Washington and 
Beijing106.
While  Indo-American  relations  were  negatively  influenced  by the  American 
rapprochement  with  Beijing,  New Delhi  and Moscow became closer.  During the 
second half of the Sixties, the Soviet Union was engaged at a global level in the 
promotion of dialogue with the West in order to freeze the status quo situation, and 
to establish strategic parity with the United States on the international scene. At the 
same time, in South Asia, the Soviet Union had started to play a more active role to 
strengthen  its  fading  influence  caused  by  the  rupture  occurred  with  Beijing107. 
Already since the post-Stalin period, India and the Soviet Union had collaborated 
profitably  in  several  economic  projects  of  development,  especially  in  the  heavy 
104Kux, India and the United States, 281. The final decision was communicated by President Richard 
Nixon  to  President  Yahya  Khan  during  his  visit  to  Washington  in  October  1970,  after  that  
Ambassador Farland had already informally conveyed the same availability on the 20th of June 
see: “Telegram from Department of State to the President, dated 1st October”, and “Memorandum 
from W. P. Rogers, Secretary of State, dated 13th October 1970, in: Khan, The American Papers, 
427–429.
105See for  example  “Record  of  the  speech  made by L.  K.  Lambah,  Under  Secretary,  American 
Division, MAE, in the Lok Sabha on 4th November 1970  about  India's protests”, and  “Note for 
supplementaries I to III”, in MAE, AMS, WII/125/71/70, National Archives, New Delhi.
106MEA,  AMS,  WII/109/13/71-V  and  WII/104/9/70  files,  National  Archives,  New  Delhi,  are 
significant, since they demonstrated that India had never considered this option.
107At the global level  the first significant step in this direction was taken in 1968 when the two  
superpowers promoted at the UN the stipulation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
that prohibited the official nuclear states (the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom) to 
transfer nuclear weapons to those countries that had not previously had them. This led China and 
France that were already developing nuclear technology, to pursue in autonomy their projects and 
to definitively break their relations respectively with Soviet  Union and NATO. The process of 
control of strategic armaments continued; even if Moscow did not give up its policy of rearm. On 
Soviet Union foreign policy see: Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics; Adam Bruno Ulam, 
Dangerous  Relations:  The  Soviet  Union  in  World  Politics,  1970-1982 (New  York:  Oxford 
University Press,  1984);  Robin Edmonds,  Soviet  Foreign  Policy--the Brezhnev Years (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983); Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s,” 
Cold War History 8, no. 4 (2008): 427–447; Vladislav M. Zubok,  A Failed Empire: The Soviet  
Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill:  Univ of North Carolina Press, 
2009).
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industrial sector108. Their friendship was also consolidated by the parallel emergence 
of America’s closer relationship with Pakistan. The Soviet decision not to support 
China during the border dispute which led to the 1962 Sino-Indian war was the first 
clear sign of Moscow’s intention to promote closer relations with New Delhi. 
After a first period of proclaimed friendship the Sino-Indian relations had indeed 
been eroded by the issue concerning the settling of their common borders109. At the 
end of the Fifties, misperceptions and misunderstandings resulted in the abandon of 
the negotiation process and in India adopting a forward policy, which involved forays 
of Indian troops inside the China controlled territories claimed by India. This defiant 
policy triggered the Chinese reaction: Beijing launched a large-scale offensive on 
23rd October 1962, that caught the Indian army by surprise, causing its  total defeat. 
Showing all the vulnerability of the Indian defence system both at the military and 
the policy-making level, the war transformed China in the Indian elites' minds into 
the  most  significant  Indian  enemy110.  This  lead  New  Delhi  to  welcome  Soviet 
neutrality,  and  to  reformulate  its  foreign  policy  priorities,  thus  augmenting  its 
spendings for defence111.
After the humiliating defeat in the 1962 war, New Delhi undertook a program of 
modernisation of its  Armed Forces that in two years  almost  doubled the defence 
budget112.  In  a  decade  it  also  enlarged  the  military  personnel  from 4.000.000 to 
8.250.000113,  and  greatly  increased  both  weapon  imports  and  domestic  arms 
108Sanjay Gaikwad, Dynamics of Indo-Soviet Relations: The Era of Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Deep 
& Deep Publications, 1990), 37–39. The Soviet Union indirectly supported India’s position over 
Kashmir,  since Independence,  and over Goa,  in  1961 when India sent  its  troops to  expel  the 
Portuguese from that part of the Indian Territory at that time still controlled by a colonial power.
109For a general historical analysis of the events see for example: Neville Maxwell,  India’s China 
War (London:  Pantheon  Books,  1970);  Neville  Maxwell,  “Sino-Indian  Border  Dispute 
Reconsidered,”  Economic  and Political  Weekly 34,  no.  15  (April  10,  1999):  905–918;  Abdul 
Gafoor  Abdul  Majeed  Noorani,  India-China  Boundary  Problem,  1846-1947:  History  and  
Diplomacy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011); Guha, India After Gandhi, 301–337.
110In addition to the demonstration of military weakness, the sensation of insecurity perceived by 
Indians was further worsened by the feeling that no country was actually ready to help India. The 
American answer to the desperate call raised by the Indian Prime Minister was indeed perceived as  
being insignificant and consistent enough by the Indian political circles. Kux, India and the United  
States, 107–108.
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production114.  In  this  process,  foreign  purchase  of  armaments  became  crucial. 
Although the United States decided to positively answer India's requests, as already 
mentioned  before  New Delhi,  in  order  to  obtain  more  significant  support  in  its 
arming  process,  it  turned  its  attention  to  Moscow115.  Since  Soviet  and  Indian 
interests, especially after the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, were gradually converging 
into a strategy to contain China, Moscow embarked itself on a program of valuable 
economic and military assistance for New Delhi, which soon became its first Third 
World aid recipient116. By May 1964, Moscow indeed answered New Delhi's requests 
by granting military aid of 130 million dollars, which was greater than the American 
one117. In addition, in autumn of the same year, Moscow offered also a ten-year 140 
million  dollar  loan to  New Delhi,  from which  44 MIG-21,  and 55 ground-to-air 
missiles, tanks and submarines were provided to the Indian Army118.
111This had led New Delhi to keep defence expenditures below 1.8% of the national spending budget. 
V. Oberoi, “Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Trends in the Indian Army and Force Structure and 
Doctrine,” in  Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspective (New Delhi: IDSA and 
Promilla & Co., 2005), 103. This choice was not only the result of the personal views of the Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which for sure played a significant role, but also of the legacy of the  
colonial past, that led to giving extreme importance to the value of self-reliance and autonomy. 
Guha,  India After  Gandhi,  153.  Also  the  Gandhian  notion of  non-violence,  and  the  historical 
pacific victory obtained by the Indian freedom movement against the colonial rule had a role in  
influencing the leadership posture in  giving a secondary importance to  the military power.  A. 
Prakash, “Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspective,” in Emerging India: Security  
and Foreign Policy Perspective (New Delhi: IDSA and Promilla & Co., 2005), 5. Additionally, the 
choice made in favour of a strategy where “soft” power had more relevance than military force 
was also the product of a realistic recognition of the relative economic weakness of the country in 
comparison to the rest of the world and the high levels of poverty diffused inside the country. M. 
S.  Pardesi,  “Deducing  India’s  Grand  Strategy  of  Regional  Hegemony  from  Historical  and 
Conceptual  Perspective”  (RSIS  Working  Papers,  076/5,  2005),  47, 
https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/4475. The first reliable numbers about the poverty incidence in 
India suggests that the 40% of the rural population, and almost the 50% of the urban one, were 
living in poverty. Corbridge and Harriss, Reinventing India, 12.
112Stephen P. Cohen,  The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 188.
113Oberoi, “Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Trends in the Indian Army and Force Structure and 
Doctrine,” 99.
114A. D. D. Gordon,  India’s Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (Basingstoke: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995), 64 and 72.
115Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Panchsheel Publisher, 1987), 
17.
116Donaldson, “India,” 478.
117Gaikwad, Dynamics of Indo-Soviet Relations, 42.
118Ibid.
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The war of 1965 fought by India and Pakistan enhanced the Indian perceptions 
of  insecurity  even  more,  though  the  Indian  Army  successfully  countered  the 
Pakistani forces. During the conflict Beijing directly supported Rawalpindi, even if 
just verbally, enhancing in the minds of the Indian elites the idea that in the future, in 
order to feel secure, India must be able to win a two front war119. The new threat led 
India to carry on the modernisation of its army, and to strengthen its relations with 
the Soviet Union. Although the erosion of the American-Pakistani relations following 
the 1965 war offered space to Moscow to improve its relations with Pakistan, the 
Indian protests and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the end led the Soviet Union to 
reinforce  its  relations  with  India  and  to  abandon  any  desire  to  get  closer  to 
Pakistan120. 
Evidence  of  the  new  orientation  of  the  Soviet  strategy  in  Asia  was  the 
appearance in the late spring of 1969 of an article in Izvestitia,  a highly circulating 
119Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 23. 
The demonstration of the Chinese support for Pakistan was a result of the economic and political  
relations the two countries had established since the second half of the 1950s. Pakistan and China 
in 1963 indeed signed a border agreement in which Pakistan ceded to China the part of its territory 
India refers to as the Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK), where the Chinese built an important 
highway for connecting Tibet to the rest of China (and Pakistan). The American decision not to 
directly  support  its  local  Pakistani  ally  during  the  1965  conflict  had  indirectly  favoured  the 
fastening of relations between Pakistan and China. After the conflict the work for building a road 
connecting Pakistani Kashmir to Xinjiang began though New Delhi raised several criticisms about 
the project  declaring it  illegal  for  the  still  unclear  status  of  Kashmir.  The work was declared  
completed in February 1971.
120The Soviets were indeed interested in balancing the new ties that Rawalpindi established with 
China, and to further try to weaken the United States’ alliances in Asia, e.g. CENTO and SEATO, 
in which Pakistan was a key member. The short warming of the Soviet-Pakistani relations resulted 
in Moscow playing the mediator part in the negotiation process after the 1965 war at Takshent, and 
in the signature of some economic and military agreements in 1967-1968. Bhatia, Indira Gandhi  
and Indo-Soviet Relations, 24. Although it also led to the abstaining of Pakistan from participating 
to CENTO and SEATO meetings, the rapprochement did not however have a long life. Donaldson, 
“India,” 478. New Delhi, which had become highly dependent upon Moscow for arms supplies, 
became seriously worried by this new evolution. The Indian government vehemently protested, 
and reacted, for example with the attempt made at the beginning of 1968 to re-open the dialogue 
with China on the unsolved border issue (Indian Express, 17th October 2011). Soon after the Sino-
Soviet  border  clashes,  the  Soviet  attempt  to  balance  the  Chinese  and  American  influence  in 
Pakistan ended anyway. The necessity of the Soviet Union to find a closer ally in South Asia to  
counter balance the Chinese influence led the Soviet Union to weaken the newly established ties 
with  Islamabad,  completely stopping  its  weapons  supplies  to  Pakistan  by May 1970.  Bhatia, 
Indira  Gandhi  and  Indo-Soviet  Relations,  38  and  MEA,  AMS,  WII/109/13/71-V,  in  National 
Archives,  New  Delhi.  It  is  however  important  to  note  that  the  economic  cooperation  was 
maintained, while new economic aids were conceded on November 1970.
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Soviet  newspaper,  which  was  focused  on  the  political  vacuum that  the  British 
withdrawal from East Suez announced the previous year had created121. In this article 
a general welcome to the new Asian sovereignty was launched. This, together with 
the Soviet decision to send six ships into the Indian Ocean in the first half of 1968, 
was  considered  by  contemporary  commentators  as  a  clear  sign  of  Moscow’s 
readiness  both  to  support  the  emergence  of  new independent  Asian  powers,  like 
India, and to fill up the international political vacuum122. Another clear sign of the 
new  Soviet  strategy  was  the  speech  pronounced  by  the  Soviet  premier  Leonid 
Brezhnev on 7th June 1969 at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers  
Parties, in which he proposed the idea of creating a system of collective security in 
Asia. The speech generated strong reactions in China123 and in Pakistan, where the 
proposal was rejected for its anti-Chinese tone; on the contrary, the answers from the 
others Asian countries and India remained vague and cautious124.
 In March 1969 the Soviet Union had already expressed its interests in signing a 
security  pact  with  India  also  at  the  bilateral  level125.  Soviet  Defence  Minister, 
Marshal Grechko, who was visiting India in the same month, had also assured New 
121In January 1968 the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared the withdrawal of the British 
troops by 1971 from their major military bases in South East Asia, situated primarily in Malaysia, 
Singapore and in the Indian Ocean. By less than one year the British withdrawal preceded the 
United States’ formulation of a strategy of disengagement from the American world commitments 
previously decided, already analysed before. This was the result of the economic crisis the United 
Kingdom, like the United States, was going through. Both countries were in fact afflicted at that 
time by chronic balance of payment deficits. On this topic see: Shohei Sato, “Britain’s Decision to 
Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–68: A Pattern and a Puzzle,” The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 37, no. 1 (2009):  99–117; Brian S. Oslon, “Withdrawal from Empire: 
Britain Decolonization of  Egypt,  Aden and  Kenya  in  the  Mid-Twentieth  Century”  (School  of  
Advanced  Military  Studies,  Kansas,  2008),  https://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=v&q=cache:I2CjcnhVTwwJ:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD
%3DADA510241+&hl=en&gl=in&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESibLhk-
A0hl5dFayB0MS6PjijTyJlQAd3Qq4hWVi_XhEnLIq6zBTVh_85t9m2nZdCoXeK7-
1WnYxNy6TBa5qlWlxGEbiuHc5NDiJlPS7pllw92YRnjqYtHVj2hWN3uBLTf2XX29&sig=AHI
EtbQZIRu1qy8kho7jkHXgkJrLXBo_bA; P. L. Pham, Ending “East of Suez”:The British Decision  
to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
122Donaldson, “India,” 481.
123Peking Review, 27, 1969: 22-23 and 32-33, cited in: Ibid., 480.
124The  Indian  Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  indeed  declared  that  the  Soviet  premier  was  just  
referring to the Kosygin’s proposal to enhance economic relations in South Asia. Bhatia,  Indira 
Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 34. The future Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh refused instead 
to consider, even just in theory, the Soviet Union as the protector of India’s security in South Asia.  
Donaldson, “India,” 480.
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Delhi of the Soviet intentions to support India in case of a new attack from China126. 
In  April  1969,  the  Indian  Foreign  Secretary  on  receiving  confirmation  from the 
Soviets of their desire to sign a treaty to consolidate Indo-Soviet relations, also got 
the Soviet promise of an increase in arms provision in case India agreed to the Soviet 
proposal127. Nevertheless, India did not give a positive answer to the Soviet proposal, 
but instead,  asked for more time to better  evaluate it.  The justifications provided 
were two: first,  in 1969 India was being led at  the domestic level by a minority 
government unable to take such a sharp turn in India's foreign policy; and second, 
India's  government  feared  that  the  signature  of  such  a  treaty  could  damage  the 
already tense relations with both China and Pakistan128. Despite India's reluctance, 
the economic and military collaboration between Moscow and New Delhi in 1969 
were not negatively influenced: the economic trade between them during the second 
half of the Sixties rapidly grew to 63%129,  collaboration in the energy sector also 
increased130, as well as the strengthening of the military links131.
In this  context of growing collaboration,  the fact  that  Indira Gandhi  was the 
candidate  at  the  1971  elections  who  dressed  the  socialist  mantle  was  pleasantly 
125“Letter from D. P. Dhar, to Kewal Singh, Secretary, Minister of External Affairs, in copy to P. N.  
Haksar, Secretary to the Prime Minister, dated 31st March 1969”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III 
inst., f. n. 203, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
126Gaikwad, Dynamics of Indo-Soviet Relations, 61.
127“Letter  from T.  N.  Kaul,  Foreign  Secretary to  Foreign  Minister,  Secretary of  Prime  Minister 
Office, and Prime Minister, dated 7th April 1969” in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 203, 
in NMML Archives, New Delhi.
128“Draft letter written by India’s Prime Minister to Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Minister of  
the USSR, Moscow, undated”, in Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 203, in NMML Archives,  
New Delhi. These worries also emerge from an official note about the Pakistani situation in 1970, 
where it was suggested to the Indian government to enhance diplomacy not just with the Soviet  
headquarters, but also with the Chinese ones in order to keep all options open. See also: “Note on 
Pakistan, dated 1970” in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 290, in NMML Archives, New 
Delhi. 
129Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 27 and 40.
130Several  power  plant  projects  in  India  were  working  thanks  to  the  Soviet  aid,  while  the  two 
countries were cooperating in the oil extraction in Gujarat. From this point of view it is therefore  
not surprising that the growing Indo-Soviet  collaboration raised critics and harsh comments in  
China. Indeed, India was attacked by the Peking Review – the English weekly journal considered 
representative of the Chinese government's position – as the “raw material reprocessing plant for 
the Soviet revisionism” for its growing dependence towards the Soviet Union. Peking Review 30, 
1969: 20-22.
131Gordon, India’s Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, 72.
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noticed by the Soviet Union. Moscow had openly supported Nehru's daughter since 
her shift towards the left after 1967132. The period of the internal struggle for power 
within  the  Congress,  from  which  Indira  Gandhi  came  out  as  the  winner,  was 
generally  considered  as  the  “most  crucial  period  since  Independence”  in  India's 
history133.  After  the  Sino-Soviet  rupture,  a  revolutionary  India  had  become 
undesirable to Soviet eyes,  since it  would have probably resulted in the issue of 
which  communist  paths,  the  Soviet  or  the  Maoist,  it  would  have  followed.  It 
therefore seems plausible that a stable India, where a more gradual change would 
have been promoted, such as that assured by Indira Gandhi's Congress, appeared to 
be a better option to Moscow. It is therefore not surprising that the Soviet Union was 
the  first  to  welcome  the  victory  of  the  Congress  led  by  Indira  Gandhi:  from 
Moscow's point of view the new Indian government would finally be free to sign the 
military pact Moscow had been proposing to India in the previous years.
From the analysis developed so far it is possible to state that India was facing a 
new  international  situation,  which  was  offering  some  new  challenges  and 
opportunities. On one hand in fact, the emergence of China as a global power, and 
the  convergence  of  American,  Pakistani  and  Chinese  interests,  threatened  India's 
position. On the other hand, the Sino-American rapprochement, also triggering the 
Soviet Union's interests towards India, offered New Delhi the opportunity to balance 
the  United  States-China-Pakistan  axis,  even  this  meant  sacrificing  India's  non-
alignment policy.
132Pravda, 24th November 1969, 5, cited in: Donaldson, “India,” 486.
133New Times, 47, 1969: 6-8.
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  4. Conclusion
From the analysis developed so far it seems clear that the new Indian government 
was  facing  a  complex  situation  both  at  national  and  international  levels.  The 
Congress won the elections with a large majority that enabled its installation in a 
strong position of power. However, its commitment to the promises made during the 
electoral campaign appeared weak. Indeed, the shift to the left made by the Congress 
seemed  to  be  the  result  of  a  tactical  political  calculation,  rather  than  a  true 
ideological  decision.  In  addition,  the  heterogeneous  coalition  of  interests  that 
supported  its  rise  to  power  directly  undermined  the  possibility  of  the  new 
government  in  implementing  the  radical  socio-economic  reforms  promised.  The 
weak organization of the Congress, further eroded by the resort to populism and to 
the centralisation of power, cast further doubts on the new government's strength. At 
the  international  level,  the  evolution  of  the  Sino-Soviet  split  and  the  gradual 
alignment  of  American-Pakistani-Chinese  interests  threatened  India  and  also 
explained growing Indo-Soviet collaboration. The latter could be an opportunity for 
New Delhi to contain China and to oppose Pakistan, even if the cost was the abandon 
of  India's  long  standing  non-aligned  foreign  policy.  Despite  this  complex  and 
challenging situation, the new Congress government in 1971 had a clear advantage 
with respect to the previous: it finally had a large majority providing the freedom to 
develop its foreign policy, and no longer influenced by domestic factors. 
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  SECOND CHAPTER:
THE EAST PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR, THE THIRD 
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
BANGLADESH AS A NEW INDEPENDENT STATE
  1. Introduction
A few days after the new Indian government took power in 1971, India's foreign 
policy became completely absorbed by the developments of the East Pakistani civil 
war. These events offered New Delhi the opportunity to support the Bengali forces 
that were challenging the central political power of Pakistan, but they also directly 
challenged India's security since millions of people poured into its territory in search 
of shelter. This chapter will demonstrate that India adopted policies in support of the 
rebels  without  hesitation,  and  that  it  did  not  alter  them even when the  situation 
became more dangerous both at local and at international levels. In fact, even if both 
the international community, and the normalisation of relations between the United 
States and China seemed to be able to undermine the position assumed by India in 
support of the Bengali forces during the summer, India demonstrated its readiness to 
change its long policy as a Non-Aligned state. Thus, New Delhi, exploiting Cold War 
dynamics, finalised an alliance with the Soviet Union. This decision gave India the 
security to initiate a war with Pakistan and to resolve several issues in its favour 
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through  military  action:  resolving  the  question  of  the  refugees;  favouring  the 
emergence of a new friendly state (Bangladesh); reducing Pakistan; and emerging, at 
least for a while, as the new undoubted hegemony power of South Asia. This chapter 
will infer that in 1971 New Delhi formulated its foreign policy driven by the aim to 
enlarge its power inside the South Asian region, even at the cost of challenging its 
long standing policy of Non-Alignment. In order to demonstrate this, the following 
paragraphs will trace events in a chronological order, showing how India reacted to 
the crisis of East Pakistan and to the problem of the refugees, from March 1971 to 
December 1971.
Therefore,  the  second  paragraph  will  briefly  focus  on  the  roots  of  the  East 
Pakistan crisis, and on the status of the Indo-Pakistani relations until March 1971. 
The aim is to demonstrate the reasons why the East Pakistan civil war assumed an 
international character in a short time. The third paragraph will start with the analysis 
of the composition of India's foreign policy decision-making process, with the aim of 
explaining how decisions related to the East Pakistan crisis were taken. The second 
part of the paragraph will present India's reactions to the initial exodus of the Bengali 
rebels in its territory, and to the subsequent influx of millions of refugees. The fourth 
paragraph will initially highlight how New Delhi began to consider the option of 
resolving  the  question  of  the  refugees  through  a  war.  A  presentation  of  the 
international challenges India faced during the summer regarding its Bengali forces, 
a  description  of  the  UN  intervention  issue,  and  the  development  of  the  Sino-
American rapprochement will then follow. The fifth paragraph will present how India 
reacted  to  those  challenges,  deciding  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union, and how it prepared itself for the war against 
Pakistan.  The  sixth  paragraph  will  consider  the  military  conflict  and  the 
developments it triggered at the international level, while the seventh will analyse the 
consequences of the war and the new South Asian equilibrium. Lastly,  the eighth 
paragraph will summarize the events, and it will offer some conclusive observations 
about the formulation of India's foreign policy.
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  2.  The  East  Pakistan  political  crisis  and  the  status  of  Indo-
Pakistani relations until March 1971
India's foreign policy in 1971 was critically influenced by the eruption of a civil war 
in East Pakistan on 25th March; just a few days after the newly elected government 
led by Indira Gandhi took power. Before then, the political crisis in East Pakistan and 
the civil war was just a Pakistani internal affair. It was on that very same day that the  
Pakistani  president  Yahya  Khan  decided  to  launch  a  military  operation,  called 
Operation  Searchlight:  the  Pakistani  army  was  ordered  to  violently  repress  the 
political dissent, to arrest all the suspected supporters of the Awami League (AL), the 
Bengali political party that had won elections in 1970, and that was demanding more 
autonomy for the Eastern wing of Pakistan, and to bring back order in the state. It 
was with the military crackdown that caused the civil war to assume an international 
character because, first of all the Bengali political leaders largely found refuge in 
Indian Territory to escape the military repression, and in a second moment a great 
influx of Bengali people began to leave their homes to find refuge in India from the 
violence of the military repression. Before going on to analyse how India's reacted to 
these dramatic developments, it is important to recall here, even if just briefly, the 
roots of the political crisis and the status of the Indo-Pakistani relations on the eve of 
25th March, in order to fully comprehend why millions of Bengali decided to escape 
to India, and the degree in which relations between India and Pakistan were affected.
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  2.1  The  roots  of  Pakistan's  crisis:  sociological,  political,  economic  and  
historical aspects
To understand the  roots  of  the  political  and social  crisis  which  emerged in  East 
Pakistan, it is crucial to take into consideration sociological, cultural, economic and 
political aspects of Pakistan as a whole. 
The first evident weakness that Pakistan inherited from the end of the colonial 
rule was that it was the first state in world history to have emerged with two different 
territorial wings,  divided by nearly 1.610 km of Indian territory1.  Because of the 
antagonism with Indians,  the difficult  communications  between the two wings of 
Pakistan were also complicated by the fact that the East and the West were connected 
by air or sea communication lines only along routes much longer than the effective 
line of sight.
The physical  distance contributed also to  obstruct  the creation  of  a  sense  of 
national  identity  fundamental  to  bridge  the  religious  and  regional  differences. 
Following the Partition2 indeed East Pakistan resulted to be the smaller wing, but 
with the larger portion of the entire Pakistani population, and with 23% of Hindu 
population,  a  much  greater  proportion  than  the  3%  in  West  Pakistan3.  The 
polarisation of religious identities in competing groups, as Hindus and Muslims, had 
begun earlier during the colonial era, like for example when in name of efficiency the 
Muslim  districts  of the Bengal presidency were  divided from the Hindu ones, and 
unified to Assam to form a new province in 19054. Religious identities had been later 
further reinforced by the communitarian violence experienced by the population of 
Bengal  during Partition. These events surely did not help to build a cohesive state 
1 Jyotindra Nath Dixit,  Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations (New Delhi: Konark 
Publishers, 1999), 9.
2 On Partition see for example: Michelguglielmo Torri, Storia dell’India (Bari: Editori Laterza, 
2007), 573–616.
3 E. H. Slade, Census of Pakistan, 1951, Pakistan Reports and Tables Vol. I (Karachi: Manager of 
Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1955), 2–6.
4 On the conflicting relations between Hindus and Muslims in Bengal during the colonial rule, and 
on the partition of Bengal realised by the British in 1905 see for example: Torri, Storia dell’India, 
493–497.
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where different religious groups could live together in peace. Religious differences in 
Independent  Pakistan  remained  alive  and  emerged  again  in  1971.  The  Pakistani 
Army, during its violent repression of East Pakistan's political instances, indulged 
indeed  in  communitarian  violence,  which  resulted  in  the  majority  of  the  Hindu 
community searching a shelter in India to escape5. 
The rivalry between Hindus and Muslims is not the sole exacerbating factor of 
the  Pakistani  civil  war.  Also  sociological  and  cultural  differences  triggered  the 
formation  of  regional  identities  competing  to  the  national  one  among  the  same 
Pakistani Muslims. Bengali Muslims identity was deeply rooted in the linguistic and 
cultural traditions of Bengal, which were significantly different from those of West 
Pakistan, for instance. In some cases the colonial rule had indirectly enhanced the 
differences.  For example,  the East  Pakistan socio-economic context  was different 
from the Western one, and not only for its different climatic characteristics. After the 
colonial period the Eastern wing resulted indeed dominated by a much smaller size 
of  land-holding  than  the  West  Pakistan,  and  by  a  more  heterogeneous  class  of 
landlords6. Another case was that  the new Pakistani administrative centre “became 
increasingly identified with Punjab because of the region's  dominance of the two 
main institutional structures of the state – the Army and the civil bureaucracy”7. This 
aspect  directly  came  from the  colonial  period  when  Punjab  and  the  North-West 
5 The percentage of Hindus on the entire number of refugees was consistent, around 80%. Richard 
Sisson and Leo E. Rose,  War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh 
(Berkeley:  University of  California Press,  1991),  296.   Even if  the word genocide  seems not 
appropriate,  what  seems  plausible  is  that  the  Pakistan  Army,  during  their  work  of  violent 
repression of the political dissent in East Pakistan, worked to up-root the Hindu population with 
the aim of weakening the resistance of the Bengali movement. On this topic see: Hasan Zaheer,  
The  Separation  of  East  Pakistan:  The  Rise  and  Realization  of  Bengali  Muslim  Nationalism 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 261; Sarmila Bose, “Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of 
Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971,” Economic and Political Weekly (October 8, 2005): 4465;  and 
“Telegram sent  by American Embassy in  Islamabad to Department of  State sent  on 2 August  
1971”,  in  Roedad  Khan,  The  American  Papers:  Secret  And  Confidential  India-Pakistan-
Bangladash Documents,  1965-1973 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  1999),  624–631,  where 
there is direct indication that “persecution of Hindus appear to have ceased” due to the “drastic 
decrease  in  number  of  Hindus  available  to  persecute”,  and  that  “the  main  instance  of  de-
Hinduization was expulsion of Hindus”.
6 It had been the process of land reforms promoted by the British to produce a society in Bengal  
where the size of land-holding was much smaller, and the power of landowners more fragmented 
than in West Pakistan. On this see for example: Torri, Storia dell’India, 368–495.
7 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Second ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 126.
59
Frontier Province were the areas from which the major part of the colonial Indian 
army had been recruited. This had led their social order to be shaped by the British 
politics of racial classification into martial groups, and by the privileged treatment 
conceded to these classes in the allocation of land and public jobs8. As a result after 
Independence Punjabi were 80% of the new Pakistani military forces, while Bengali 
only 5% of the officer corps of the Pakistani Army, and 7% of the other ranks, doing 
slightly better in the air force representation9. Moreover, Punjabi covered 55% of the 
entire civil service, while East Pakistani working in this field were only 16%10. 
As  a  last  colonial  inheritance,  the  vice-regal  pattern  of  government  directly 
favoured the centralisation of state power in the hands of the Governor General who 
led the country until 1956, thus encouraging Pakistani political system to become 
authoritarian11.  The  lack  of  well-established  political  institutions  at  the  time  of 
Independence also did not favour the democratization process of the newly formed 
state. The Muslim League (ML), the larger Muslim party that during the colonial 
period represented all the Muslims in the dialogue with the Indian National Congress 
and the colonial power, did not have a mass participation until 1940-7, and not even a 
strong  local  and  territorial  organization  in  the  territories  that  became  Pakistan12. 
Deprived by Partition of “the platform of religion as a political mobiliser”, the ML 
lost  the element  of cohesion that  was central  in  its  previous political  struggle to 
assure Muslims a protected position, and faced the emergence of other parties based 
on regional and provincial identities, like for example the Awami League (AL) in 
East Pakistan13. The latter demanded indeed a more fair representation in the civil 
and military jobs, a more equitable distribution of the economic resources, and a 
proportional  political  representation  of  the  provinces  in  the  National  Assembly. 
8 David Taylor, “Pakistan: The Military as a Political Fixture,” in Politics in the Developing World, 
by Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 420.
9 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 10.
10 Christophe Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and Its Origins (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 18.
11 Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 300.
12 Hasan Askari Rizvi,  Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York: Macmillan Basingstoke, 
2000).
13 Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (New York: Routledge, 2008), 15.
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Moreover, the only nationally recognised leaders of the whole Pakistan, Mohammed 
Ali  Jinnah  and  Liaquat  Ali  Khan,  dying  prematurely  soon  after  Independence, 
created  a  political  vacuum in  the  ML that  was  not  so  easily  filled  by the  other 
emerging political leaders that had only regional support14.
The  responsibilities  of  the  failure  of  the  Pakistani  national  state  have  not, 
however, to be just linked to the legacies of the colonial period. In fact, political 
developments in Pakistan after 1947 directly favoured the explosion of conflicting 
identities. In fact, “successive bouts of authoritarian rule have reinforced centrifugal 
ethnic, linguistic and regional forces”, enhancing economic and political imbalances 
between the West and the East Pakistan15.  For example,  the attempt made by  the 
Governor General in 1948 to impose Urdu as the only national language in order to 
suppress the regional  different  identities  of Pakistan had the opposite  effect.  The 
strong resistance to replace Bengali with Urdu became indeed the ground on which 
the Bengali regional political movement of the AL was built. 
As yet another cracking factor, the regionally divided and weak political parties 
of Pakistan did not reach any agreement in the Constitution Assembly upon the rules 
for  the formation of  the National  Assembly until  195416.  This  gave an important 
advantage to the bureaucratic and military institutions of the state controlled just by 
the  Punjabis,  who  threatened  by the  request  of  a  more  equitable  distribution  of 
military and civil jobs raised by regional parties17, gradually assumed the control of 
the state politics. Even though expectations of a democratic evolution brought three 
prominent  politicians  from  the  Eastern  wing  to  become  Prime  Ministers  in  the 
Fifties, political power was indeed taken over by a triumvirate, based on the military-
bureaucratic nexus, and composed by Ghulam Muhammad (Governor General from 
1951 to 1955), General Ayub Khan (Commander in Chief of the Army), and Iskander 
14 Taylor, “Pakistan: The Military as a Political Fixture,” 420.
15 Talbot, Pakistan, 1.
16 The issue was if adopting the proportional method for the formation of the National Assembly, 
which would have favoured the major populated East Pakistan, or instead the concept of parity 
among the two wings of Pakistan to avoid the East to become dominant. Sisson and Rose, War and 
Secession, 10.
17 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 298.
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Mizra (an Army officer who was Defence Secretary, and later President). The reign 
of  this  power  block  was  imposed  in  1954,  when  the  Governor  dissolved  the 
Constitutional Assembly and the provincial governments elected previously, directly 
naming a new government18. The promised elections of the National Assembly did 
not take place, and were definitively cancelled by President Mizra's imposition of 
martial law in 1958. Justified by the Army with the necessity to save the nation from 
political  disintegration19,  the  subsequent  coup  of  Ayub  Khan  imposed  a  new 
Constitution that exacerbated the East-West tensions. This indeed recognised both the 
concept of equity between the two wings, which damaged the representation of the 
Eastern wing, and only few powers to the provinces, thus subjugating them to the 
presidential  executive  located  in  West  Pakistan.  Furthermore,  during  the  Ayub 
government, the military-bureaucratic nexus was further reinforced by introducing 
military officers into bureaucracy20. 
Regional dissatisfaction and resentment were strengthened during the Fifties and 
the first half of the Sixties when East Pakistan saw a diverse economic and social 
development of West Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan emerged in 1947 were 
indeed  not  characterised  by  critical  differences  in  terms  of  development.  After 
Independence,  however,  resources  were  mainly  directed  towards  the  industrial 
development of West Pakistan, though East Pakistan was the larger foreign exchange 
winner,  exporter  of  jute  and tea.  Thus,  the East  received only 20% of the entire 
developmental expenditure during the 1950-1951/1954-1955 period, and 36% during 
1965-1966/1969-1970  period,  though  it  had  the  60%  of  the  total  population21. 
Therefore,  while  East  Pakistan's  industrial  production  grew only marginally until 
18 Ibid., 196.
19 See for example Ayub Khan’s speech made on 8 October 1958, quoted in Owen Bennett Jones,  
Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Bodmin: Yale University Press, 2009), 77.
20 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan: Civil-military Relations in a Praetorian State,” in The Military and 
Democracy  in  Asia  and the  Pacific,  by Viberto  Selochan and  Ronald  James  May (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 2004), 194.
21 Dixit,  Liberation  and  Beyond,  12;  Muhammad  Anisur  Rahman,  East  and  West  Pakistan:  a  
Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning (Harvard: Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 1968), 32–36.
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1970, that of West Pakistan tripled compared to the East Pakistan's one22. As a result, 
in the  Sixties the Bengali population increasingly felt they were being treated as a 
colony by the West. The feelings of dissent therefore revolved around Bengal identity 
and reinforced the linguistic and cultural traditions. 
Divergences  were  further  sharpened  during  the  1965  war  when  the  central 
government decided to dismiss the supervision of defence and economic matters of 
East Pakistan; thus enhancing its geographical isolation and vulnerability23. In this 
context the demand for a more political and economic autonomy for the East was 
clearly formulated in  the Six-Points Programme by the leader  of the AL, Sheikh 
Mujib-ur Rahmana, in February 196624. This programme not only asked once again 
for the recognition of a major autonomy to the province of East Pakistan, but also for 
its full fiscal independence, and for the creation of a separate militia or paramilitary 
force for the security of East Pakistan. The Pakistani government reacted by arresting 
the  AL leader,  and  beginning  a  trial  in  1968  against  him and 35 other  political 
personalities,  civil  servants  and  army officers  accused  to  have  taken  part  in  the 
Agartala conspiracy, a plot to bring out the secession of East Pakistan with Indian 
help. Although there were some grounds for these accusations25, no solid evidence 
was presented. Thus social and political pressure erupted in the streets in the East, 
added  to  the  political  demonstrations  in  West  Pakistan,  leading  the  Pakistani 
government of Ayub Khan to release Mujib on the 22nd of February 1969, and to pass 
22 As a consequence disparities in per capita income significantly grew (the disparity ratio passed 
from 21,0% in 1949-50 to 61% in 1969-1970), as well as the disparities in infrastructures such as 
power  generation,  transport  facilities,  health  and  educational  services.  Dixit,  Liberation  and 
Beyond, 12.
23 Talbot, Pakistan, 189.
24 For  the  text  see  Government  of  India,  Bangladesh  Documents (New  Delhi:  Ministry  of 
Information and Broadcasting, 1972), 23–33.
25 The name of the conspiracy came from the Indian city in the Tripura state where the accused were 
supposed  to  have  met  Indian  army  officers.  The  fact  that  Mujib  had  had  meetings  with 
representatives of the Indian government since 1962 in different secret locations in India is largely 
recognised.  See: The  Bangladesh  News,  23  February  2011 
(http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=188118&cid=2),  or  The  Daily  Star,  12  June  2010 
(http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=142345,  both  retrieved  on  6th 
August 2012). What remains unclear is whether the two parts were really acting with the same  
goal  of  the division of  Pakistan in  the Sixties  or  if  the Indians  were  just  keeping alive  their  
relations with the East Pakistan political exponents.
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on its powers to another general of the same faction, Yahya Khan, who imposed the 
Martial Rule again. 
The  new  President  declared  his  intention  to  give  proportional  political 
representation to the two wings of Pakistan26.  The first  free elections of Pakistan 
where then fixed and held on December 1970. The AL won in East Pakistan running 
a political campaign on the base of the Six-Points Programme, while in the West the 
Pakistani People Party (PPP), a political party led by the previous member of the 
Ayub government, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, emerged as the major party. The AL won 160 
of 162 seats  available for the East Pakistan candidates, ensuring the control of the 
majority of seats in the National Assembly, while PPP assured 81 seats, becoming the 
second party27. However, these results left Pakistan politically divided: on one hand, 
the day after the elections Bhutto declared that the PPP and the AL had to share the 
authority of the national government and that the AL could not lead alone; on the 
other, Mujib claimed his right to lead a government in autonomy28. 
The  first  free  elections  of  Pakistan  dramatically  ended  in  a  new  political 
stalemate  which  left  the  space  to  the  military  to  return  on  the  political  scene, 
precipitating the situation29. President Yahya Khan seized indeed the opportunity and 
intervened again, first postponing the National Assembly to 3rd March 1971, and later 
further  complicating  the  political  negotiations30.  On  21st February  the  Pakistani 
president decided indeed to dismiss the civilian government he had named in 1969, 
to rule just with his personal military advisers, and to consider the option of making a 
26 On 30th March 1970 Yahya promulgated the Legal Framework Order (LFO), giving 120 days to 
the Constitutional Assembly to frame a new Constitution where 162 seats over 300 (the majority)  
had to be given to the elected representative of East Pakistan. Golam Wahed Choudhury,  India,  
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New Delhi: 
Free Press, 1975), 92–93.
27 Craig Baxter, “Pakistan Votes -- 1970,” Asian Survey 11, no. 3 (March 1971): 206.
28 Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 132–133 and 137–142.
29 Although Sisson  and  Rose  claimed that  the  electoral  results  surprised  all  the  actors,  bringing 
president Yahya Kahn to be driven by just events, it  is possible to argue that the army, as the  
principal actor controlling the political scene in Pakistan at that time, was aware of the probability 
and interested to assume direct political control. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 310–313.
30 Yahya meeting several times in private Bhutto, and modifying repeatedly its position over the Six-
Points programme, gave the impression of preferring Bhutto and enhanced the political distrust 
that led to the stalemate.
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display of power in East Pakistan31. As a result, even though the Governor of East 
Pakistan had informed him of the risks of a further postponement of the National 
Assembly, the president dismissed the Governor, and on 1st March 1971 announced 
both the postponement sine die of the National Assembly, and a sharper imposition 
of martial law. 
The  reaction  in  the  East  was  harsh,  seeing  people  marching  in  the  streets 
seriously protesting.  On 3rd March  the AL launched a non-violent non-cooperative 
movement, blocking all the governmental and commercial activities, and recurring to 
violence  in  some  occasions32.  As  a  consequence, the  central  authority  in  East 
Pakistan collapsed, the Pakistani army found it difficult to control the situation, and a 
civil war erupted. Yahya reacted shifting to the political parties the responsibilities, 
and fixing the date for the inaugural session of the National Assembly on 25th March. 
He then flew to Dhaka on 15th March officially to try to find a last agreement with 
Mujib. Even if the negotiations came close to defining an interim government, they 
definitively failed when Bhutto, who had not been consulted since the beginning, 
joined the discussions33. As a result of the failure of the negotiations, on 25th March 
1971,  after having left  Dhaka with the West Pakistan politicians, president Yahya 
seized  the  opportunity and ordered the  Army  to  launch  a  violent  and repressive 
operation,  Operations Searchlight,  with the aim  to bring East Pakistan back under 
control as it had been successfully done in 196934.
A 24 hours curfew was therefore called, and the Army forces got out from their 
barracks with the order to suppress the political demonstrations recurring to violence 
if  necessary,  to  arrest  Awami League members,  students,  and all  those suspected 
31 Talbot, Pakistan, 206.
32 Bose,  “Anatomy  of  Violence,”  4464.  Highlighting  the  complexity  of  a  situation  where  no 
obviously right or wrong positions were present, Bose’s recent work reinforces in part the official  
Pakistani position, sustained in the Government of Pakistan,  Hamoodur Rahman Commission of  
Inquiry  Into  the  1971  India-Pakistan  War (Karachi:  Arc  Manor  LLC,  1974), 
http://www.pppusa.org/Acrobat/Hamoodur%20Rahman%20Commission%20Report.pdf,  retrieved 
on 5th May 2012.
33 President Yahya indeed invited Bhutto only on 16th March, when negotiations already were begun. 
Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 119.
34 Harry  W.  Blair,  “Sheikh  Mujib  and  Deja  Vu  in  East  Bengal:  The  Tragedies  of  March  25,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 52 (December 25, 1971): 2559.
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supporting  the  AL claims  of  major  autonomy  for  East  Pakistan.  Despite  Mujib 
Rahman  being captured, the majority of AL members escaped and found refuge in 
India.  Violence  was  indiscriminately  used,  and  women  and  Hindus  became  the 
primary  target  of  the  repression35.  Differently  from 1969,  this  time  the  military 
crackdown triggered the mutiny of the East Bengal regiment led by Major Ziaur-
Rahman on 27th March, and a popular revolt against the Pakistani Army presence. In 
some cases killings of Urdu-speaking minorities occurred, like  those of the West-
Pakistani and Bihari people (the non-Bengali Muslims who had moved from India to 
East  Pakistan  after  partition)36.  Due  to  the  opposition  of  the  Bengali  population, 
bringing back the urban centres of East Pakistan under control took the Pakistani 
Army almost six weeks. The surviving nucleus of the future Bangladesh army which 
had tried to military resist thus escaped in India, enlarging together with millions of 
Bengali  people  who  fled  violence  and  murders  the  lines  of  refugees  of  the  AL 
members. These events directly involved New Delhi, which offered hospitality first 
to the rebels and then to the refugees, and affected the already tense Indo-Pakistan 
relations, thus leading to the third Indo-Pakistani war.
  2.2 Indo-Pakistani relations until 25th March 1971
The relations between India and Pakistan, as already highlighted in the first chapter, 
had been characterised by profound distrust and rivalry since the foundation of the 
two  states.  Cultural,  religious  and  communal  divergences  developed  during  the 
colonial rule, led Pakistan to emerge on a religious base and to proclaim itself as the 
state  for  the  Indian  Muslims.  As  already  mentioned,  after  Independence  several 
35 For  a  selection  of  eyes-witness  accounts  and  newspaper  reports  see  Government  of  India,  
Bangladesh  Documents,  280–445.  For  a  complete  account  from a Bengali  point  of  view,  see 
Zaheer,  The Separation of East Pakistan; David Loshak,  Pakistan Crisis (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1971). For an account much closer to the Pakistan’s official view, see Bose, “Anatomy of 
Violence”; Sarmila Bose,  Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (New Delhi: 
Hachette India, 2011).
36 Bose, “Anatomy of Violence,” 4464–4465.
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tensions also grew, further estranging the relations among the two countries: first, the 
question of Kashmir led to military confrontation in 1948 and in 1965; and second, 
the  process  of  militarization  of  Pakistan  resulted  in  Rawalpindi  entering  the 
American sponsored alliances of CENTO and SEATO at first, and then establishing a 
growing military collaboration with China. However, after the Tashkent Conference37 
of 1966, which followed the 1965 war and laid down the conditions for a restoration 
of normal relations between the two states, relations between Islamabad and New 
Delhi did not off. First the global developments that had been analysed in the first 
chapter, like the new friendly American attitude toward Pakistan and the improving 
Sino-Pakistani  relations,  caused  New  Delhi  to  be  concerned  about  Pakistan's 
armament plans. Secondly, some specific regional issues, which will be now better 
analysed,  like  the  alleged  Indian  support  for  the  AL secession  project  in  East 
Pakistan,  and  the  Indian  reaction  to  forbid  the  flyover  right  as  a  result  of  the 
hijacking  episode  of  30th January  1971,  contributed  to  growing  tension  between 
Islamabad and New Delhi.
As already mentioned previously in this chapter, in 1966 Mujib Rahman was 
accused by the Pakistani judiciary to be part of the  Agartala conspiracy in which 
India apparently collaborated with the leaders of the AL, supporting their secessionist 
movement. Even if it is certain that Indian functionaries since 1962 and onwards met 
Bengali political leaders (a fact in itself not surprising since it was part of the duties 
of  the  diplomatic  corps  stationed  in  Dhaka),  it  is  still  unclear  if  the  Indian 
government  played  an  active  role  in  supporting  the  AL plan  to  secede,  as  the 
Pakistani government was suspecting. In the absence of official sources, it  seems 
plausible that India was seriously interested in  fostering relations with the AL to 
weaken the  strength  of  the  Pakistani  state,  and because  it  was  a  party based  on 
secular values,  thus considered more reliable to the Indian eyes than the military 
institutions of the Pakistani state, or the small Islamic parties diffused in the West, or 
37 The Tashkent Declaration was released at the end of the Conference, on the 10th of January 1966 
after  the  second Indo-Pakistani  war fought  in  1965.  The two agreed to  return  their  territorial  
position to those of the pre-conflict, so as not to interfere with each other’s internal affairs, and to 
restore economic and diplomatic relations. Francine R. Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-
2004: The Gradual Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 287–288.
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the political party led by Bhutto. Even if since 1966 Bhutto had developed a populist 
rhetoric  similar  to  the  one  of  Indira  Gandhi,  there  was  no  room for  sympathy 
between the two, and he was certainly a strong supporter of harshening the relations 
with India38. Although this fact was mainly dictated by the domestic politics goal to 
emerge as an alternative to Ayub at the political level, it did not help the relations 
between the PPP and the Indian government that became increasingly strained as a 
consequence  of  the growing aggressiveness  shown in Bhutto's  speeches  after  the 
1970 Pakistani elections39. Yet another factor strengthening the Indian support for the 
AL was that the two were more interested than Islamabad to see the lifting of the 
trade-ban between India and Pakistan in force since the 1965 war, because of the 
embargo was affecting the interests of East Pakistan and of India more than the West 
Pakistani ones40. However, a significant involvement of India in the plot to subvert 
Pakistani internal equilibrium before the dramatic events of March 1971 does not 
seem  so  credible.  Despite  the  sympathy  towards  Bengali  nationalism,  India's 
leadership  until  the  spring  of  1971  was  primarily  focused  on  domestic  politics. 
Before hand Indira Gandhi was fighting against the Syndicate, and after 1969 trying 
to gain the political power for ruling the country autonomously from the support of 
opposition parties. Even if  some economic and political  support could have been 
provided to the AL, it seems probable that this was not significant enough to alter the 
internal  relations  of  power  existing  in  Pakistan41.  In  addition  to  the  absence  of 
evidence of the alleged open support of India to the secessionists of East Pakistan, 
38 Talbot, Pakistan, 197.
39 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 40.
40 “Note on Pakistan, dated 28th November 1970”, in MEA, HI, HI/121/11/70, National Archives, 
New Delhi. On this see also: P. N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 49.
41 Talbot, Pakistan, 203–205. An evidence of the Indian presence in East Pakistan in support for AL 
is given by a note of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the section of the Indian intelligence 
service  that  deals  with  international  intelligence,  that  informs  on  13th  April  1971  the  Prime 
Minister Secretariat (PMS) of the fact that the they (together with the AL) were losing the control  
of almost all Bangladesh in favour of the Pakistan Army: “Note from RAW to PMS, dated 13th 
April 1971”, in P. N. Haksar private papers,  III inst.,  f.  n. 227, NMML Archives, New Delhi.  
However, the presence in East Pakistan’s territory of the envoys of the Indian Intelligence services 
is  not  evidence of the direct  involvement of the Indian government in a plot  aimed to divide 
Pakistan before 1971.
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the fact that the AL had an even more rigid position than the official Pakistani on the 
issue of the Ganga river (for obvious territorial interest reasons), cast also doubts on 
the fact  that  India was directly supporting the AL before the military crackdown 
launched by the military junta in March 197142.
The second issue that directly complicated bilateral relations and also had an 
important impact on the events of 1971 in East Pakistan was the hijacking by two 
Kashmiri of an Indian Airline flight from Srinagar to Jammu on 30th January 1971. 
The  two  hijackers  landed  the  plane  in  Lahore,  and  after  evacuating  crew  and 
passengers,  they  blew  it  up.  While  Pakistan's  government  granted  the  hijackers 
political asylum and allowed them to address public meetings where they strongly 
criticised India's policies in Kashmir43, on 4th February, India reacted by revoking all 
flyover rights from Pakistan over Indian Territory, both civilian and military. This 
action had a significant impact since the resumption of the over flight rights across 
each other’s  territory was the only significant  agreement  reached since Tashkent. 
This  veto  further  complicated  the  Pakistani  process  of  strengthening  its  military 
presence in East Pakistan that had begun in the second half of February as a reaction 
to the political stalemate reached with the 1970 elections, with the aim of launching a 
political  repression  to  the  AL  movement  in  East  Pakistan.  Pakistan  military 
equipment and soldiers therefore had to make longer trips around India either flying, 
or sailing through Ceylon44. Several explanations had been formulated to explain the 
hijacking: Indian intelligence and politicians believed it was an accident planned by 
42 The main issue on diverging interests of East Pakistan and India was the Farakka Barrage Project: 
a barrage located in West Bengal, only 16 km from the border with East Pakistan, right before the  
beginning of the Ganga delta, allowing India to control during the whole year the flux of water 
towards East Pakistan. This was a 1951 project of the Indian Government that consisted in the 
construction of a damn diverging waters from the Ganga to the Hoogly river in order to improve 
the navigation conditions along the latter and to preserve and maintain the Kolkata port where it 
debouched. These were the official reasons justifying the project built by the Government of India 
(see: http://mowr.gov.in/index3.asp?sslid=296&subsublinkid=714&langid=1, retrieved on the 8th 
August 2012). On the Ganga division see: Salman M. a Salman and Kishor Uprety, Conflict and 
Cooperation  on  South  Asia’s  International  Rivers:  Legal  Perspective (London:  World  Bank 
Publications,  2002),  125–194;  B.  G.  Verghese,  Waters  of  Hope:  Integrated  Water  Resource  
Development and Regional Cooperation Within the Himalayan-Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak Basin 
(Oxford: Oxford & IBH Pub. Co., 1990).
43 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 136.
44 Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 495.
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some sections of the Pakistani military in order to erode relations with India, and to 
divert attention and complicate the political negotiation process on going between the 
political  forces  of  Pakistan  to  restore  democracy45;  on  the  contrary,  a  Pakistani 
commission inquiry produced a report in April 1971 accusing the two hijackers of 
being Indian spies working in favour of the secession of East Pakistan46.  Despite 
these contrasting versions, it appears credible that New Delhi's decision to revoke the 
over flight rights came as a retaliation answer to the fact that Pakistan 4 years after 
Tashkent  was  still  linking  the  lifting  of  the  trade  ban,  the  softening  of  the  visa 
procedures, and the opening of the cultural exchange with India to the resolution of 
the question of Kashmir and Farakka47. In addition, Indian reaction could have been 
motivated  by  several  other  factors:  the  renewal  of  the  weapons  flown from the 
United  States  to  Pakistan  in  September  1970  through  the  American  one  time 
exception policy; the opening of the road connecting Pakistani Kashmir to China in 
196948; the alleged support since 1969 provided by Pakistan to the rebels of North-
East  India,  such  as  the  Naga  and  the  Mizo49;  and  the  attempt  of  Pakistan  to 
internationalize the issue of the Ganga water through the intervention of international 
organization like the World Bank in 197050. 
Therefore, Indo-Pakistan relations in March 1971 had already been really tense. 
However,  it  was  the  crisis  that  exploded  after  25th March 1971  that  definitively 
affected them, triggering a broader re-formulation of India's foreign and domestic 
45 Sisson and Rose got the impression this vision was generally diffused from several interviews they 
made in India. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 136. About the Pakistani domestic policy, it is 
relevant to note that Bhutto supported openly the hijackers, criticising India’s policy in Kashmir, 
while Mujib downplayed the event as a simple terrorist attack without linking it to India. Ibid., 76.
46 This version it is not so credible since the hijackers after 1971 war were released and in 1982 were  
still living without any restrictions in Pakistan. Sisson and Rose,  War and Secession, 137. It is 
rather more credible to think that this would have been impossible, had they actually been “Indian 
agents.”
47 “Note on the state of Indo-Pakistani relations, dated 1st August and 28th November 1970”, in MEA, 
HI, HI/121/11/70, National Archives, New Delhi. Evidence of this irritation was India deciding not 
to celebrate the 5th anniversary of the Tashkent agreement signature, and explaining its decision to 
its High Commissioning Offices in Pakistan declaring that the improvements from 1966 in the 
bilateral relations had been too slow.
48 Indeed even if the road was declared opened only in February 1971, truck passage was already 
possible  since  1969.  John W.  Garver,  Protracted  Contest (Seattle  and  London:  University  of 
Washington Press, 2001), 207.
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policies, and a re-organization of the entire South Asian political equilibrium.
  3. India's foreign policy formulation from March to July 1971
India officially reacted to the launch of  Operation Searchlight assuming a neutral 
position, and indeed it depicted it as a domestic affair of Pakistan; but this did not  
prevent  New  Delhi  to  immediately  grant  hospitality  to  the  Bengali  political 
leadership  and  to  the  refugees,  and  to  support  their  cause  through  sympathetic 
statements.  The situation changed significantly from mid-April,  when the flux of 
refugees became consistent. At that point, New Delhi declared that their settlement 
would only have been on a  temporary base,  in  special  camps along the borders, 
limited until the solution of the East Pakistani crisis. India carried on keeping its 
formal neutral position, but increased its military support of Bengali guerrilla forces, 
49 The control over the North Eastern area of India had already been a problem for the British during 
the colonial era since the Eastern regions were not densely populated and they were instead largely 
controlled by tribes that maintained a sort of autonomy from the British rule. When New Delhi  
with Independence extended its political control over these remote and distant areas of the North  
East some Naga groups, after an initial period of consultations, in mid-1950s recurred to arms to  
raise their cause for larger autonomy and independence. Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi:  
The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: Pan Macmillan, 2011), 271.  New Delhi 
at the time sharply reacted sending the Army to brutally repress the rebels, and at the same time try 
to find a political solution. It granted them in 1953 the creation of their own state (Nagaland),  
without  however  ending  the  quest  for  independence  raised  by  the  rebels.  Rebels  after  1966 
established some contacts with Beijing that began indirectly to support them. During that period 
another  violent  movement  also  emerged  in  the Mizo hills  calling for  independence,  which  is 
generally know as the Mizos. This has led New Delhi since1969 to accuse Islamabad of allowing 
the establishment of Chinese training camps into its territories along the borders with North-East 
India for the Indian rebels. After several years of military repression and negotiations a state, the  
Mizoram, was then granted in 1986 to this population ending their rebellion. However, in reality 
the  rebels  problem  is  much  more  complex  for  India  and  Pakistan:  indeed  Pakistan  actively 
supported dissident elements in Jammu and Kashmir, while India continued to provide economic 
and political support to the Pakhtoon dissidents in the North-West Frontier province of Pakistan. 
Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 43.
50 “Telegram of the Indian Embassy in Washington to High Commissioner of India in Pakistan on 
10th February”, and “Telegram of the latter to Foreign Secretary in New Delhi on 11 th January 
1970”, in MEA, AMS, WII/104/14/70, National Archives, New Delhi.
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and its urge over the international community to ask Pakistan to achieve a fast crisis 
solution that could bring back the refugees. According to India, this was the only 
solution  that  could  assure  the  restoration  of  democratic  policies  in  Pakistan  and 
return the AL to government  in  East  Pakistan.  Before analysing the evolution of 
India's foreign policy during spring and the first half of summer 1971, it is important 
to consider briefly who those Indian institutions and people were that handled the 
foreign policy decision-making process. Since it was highly centralised, few people 
directly influenced the formulation of India's foreign policy. Therefore, it becomes 
interesting to spend time in presenting them.
  3.1 The foreign policy decision-making process in India in 1971
The foreign policy decision-making process in India in 1971 was highly centralised 
to a small circle of the Prime Minister’s personal advisers that held positions in the 
Prime Minister Secretariat (PMS) and in the Cabinet Secretary. This group of people 
made decisions informally calling on the Army and Intelligence when considered 
necessary.  This  was  partially  a  historical  consequence  of  the  fact  that  since 
Independence Jawaharlal Nehru had not only been the Prime Minister until his death 
in 1964, but also the Minister of External Affairs for the whole period51, and that he 
was  used  to  making decisions  upon foreign-policy matters  mainly consulting  his 
circle  of  personal  advisers52;  and occasionally the  Parliament,  the  Cabinet  or  the 
51 On this question see: Warren F. Ilchman, “Political Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of 
India,”  Journal of  Commonwealth Political  Studies 4,  no. 3 (1966):  216–230; Sumit Ganguly, 
“The Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” in Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing  
Office of  Prime Minister  in India,  by James Manor and B.  D. Dua (London: C. Hurst  & Co. 
Publishers,  1994),  142–143;  Steven  A.  Hoffmann,  India  and  the  China  Crisis (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), 46–47.
52 This group was really restricted to the personal friend of the Prime Minister, Krishna Menon, who 
in 1957 became Minister of Defence, to the Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant for the period  
preceding 1962, to B. N. Mullik, the head of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and to Subimal Dutt, the 
Foreign Secretary.
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Army officers. Although after the 1962 defeat53 of India in the war with China the 
foreign policy decision-making institutionalisation process was consolidated, in 1971 
it had reached only partial results. However, several explanations have been given to 
explain why it was characterised by such a high concentration of power: some argued 
that the personal character of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, insecure and power-
hungry,  contributed  to  the  centralisation54.  Others argue  that  personal  influences 
alone  cannot  explain  the  whole  scenario:  social,  economic  and  political  aspects, 
which  have  already  been  briefly  analysed  in  the  first  chapter,  would  have  also 
contributed to the centralisation process that involved the Indian government55. The 
fact that both Pakistan and Bangladesh in the same period, and in similar condition of 
deep crisis  and large  weakness  of  their  dominant  political  parties,  experienced a 
similar regime of authoritarian democracies further reinforces this thesis56. However, 
the long standing disinterest of the Indian politicians in foreign policy, as argued by 
Tharoor57, certainly contributed to the process in relation to the foreign policy area. 
53 During the initial phases of the 1962 war the opinions of the Army were generally not seriously 
considered. Even worse, the Prime Minister on several occasions bypassed their criticism deciding 
to promote to the apex of the Army those who were condescending towards the government’s will, 
like Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul during the last phases that preceded the Sino-Indian war of 1962. On this 
see for example: Neville Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,”  The China 
Quarterly no. 43 (July 1, 1970): 179–199 and 202.
54 See for example:  Surjit  Mansingh,  India’s  Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s  Foreign Policy,  
1966-1982 (London: Sage Publications, 1984), 19–29; B. D. Dua and James Manor, Nehru to the  
Nineties: The Changing Office of Prime Minister in India (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 
1994),  8;  Paul  R.  Brass,  The  Politics  of  India  Since  Independence (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Frankel,  India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004; Harish Kapur,  Foreign 
Policies Of India’s Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2009), 124–130.
55 It has been argued that the growing Congress party crisis that began in the first half of the Sixties  
indeed could have contributed to the centralisation of power into the Prime Minister hands and of  
her  advisers.  On  this  see:  Atul  Kohli,  Democracy  and Discontent:  India’s  Growing Crisis  of  
Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). At the same time some sustain that 
the Indian growing socio-economic conflicts that emerged in the second half of Sixties, and the 
masses entrance into politics could have created a situation of instability that indirectly favoured 
the emergence of a strong man at the political level. On this see for example: James Manor, “Party 
Decay and Political Crisis in India,”  The Washington Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1981): 25–40; James 
Manor, “Anomie in Indian Politics: Origins and Potential Wider Impact,” Economic and Political  
Weekly 18,  no.  19/21  (May  1,  1983):  725–734;  Sudipta  Kaviraj,  “Indira  Gandhi  and  Indian 
Politics,”  Economic  and  Political  Weekly 21,  no.  38/39  (September  20,  1986):  1697–1708; 
Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004.
56 On this topic see: Ayesha Jalal,  Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative  
and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
57 Shashi Tharoor, Reasons of State: Political Development and India’s Foreign Policy Under Indira  
Gandhi, 1966-1977 (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House, 1982), 116.
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What  is  important  to  note  here  is  that  the  Indian  Parliament  was  almost 
completely excluded from the decision making process. By 1971 all the Parliament 
committees  concerned  with  foreign  policy  issues,  organised  during  Shastri's 
government,  had  been  abolished  and  replaced  in  1970  with  the  Political  Affairs 
Committee (PAC): a body that only occasionally functioned58, and that was chaired 
by the Prime Minister  herself,  and composed only of  those Ministers  that  Indira 
Gandhi had maintained from her previous government, therefore clearly loyal to her, 
or at least considered as such. These were the Minister of External Affairs, Swaran 
Singh, the Minister of Defence, Jagjivan Ram, the Minister of Finance, Y. B. Chavan, 
the Minister of Agriculture and Food, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and the  Minister of 
State K. C. Pant, who was inter alia in charge of the situation in West Bengal. The 
rest of the Cabinet was generally just informed of the decision taken by the PAC and 
the Prime Minister,  and its “formal approval, when requested, was automatic and 
usually given without serious discussion”59. The exclusion of the Parliament from the 
decision-making process related to foreign policy matters was also directly favoured 
by the fact that the government held a large majority after 1971. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  military and the  intelligence  were  involved in  the 
foreign  policy  decision-making  process  only  informally,  though  after  1962  new 
authority and weight had been recognised for both institutions. During the Pakistani 
invasion of Kashmir in 1965 Lal Bahadur Shastri, Nehru's successor, left almost all 
decisions about the formulation and implementation of the defence strategy to the 
military60. In  addition after 1962 the military intelligence was strengthened, with a 
50% increase of the assigned officers61. Moreover, after the 1965 war with Pakistan, 
in  order  to  increase  independence  and  efficiency  in  the  intelligence  work,  the 
competences of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) were restricted to the internal field. A 
new body, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was created in 1968, assuming 
control over the international intelligence; furthermore a new committee, the Joint 
58 Ganguly, “The Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” 152.
59 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 140.
60 Ganguly, “The Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” 30.
61 Steven A. Hoffmann, “Anticipation, Disaster and Victory: India 1962-71,” Asian Survey 12, no. 11 
(1972): 977.
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Intelligence Committee (JIC),  was formed to coordinate  the different  intelligence 
services, like the IB, the RAW and those of the military, and passed under the direct 
and  personal  control  of  the  Prime  Minister62.  However,  the  military  and  the 
intelligence roles in 1971 were not formally institutionalised. In fact, for example, 
Indira Gandhi during her first government had abolished the Defence Committee (set 
up during Shastri's government): an organ through which the three Indian military 
forces’ chiefs (Army, Navy and Air) had to become involved in decision-making63. 
Therefore, the army and the intelligence heads were consulted only when the Prime 
Minister and her advisers considered it strictly necessary. 
As  a  consequence,  the  dominant  component  of  the  foreign  policy  decision-
making process was the bureaucracy. The institutional places where the process was 
effectively carried out were indeed those inter-ministerial committees that included 
all  the  key  Indian  administrative  officials,  such  as  the  PMS  and  the  Cabinet 
Secretariat.  In  the  Cabinet  Secretariat  these  were  V.  W.  Swaminathan  (cabinet 
secretary), P. N. Haksar (Prime Minister's secretary), K. B. Lal (defence secretary), I. 
G.  Patel  (economy secretary),  T.  N.  Kaul  (foreign  secretary)64.  Moreover,  Indira 
Gandhi dealing with the Pakistan crisis in 1971 relied largely on a number of other 
secretaries  of  the  Prime  Minister  Secretariat  (PMS):  like  G.  Ramachandra,  M. 
Malhotra, Sharada Prasad, and B. N. Tandon, who later achieved important posts in 
the Indian administrative service. Other key figures of the administration at that time: 
P. N. Dhar, who later replaced Haksar in 1973 as principal secretary of the Prime 
Minister, in 1971 was the external adviser of the PMS; and G. Parthasarthy, the close  
confidant of Indira Gandhi65. The other functionary that played a crucial role was D. 
P. Dhar: a socialist member of the Congress For Socialist Actions that had formerly 
been ambassador to the Soviet Union, who after the eruption of the Pakistani crisis 
was designated head of the Policy Planning Committee in the Ministry of External 
62 Asoka Raina, Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), 12–14.
63 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 139.
64 Ibid.
65 Bishan Narain Tandon, PMO Diary: The Emergency (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2006), viii–
ix.
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Affairs66.  From that position D. P. Dhar strategically controlled the setting of the 
long-term targets for India's foreign policy, and the entire institution of the Ministry 
of External Affairs that, as a matter of fact, played a secondary role in the decision-
making  process67.  The  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  was  thus  consulted  by  the 
political leadership only when considered useful.
What has been said until now underlines the statement that only a few people 
directly influenced the decision making process in 1971: the most important role was 
obviously that of Indira Gandhi, who ultimately retained the last word and the power 
to decide68; followed by P. N. Haksar, her principal secretary, who during those years 
had  been  described  as  the  “main  centre  of  power  and  authority”  in  the  Indian 
government69. Further down the chain of command were D. P. Dhar, P. N. Dhar, and 
T. N. Kaul, who together with Haksar were known as the Kashmiri Mafia, for their 
ethnic  provenance,  and  for  the  influence  they  had  upon  the  Prime  Minister.  To 
understand  why  Indira  Gandhi  preferred  circling  with  bureaucrats  instead  of 
politicians,  let  us  reassert  at  this  point  her  personality,  insecure and incapable of 
tolerating criticism, which directly influenced the way the decision-making process 
was carried out, impeding her in trusting her political colleagues70. In fact, in the 
absence of a specific ideological inclination or a clear personal vision of the world, 
Mrs. Gandhi had to rely on her advisers to formulate long term strategies71. Others 
analysts when talking of Indira Gandhi rather prefer to describe her as a person just 
interested in detaining political power, and sitting on top of the “decision making 
66 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 463.
67 Under  the  level  of  secretary  indeed  the  bureaucracy of  the  Ministry of  External  Affairs  was 
subservient: because those high-ranking officials, such as Jagat Mehta, that had tried to criticise  
PMS’ decisions in appointing new officials, had been sent in 1971 outside New Delhi for other  
duties. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 141; The fact that the same Foreign Minister Swaran 
Singh (1970-1974) was a man of Indira, loyal and submissive, and that Y. B. Chavan became then 
Foreign Minister (1974-1977) did not help making the independence of the Ministry.  Tharoor, 
Reasons of State, 151–156.
68 P. N. Dhar sustains in his book that she generally consulted and carefully took into consideration 
the opinions of her advisers, but on several occasions she decided not to follow their indications. 
Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 144.
69 V. A. Pai Panandiker and Ajay K. Mehra, The Indian Cabinet: a Study in Governance (New Delhi: 
Konark Publishers, 1996), 227.
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pyramid”72 who had no problems manipulating people for her personal interests73. 
Insecure and power-hungry Indira Gandhi developed an authoritarian style of ruling 
that explains the growing role of bureaucracy under her mandate: in fact bureaucrats, 
lacking a political base of power in the Congress or among the people, were indeed 
not  able  to  challenge  the  Prime  Minister’s  political  influence,  while  they  were 
however able to support her in the decision-making process. 
This explains why P. N. Haksar, her private secretary from 1967, became the 
most influential man of Indira Gandhi's group of personal advisers74. Haksar had a 
career as a civil servant, holding important posts at the diplomatic level in several 
states in Europe. Serving as secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, he had the 
70 She had a lonely and difficult childhood: with her mother having a long-term sickness before 
dying prematurely ; and her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, often absorbed by his political engagements 
as the leader of the Indian nationalist movement that fought against the colonial rule at first (he  
spent  several  years  in  prison),  and  later  as  the  Prime  Minister  of  Independent  India.  Her 
personality remained for a long time highly insecure even when she became an adult, she often  
experienced long periods of depression and witnessed several failures in her academic and private  
life. Katherine Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2010),  251–271;  Kapur,  Foreign  Policies  Of  India’s  Prime  Ministers,  124–126.  Although  her 
father insisted on having her educated in one of the best universities of that time, such as Oxford,  
Indira Gandhi  repeatedly failed exams and finally abandoned academia without concluding it. 
Moreover,  during her  youth  she  suffered  for  a  long period with  serious health  problems that  
obliged  her  to  remain in  a  sanatorium in  Switzerland.  Lastly,  even  her  marriage  with Feroze 
Gandhi, thoroughly desired by Indira Gandhi, soon failed. She then moved into her father’s house 
becoming his primary help in both practical and political issues. When following her father and  
Shastri’s death she became Prime Minister, her persona also began to influence her way of dealing  
with political power. At the beginning of her political career she was much too shy, insecure and 
did not shine for her oratory capabilities. For these reasons it has been reported that she was called  
“dumb doll”. Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Hodder, 2010), 43. However, after a few 
years  in  power  she  quickly transformed  herself,  gaining  self-esteem,  and  generally becoming 
perceived as the “only man in the government” in 1971. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”,  
and  Indian  Democracy,  123.  For  more  information  over  the  life  of  Indira  Gandhi  consult 
biographies  like  for  example:  Frank,  Indira;  Malhotra,  Indira  Gandhi;  Benny  Aguiar,  Indira 
Gandhi,  a  Political  Biography  1966-1984 (Vitasta  Pub.,  2007);  Dhar,  Indira  Gandhi,  the 
“Emergency”,  and Indian  Democracy;  Pupul  Jayakar,  Indira  Gandhi:  An Intimate  Biography 
(New Delhi: Pantheon Books, 1992); Zareer Masani, Indira Gandhi: a Biography (New Delhi: T. 
Y. Crowell, 1976); Uma Vasudev,  Two Faces of Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House, 
1977);  Uma Vasudev,  Indira Gandhi:  Revolution in  Restraint (New Delhi:  Vikas Pub.  House, 
1974).
71 Mansingh, India’s Search for Power, 27; Kapur, Foreign Policies Of India’s Prime Ministers, 123. 
P.  R. Chari,  in the interview done on 29th November 201,  argued she was not  really able to  
conceptualise and that she relied on others for that within the PMS, such as P. N. Haksar, D. P. 
Dhar and P. N. Dhar. She did not write books or spend her time in long philosophical discussions,  
as opposed for example to Haksar who wrote Premonitions (1979), Reflections in our time (1982),  
One more life (1989) and India’s Foreign Policy and its Problems (1989) and edited several others 
books. Thus she was a pragmatist and a tactical person, rather than a thinker or a strategist.
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Prime Minister's confidence also thanks to the fact that he had been a close friend of 
Indira  Gandhi's  husband,  Feroze  Gandhi,  since  their  youth.  Known as  a  staunch 
socialist, he was one of the most influential persons within the Congress Forum for 
Socialist Action on which Indira Gandhi had begun to rely since 1967 when she tilted 
toward leftist policies to win her battle for power within the Congress75. His desire to 
see leftist forces assuming the position of power in India led him first to believe and 
support Indira Gandhi, and then to work with her to reinforce the Prime Minister’s 
powers through a bureaucratization of the political decision making process, with the 
clear  aim  to  weaken  the  moderate  and  more  conservative  forces  present  in  the 
Congress party. Having the power to control all the civil servant appointments in 
Indira Gandhi's government76, Haksar facilitated the ascent of those bureaucrats loyal 
to  Indira  Gandhi,  and  contributed  to  the  Indian  bureaucracy  “politicization” 
process77. This fact seriously undermined the bureaucratic independence, especially 
of the PMS, and of the Cabinet Secretariat, that were actually the key institutions 
72 Stanley A. Kochanek, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid: The New Congress,” in Indira Gandhi’s India: a  
Political System Reappraised, by Henry Cowles Hart (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), 95–102. 
This aspect of her personality was also expressed by her obsession, already developed in 1969 
according  to  her  biographer,  in  identifying  herself  with  the  nation,  and  in  considering  her 
permanence to power as necessary for the future of the nation. Frank, Indira, 320. By 1971 she had 
indeed centralised the power within the Congress party in her hands, intervening, as already shown 
in the first chapter, with the selection of candidates for the 1971 elections, and by-passing the  
structure of the party through a direct and populist call to the masses. Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and 
Indian Politics”. Moreover, after the electoral victory Indira Gandhi assumed not only the position 
of  Prime Minister,  but  also the portfolio of  the Information and Broadcasting Ministry,  of  the 
Home Affairs Ministry, of the Planning Ministry and of the Atomic Energy.
73 Interview with P. R. Chari, dated 29th November 2011 at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 
(IPCS), Salfadurang Enclave, New Delhi. Prof. P. R. Chari was a civil servant at the Ministry of 
Defence from 1971 to 1975. He had not direct access to the Prime Minister at that time, but he 
based his affirmations upon his memories of that time and on the accounts of other more important 
bureaucrats, such as B. N. Tandon. 
74 From a letter sent by D. P. Dhar to Haksar on 22nd December 1972 one can easily understand that 
Haksar was the man after the Prime Minister that had major power in the Indian government: in 
this letter D. P. Dhar, a close adviser of Indira Gandhi, gives his apologies to Haksar for having 
criticised a decision made by the latter. See: “Letter from D. P. Dhar, to Principal Secretary, P. N. 
Haksar, dated 22nd December 1972”, in P. N. Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 235, NMML Archives, 
New Delhi. The relation of power that emerges clearly confirms the impression that Haksar was  
the most powerful man even inside the small circle of close advisers of the Prime Minister.
75 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 401.
76 Tharoor, Reasons of State, 116.
77 David Potter, “The Prime Minister and the Bureaucracy,” in Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing  
Office of Prime Minister in India (New Delhi: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1994), 86–87.
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where foreign policies were formulated78. Having Indira Gandhi's direct support and 
confidence, Haksar during 1971 was therefore the first bureaucrat to influence India's 
decision making process in such a considerable way, especially at the foreign policy 
level79. The Prime Minister indeed trusted him so much that it has been argued that 
“his guidance was behind most of the initiatives that Indira took to prevail over the 
Syndicate”80. As a consequence of all these aspects, within the PMS and the Cabinet 
Secretariat decisions were taken in a highly informal way. According to P. N. Dhar's 
account,  the  decision  making  process  was  indeed  completely  dominated  by  “a 
personality cult”, and by the fact that “a court came into existence” where the Prime 
Minister and P. N. Haksar held positions of major authority and respect81. Also B. N. 
Tandon  recognises  the  fact  that  the  people  who  worked  close  to  Indira  Gandhi 
generally lacked the courage and vision to obstruct her authoritarian style82. This was 
related to the fact that political and bureaucratic careers during the government of 
Indira Gandhi were completely dependent on the loyalty people demonstrated to her 
or her advisers, rather than on their political base or capabilities83. 
Therefore,  the  decision-making  process  related  to  the  handling  of  the  East 
Pakistani  crisis  that  exploded in March 1971 was significantly influenced by the 
Prime Minister and her small group of advisers, excluding other sources playing their 
part, such as the Parliament and the Cabinet. As it will be shown later in this chapter, 
this aspect left ground to polemics about the decisions New Delhi took about some 
issues84.
78 Tharoor, Reasons of State, 144–145.
79 See  for  example:  “Letter  form  P.  N.  Haksar  to  Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi,  dated  8 th 
October1970”,  in P. N.  Haksar,  III  inst.,  f.  n.160, NMML Archives,  New Delhi.  Here Haksar 
criticises and tries to influence the choice made by the Director about who to promote in the top 
ranks of the military.
80 Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 635.
81 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 135.
82 Tandon, PMO Diary, xxiii–xli.
83 Tharoor, Reasons of State, 118.
84 This is particularly true for the Simla agreement, as it will be shown later.
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  3.2 The first reaction of New Delhi to the launch of Operation Searchlight
New  Delhi  in  the  days  that  followed  the  launch  of  the  Operation  Searchlight 
elaborated an ambiguous position: India officially assumed formal neutrality with 
respect  to the crisis  in East  Pakistan,  but  granted its  concrete support to Bengali 
nationalism. Indira Gandhi in her statements in the Lok Sabha on 27th March indeed 
declared the intention of her government to “act within proper international norms”85, 
while two days later Samar Sen, India's representative at the United Nations, defined 
the development in East Pakistan as being a “domestic affair” of Pakistan86. By doing 
so,  India  expressed  its  anguish  over  the  human  rights  violation  perpetrated  by 
Pakistan, also trying to focus international attention on the matter. Therefore, on 30 th 
March Samar Sen submitted a note concerning the “question of the situation in East 
Pakistan” highlighting the dramatic on going situation87. The same Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi on 4th April declared that it was “neither proper nor possible” for India 
not to comment on the East Pakistan situation88. 
In spite of these mild neutral declarations, the official Indian reaction revealed 
immediately the support toward the Bengali, through different channels, some more 
subtle than others. Firstly, Indira Gandhi and the Foreign Minister in their official 
Indian Parliament public speeches on 27th March declared the general support of the 
government to the people of East Pakistan, and its availability to help them as it did 
during the numerous natural disasters that had hit East Pakistan in the past89. Second, 
Indira Gandhi also openly manifested India's sympathy towards the Bengali inserting 
an element that clearly revealed India's inclinations: in her speeches she purposely 
85 Indira  Nehru  Gandhi,  India  and  Bangla  Desh;  Selected  Speeches  and  Statements,  March  to  
December, 1971 [By] Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), 11.
86 The Times of India, 31 March 1971.
87 Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 275.
88 Robert Victor Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 44.
89 Gandhi,  India and Bangla Desh; Selected Speeches and Statements, March to December, 1971  
[By] Indira Gandhi, 9–12.
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used the term “East Bengal” or “Bangladesh”, and not “East Pakistan”90. It should 
also be considered that even in the private conversations between Haksar and Gandhi 
the term “East Bengal people” was always used91. 
Moreover,  the  sympathy  towards  Bengali  nationalism  was  diffused  in  both 
Indian  society  and  political  elite:  this  also  immediately  emerged  through  the 
reactions  of  political  parties,  the  press,  and some other  influential  figures.  These 
supportive reactions in some cases became critical with respect to the government’s 
neutral and cautious reaction. Some elements inside the Congress party for example 
urged a  tough response of the Indian government,  while  some opposition parties 
directly called for a military intervention in order to support the repressed Bengali 
forces92.  However,  the fact that the Congress was leading a majority government, 
installed just a few days before the crisis, enabled it to largely ignore the opposition’s 
interventions and critics. This facilitated the duty of the Prime Minister, and of her 
advisers who could take their time to evaluate the situation and carefully choose how 
to proceed. Only a few sections of the press, namely the conservative comprising 
Motherland and the  Organizer,  and the communist  pro-Soviet  newspaper  Patriot, 
criticised the official government reaction, demanding direct military intervention. 
All  the  other  newspapers,  especially  the  English-language  ones,  took  a  more 
moderate position, supporting the government93. The only interventions that publicly 
embarrassed New Delhi were the ones made by Jayaprakash Narayan94, who asked to 
sustain more Bengali forces, and by K. Subrahmanyam, the director of the Institute 
of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi. In a seminar held by the 
90 Similarly the resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Congress of the 29th of March,  
and the resolution of the Lok Sabha on the 31th of March. Government of India,  Bangladesh 
Documents, 669–672.
91 “Letter from Principal Secretary, P. N. Haksar, to Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, dated 26 th March 
1971” and “Letter from Principal Secretary, P. N. Haksar, to Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, dated 
27th March 1971”, in P. N. Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 164, in NMML Archives, New Delhi.
92 The Time of India, 8 April 1971; and Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 149.
93 “Old Wine,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 13 (March 27, 1971): 690.
94 The Hindustan Times, 17th March 1971. Jayaprakash Narayan, popularly known as J. P., was an 
Indian independence activist and a respected Gandhian leader. After his retirement from political  
life following the Indian Independence, he returned on the political scene during the Seventies,  
playing later  a  national  role in  leading the  opposition to  Indira Gandhi's  government  in  1975 
against its corruption and authoritarianism.
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Council  of World Affairs on 31st March, Subrahmanyan expressed the need for a 
direct Indian military intervention95, and on 5th April he published an article in the 
National Herald where he wrote that: “the breakup of Pakistan is in our interest and 
we  have  an  opportunity  the  like  of  which  will  never  come  again”96.  Although 
Subrahmanyan  declared  this  without  consulting  any  Indian  government  officers 
before  expressing  his  personal  opinion,  it  is  clear  that  his  decision  to  take  that 
position probably had some impact on the political leadership in New Delhi. He was 
an influential political analyst leading the national strategic thinking, funded by the 
Indian  Ministry  of  Defence97.  However,  at  least  at  a  first,  India  decided  to  act 
differently from what he advised, keeping a cautious approach towards the crisis. 
Likewise, several others public figures intervened in the debate over the crisis in East 
Pakistan  supporting  the  government,  for  example:  C.  Rajagopalachari,  former 
governor  general  of  India  and  former  chief  minister  of  Tamil  Nadu,  General 
Cariappa, former commanding general of the Indian army, and M. Karunanidhi, chief 
minister of Tamil Nadu. They sustained the softer approach proposed by New Delhi, 
underlining the risks that hasty action could have created98.
Despite of the public discussions and the reaction of the press, the Indian foreign 
policy decision-making process remained highly centralised within the small circle 
of advisers that surrounded the Prime Minister.  Discussions were kept secret and 
limited to the PMS and PAC circle, with the executive consulting neither the Cabinet 
nor the Parliament. However, according to P. N. Dhar, the criticism raised by the civil 
society against the weak reaction of the Indian government instilled some doubts in 
the Prime Minister  who decided to  consult  the  Army;  at  least  for  evaluating  the 
possibilities  of  a  direct  military  intervention  of  India  in  the  Pakistani  crisis  for 
solving the issue in favour of the AL99. According to J. N. Dixit, who at that time was 
Deputy  Secretary  in  the  UN division  of  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs100,  this 
decision  was  also  supported  by D.  P.  Dhar.  Instead,  although Swaran Singh and 
95 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 151.
96 Pakistan Horizon, 5th April 1971, 64.
97 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 150.
98 The Hindu, 30th March 1971.
99 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 157.
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Haksar  accepted  to  listen  to  the  army’s  advice,  they clearly declared  themselves 
contrary to  a  conflict  underlining  the  necessity  to  respect  international  norms to 
avoid the world community condemnation, and the possibility that a similar position 
could later  be taken by other  countries  in  relation to  the question of Kashmir101. 
Based on these different opinions the Army and the Ministry of Defence, Jagjivan 
Ram, were therefore asked for advice.
It  has  been  reported  that  the  Chief  of  the  Army  Staff,  Gen.  S.  F.  H.  J. 
Manekshaw, informed the government that, in the best case scenario, the completion 
of a successful military intervention would have required several months102. Indeed, 
it would have required time to prepare the army for a direct military intervention: 
although the expansion and re-organisation of the Indian armed forces that began 
after the 1962 war with China, and continued after the 1965 war with Pakistan, with 
the aim of being able to fight a two-front war were proceeding fast, in the spring of 
1971 they were still not concluded103. In addition, it would also have been necessary 
to wait for the dry season to allow military movements in the area of East Pakistan,  
since it was expecting monsoons in the April-May period, and even better to wait for 
winter time when the Himalayan passes would have been naturally blocked by the 
snow, preventing a direct Chinese military reaction104. At last, Gen. Manekshaw also 
warned the government that it was strategically fundamental to wait in order to allow 
the Bengali armed forces re-organization, and to support formation and training of 
Bengali guerrilla groups – activities that would have required three to four months at 
least105. Exploiting Bengali support in both forms would have facilitated the Indian 
intervention since these local groups knew the territory better, and had the support of 
100Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 50. J. N. Dixit based his descriptions over the secondary briefings 
he received on the discussions the Prime Minister had with a closer group of senior by D. P. Dhar, 
at that time chairman of the Policy Planning Committee, and T. N. Kaul, Foreign Secretary, who  
actively took part in those meetings.
101“Letter from Principal Secretary, P. N. Haksar, to Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, dated 26 th and 
27th March 1971”, in P. N. Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 174, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
102Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 209.
103D. K. Palit, Lightning Campaign: Indo-Pakistan War, 1971 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1972), 
41–43.
104Ibid., 44.
105Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 209.
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the population.
Therefore, the military recommendations, reinforcing the authoritative position 
taken by Haksar concerning the impropriety of attacking Pakistan at that time106, led 
the  Indian  political  leadership  to  exclude  the  possibility  of  starting  a  war  to 
immediately  solve  the  crisis.  Nevertheless,  during  the  first  days  of  April,  the 
demonstrations of general support expressed by the Indian government became more 
explicit. New Delhi, reacting to the fact that the Pakistani Army was re-gaining the 
control  over  the  larger  cities  of  East  Pakistan107,  allowed  the  Awami  League  to 
establish  its  headquarters  in  Calcutta,  and  to  proclaim  on  17 th that  month  the 
formation  of  the  Sovereign  People's  Republic  of  Bangladesh,  without  however 
officially  recognizing  it.  Furthermore,  India  took  several  other  actions:  giving 
hospitality on its territory along the border to the people escaping from Bangladesh; 
allowing  Radio Free Bangla to set up near Calcutta; transforming the old Pakistan 
High Commission office to function as a Bangladeshi mission; and forming training 
camps for the Bangladeshi liberation,  called  Mukti  Bahini108,  on its  own territory 
directly  controlling  their  organizations  through  the  provision  of  military  and 
economic support.  The control  of the camps was indeed assigned by New Delhi 
before the Border Security Forces (BSF), and after 30 th April to the Indian Army109. 
Moreover, India “began a gradual but substantial build-up of its military forces” in 
the North-East states110. The aim was to control the political order of the area111, and 
to  answer  the  threatening  presence  of  the  Pakistan  Army.  By the  end  of  April, 
following the regain of control over the territory, the Pakistani armed forces indeed 
began to concentrate their troops along the borders with India. This was a significant 
sign since even during the 1965 conflict East Pakistan was barely armed enough to 
106“Letter from Principal Secretary, P. N. Haksar, to Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, dated 26 th and 
27th March 1971, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 174, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
107The Pakistani  victories  had been reported in  Indian press  since mid-April.  Sumanta Banerjee, 
“Next Phase of the War,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 16 (April 17, 1971): 818–819.
108Literally meaning “Freedom Fighters”. This name generally described the forces that were trained 
in  unconventional  ways  by either  the  Indian  or  the  Bangladesh  Army officers,  and  that  later  
directly contributed to the liberation of Bangladesh.
109Interview with Gen. Jacob held in New Delhi on the 6th of December 2011.
110Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 145.
111Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 275.
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guarantee its internal security. Finally, the dispatch of Indian military forces in West 
Bengal turned out to be doubly useful to New Delhi, since it provided major freedom 
to the government of West Bengal for dealing with the Naxalite movement, which 
was, by that time, becoming a serious challenge to the state power supremacy in the 
North-East Indian region112. Not surprisingly the increasing presence of armed forces 
in  West  Bengal  was  carried  accompanied  by  the  introduction  of  a  presidential 
ordinance allowing preventive detention113.
From the analysis  developed so far,  there is  no element to argue that India’s 
reaction was passive and only driven by events, as expressed by some114. Instead, it 
seems clear that from March New Delhi followed a clear strategy of supporting the 
112The Naxalites movement originated in 1967 in Naxalbari, in the Darjeeling district where India  
touches Nepal and East Pakistan; in the strategic corridor that provides access to the states of the  
North-East. In the same year other groups of Naxalites became active in Andra Pradesh and in 
Orissa,  claiming  better  wages  for  labourers,  redistribution  of  land  and  access  right  to  forest 
products. Since 1967 the term “Naxalite” became however the word used to address all the radical  
revolutionaries  active  in  India.  In  that  area  the  rural  poor  were  mobilised  by  some  political 
exponents  of  the  CPM on the  basis  of  the  deeply inequitable  agrarian  structure  of  that  area. 
Following those events the CPM and the Bangla Congress, a breakaway of the Congress party, 
took power in West Bengal in 1967, leaving the activists the freedom to recur to violence. After the 
fall of the government and the President Rule imposition in 1968, a new set of elections in 1969 
restored power to the CPM-Bangla Congress coalition; which then tried to open a dialogue with  
the Naxalites, and to pursue an effective redistribution of land. The situation, however, became 
chaotic,  problems  emerged  on  how  land  should  be  distributed,  and  violence  spread  in  the 
countryside.  Tensions  grew  between  the  two  parties  in  power,  between  the  West  Bengal 
government and the Naxalites that formed a new party, the CPI (Marxist-Leninist), to distinguish  
them from the CPM, and between the state and New Delhi. Guha, India After Gandhi, 422–424; 
An intensive anti-terrorist campaign was therefore launched by New Delhi after the reintroduction 
in March 1970 of the President Rule. Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 381; On the 
2nd of April in 1971 a new coalition government led by Indian National Congress took power, 
exploiting the division which had emerged among the Marxist parties (The Statesman, 16 March 
1971).  In  spite  of  the  superior  position  assumed  by  the  Congress,  CPM  being  out  of  the  
government was interpreted by New Delhi as a new threat, since it was free to re-establish closer  
ties with the Naxalite movement. This was a challenge for New Delhi that wanted to bring back  
the state  under the Congress  control.  For a better  analysis  of  the Naxalite  movement  see,  for  
example: Sumanta Banerjee, India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising (Michigan: Zed 
Books, 1984); Prakash Singh, The Naxalite Movement in India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1996).
113The  presidential  ordinance  was  later  introduced  into  Lok  Sabha  and  voted  in  1974  as  the  
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). This law empowered the governments at the centre 
and in the states to detain people without process for up to one year in order to prevent actions 
against the security of India, of the states and of the maintenance of the public order. Frankel, 
India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 457.
114Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 141; Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 37; Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 
the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 50.
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Bengali  forces115.  Moreover,  some documents  prove  that  even  before  25th  March 
India's political leadership already had quite a clear view concerning what was going 
on in Pakistan. In fact, on 14th January 1971 the RAW had already sent the Cabinet 
Secretary a note about the Pakistani situation, considering it highly probable that the 
democratic forces in Pakistan could be repressed again, and judging the situation as a 
potential threat for India's security116. Moreover, Yayha Khan's decision to dismiss 
the  Pakistani  civilian  government  on  21st February  and  to  authorise  the  press 
censorship did not pass unnoticed, since it followed his previous Army mobilization 
in  reaction  to  the  Indian  imposition  of  an  over  flights  veto  on  4 th  February. 
Furthermore, during the first days of March, a RAW operator from Dhaka had resent 
a letter  to Calcutta  informing his uppers and New Delhi  of a probable imminent 
military crackdown of the Pakistan Army against the Awami League117, who was in 
turn informed by the Indian government118. 
Therefore, it appears unconvincing to assume that the Indian political leadership 
was completely surprised by the military crackdown in East Pakistan. The decisions 
taken by New Delhi in late March and early April, which offered its informal (but 
concrete) support to Bengali nationalism, showed the intentions of a state willing to 
sustain  the  Bengali  movement.  Indeed,  after  25th March  it  was  quite  clear  that 
supporting the claims for Bengali nationalism, or the return of the AL to the East 
Pakistan government, could have assured the establishment of a much more friendly 
government in the north-eastern neighbourhood of India. However, the cautiousness 
of  the  Indian  government,  that  did  not  officially  recognize  the  government  of 
Bangladesh as being in exile, has to be considered as an obvious reaction from an 
entity  trying  to  better  understand  how  the  East  Pakistani  situation  could  have 
developed  before  creating  greater  hostility  with  Pakistan  and  declaring  a  war 
115See for example: “A Relevant Pakistan Policy,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 3/5 (January 
1971):  171–172;  K.  P.  Karunakaran,  “East  Pakistan’s  Non-Violent  Struggle,”  Economic  and 
Political Weekly 6, no. 12 (March 20, 1971): 659–660.
116“Note from RAW on Pakistan, dated 14th January 1971”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f.  
n. 220, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
117Raina, Inside RAW, 53–54.
118Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 495.
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unsupported at the international level. This last dissent will be shown to be the main 
position the world’s great powers.
  3.3 The development of India's position towards the influx of millions of  
Bengali refugees in May
New Delhi's position with respect to the East Pakistan issue, undertook a significant 
reformulation during May-June 1971, following the consistent growth of the influx 
of East refugee from mid-April onwards. In reality, the first groups of refugees that 
found protection across the Indian border in late March were not so significant in 
dimension. They were mainly Awami League leaders that had escaped the Pakistani 
army repression, or Bengali officers of the Pakistani police, or Bengali soldiers. In 
addition, there were also some Bihari-Muslims and a few West-Pakistani civil and 
military officers that had escaped from the area controlled by the Bengali, feared by 
the retaliation measures they adopted. India allowed them to enter its territory on a 
temporary base.  However,  from mid-April  onwards the flood of refugees became 
significantly  more  consistent.  According  to  the  Indian  Minister  of  Labour  and 
Rehabilitation there were 119.566 refugees on April 17th; but they suddenly became 
3,37 million by May 22nd,  and 6.33 million by late-June119.  The influx of such a 
massive population, with proportions unseen in earlier world history, created several 
problems  for  India,  and  the  territories  that  hosted  them,  as  will  be  seen  later. 
However, in order to understand the real nature of the influx it is first  crucial  to 
highlight the fact that the percentage of Hindus within the entire number of refugees 
was  close  to  80%120.  The  religious  composition  of  the  refugees  indeed  helps 
understand  why  such  a  population  migration  occurred,  and  to  reflect  over  the 
different interpretations, some not plausible, that have been provided to explain such 
119Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 446.
120Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 296.
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a human tragedy. 
The only convincing explanation is that by mid-April the Pakistan Army had 
regained control over the largest cities in East Pakistan. This aroused fear in peoples' 
minds of retaliation to the support given to the AL party, and among Hindus for the 
communitarian  violence  carried  out  by the  Pakistani  army.  As  a  consequence,  a 
significant portion of the population began to leave their houses and properties to 
find shelter in India. Even if many had used the word genocide in reference to the 
East Pakistan violence121, it seems incorrect to argue that the Pakistani Army was 
aiming  at  physical  elimination  of  the  Hindu  Bengali  population.  A  historical 
perspective  analysis  indeed  shows  the  absence  of  plans  for  selective  killings  of 
Hindus, and that no official orders were given by the Pakistani Army high command 
to kill  Hindus only.  However,  it  is  clear  that  a  large  part  of  the Pakistani  Army 
officers indulged in various forms of violence purposely intended to harm the Hindu 
minority,  which they superficially considered to be the first  supporters of the AL 
party122. What seems plausible is that the Pakistan Army during their work of violent 
repression of political dissent also actively worked to up-root the Hindu population 
with the aim of weakening the resistance of the Bengali movement123. In addition, it 
has been reported that many civil and military West Pakistan officers welcomed the 
Hindu exodus as “good riddance”124, and that the Pakistani army spread several false 
rumours of massacres perpetuated by Hindus against Muslims to incite Muslims and 
121See  for  example:  J.  Sengupta,  History  of  the  Freedom  Movement  in  Bangladesh,  1943-1973 
(Calcutta:  Naya Prokash, 1974),  281–312; Government of  India,  Bangladesh Documents,  345; 
Several  contemporary  newspaper  articles  (like  Mascarenhas  in  Sunday Times,  13  June  1971; 
Editorial in The New Nation (Singapore), 6 April 1971; and The Saturday Review (New York), 22 
May 1971), made reference to the violence in East Pakistan, as well as All-India radio, improperly  
using that term. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 147.
122It  seems  that  Major  General  Gul  Assam,  Major  General  Farman  Ali,  and  the  martial  law 
administration,  General  A.  A.  K.  Niazi,  incited  their  troops  to  kill  Hindus.  The  fact  that  the 
Hamoodur Rahaman Commission Report, fruit of a Pakistani judiciary enquiry made in 1972-4,  
reported  some accusations against  these three Generals,  without  however  recognising them as 
guilty for the abuse, can be considered as evidence of the fact that these Army officers probably 
abused of their power. Government of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry Into  
the 1971 India-Pakistan War, 27–30.
123Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 177.
124Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 261.
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to justify their  resorting to violence,  and to convince Hindus to migrate125.  Eyes-
witness accounts indeed reported that communal violence was initially caused by the 
behaviour of some paramilitary forces and of the Pakistani Army units, even if later 
tensions  significantly  became  diffused  in  East  Pakistan,  dividing  villages  and 
communities along religious affiliations, and creating a situation of growing chaos 
and misery that echoed the massive migration of people at the time of partition126. 
Significant in this respect is also the account provided by the US Consul-General in 
Dhaka, Archer Blood, that reported how the violence and atrocities committed by the 
Pakistani Army in turn triggered the violent answer of the Bengali forces127. He also 
argued  that  often  the  Pakistani  Army  could  not  concretely  distinguish  between 
Hindus and Muslims, and that specific division was based upon local people hinting 
to the military. Therefore, even if the word genocide appears improper for describing 
the massacres committed by the Pakistani Army, the crucial outcome of their action 
was the success in uprooting several million people, largely Hindus, who looked for 
shelter in India.
Other two motivations had been used to explain the significant influx of people 
to India, but are not credible. The first is the famine that hit East Pakistan after the 
beginning of the civil war. From the analysis of birth and death rates made by Curlin,  
Chen  and Hussain  in  their  study,  it  has  been  indeed demonstrated  that  the  food 
125Partha N. Mukherji, “The Great Migration of 1971: I: Exodus,” Economic and Political Weekly 9, 
no. 9 (March 2, 1974): 369.
126Bose, “Anatomy of Violence,” 4465; A direct indication that the “persecution of Hindus appears to 
have ceased” due to the “drastic decrease in the number of Hindus available to persecute”, and that 
“the main instance of de-Hinduisation was expulsion of Hindus” is present in: “Telegram from the 
American Embassy in Islamabad to the Department of State, dated 2nd August 1971”, in Khan, 
The American Papers,  624–631. Evidence of  the interests for  the de-Hinduisation of  the East  
Pakistan society are present also over several different newspapers that documented the operations 
of replacement of Bengali script by Urdu ones (Times of India, 9 July 1971). Similar evidence also 
reported on different Pakistani newspapers cited in: Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 76.
127Archer K. Blood,  The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat  (Dhaka: 
University Press, 2002), 216–217. From the American declassified documents it became evident  
that  the  alarming accounts  sent  by Blood  to  Washington  were  not  considered  with  the  right  
attention, and largely ignored by the Nixon administration that at that time preferred to believe the 
American Embassy in West Pakistan that was reporting that the situation was under control. On 
this see for example: Gary R Hess, “Grand Strategy and Regional Conflict: Nixon, Kissinger, and 
Crisis in South Asia,” Diplomatic History 31, no. 5 (2007): 961. He reports the fact that Blood’s 
messages was commented as “miserable [… and] inexcusable.”
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scarcity doubled the number of the malnourished children in 1971 in East Pakistan, 
and caused the consumption of food grains to dramatically fall128. Food scarcity was 
not only due to the crop waste generated by the political instability and violence, but 
also to the collapse of the Pakistani authorities’ control of river communication over 
which  food  and  imports  were  generally  distributed  inside  the  Pakistan  Eastern 
wing129.  However,  the  famine  cannot  explain  why  the  major  component  of  the 
refugee flux from mid-April  onwards was Hindu. It  is important to note that the 
majority of Hindus who escaped to India were not coming from the lower Pakistani 
classes (which could have explained their escape); but were rather small/middle class 
landowners,  traders,  or members of the middle urban class130.  The third thesis  to 
explain the refugee influx in India was the one formulated by the same Pakistani 
military  regime  in  1971:  trying  to  hide  its  responsibilities,  it  accused  India  of 
deliberately  encouraging  the  Hindu  outflow  in  order  to  destabilise  the  Pakistani 
internal situation131. However, this hypothesis completely lacks credibility for at least 
two reasons. First, All-India radio and newspapers not only described the Pakistani 
violence,  but  also  reported,  often  exaggerating,  the  victories  of  the  pro-Awami 
League forces132. Second, although India gave support to the Bengali forces, it was 
for sure contrary to the influx of such a consistent number of Hindu refugees, which 
was a potential destabiliser for its already unstable territories of the North-East, as 
this will be shown later. 
The  official  position  of  the  Indian  government  concerning  the  refugee  issue 
remained unclear until 4th May when Indira Gandhi, without previously consulting 
any political apparatus of her government finally declared in an interview to  India 
News that  the  Indian  government  had  no  intention  to  rehabilitate  refugees  on  a 
permanent basis. The official government position was then translated into laws for 
128George T. Curlin, Lincoln C. Chen, and Sayed Babur Hussain, “Demographic Crisis: The Impact 
of  the  Bangladesh  Civil  War  (1971)  on  Births  and  Deaths  in  a  Rural  Area  of  Bangladesh,”  
Population Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1976): 88.
129Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 237–272.
130Mukherji, “The Great Migration of 1971,” 366.
131Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 198.
132“Beyond Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 15 (April 10, 1971): 762.
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regulating the organization of the refugee camps constructed along the border with 
East Pakistan. According to the text of the laws, refugees had to register to the Indian 
authorities as foreigners in order to receive a card. Such card entailed them to the 
right to receive food rations; obligation not to leave the camp where they would be 
assigned, with the risk of being otherwise arrested; and the prohibition to work in 
order to avoid their integration inside the Indian social context and the emergence of 
tensions with the local Indian people133. This was innovative since until that moment 
refugees had always been considered by the host country as non-returning population 
that needed to be rehabilitated and resettled, as for example during the partition in 
1947 in the Indian subcontinent. On 24th May in a speech to the Indian Parliament the 
Indian Prime Minister further clarified the government position arguing that: “They 
are not refugees in the sense we have understood this word since the partition. They 
are  victims  of  war  who have  sought  refuge  from the  military terrors  across  our 
frontier”134. By the end of May therefore 330 temporary camps were established to 
care for nearly 4 million refugees135. With the only exception of some small programs 
of re-settling people from the crowded refugee camps along the border to some more 
internal areas in mid-June136, these refugees were kept in camps close to the borders, 
theoretically ready to go back to their homes as soon as possible. 
Nevertheless, the influx of the refugees soon became a serious concern for New 
Delhi at different levels: at the economic level because of maintenance costs; at the 
humanitarian  level  since  several  illnesses  began to  spread;  and at  the  social  and 
political level since the concentration of so many people in specific areas created 
problems with  the  local  population.  The growing number  of  refugees  during the 
spring resulted  in  a  significant  financial  burden for  New Delhi  since  the  official 
statistics  of  the  Indian  Government  were  of  18,5  million  Rupees  as  the  daily 
133Government of India, “Administrative Regulations for Transit Relief Camps for Refugees from 
East Bengal” (Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation, Branch Secreteriat, Calcutta, 1971).
134Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 673.
135Ibid.
136These small programs were started and carried out with the support of the US and Soviet forces, 
but after a short period were ended by the Indian government due to operational costs, and not to 
complicate the process of a future return of the refugees to East Pakistan. Sisson and Rose,  War 
and Secession, 178.
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maintenance costs137: a sum of money significant for a country like India that had just 
reached precarious  food self-reliance138.  The first  allocation of resources made in 
April-May in the  national  budget  was  of  600 million  Rupees,  but  this  was later 
increased to 2.000 million in August, when the refugees were about 8,2 million139, 
and of other 1.430 Rupees in December 1971 with supplementary budgets, reaching 
5,5% of the total (including planned and not plan expenditures) outlay of the Union 
budget140. In addition, health problems emerged in the camps: the Indian government 
indicated that by 4th June there had been approximately 9.500 cases of cholera, with 
1.250 deaths141. This estimate then increased during the summer resulting in 46.000 
reported cases by the end of September, and the number of casualties to 6.000142. 
Moreover,  social  tensions  emerged soon after  the settling of  the camps since the 
resources given by the centre to maintain the refugees depressed the prices of the 
local food grain. In spite of the legislations banning refugees to work, it was also 
difficult for them to remain inactive for a long time. Therefore, paid less than the 
usual minimum wage of an agricultural labour, they altered the economic and social 
context  of  those  areas  where  the  camps  were  located,  creating  an  explosive 
situation143.  Moreover,  the  hosting  Indian  states,  such as  West  Bengal,  Tripura144, 
Assam, and Meghalaya, also faced specific problems due to communal tensions that 
the introduction of such great number of Hindus caused. In fact, during partition the 
areas involved had been earlier interested by the migration of Hindus from those 
137Mukherji,  “The Great  Migration  of  1971”;  Frankel  refers  to  almost  US$3-4  million  per  day:  
Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 461.
138Government of India, “Economic Survey 1971/1972” (Ministry of Finance, 1972), Review and 
Assessment, 87, http://indiabudget.nic.in/es1971-72/esmain.htm. 
139Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 262.
140The import of food grain had been reduced largely by 1971: in 1970-1971 the total amount of food 
imports  was  only 2.2% of  the  net  availability  of  food  grains  in  India.  Government  of  India,  
“Economic Survey 1971/1972,” Major Economic Indicators, 9; Review and Assessment, 100.
141Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 153.
142New York Times, 30th September 1971.
143Partha  N.  Mukherji,  “The  Great  Migration  of  1971:  II:  Reception,”  Economic  and  Political  
Weekly 9, no. 10 (March 9, 1974): 407.
144By the end of May in the state of Tripura 900.000 people had found refuge in the camps, over an 
indigenous population of only 1,5 million. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 153.
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territories that had become part of Pakistan145, which had already created political 
and communal problems for these states, especially in West Bengal and Assam146. In 
addition, local specific problems emerged: in Tripura the rapid influx of two million 
refugees  threatened the  fragile  internal  stability of  the state  since  it  reversed  the 
tribal/non-tribal population ratio147; while in West Bengal, the radical communists of 
the CPM and of the Naxalites movement began to establish direct links with the 
extremist groups of the East Pakistani forces, such as the communists, and those of 
the National Awami Party (NAP), rivals of the AL and considered pro-Beijing by 
India148. 
As a consequence, in the second part  of May the Indian government felt the 
necessity to assume a firm position and to answer to the critics raised by the press. 
The  latter  had  indeed  begun  expect  a  more  aggressive  approach  from  the 
government, and the official recognition of the Bangladesh government in exile in 
Calcutta149. Therefore, following a two day visit of the Prime Minister to the refugees 
camps  in  mid-May,  which  contributed  to  the  growing  awareness  of  the  political 
leadership about the delicate situation, the Prime Minister informed the Parliament, 
until that moment kept uninformed, as well as the Cabinet150, of the situation and of 
the measures chosen by the executive.  Indira  Gandhi  depicted the refugee influx 
from Pakistan as a “threat to India's security”, and as a form of “indirect aggression” 
145It has been reported that 344.000 Hindus came to India during 1947, and that 180.000 continued to 
flow annually from 1948 to 1955 creating several problems in the Indian state along the borders  
with East Pakistan. Public political discussion emerged over the question of the rehabilitation of 
East Pakistan refugees and several states decided to declare the issue of federal power competence 
in order to receive the necessary aid to face the burden. However, the larger part of the state-
sponsored initiative failed and the rehabilitation process was almost left to self-initiative of the 
single groups of refugees. Gyanesh Kudaisya, “Divided Landscapes, Fragmented Identities: East 
Bengal  Refugees  and  Their  Rehabilitation  in  India,  1947–79,”  Singapore  Journal  of  Tropical  
Geography 17, no. 1 (1997): 28–39.
146Economic and Political Weekly, 12th June 1971; and ibid., 31.
147Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 181.
148Economic and Political Weekly, 1st May 1971.
149See for example the incitements raised by Romesh Tapar (Economic and Political Weekly, 16 th 
April,  813, and Economic and Political  Weekly,  8th May 1971, 946),  and Ashok Sanjay Guha 
(Economic and Political Weekly, 15th May 1971, 983-85) asking the intervention of India in favour 
of the Bengali movement.
150Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 117.
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against  India that had to  be solved as soon as possible151.  At the Lok Sabha she 
argued about the necessity of taking action to solve the crisis and allow the return of 
refugees,  reiterating  their  “temporary”  status.  Interestingly,  the  question  of  the 
religious affiliation of the refugees was downplayed, since Mrs. Gandhi affirmed that 
“They  belong  to  every  religious  persuasion  –  Hindu,  Muslim,  Buddhist  and 
Christian”,  therefore without  underlining  that  the largest  percentage  of  them was 
Hindu152.  This  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  New  Delhi  was  not  interested  in 
transforming the political crisis of East Pakistan into a communal problem between 
India and Pakistan,  for  at  least  two reasons:  first,  it  would  have probably raised 
political and social turmoil in the North-East Indian states already sensitive to these 
issues; second, it would have transformed the conflict in the eyes of the international 
community that could have assimilated it to the events of Partition, and therefore 
diminishing the political responsibilities of Pakistan's government. It should also be 
noted that in her discourse at the Lok Sabha the Indian Prime Minister did not make 
any references to India’s intention to respect those international norms that protected 
the state from external interference in its internal affairs, as she on the contrary did in 
late  March153.  Even more  clearly at  the  Rajya  Sabha Mrs.  Gandhi  affirmed that: 
“what was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan has also become an internal 
problem of India” regarding the refugee problem154. 
Despite  this  more  aggressive  position  and  the  pressure  exercised  by  the 
Parliamentary  members,  New Delhi  did  not  officially  recognise  the  exile  of  the 
government  of  Bangladesh.  The  official  explanation  provided  was  that  since  the 
situation was still  fluid,  there was no need to alter the official Indian position of 
neutrality  that  could  have  just  complicated  matters  at  the  international  level155. 
However,  New  Delhi  reinforced  its  previous  political  strategy  in  order  to  try 
influencing the development of the crisis. Therefore, at first larger support was given 
to the Bengali forces in order to increase their political cohesion and organization, 
151The Washington Street Journal, 19th May 1971.
152Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 673.
153Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 258.
154Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 673–674.
155Ibid., 679–681.
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and their military capabilities; and second, an increased effort was made to sensitise 
world opinion and great powers over the growing challenge the refugees was posing 
to India's security, and for increasing the pressure over Pakistan to solve the East 
Pakistani crisis politically.
The Indian government increased its efforts in sustaining the Bengali forces both 
at the political level, reinforcing its control over the government of Bangladesh in 
exile in Calcutta, and over the Mukti Bahini in order to control their factionalism and 
support the AL, and at the military level, training the guerrilla forces. Even if the first 
initiative gave partial results, the second was entirely successful, as now detailed. 
Political  Bengali  forces  were  indeed  quite  heterogeneous  at  the  political  level: 
internal divisions had emerged since the AL had tried to stand as the political force 
able to represent all the Bengali government members in the exile of Bangladesh156. 
The AL justified its pretensions making reference to the electoral results obtained in 
the  elections  of  1970.  However,  several  others  forces,  like  the  NAP  and  the 
communists,  contested  its  position  from  the  beginning157.  Moreover,  divisions 
emerged even within the same AL party, as for example over the role of Tajuddin 
Ahmed,  who  had  assumed  the  office  of  Prime  Minister  in  the  government  of 
Bangladesh in exile,  as the leader of the Awami League158.  Personal rivalries and 
ideological differences also became shaded into disagreement over the strategies the 
liberation movement should follow, like for example over the issue of what to do in 
case  of  Mujib's  death159.  In  order  to  face  this  problem  the  Indian  authorities 
established  a  separate  secretariat  branch  of  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  in 
Calcutta with the aim of reinforcing relations and contacts with the government of 
156A. Mukhopadhyay, “Mukti Fouj’s Two Fronts,” Economic and Political Weekly (1971): 855–856.
157Economic and Political Weekly, 10th April 1971, p. 761.
158Lawrence Lifschultz and Kai Bird, Bangladesh, the Unfinished Revolution (New York: Zed Press, 
1979), 21–30; It is interesting to note that the American Consulate in Dacca on the 29th of January 
1971 underlined, in a letter to the Department of State, the fact that the AL was “a vast umbrella 
sheltering many disparate elements” and that “one theme only, binds them together - […] anti-
West Pakistan feeling”, reflecting on the scarce possibilities for that party to remain “a cohesive 
political force”. See “Letter from American Consulate in Dacca to Department of State, dated 29th 
January 1971”, in Khan, The American Papers, 457. 
159Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 57.
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Bangladesh in exile160. Moreover, India proposed to the government of Bangladesh in 
exile  to  create  a  committee,  called  War  Council,  which  also  included  the  other 
political  forces  of  the  East  Pakistan  political  scene,  like  the  NAP,  and  the 
communists.  The  effort  however  was  not  positive  since  the  other  groups  were 
reticent to come under the umbrella of the Bangladesh government in exile that was 
(in their eyes) too linked to the Indian government, and for the same fear of the AL to 
lose its position of dominance inside the Bengali forces161.
A similar attempt was also carried out in reference to the Mukti Bahini  forces, 
where  political  divisions  also  emerged162,  complicating  other  specific  internal 
problems of those groups. These were caused by several factors: first, the recruited 
Bengali came from different political and social backgrounds since some were just 
students,  political  activists,  and  peasants  lacking  any military  preparation,  while 
others were soldiers coming from the East Bengal Regiment, the Pakistani Army, or 
the  police  corps;  second,  the  direct  assumption  of  responsibility  by  the  Indian 
military forces over the training camps raised a lot of resentment among the trainees, 
who were upset about getting their salary and arms from the Indian Army officers 
(since this gave them the feeling of being on the pay roll of India), and among some 
Bengali  ex-Pakistani  army officers,  who  were  irritated  by the  control  over  their 
behaviour by the government of Bangladesh in Calcutta through the Indian Army163; 
and  third,  in  West  Bengal  the  presence  of  external  groups  of  guerrillas  to  those 
organised  in  the  Mukti  Bahini,  which  were  those  guerrilla  groups  officially 
recognised by the government of Bangladesh and controlled by the Indian Army, 
further complicated the already precarious political  situation,  since those close to 
communist  positions  allegedly  started  to  organize  themselves  together  with  the 
160Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 59.
161“RAW note on the situation of the Bangladesh Army dated 5th of July 1971”, and “Letter from 
Principal Secretary, P. N. Haksar, to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, dated 5 th May 1971”, in Haksar 
papers, III inst, f. n. 227, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
162“RAW report over the situation in Bangladesh dated 5 th of July 1971”, in P. N. Haksar private 
papers, III inst. f. n. 227, in NMML Archives, New Delhi.
163“RAW record dated the 3rd of July 1971”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML 
Archives, New Delhi.
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Indian revolutionaries164. Therefore, specific draconian measures were thus adopted 
by  New  Delhi  in  West  Bengal  to  face  and  trying  to  exploit  the  situation  to 
definitively  solve  the  problem  of  the  Naxalites165.  In  addition,  to  control  this 
generally explosive situation, in May New Delhi decided to sustain the enlargement 
of the recruitment of the Mukti Bahini to people affiliated to the NAP and to the less 
radical communists.  Again,  the aim was to include them in a coordinated action, 
avoiding the radicalisation of those groups. However, these operations largely failed 
for reasons similar to those mentioned for the War Council creation initiative166. 
Despite all these problems, and thanks to the decision made by New Delhi to 
also support the  Mukthi Bahini militarily and assisting them with the Indian Army 
and with the RAW, by the end of May a command structure was formed under the 
guidance  of  Col.  A.  G.  Osmani,  a  retired  Pakistani  army officer  loyal  to  Mujib. 
Bengali forces were therefore organised in units, which were incorporated into three 
brigades, and the East Pakistan territory was divided into several sectors, each one 
164Economic and Political Weekly, 19th June 1971, 1218-9; and Economic and Political Weekly, 3rd 
July 1971, 1319.
165New Delhi  on 19th June decided to  impose once again the President’s  Rule to West Bengal.  
Therefore, using the excuse to avoid a destabilization of the area, the centre assumed free hands  
again to squeeze the Naxalites and the CPM activities once and for all (Economic and Political  
Weekly,  25th September 1971, p.  2045).  The control  of the political  situation of  West Bengal  
therefore passed to Sidhartha Shankar Ray, Secretary of State for West Bengal, and to Governor A. 
L. Dias, who directly re-called the Army to assist the civilian authorities. A. M., “Calcutta Diary,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 8, no. 20 (May 19, 1973): 889. The state then entered a phase of 
terrible  and  violent  political  repression,  and  again  large-scale  arrests  were  carried  out  as  it 
happened during the period of the President’s Rule that preceded the elections of March 1971, 
when 3.000 people were arrested because suspected of being Naxalites (The Statesman, 9th July 
1971).  The  lower  estimates  of  the  number  of  people  killed  and  arrested  for  political  crimes, 
provided by a senior civil servant, is that 15.000-17.000 were detained in 1971, of whom around  
2.000 were killed. Frankel,  India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 458. The repression led to a 
large-scale use of terror by the state (Economic and Political Weekly, 6th November 1971, 2267-
2268) that resulted by the end of the year in an official spokesman reporting that West Bengal had  
become “one of the most peaceful states in India” (The Statesman, 2nd December 1971).
166“RAW report dated 5th July”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives,  
New Delhi. However,  these attempts brought some results in September when the hopes for a  
peaceful  resolution  had  almost  completely  evaporated.  Thus  external  groups  were  finally 
integrated inside the Mukti Bahini forces, and a “Five Party Consultative Committee”, including 
the AL,  the NAP, the Communists,  and other  smaller  forces,  was finally set  up to coordinate  
actions of the Mukti Bahini on 8th September 1971. Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 78. This will be 
better explained later in this chapter.
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under the control of a Bengali officer167. Moreover, it has been calculated that by the 
end of June, 30.000 Mukti Bahini recruits had been trained, and that by September 59 
camps had been organised by the Indian Army along the borders168.  The guerilla 
activities during June-August exploited the monsoon period, and therefore the scarce 
mobility of  the conventional  Pakistani  forces.  Through small-scale  raids over  the 
border and actions of sabotage against Pakistani strategic facilities such as bridges, 
communication  systems,  power  stations,  and  ships169,  the  Mukti  Bahini created 
serious disruptions170. They caused the collapse of the communication system and the 
East  Pakistani  economy  to  almost  come  to  a  halt171.  Therefore,  in  spite  of  the 
persistence of those organizational problems cited before,  by the end of June the 
Mukti Bahini were instead organised, and since that moment onwards they had begun 
to operate with coordination under the Indian Army supervision. 
The second strategy followed by the Indian government from mid-May was to 
increase  its  efforts  to  lead  the  international  community  in  putting  pressure  on 
Islamabad to solve the East Pakistan's political situation. In the speech of 24th May 
Indira Gandhi argued that “there cannot be any military solution to the problem of 
Bangladesh. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power 
to  do  so.  World  opinion  is  a  great  force.  […]  The  great  powers  have  a  special 
responsibility”172.  World  opinion  until  that  moment  had  indeed  been  sympathetic 
towards  the  Indian  position173,  though  global  players  like  Great  Britain  and  the 
167“Note for the Chief in Command about the Bangladesh forces”, in P. N. Haksar files, III inst., f. n. 
227, in NMML Archives, New Delhi.
168Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 184–185.
169Attacks against Pakistani ships were launched during August. See: Indian Express, 12 th August 
1971; and Times of India, 21st August 1971.
170Later  these  destructions  were  major  obstacles  for  the  same  Indian  forces  that  invaded  East 
Pakistan. This strategic error can be explained with the scarce strategic ability of New Delhi to 
plan its actions. See: Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 304. Otherwise it soul be evidence of 
the fact that until the second half of July there was no specific plan to invade East Pakistan in New 
Delhi.
171Banerjee, “Next Phase of the War,” 818–819.
172Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 674.
173British  and  American  newspapers  criticise  the  behaviours  of  their  governments  that  did  not 
condemn Pakistan for the repression. See for example: The Guardian, 31st March 1971; and The 
New York Times, 31st March 1971, and 18th April. 
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United  States  had  remained  neutral,  or  had  continued  to  support  Pakistan174. 
Therefore, the New Delhi man began to call for international aid assistance to face 
the refugee burden175. These efforts were reinforced by the tour in the West capitals 
made  by  the  Indian  Foreign  Minister  Swaran  Singh,  together  with  Japrakash 
Narayan. This brought positive results, bringing the total international aid assistance 
to  $160  million  by  30th June176.  Moreover,  several  international  voluntary 
humanitarian organizations, together with numerous national ones, gave their direct 
collaboration to the Indian Army in the management of the refugee camps. Relief 
assistance was also provided by several UN agencies head quartered in New Delhi, 
such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP). In addition, the increasing 
pressure of great powers on Pakistan to solve the East Pakistan crisis, India had some 
initial  success  in  influencing  the  position  of  the  global  powers  to  support  the 
intervention  of  the  UN  in  East  Pakistan.  In  May both  London  and  Washington 
answered  the  pressure  exercised  by  India,  by  the  press,  and  by  the  opposition, 
beginning to distinguish between the relief help, and the developmental aid they were 
providing to Pakistan. They linked the second to the Pakistani acceptance allowing 
the UN to intervene upon its territory177. This was an important fact since Pakistan 
was facing a difficult situation at the economic level, urgently needing significant 
international  assistance.  In  fact,  during  July  1970  till  February  1971  its  foreign 
174Britain on the 27th and the 29th of March had assumed, with the statement of its Prime Minister  
and its foreign minister, a neutral position on the East Pakistan’s crisis; and had further resisted a 
growing internal public and parliamentary pressure to assume a more active role to mediate the 
crisis within,  for example,  the Commonwealth. Jackson,  South Asian Crisis,  38. In  the United 
Kingdom opposition members of the Parliament criticised the “soft” British stance towards the 
issue and intervened in the debate about the necessity to stop all developmental aid to Pakistan. On 
this issue see, for example, the intervention made by Mr. Russel on the 31st of March, by Lord  
Fenner Brockwaz on the 4th of April and the articles published by Mr. Reginald Prentice and,  
members of the British Parliamentary delegation which visited Pakistan and India (Sunday Times, 
11th July 1971). Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 520, 522, 564–565. The case of the 
United States will be better analysed in the next paragraph.
175Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 675.
176Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 263.
177Jackson,  South  Asian  Crisis,  49  Ambassador  Keating  confirmed  this  in  a  conversation  with 
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on 26th May 1971. See: “Record of the conversation made by 
Rukmini Menon, Joint Secretary at American Division of MAE, in MAE, AMS, WII/104/17/71, 
National Archives, New Delhi.
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exchange  reserves  critically  diminished  due  to  the  increased  imports  of  military 
material and food, and the diminished export earnings. Moreover, in 1971 Islamabad 
was unable to repay its foreign debt to the World Bank Consortium, due by the end of 
June, and needed a rescheduling of the deadline for the re-payment even more178. 
This  financial  weakness  led  Pakistan  to  be  extremely careful  not  to  alienate  the 
support  of  the  international  community.  Although  the  question  of  the  UN 
intervention  developed  later,  as  it  will  be  detailed  in  the  next  paragraph,  in  a 
potentially dangerous affair for India, it is interesting just to note that in June the 
Indian diplomacy obtained another important result. Peter Gargill, a team leader for 
the World Bank, in his report on the East Pakistan's situation suggested a suspension 
of the developmental aid179. This directly influenced the activities of the Pakistan Aid 
Consortium  that  did  not  find  an  agreement  over  the  future  of  its  multilateral 
developmental aid, and in turn the same bilateral assistance programmes of all the 
Western  countries.  On  23th June  Great  Britain  announced  that  its  developmental 
programme  in  Pakistan  was  suspended  until  the  resolution  of  the  crisis  in  East 
Pakistan180; during the first days of July the same position was taken by the Swedish, 
Dutch  and  West  German  governments  and  on  15th July  also  by  the  American 
Congress.
In spite  of  these  accomplishments,  three  factors  during  the  summer  of  1971 
further complicated the Indian position and the solution of the East Pakistan crisis: 
first,  the  continuation  of  the  flux  of  refugees;  second,  the  possibility  of  the  UN 
intervention  in  East  Pakistan;  and  third,  the  evolution  of  the  Sino-American 
normalisation process.
178Ibid., 48.
179Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 518.
180Ibid., 509.
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  4. International dynamics and the development of India's position  
towards the East Pakistan crisis during June and July
As a consequence of the continuing influx of refugees, from the end of June India 
began to consider a war with Pakistan as the only option to bring the AL party back 
to power in East Pakistan, and to repatriate the refugees. Therefore, India faced the 
increasingly worrying possibility of the UN intervention in East Pakistan. As a result, 
India  felt  the  need  to  assure  the  support  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  to  therefore 
consider the beginning of the negotiation of the treaty Moscow had been proposing 
since 1969. In mid-July the discovery of a Sino-American-Pakistani axe confirmed 
the  accuracy  of  such  a  decision.  This  paragraph  will  first  consider  India's  new 
approach towards the East Pakistan's crisis and to the UN intervention issue, and then 
the discovery of a potentially hostile alignment between Washington, Beijing and 
Islamabad.
  4.1 India's new approach and its isolation over the UN intervention issue
After mid-May Pakistan formulated a new conciliatory domestic strategy for East 
Pakistan.  Islamabad  tried  to  regain  international  credibility,  showing  the  formal 
intentions of the Pakistani military junta to repatriate the Bengali refugees. In this 
context, on 24th May Yhaya Khan ordered the construction of camps for resettling 
returning refugees, and announced the first restoration plan for a civilian government 
in East Pakistan181.  To sustain his declaration,  on 28th June the Pakistan president 
announced the appointment of a Bengali as his special assistant, in the form of Dr. A. 
M. Malik; he further promised the establishment of a new government based on the 
181Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 51.
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November  1970  election  results,  to  which  only  elected  politicians  who  were 
considered  anti-state  would  not  be  allowed  to  participate.  Yayha  Khan  left  this 
statement vague until August, though it seemed clear that the Pakistani president was 
probably  referring  to  Mujib  Rahman  and  the  main  AL  leaders  forming  the 
government  of  Bangladesh  in  exile  in  Calcutta.  These  conciliatory  gestures  of 
Islamabad came along with the change of position over the UN involvement, passing 
from a contrary to a favourable one. As a matter of fact, since by mid May Pakistan 
had regained major  control  over  East  Pakistan,  the UN presence could have just 
improved its international credibility, and legitimise its programme of creating a new 
civilian government in East Pakistan. Moreover, the necessity to keep the Western 
economic support  alive led it  to  answer the pressure of London and Washington 
positively. Therefore, already in May the Pakistani government officially announced 
its  availability to  host  the UN mission,  through the words  pronounced by Yahya 
Khan's economic advisers, M. M. Ahmed, during his visit in the United States182. 
This official and conciliatory new approach of Islamabad, however, did not convince 
the Bengali  refugees who did not go back to East Pakistan.  On the contrary,  the 
refugee influx to India continued consistently during both June and July, even if it 
fortunately began to decrease in size183, as a consequence of the repeated violence in 
East Pakistan daily life. In this regard, it has been reported that since mid-July a para-
military force, called the  Razikars184, began to control rural areas of East Pakistan, 
arresting suspected people, and recurring to violence185.
These events convinced New Delhi that probably only through a war would it 
have  been  possible  to  bring  the  AL back  to  government  in  East  Pakistan,  and 
therefore to allow the repatriation of the Bengali refugees. From this point of view, 
therefore, the UN intervention would have just been an obstacle. Up until mid-May 
182Ibid.,  50;  and  “Telegram  from  American  Embassy  in  Pakistan  to  American  Consulates  in 
Pakistan”, in: Khan, The American Papers, 587–589.
183Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 446.
184These forces were largely composed of non-Bengali that continued the de-Hinduisation campaign 
begun by the Pakistani Armed forces in March, such as the Bihari or those coming from other  
Indian states. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 62. 
185“Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  by  the  Agency  for  International  Development,  dated  5th 
November 1971”, in Khan, The American Papers, 703–705.
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the UN intervention could have been useful to impede the Pakistani Army to repress 
the Bengali population, and to up-root Hindus, from June onwards the UN presence 
in East Pakistan only would have been and impediment for India.  It would have 
obstructed Indian Army's training of the Mukthi Bahini, and New Delhi to declare a 
war with Pakistan186. Moreover, India did not want the UN to pry into West Bengal, 
where repressive operations were carried by the Indian Army and police against the 
Naxalites and the CPM.
As a consequence, from mid-June New Delhi therefore reformulated its position: 
as an example, on 17th June Foreign Minister Swaran Singh who was visiting the 
United States asked for a  political settlement of the East Pakistan crisis; criticising 
the international community appearing at  that time as  only being interested in an 
economic and social solution of the emergency187. The situation got even worse when 
during the last days of June both the Indian Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, and the 
Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, released aggressive statements, as they had never 
done before, that openly considered resorting to an open war as the only solution to 
the crisis188. These statements came together with the reportedly regular movement of 
Indian Army units  along the border189,  and with the decision to  comply with the 
Soviet pressures to reconsider the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, as will be 
further  analysed  in  the  following  chapter. Moreover,  the  Indian  press  published 
several articles presenting the option of a war as the “cheapest” solution for solving 
the  refugee  issue,  thus  urging  a  direct  military  intervention  from  India190.  The 
perception of the American president advisor, Henry Kissinger, who visited India at 
the  beginning  of  July,  confirmed  the  fact  that  India  by  that  time  had  started 
considering war as the only favourable solution to the East Pakistan crisis191. 
India's  position  concerning  the  UN  involvement  was  restated  again  at  the 
186Evidence that  reinforces this thesis is  the fact  that  India also required a withdrawal of all  the  
foreigners  working inside the refugees camps by the end of June: Sisson and Rose,  War and 
Secession, 190.
187Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 687–690.
188Ibid., 688.
189National Herald, 21st June 1971; and The Hindu, 26th June 1971.
190Economic and Political Weekly, 3rd and 5th July 1971; and 14th August 1971.
191Henry Kissinger, White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 860.
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Economic and Social (ECOSOC) meeting held in July, where New Delhi officially 
voted against the Pakistani proposal favourable to the UN intervention. However, 
foreign countries supported it, leaving India alone. As a confirmation to that: on 17th 
July  the  UN  special  representative,  I.  T.  Kittani,  submitted  a  report  about  East 
Pakistan relief needs where he recommended that the UN immediately provide a sum 
of $28 million for humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance192. Furthermore, on 
19th July the Secretary of the UN, U. Thant, sent a memorandum to both Indian and 
Pakistani  governments  asking that  the  representatives  of  the  United  Nation  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR) be  stationed along the  common border193. 
Such action, not formally being a UN “humanitarian peace-keeping” action, did not 
require the Security Council support and could have been launched if the two states 
agreed. Internationally it was immediately welcomed not only by Pakistan, but also 
by Great Britain and the United States, which then supported this cause until the late 
fall of 1971. In addition, the proposal was pushed even further on 20 th July by U. 
Thant who unusually wrote a memorandum to the President and members of the 
Security  Council,  describing  that:  “border  clashes,  clandestine  raids,  and  acts  of 
sabotage appear to be becoming more frequent, and this is all the more serious since 
the refugees must cross this disturbed border if repatriation is to become a reality”. 
With  these  words  he  stood  for  the  stationing  along  the  border  of  the  UNHCR 
representatives. 
India's reaction to these international developments came indirectly on 27th July 
through the speech released by Mr. Hossain Ali, the head of the Bangladesh mission 
in Calcutta. On that occasion he announced that, although the UN were “honoured 
people”,  the  Mukti  Bahini  would  have  not  welcomed  them and  that  their  safety 
would not have been guaranteed194. A few days later India's official reaction came 
through the declaration of the Foreign Minister Swaran Singh who on 2nd August 
affirmed that: “the mere posting of observers will only create a façade of action as a 
cover for the continuation of the present policies of the military rulers of Pakistan”, 
192Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 66.
193Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 657–658.
194The Statesman, 27th July 1971.
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and restated the “total opposition” of India to the presence of UN in East Pakistan195. 
Moreover, similar instructions were sent by the Foreign Minister on 24th July 1971 
and by P. N. Haksar on 7th August 1971 to the Indian Embassy in Washington196.
The eventuality of having to fight a war, together with the prospect of the great 
power pressure over India’s acceptance of international observers, transformed the 
situation into an extremely risky one for India. On the one hand, New Delhi had the 
option  of  accepting  the  representatives,  give  up  its  support  to  the  Bengali 
movements, and hope for the UN and the world opinion to be able to press Yahya 
Khan’s regime to assure a real transfer of power to the East Pakistani civilians. This 
could have caused, however, a problem at the domestic level where public opinion 
was  instead  becoming  largely  favourable  to  supporting  Bengali  forces,  and  was 
agitated by the right parties like the Jan Sangh197.  On the other hand, New Delhi 
could have decided to keep the position since the beginning of the East Pakistan 
crisis: thus, continuing to sustain the refugees, and the Bengali liberation movement, 
and  considering  the  possibility  to  solve  the  situation  with  a  military  conflict. 
However, in order to be carried out, this second option would have required India 
finding support of its point of view at the international level, and in the Security 
Council to avoid a UN intervention. Pressed also by the news of the secret trip made 
by Kissinger  to  Beijing  through  Pakistani  mediation,  as  the  next  paragraph  will 
underline, India definitively carried out the second option.
  4.2 The American and Chinese stances on the East Pakistan crisis and the  
effects of the normalisation of their relations with India
India was persistently dissatisfied with the international response to the crisis of East 
195Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 662.
196See: MEA, AMS, WII/104/17/71, National Archives, New Delhi; and P. N. Haksar private papers, 
III inst., f. n. 170, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
197David H. Bayley, “India: War and Political Assertion,” Asian Survey 12, no. 2 (February 1972): 92.
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Pakistan, not only with regards to the UN, but also to the United States. In fact, from 
March 1971 Washington had assumed a neutral (and quite silent) position. Although 
on 14th April the Congress officially suspended all of the military sales that had been 
granted by the one time exception in 1970, New Delhi was irritated by the fact that 
Washington released its concerns just over the humanitarian issue, without raising 
any specific criticism to Islamabad198. Therefore, on 13th May Indira Gandhi sent a 
letter to President Richard Nixon urging Washington to press Pakistan to condemn 
the actions of Islamabad in East Pakistan, and to use its influence over Yahya Khan 
to assure the personal security of Mujib199. The American answer came on 27th May 
when Washington urged “restraint” to India and Pakistan, profoundly irritating New 
Delhi. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh affirmed that the equation of responsibilities, 
implicit  in  the  American  declaration,  had  to  be  considered  as  another  form  of 
assistance to Yahya Khan's regime200. Criticism did not only come from New Delhi, 
but also,  as already mentioned,  from the same American public opinion, and the 
world  press.  Also  opposition  members  in  the  American  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives  during  the  whole  spring  of  1971  raised  their  voice  against  the 
government  position201.  The  consequent  American  pressure  on  Pakistan  for  the 
acceptance of the UN relief activities should not be considered as a withdrawal of 
American support of the military regime of Pakistan. Indeed, not only was Pakistan 
ready by that time to accept the UN presence in its territory, but the White House in 
parallel had sent some warm messages to the government of Pakistan: on 28 th May 
even President  Richard Nixon wrote to Yahya encouraging him in his  attempt to 
establish political accommodation in East Pakistan, and at the beginning of June he 
recalled the United State Consul-general in Dacca, Archibald Blood, who had been 
198Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 42.
199Nixon Presidential Material Staff, NSC files, Indo-Pak war, Pakistan chronology, Dr. Kissinger to 
India chronology 1971, 1 of 2, Box 578, Kalyani Shankar,  Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and  
Beyond (New Delhi: MacMillan, 2010), 216.
200The Patriot, 29 June 1971.
201See, for example, the statements pronounced by Senator E. M. Kennedy, Senator Harris, Senator 
W. F. Mondale, Senator C. E. Gallagher, and Senator Church had made in the American Senate  
since April to June 1971, in Government of India,  Bangladesh Documents,  520–525, 535–536, 
538–545, and 547–556.
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highly critical with respect to the neutral position assumed by its country and to the 
behaviour of the Pakistani authorities202.
The estranged relations between Washington and New Delhi were further eroded 
on 22th June by the news published in the  New York Times  that some shipments of 
American  military  supplies  had  been  dispatched  from the  United  States203. This 
triggered strong reactions: in Washington, members of the opposition parties raised 
their vibrant criticism in the Senate, calling for the imposition of a total embargo to 
Pakistan. Some parts of the American press reacted similarly204; while in India on 24th 
June the Political Affairs Committee met to evaluate the situation, and on the same 
day the Indian Foreign Minister stated in the Parliament that “…any accretion of 
military strength of Pakistan […] would not only amount to a condonation of these 
atrocities, but could be constructed as an encouragement to their continuation. […] 
The United States Government have promised to give urgent consideration to this 
matter and we are awaiting their response”205. The official reaction of Washington 
was that military shipments to Pakistan would only be constituted with “non-lethal 
arms”, and were related to sales already concluded before March 1971206.  Studies 
202Times of India, 7 June 1971; and Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 55.
203Intelligence  reports  and  documents  of  the  Ministry  of  the  External  Affairs  of  India,  now 
declassified, calculated that during the spring 1971 three ships left the United States to carry arms  
to Pakistan: the steamships Padma (left the United States on 22nd June), Sunderbans (left on 8th 
May), and Kaukahla (left in the second week of April and reached Karachi on 16 th June). All of 
them reportedly were carrying parts and electronic accessories for tanks, artillery, and aircraft. On 
this, see: “Letter sent by the American Embassy in India to the Ministry of External Affairs in New 
Delhi,  dated 15th July”,  “Letter  sent  by S. K.  Lambah,  AMS sections of MEA, to Parliament  
sections, dated 31st July”, and “Letter sent by G. C. Saxena, Department Director of RAW, to the 
Cabinet  Secretariat,  dated  2nd August  1971”,  in  MEA,  AMS,  WII/109/13/71-VII,  and 
WII/109/1/73-I, National Archives, New Delhi. 
204See for example the speeches made by Senator E. M. Kennedy and Senator W. Saxbe on the 22nd  
of June, and those made by Senator C. E. Gallangher, Senator F. Church and by the same Saxbe on 
the first days of July. Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 556–559, 562–564, and 567–
568; About the press reaction see the critics moved by the Washington Daily News (30th June  
1971), the ABC Evening (13th July 1971), and the Evening Star (19th July 1971). See also the 
article of the former American ambassador to India where he contested the American approach to  
India: Chester Bowles, “America and Russia in India,” Foreign Affairs 49, no. 4 (1971): 636.
205Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 696.
206Later Kissinger, in his official visit to India on the 6th of July, tried to excuse the United States  
behaviour talking of a “bureaucratic muddle” that led Washington to release contrasting statements 
over the issue.  Dennis  Kux,  India and the United States:  Estranged Democracies,  1941-1991 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 293–295.
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published in 1972 calculated that the value of the military equipment provided by the 
United  States  to  Pakistan  from March  1971  to  September  1971 was  worth  $3,8 
million,  under  licenses  conceded  before  25th March207.  However,  the  Indian 
government  in  the following days was not impressed by the statements made by 
some American members of the opposition, such as Senators Edward Kennedy and 
Frank  Church,  who  reported  that  United  States  sales  of  military  equipment  to 
Pakistan in the previous five years came to $30 million208. The fact that this sum was 
much  higher  than  the  one  ($10-15  million)  previously  declared  by  the  State 
Department to the Indian Foreign Minister during his visit to the United States in 
June, triggered further anger in New Delhi that felt humiliated209. 
In order to clarify the misunderstandings and to discuss America's position over 
the East Pakistan issue, during the first weeks of July a few meetings were arranged 
between Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, and American Secretary of State, William 
Rogers. On these occasions, Rogers announced that Washington had no intention of 
imposing a  complete  economic embargo on Pakistan,  justifying such decision by 
commenting  that  it  would  have  only  brought  as  a  result  the  rapprochement  of 
Islamabad to Beijing, diminishing the possibility of a political settlement of the crisis 
along the lines traced by president Yahya Khan, which were fully supported by the 
United States210. Moreover, during the visit made by Nixon's advisor in India on 6 th 
July, the message conveyed to New Delhi was that India should not expect any help 
from the United States in the event of a Chinese intervention in an Indo-Pakistani 
conflict over East Pakistan211. Lastly, the American support of the Yahya plans for 
East  Pakistan  was  again  confirmed  on  14th July,  when  Nixon’s  administration 
207Michael Walter, “The U. S. Naval Demonstration in the Bay of Bengal During the India-Pakistan 
War,” World Affairs 141, no. 4 (1979): 298.
208India followed with great attention all the movements made by the American Senators, as the  
letters sent by the Indian Embassy in Washington to New Delhi along 1971 demonstrate. See: 
“Letter dated 14th and 15th July 1971 and 5th August 1971”, in MAE, AMS, WII/109/13/71-VII, 
National Archives, New Delhi.
209See for example the two speeches released by the Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha on 
the 12th of July,  and those made on the 20th of July 1971. Government of India,  Bangladesh 
Documents, 699–710.
210Indian Express, 9th September 1971.
211Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 77. That stance was then re-asserted on 17th July during a conversation 
between Kissinger and the Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha. Kux, India and the United States, 295.
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declared  its  intention  to  finance  a  fresh  list  of  developmental  projects  in  East 
Pakistan, and to increase humanitarian relief help, which also included the restoration 
of the principal communications lines212. 
To  fully  comprehend  the  Nixon  administration's  favourable  attitude  towards 
Islamabad, it is important to appreciate the crucial role Pakistan played in facilitating 
the  normalisation  of  relations  between  the  United  States  and  China.  As  already 
explained in the first chapter, when the East Pakistan crisis exploded in March 1971 
the relations between Washington and Beijing had reached a deadlock, although both 
sides had intentions to elevate the bilateral discussions from the bureaucratic to a 
higher political level. The first big issue was to decide which topics to cover on the 
dialogue agenda. As it emerged during the initial contact in Warsaw in 1970 the two 
governments were still in profound disagreement on several issues, among which the 
Taiwan question. On this issue for example, Beijing judged the American military 
intervention in Taiwan as an intrusion in its  internal  affairs,  whereas Washington 
wanted Beijing to recognise the control of the island belonging to the government of 
Taiwan213. It was in order to close these gaps that both sides had agreed at the end of 
1970 to hold bilateral meetings at a higher level. The first months of 1971 were used 
by both parts to assess their diplomatic options, and to formulate the negotiation-
strategies214, and to wait for the opportunity to carry on. According to Chen this was 
especially true for China since its leader Mao needed a triggering event to mobilize 
the support of his people for establishing the dialogue with the United States. That 
opportunity suddenly emerged in April 1971 in Japan where the Chinese delegation 
was participating to the Thirty-first World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya215. 
212Times of India, 15th July 1971. Due to the Congress opposition, the Nixon administration could 
only on that occasion introduce a new food aid program of $54 million together with $36 million 
cash. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 257.
213Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapell Hill and London: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001), 258.
214Kissinger, White House Years, 704–705.
215It was the first time that the Chinese delegation had participated in an international competition 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Cultural  Revolution.  In  the  early Seventies  ping pong was  a  sport  
extremely popular in China and therefore the decision to send a team to play abroad was regarded 
in China as a political issue. The Nagoya championship proved to be a great national event in 
China.
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During  the  championship  the  Chinese  and  the  American  players  had  several 
opportunities to meet; during one of those meetings the manager of the American 
delegation asked the Chinese if it was possible, in light of the ending of all travel 
restrictions to the United States imposed to China, for American players to go to 
China to learn from their Chinese counterpart216. This was the kind of event that the 
Chinese political leadership was waiting for. After some hesitation, on 6 th April Mao 
decided to seize the opportunity and officially invite the American ping-pong team to 
visit China. The United States immediately approved the visit that turned out to be a 
big diplomatic success. At the end of the period of visit, in a ceremony at the Great 
Hall of the People, the Chinese Prime Minister announced that the visit had: “opened 
a  new  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  relations  between  Chinese  and  American 
peoples”217. Moreover, a few hours after  Chou Enlai pronounced those words, the 
American administration announced new measures concerning China, including the 
ending of the trade embargo imposed twenty-two years earlier. After these positive 
developments,  Mao  decided  to  grant  permission  to  Edgar  Snow,  the  American 
journalist invited to visit China in the previous autumn, to publish the interview the 
Chinese chairman had left him – in which Mao declared to be willing to meet Nixon 
in Beijing – and ordered the diffusion of the interview also in China218.
In the wave of the ping-pong diplomacy both chancelleries continued to work 
through the Pakistani channel to organise the agenda and the details of the high level 
meeting.  On  21st April  Beijing  sent  Washington  another  message  reiterating  the 
necessity  to  solve  the  Taiwan issue,  and its  availability  to  receive  the  American 
president or someone from his representatives. Nixon received the message on 27th 
April and decided that for domestic reasons the visit should be kept “totally secret 
until the final arrangement for the presidential visit had been agreed upon”, and that 
Kissinger  was  the  best  person to  go  to  Beijing  for  the  meeting219.  On 10th May 
Kissinger handed the message to the Pakistani ambassador in the United States with 
216The Chinese team were the best of the world: they won four medals out of seven events in 
Nagoya.
217Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 261.
218Ibid., 262.
219Richard Nixon, Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 549–550.
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the order to deliver to Beijing. The text stated Nixon’s availability to make a visit to 
China and proposed his advisor Kissinger to go on a secret preparatory trip after the 
15th of June; the goal being to begin working on the official presidential visit agenda. 
The message was received by Mao on 17th May who replied on 29th the same month, 
again through Islamabad’s mediation, announcing that the Chinese Prime Minister 
was ready to receive Kissinger in China220. The American president got the message 
four days later, commenting: “This is the most important communication that has 
come to an American president since the end of World War II”221.
The statement made by Nixon clearly demonstrates the fact that the American 
political leadership during spring 1971 was fully concentrated on the Sino-American 
rapprochement. This also helps in understanding that the events related to the East 
Pakistan conflict were received and considered by Washington as troublesome news: 
in fact South Asia “was definitively not on its radar”222. According to Robert Dallek 
the highest priority of the Nixon administration was to avert a war between Pakistan 
as long as “Pakistan served as gateway to China”223. This tilt towards Pakistan led the 
Nixon administration to grant its support to the Pakistani president in his attempts to 
restore peace in East Pakistan, and to identify India and its support to the Bengali 
liberation movement as the threat for the maintenance of stability in the area224. From 
the  analysis  that  had  been carried  out  on the  American  Government  declassified 
files225, it had emerged that the Nixon administration was aware since the beginning 
of the humanitarian dimensions of the crisis, since the American Consul General in 
220Kissinger, White House Years, 725–727.
221Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 265.
222Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 2.
223Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 337–
338; In reality another channel was available for the White House to communicate with China: the 
Romanian one, as already mentioned in the first chapter. However, already in 1970 that of Pakistan 
revealed to be the fastest and the Nixon administration opted to continue to use it even after the 
crisis explosion in March 1971. Kissinger, White House Years, 704; this was probably due to both 
personal inclinations, as already explained in the first chapter, since Nixon had established friendly 
relations with president Yayha Khan, and to the fact  that  the Pakistani channel had long term 
success.  Moreover it  was probably complex to re-frame the communication through the other 
channel, and it is possible that the White House did not want to appear to China as an opportunistic 
country that abandoned its allies (such as Pakistan) in adversities. On this topic see the interview 
with Winston Lord, a member of the NSC staff who accompanied Kissinger in his trip to Beijing  
reported in: Lifschultz and Bird, Bangladesh, the Unfinished Revolution, 156.
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Dacca,  A.  K.  Blood,  sent  several  cables  informing  Washington226.  Moreover,  for 
years the United States was well aware about the political fragility of Pakistan due to 
the economic and political disparities between the two wings227. However, Nixon and 
his  national  security  advisor,  Henry  Kissinger,  decided  that  the  humanitarian 
considerations had to be submitted to the American global strategy228, and that the 
United States had to continue to support the Pakistani position vis-à-vis with India 
concerning the East Pakistan question229. It is interesting to note that since 1969 the 
State Department was approaching the American South Asian policy in a completely 
different manner, with respect to the White House230. On the issue regarding how to 
react  to  the  East  Pakistan  crisis  the  two  institutions  differed  even  more  in  their 
evaluations;  this  was  because  the  State  Department  was largely kept  uninformed 
about the evolutions of the Sino-American rapprochement, and of Nixon's plans for 
the secret visit of Kissinger to China231.
India was aware of the relaxation process on-going between the United States 
and China, but it did not see it as a direct potential danger that could have some 
224On the 28th of April Kissinger and Nixon agreed on the necessity to “squeeze not Yahya at this 
time”, but to support politically the military junta in Pakistan to find a solution for East Pakistan. 
See “Note from Kissinger to Nixon about Washington’s options, in FRUS, Vol XI, No. 36, cited by 
Geoffrey Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” International Affairs 81, 
no. 5 (2005):  1105; As reported by Kissinger,  Nixon administration had been indeed informed 
during the spring of 1971 of the fact that Indira Gandhi had consulted the Army already in late  
March to evaluate the possibility of a war. See: “Note dated 25thMay”, in FRUS, Vol XI, No. 57, 
in Kissinger,  White House Years, 857; When the refugee influx became substantial during May 
also the State Department  began considering a war  between India  and  Pakistan  possible.  See 
“Memorandum to the President, dated 26th May 1971”, in Khan, The American Papers, 592–595.
225The most relevant declassified documents that shed new light on the American policy towards 
South Asia in 1971 are the following: the file “South Asian Crisis, 1971” in the American State  
Department; the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Volume IX. Among 
the edited texts there are: about the White House’s documents F. S. Aijazuddin, The White House  
& Pakistan:  Secret  Declassified  Documents,  1969-1974/selected  and Edited by  FS Aijazuddin 
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2002);  and  Khan,  The  American  Papers about  the  State 
Department’s  documents.  These documents  confirm the revelations appeared on the American 
press in December 1971 and the first months of 1972, called “The Anderson Papers”, due to the  
journalist name, , that embarrassed Nixon administration about their unethical choices. Marta R. 
Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg,  Bangladesh: The Birth of a Nation; a Handbook of Background  
Information and Documentary Sources (Madras: M. Seshachalam, 1972); Christopher Van Hollen, 
“The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,” Asian Survey 20, no. 4 
(April 1980): 339–361.
226Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” 1103–1104; Dallek,  Nixon and 
Kissinger, 325–362; Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 212–350.
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specific impacts on the East Pakistan crisis. Indeed, New Delhi, as well as many 
other  chancelleries,  did  not  know  that  Pakistan  had  played  a  direct  role  in  the 
evolution of that process in the past,  and that was continuing to doing so during 
1971.  Moreover,  the Chinese  behaviour  since the  beginning of  the crisis  did  not 
provide  any evidence  that  could  alarm New Delhi  in  any way.  Indeed,  Beijing's 
formal definition of its position over the East Pakistan question came late, on 13 th 
April,  and  it  was  cautious,  and  far  less  aggressive  than  during  the  1965  Indo-
Pakistani war.
The Chinese  Prime  Minister,  Chou En-Lai,  in  a  letter  he wrote  to  President 
Yahya Kahn declared its support of the Pakistani effort to “uphold the unification of 
227Professor Morghentau already in an article published in mid-1950s expresses his scepticism about  
the  political  future  of  Pakistan  Hans  J.  Morgenthau,  “Military  Illusions,”  The  New Republic 
(March 19, 1956): 15–16. Moreover, the same Nixon administration was aware of the difficulty 
Pakistan was facing already in 1969: first, a telegram sent by the American Consulate in Dacca on 
the 9th of June 1969 to the Secretary of State, Washington informed Nixon administration of the  
pessimism of the UK deputy High Commissioner in Dacca, Roy Fox, about the future of Pakistan 
which was going to breakup due to the next likely victory of  Mujib at  the elections,  and the  
successive repression of the authorities, in Khan, The American Papers, 274–275; second, political 
and economic imbalances were well summarized by Kissinger in the secret memorandum he wrote 
to the president on the 16th of July 1969, before Nixon’s visit to Islamabad, in Shankar,  Nixon,  
Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 48. Several other documents of the State of Department of 
the United States carefully describe the political evolution and expressed their pessimistic opinion 
about the future of Pakistan (e.g. Khan, The American Papers, 293–310, 327–346, and 358–416). 
Furthermore, Indian declassified documents demonstrate that the United States were informed of 
the critical situation in Pakistan during April 1970. See for example: “Telegram sent by the Indian 
Embassy in Washington to C. B. Multhamma, Joint secretary in New Delhi”, with attached the 
report made by J. N. Ganju, Public Relations International, on the political situation in Pakistan, in 
MAE, AMS, WII/104/9/70, National Arcihves, New Delhi. Communications from the Consulate in 
Dacca were absolutely pessimistic on the topic of Pakistan unity: reportedly Blood already on 2nd 
March 1971 defines them “to be near zero”. See: “Information memorandum sent to Kissinger 
from the Executive Secretary of the State Department on the 3rd of March 1971”, in ibid., 497.
228Kissinger, White House Years, 854.
229This fact, documented by the declassified American documents, had led many to blame the Nixon 
administration for moral failure in dealing with the crisis. See for example: Itty Abraham, “South 
Asian Events of  1971: New Revelations,”  Economic and Political  Weekly 40, no.  28 (July 9, 
2005): 2994–2995; Dallek,  Nixon and Kissinger; Hess, “Grand Strategy and Regional Conflict”; 
Robert J. MacMahon, “The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger, and the South 
Asia Crisis of 1971,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, by Fredrik 
Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 249–268; Shankar, Nixon,  
Indira and India: Politics and Beyond. 
230On  this  see,  for  example:  “Memorandum  for  the  President,  dated  10th  February  1970” 
commenting  that  India  is  “relatively  more  important  to  our  interest  than  Pakistan”,  or 
“Memorandum sent by W. P. Rogers to Nixon, dated 18th December 1969”, that does not suggest  
providing arms to Pakistan through third countries. Documents coted are in: Khan, The American 
Papers, 320–325.
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Pakistan  and  to  prevent  it  from  moving  towards  a  split”,  and  reiterated  its 
condemnation of India's “flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan”232. 
India had already been attacked by Beijing in a People's Daily233 commentary for its 
“open interference” linked to the hospitality given to the AL politicians and to the 
government in exile in Calcutta234. However, the key passage in the letter from Chou 
En-lai was a specific phrase that shows the cautious approach of Beijing: “should the 
Indian  expansionists  dare  to  launch  aggression  against  Pakistan,  the  Chinese 
government and people will as always support the Pakistan government and people 
in their just struggle to safeguard State Sovereignty and national independence”235. 
Although the tone was of warm support towards Pakistan, the exact phrasing of the 
letter caused growing concern for Pakistan. The formula that Pakistan would have 
preferred was the one accepted by the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers in 
June at the Jiddah meeting where the twenty two ministers expressed their support 
for “Pakistan's national unity and territorial integrity”236. Differently from the latter, 
Zhou's phrase indeed seemed to assure support for Pakistan only in the case of a 
threat of war West Pakistan. Despite Pakistan's pressure, Beijing did not modify that 
statement.  Instead  that  approach  was  reiterated  by  Chou  Enlai  during  his 
conversation with Kissinger in July: on that occasion indeed the necessity to work for 
a peaceful resolution of the crisis was affirmed by both parts, whereas the Chinese 
Prime Minister reiterated his (general) intention to support Pakistan in case of an 
231Kux, India and the United States, 293–295; Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited,” 343–346; and 
the much more recent analysis made by Dallek the Nixon administration acted independently from 
the State Department especially regarding foreign policy, concentrating all the powers in the hands 
of the President, of his aide, Kissinger, and of the National Security Council (NSC): he describes  
the Nixon administration as an “Imperial Presidency”. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 51. The State 
Department during the first months of 1971 expressed its suggestions to urge Yhaya to desist from 
military actions in March 1971. See for example: “Letter sent by the assistant secretary, Sisco, to 
Kissinger,  dated  2nd  March  1971”,  in:  Khan,  The  American  Papers,  504–517;  and  later  to 
recognise the existence of an international problem in East Pakistan, no longer an internal affair of 
Pakistan. See: “Telegram sent by Keating to Secretary of State in Washington, Rogers, dated 13th 
of April 1970”, in: ibid., 527–529.
232Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 41.
233The paper is an organ of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China.
234Garver, Protracted Contest, 210.
235Pakistan  Horizon,  24:  2,  153-154;  a  copy  was  transmitted  to  the  Secretary  of  State  by  the  
American Embassy in Pakistan, in: Khan, The American Papers, 530–531.
236Times of India, 27th June 1971.
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Indian aggression threatening its sovereignty237.
This cautious attitude came from the fact that China “concluded early on that it 
had nothing to gain and much to lose by developments in East Pakistan”238. Several 
reasons  explained  that  evaluation.  At  first,  like  the  United  States,  for  its  global 
interests China did not want to be involved in a dangerous crisis that could evolve at 
the  international  level  damaging  the  rapprochement  between  Beijing  and 
Washington. Secondly, China was disturbed at the ideological level by the Pakistani 
repression  since  it  was,  at  least  in  theory,  the  supporter  of  world  revolutionary 
movements, and by the fact that the Bengali secessionist movement was well rooted, 
and by the presence of pro-Beijing groups in it. At last, Beijing was irritated by the 
fact  that  at  the  regional  level  the  Pakistani  repression  could  have  provided 
justifications  to  India  for  intervening  and strengthening  its  friendly ties  with  the 
eventual  future  Bangladeshi  government  at  the  detriment  of  China.  Therefore, 
Beijing's policy was balanced between the necessity not to alienate its relations with 
Pakistan, strategic for the rapprochement with the United States and for its interests 
in South Asia in balancing India, and the will to avoid the explosion of a war, which 
would have advantaged New Delhi's image and credibility.
These factors led the Chinese Prime Minister, in a private communication with a 
high delegation of the Pakistani military junta, to criticise the brutal methods used in 
East Pakistan and to urge Islamabad to find a quick political solution to the crisis239. 
During the same month China's ambassador in Pakistan also pronounced his distress 
for the raising disaster  in East  Pakistan and the beginning of the refugee flux to 
India240.  However,  this  did  not  prevent  China  to  openly  support  Pakistan  with: 
military supplies,  delivered  through the  Karakorum highway officially  opened  in 
February  1971,  economic  assistance,  cooperation  (such  as  at  the  Taxila  heavy 
engineering complex) and training from March onwards241. When Western nations 
began to compel Pakistan for its repression, Beijing inversely promised $100 million 
237“Memorandum of conversation between Chou En-Lai and Henry Kissinger, dated 11 July”, in: 
Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 148.
238Garver, Protracted Contest, 209.
239Ibid., 210.
240Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, 211.
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in economic assistance – in addition to the $200 million given in November 1970242.
India  carefully  monitored  the  signs  Beijing  gave  during  1971  at  the 
governmental243,  academic,  and political levels244.  From the available sources it  is 
possible to argue that by the beginning of July 1971 India was led to conclude that 
China would definitely have continued providing diplomatic and physical support to 
Pakistan until the end of the crisis; but that it would have intervened militarily only if 
the very existence of Pakistan (the West wing) was threatened245. Nevertheless, the 
decision announced by the United States not to intervene in favour of India in case of 
a Chinese military reaction caused distress.
The news of Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July came as a big surprise, 
making India feel even more insecure. When Henry Kissinger came to India on 6 th 
July during his trip to Pakistan, New Delhi was certain the reason was for looking for 
a solution for the East Pakistan crisis. When the news that Kissinger had prolonged 
his permanence in Pakistan for health problems reached India, it did not alarm New 
Delhi too much. On the contrary what shook New Delhi was the announcement made 
241There are references about the Chinese economic and military assistance to Pakistan in 1971 in the 
Financial Times, April 29; Dawn, 21st May, 12th August and 25th September 1971; Hindustan 
Standard, 17th June 1971; The Times of India,16th May, 28th June, 9th July, and 22nd September 
1971; and International Herald Tribune, 14th-15th August 1971. Chou Enlai recognised that China 
also gave military training aid to Pakistan during the conversation he had with president Nixon and 
Kissinger on 23rd February 1972. See “Memorandum of conversation in Beijing” in: Shankar, 
Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 164.
242Garver, Protracted Contest, 210.
243Even if no document declassified by the MAE proves that India tried to establish direct contacts 
with China in 1971, to understand China's intentions it is possible to consult: “Letter from D. P. 
Dhar to T. N. Kaul, dated 29th Apr 1971”, and “Record of conversation between Gromkyo and 
Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, dated 7th June 1971” in P. N. Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 207, 
NMML Archives, New Delhi. They show that India was carefully monitoring China's actions, and 
that postponed all decisions about the possibility to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union with hope 
to improve relations with China.
244The Indian Council of World Affairs conducted several analysis of the situation and presented its  
results during different seminars in July 1971. See for example Sinha and Gosh essays in:  K. 
Subrahmanyam,  Bangla Desh and India’s Security (Dedra Dun: Palit and Dutt, 1972), 113–134 
Serious analysis of the Indian options were published also in the Economic and Political Weekly 
(17th July 1971, 1413 and 1424-5). See also the article of Balrai Puri in the Special Number of that 
month (1517-20), and the article of Giridal Jain in The Times of India (3rd June 1971).
245“Letter from D. P. Dhar to T. N. Kaul, dated 29th April 1971”, in P. N. Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 
207,  NMML Archives,  New Delhi.  Even the Indian  journals  shared  this  view:  Economic  and 
Political Weekly, 5th June 1971.
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by the American president, Richard Nixon, on 15th July about the secret successful246 
meeting held between his advisor, Henry Kissinger, and the Chinese Prime Minister, 
Chou  Enlai,  thanks  to  the  mediation  of  the  Pakistanis.  Reactions  in  India  were 
vibrant  not  so  much  because  of  the  discovery  of  the  Sino-American  détente, 
considered  a  natural  development,  but  for  the  secrecy  around  Kissinger's  trip: 
newspapers criticised the government for not having fully understood the situation, 
and seize the opportunity to also call for a stronger approach to the East Pakistan 
issue247. The official reaction of the Indian government was fearful: Foreign Minister 
Swaran Singh indeed argued that the Sino-American rapprochement became a threat 
to  India  due  to  its  enlargement  to  Pakistan248.  The  secret  Indian  documents  now 
declassified by MAE confirm that Singh considered that “this rapprochement with 
Peking would be at the expense of India”249.
On  the  contrary,  the  development  of  the  Sino-American  rapprochement  was 
regarded in Islamabad as a “major diplomatic success for Pakistan”250. Indeed, Yahya 
Khan  knew  due  to  his  contribution  in  bridging  the  secret  meeting  with  China, 
Washington had a debt of gratitude towards Islamabad. Considered as a significant 
246Kissinger’s visit to Beijing turned out to be a success because of some concessions he made on 
Taiwan  that  led  a  Chinese  agreement  on  a  common agenda  for  Nixon’s  future  visit.  In  fact  
Kissinger informed that the United States were ready to withdraw two-thirds of their troops from 
Taiwan after the end of the Vietnam war, and to continue later in parallel with the improvement of  
Sino-American relations. Nixon’s advisor assured the Chinese Prime Minister that Washington was 
also ready to recognise Taiwan as a part of China and that it would not support its independence.  
Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 266. Beijing considered these concessions as the first step 
America had to take in order to reach a decision for the complete removal of all the American 
troops from Taiwan and the abolishment  of the American-Taiwanese Treaty.  Therefore,  on the 
issue of Nixon’s visit to China an agreement was reached, spring 1972 was chosen as the best  
period for it, and a new channel for bilateral communications was established, namely Paris. See: 
“Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Chou of the 11th of July”,  in: Shankar, 
Nixon,  Indira  and  India:  Politics  and  Beyond,  134.  On  the  15th  of  July  both  Beijing  and 
Washington announced simultaneously the coming visit of Nixon to China. This was for the Nixon 
administration a significant foreign policy accomplishment  that  brought  positive effects on its  
domestic popularity, and that, according to Dallek contributed in the following year to Nixon’s 
second victory at the presidential elections: Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger.
247Inder Malhotra, in The Guardian, 19th July 1971; Economic and Political Weekly, 17th July 1971: 
1414 and 1424-1425; and Economic and Political Weekly, Special Number July 1971: 1517-1520.
248See the speech made by Swaran Singh on the 20th of July in the Lok Sabha in: Government of  
India, Bangladesh Documents, 707–708.
249“Note of MEA, dated 30th July”, in MEA, AMS, WII/104/34/71, National Archives, New Delhi.
250Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 65.
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deterrent to India's intervention in East Pakistan, this led president Yahya Khan to 
declare that in case of any attack conducted by Bengali rebels in East Pakistan, he 
was ready to declare total  war  to  India251.  Such a  statement  triggered  the Indian 
reaction: the Indian Foreign Minister answered that India had “no desire to seize any 
part of Pakistan”, but that it was “ready to defend” itself252. As a consequence, reports 
indicated that the Pakistan Army began to deploy troops along the West Pakistan 
border with India253. Despite the growing tension, the international criticism254, and 
the  reduction  of  the  strategic  position  followed  by the  opening  of  direct  China-
American relations in Paris, Nixon did not delude his ally. On 4th August he publicly 
reaffirmed  that  they  were:  “not  going  to  engage  in  public  pressure  over  the 
government  of  Pakistan”255.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Nixon 
administration did not want to forget Yahya Khan, and on the contrary wanted to 
demonstrate its loyalty to its key ally256;  though most of the Department of State 
raised doubts about the possibility to solve the crisis without pressing Pakistan to 
include the AL leaders into the new government257. In the meantime, also the Chinese 
and the Soviets continued to contribute their direct economic and military assistance 
to Pakistan258.
251Times of India, 18th July 1971.
252Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 711.
253Times of India, 23rd July 1971.
254The Beatles,  Bob Dylan and the Indian sitar  Ravi Shankar performed together  on the 2nd of 
August for raising funding for Bengali and sensitising world opinion. MacMahon, “The Danger of 
Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Asia Crisis of 1971,” 250.
255Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 218–220.
256This is confirmed by the now available record of the meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese 
ambassador held in France on 16th August 1971, in ibid., 107–108.
257Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited,” 430.
258Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 48.
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  5.  The Indian diplomatic reactions and the preparation for the  
worst
In  July India  came to  the  conclusion  that  a  political  solution  with  Pakistan  was 
improbable, and that it had to act to escape the diplomatic stalemate it had found 
itself  in.  Therefore,  during the summer New Delhi  decided to  answer the Soviet 
pressure and in  August  to  sign the  Treaty of  Friendship and Cooperation259 with 
Moscow. Later  when the last  hopes  to  find  a  political  solution  acceptable  to  the 
Bengali  forces  with  the  Pakistani  president  went  through  the  board,  New  Delhi 
decided to prepare its military forces for the conflict, and to embark on a diplomatic 
effort to defend India's cause in front of the world community.
  5.1 India's decision to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with  
Moscow, July-August 1971
As already analysed in the first chapter, although still publicly neutral towards South 
Asia from Tashkent, since 1969 the Soviets had indeed been trying to approach their 
relations with India. Moscow's goals were to assure its influence over the region in 
the wake of the  Nixon doctrine, and to contrast the growing influence China was 
assuming  over  Pakistan.  Not  surprisingly,  Moscow had been  the  first  country to 
welcome Indira Gandhi's victory, considered as a positive and significant step for 
259The Treaty was signed on 9th August 1971 by the foreign ministers of India and the Soviet Union.  
It proclaimed that the two countries would have to work together for the preservation of peaceful 
relations  in  Asia,  and  for  the  refusal  of  colonialism  and  racialism.  One  of  its  aims  was  to  
strengthen the economic, technological, and cultural cooperation between the two parts in respect  
of India’s policy of Non-Alignment. However, as it will be shown later the treaty included also a 
specific article (article nine) that gave, especially to India, the security and military assurance of 
Soviet support that New Delhi needed in relations to the situation of East Pakistan. To see the 
entire text of the Treaty: Ibid., 188–191.
119
Indo-Soviet relations due to her socialist credentials. The Soviet Union, willing to 
finalize the Treaty it had proposed to India since 1969, indeed interpreted the victory 
of the party led by Indira Gandhi as a guaranteed signature. This stance led the Soviet 
Union to be the first great power to state its position over the East Pakistan crisis. 
Although an initial intervention in favour of India, the Soviet position later became 
less critical towards Pakistan.
In fact, afterwards, on 28th March the Soviet consul in Karachi investigated the 
Pakistani  government's  intentions  and,  on 2nd April  the president  Podgorny urged 
Yahya Khan to “put an end to bloodshed and repressions against the population of 
East Pakistan” in order to reach “a peaceful political settlement”, thus demonstrating 
a critical position over Pakistan's behaviour260. This generated profound satisfaction 
in New Delhi among those people who had closely followed Indo-Soviet relations in 
the previous years, like D. P. Dhar, T. N. Kaul and P. N. Haksar261. By the end of the 
month the Soviet Union also encouraged India to help with the refugees and to press 
Pakistan to find a political solution to the crisis262. However, during April the Soviet 
approach towards the question became less critical towards Pakistan, and a much 
more complaisant letter was sent to Islamabad263. Later in May and June some other 
signs  of  openings  towards  Pakistan  followed,  with  the  probable  aim  not  to 
completely alienate  the  Pakistani  military junta.  For  example,  an  agreement  was 
signed  that  doubled  the  Pakistani  export  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  footwear 
manufacturing, and the Soviet Union approved the project for a steel mill to be set up 
near Karachi with Soviet help264. Although on 8th June, during the visit of Swaran 
Singh to Moscow, the Soviets pressed India for the discussion of a Treaty proposal265, 
and expressed in a joint statement their desire to see the “creation of the conditions 
260Ibid., 172.
261“Letter of D. P. Dhar to Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul and Foreign Minister, dated 4 th April 1971”, 
in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
262“Letter of D. P. Dhar to Principal Secretary,  P. N. Haksar, dated on 29 th April 1971”, in P. N. 
Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
263Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 40.
264Ibid., 48.
265“Record of conversation between Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Andrei Gromyko, dated 7 th 
June 1971”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 203, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
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for the return of refugees”266, Moscow still decided to continue their economic aid to 
Pakistan for July267.
Although the Soviet ambivalence was interpreted by Jackson268 as a sign of the 
desire to maintain a balanced position in South Asia, it appears more convincing that 
Moscow was trying to  press Indians to  seriously evaluate  the Soviet  proposal  of 
treaty. According to the declassified documents of the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs and the private papers of Haksar, India during the first six months of 1971 did 
not  demonstrate  any particular  interest  in  resuming the  discussion  over  the  draft 
circulated since 1969, on the contrary to the Soviet Union that returned the issue 
twice. New Delhi was rather interested in receiving and finalizing arms sales with 
Moscow, as expressed several times269. The first time New Delhi reacted postponing 
any decisions, declaring the need for more time to understand the Chinese position 
toward  the  recent  developments  in  East  Pakistan,  and  expressing  the  will  to  try 
improving relations  with  Beijing270.  When the  Soviets  in  late  June  pressed  again 
about  the  issue,  finally  India  demonstrated  its  availability  to  negotiate.  It  was  a 
probable consequence for the failure of the attempts to improve its relations with 
Beijing271, and for the same developments of the situation in East Pakistan. In fact, 
realising that the possibilities to reach a significant political solution with Pakistan 
were minimal272,  in  June New Delhi  took the decision to  continue sustaining the 
Bengali forces. In fact, since the Bengali forces alone were not able to win against 
the Pakistani Armed Forces in a reasonable amount of time273, by the end of July the 
Indian Army, the Navy and Air Forces discussed plans and tactics, and adopted some 
266Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 511–512.
267Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 70.
268Jackson, South Asian Crisis.
269“Note of Haksar to D. P. Dhar dated on the 25 th of February 1971”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 
167; “Note of Haksar to Prime Minister dated on the 9 th of March 1971”, in Haksar papers, III 
inst., f. n. 164, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
270“Letter of D. P. Dhar to Foreign Secretary, T. N. Kaul, dated on 29 th April 1971”, in P. N. Haksar 
private papers, III inst., f. n. 227, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
271“Letter of Haksar to Prime Minister and T. N. Kaul dated June 1971”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f.  
n. 258; “Record of conversation between Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Foreign Minister  
Andrei Gromyko held on the 7th of June 1971”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 203, in NMML 
Archives, New Delhi.
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measures to prepare for the war274. Although by June East Pakistan had become a 
burden  for  West  Pakistan,  the  division  of  Pakistan  was  considered  as  being  of 
strategic interest for India: West Pakistan would have been more inclined to identify 
itself with Central Asian and Middle Eastern states rather than with South Asia; and 
profiting from this territory and population reduction due to the split, India would 
have emerged as the major power of the region. 
Therefore, during the summer, in order to contrast its international isolationism, 
the Indian political leadership, consulting neither the Parliament nor the Cabinet275, 
began  the  negotiation  process  with  the  Soviet  to  sign  a  Treaty.  Although  some 
overrate the impact that the secret visit made by Kissinger could have had over the 
foreign policy decision-making in New Delhi276, it is erroneous to think it had no 
significant role in it since it constrained India's position favouring the acceleration, 
and finalisation of the treaty discussions277.  Moreover, the assurance given by the 
Nixon administration to Yhaya Khan, that the American declaration of intention was 
not to intervene in case of a Chinese attack to India, and the evolution of the situation 
at  the  UN  level,  contributed  to  raising  concerns  in  New  Delhi.  Those  events 
272In order to assess that no other negotiation options were really possible with Pakistan, at the end of 
July the government in exile of Bangladesh and India tried together to reach a last compromise 
with president Yayha Khan, applying to the United States for mediating between the two parts. 
Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 173–174. American officials considered it highly likely that 
the  positions  assumed  by  the  representative  of  the  Bangladesh  government  in  exile  had  the 
approval of New Delhi. Ibid., 193–194. It is reported that the United States communicated to the 
Pakistani the new availability of the Bengali forces to withdraw their request of secession if the  
Pakistani president was ready to include AL members in the list of candidates for the mid-elections 
that  he  was  planning  to  hold  in  September.  Mid-elections  were  the  solution  found  by  the 
government of Pakistan for substituting those members considered anti-state. But Islamabad did 
not answer.
273Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 207.
274F.  R.  J.  Jacob,  Surrender  at  Dacca:  Birth  of  a  Nation (New  Delhi:  Manohar  Publishers  & 
Distributors, 1997), 59–77; Nilkanta Krishnan,  No Way but Surrender: An Account of the Indo-
Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal, 1971 (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1980), 17–25.
275According to P. N. Dhar the Cabinet was informed of the initiative just a few days before the  
signature of the Treaty, while the Parliament was informed only later. Dhar,  Indira Gandhi, the 
“Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 52.
276See for example: Mariele Merlati, Gli Stati Uniti tra India e Pakistan: gli anni della presidenza  
Carter (Roma: Carocci, 2009), 54; “A Relevant Pakistan Policy.”
277“Record of conversation between Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Andrei  Gromyko on 8th 
August 1971”, in Haksar papers, III inst. f. n. 170; “Letter of T. N. Kaul to Prime Minister on 3 rd 
August 1971” and “Record of Conversation between Kosygin and D. P. Dhar on 5 th August 1971”, 
in Haksar papers, I&II inst., f. n. 49, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
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convinced New Delhi of the necessity to balance the new alignment of the United 
States  with Pakistan,  and most  probably with China,  reaching for  the  support  of 
another  great  power.  At  the  domestic  level,  the  same  pressure  raised  by  the 
opposition parties for a direct military intervention in East Pakistan could not have 
been completely ignored for the negative impact it could have had on the next state 
assemblies  scheduled  for  early  1972278.  Moreover,  criticism  emerged  during  the 
summer of 1971 on the scarce performance of the new Indian government, due to the 
fact  that  “Mrs.  Gandhi's  government  had done nothing  to  implement  the  'Garibi 
Hatao'  slogan”279,  required something to  be  done to  distract  attention.  Lastly,  the 
number  of  refugees,  which  had  reached  seven  millions  by July280,  increased  the 
burden over the budget281, and worsened the situation in the North East of India282.
Therefore, D. P. Dhar, who had previously been ambassador in the Soviet Union 
and had followed the conception Soviet phases of the treaty in close collaboration 
with P. N. Haksar, went to Moscow on 2nd August to discuss the issue. During the 
discussion  a  specific  article  (article  nine)  was  added  to  the  drafts  of  the  Treaty 
circulated earlier  in  1969 and 1970,  due to India's  pressure.  That  article  was the 
crucial part of the agreement since it disciplined the behaviour of the two states in 
case of war. The article first stated that both signatory countries would “abstain from 
providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the 
other party”; assuring New Delhi therefore of the fact Moscow would not provide 
military aid to Pakistan in case of war. Moreover, “mutual consultations” should have 
been held between the signatories in case of an attack (or threat of an attack) from a 
third country to either parts in order “to remove such threats and to take appropriate 
effective measures to ensure peace and security”283. It is clear that this article was 
included in the treaty with the specific aim to reassure India of the Soviet help in 
278Hindustan Times, 7th and 9th July 1971
279Bayley, “India,” 91.
280Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 446.
281Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 159.
282Economic and Political Weekly, 12th June 1972, 1159.
283“The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, 9th of August 1971” in Jackson,  
South Asian Crisis, 188–191.
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case of a war with Pakistan, considered then probable by New Delhi284. Nevertheless, 
after the signature of the twenty-year  Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, New 
Delhi and Moscow agreed to issue a milder declaration to diminish the impact it 
could have had on foreign chancelleries. The Foreign Ministers indeed stated that 
both  sides  “reiterated  their  firm conviction  that  can  be  no  military  solution  and 
considered  it  necessary  that  urgent  steps  be  taken  in  East  Pakistan  for  the 
achievement of the political solution”285. 
Although  in  India  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  was  celebrated  also  by  the 
opposition  parties286,  for  New  Delhi  it  was  indeed  important  not  to  be  read 
internationally as  the aggressive state  of  South Asia,  or as a client  of  the Soviet 
Union. As a matter of fact, there was the risk that the Treaty signature was perceived 
by the non-alignment states as a departure from the policy of Non-alignment that 
India was still firmly declaring to support in 1971. Therefore, New Delhi reassured 
both publicly and privately that the Treaty was not a formal alliance with the Soviet 
Union, and that it did not constitute a departure from its historical policy of non-
alignment287. As a sign of openness, New Delhi even declared its availability to sign 
similar treaties with other states as well, and included the United States288. From the 
Soviets’ perspective the treaty was an important result since it enlarged its influence 
in South Asia; and moreover was a concrete action for deterring other great powers, 
such as China and the United States, to intervene in an Indo-Pakistani war, which at 
that time seemed probable, even if not desired by Moscow. The news of the Treaty 
surprised the United States: Kissinger defined it as a “bombshell” that was “throwing 
a lighted match into a powder keg”289. According to Van Hollen, who was an official 
of  the  State  Department,  from that  moment,  Nixon began to  fear  that  India  had 
284D. R. Mankekar,  Pakistan Cut to Size: The Authentic Story of the 14-day Indo-Pak War (New 
Delhi: Indian Book Co., 1972), 32.
285Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 201.
286Economic and Political Weekly, 14th August 1971.
287“Record of the discourse made by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in the Lok Sabha, dated 9 th 
August 1971”, in MEA, AMS, WII/504/4/71, National Archives, New Delhi.
288“Letter from Joint Secretary in New Delhi to Rasgotra, Indian Embassy in Washington, dated on 
24th August 1971”, in MEA, AMS, WII/504/3/71, National Archives, New Delhi.
289Kissinger, White House Years, 867–868.
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become a Soviet client, and considered the evolution of a Indo-Pakistani conflict to a 
global scale probable290. As a result Nixon’s administration began to threaten India of 
cutting all the economic assistance in case of a conflict291. On 7th August 1971 Indira 
Gandhi sent a letter to president Nixon refusing to accept the presence of the UN 
forces in its territories, and accepting the American invitation to visit Washington to 
discuss  the  issue  directly  talking  to  president  Nixon.  Later,  Kissinger  positively 
acknowledged that India was “by no means prepared to write off the US”, despite his 
concern about the situation in South Asia292. 
  5.2 The military and diplomatic preparation for the conflict,  September-
November 1971
For India and the Bangladeshi government in exile the participation of the Awami 
League in the political negotiation was a prerequisite for solving the crisis. In mid-
August,  some  days  before  the  signing  of  the  Indo-Soviet  Treaty,  the  Pakistani 
president took the decision not to allow AL participation in the political process for 
setting up a civilian authority in East Pakistan293, and to begin a trial on a charge of 
treason against Mujib Rahman, for which he could be sentenced to death. This was 
unacceptable for both the government of Bangladesh, where the AL leaders were the 
majority, and for India that commented on the Pakistani decision declaring its “deep 
anxiety” and warning of the “grave and perilous consequences” that the trial to Mujib 
290Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited,” 432.
291“Memorandum  for  the  record  of  the  President’s  meeting  with  the  Senior  Review  Group  on 
Pakistan, dated 11th August 1971”, in Khan, The American Papers, 659.
292“Memorandum sent to Nixon by Kissinger, dated 19th August 1971”, in Shankar,  Nixon, Indira  
and India: Politics and Beyond, 255.
293The government of Pakistan on 5th August published a white paper giving its fullest account to 
date of the origins of the crisis and accusing AL members and Mujib of being responsible for the 
violence.  Jackson,  South Asian Crisis,  80. In  addition, a few days later the Pakistan president 
stated that 79 of the 160 Awami League members elected to the National Assembly had been 
disqualified by the new government, as well as 159 of the 228 AL members of the provincial  
Assembly. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 194.
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would have worsened the situation in Bangladesh294. These decisions taken by Yahya 
excluded any possibilities to find a peaceful solution for the East Pakistani crisis. 
Again  in  September  the  Nixon administration,  fully  aware  of  the  erosion  of  the 
situation  in  South  Asia,  tried  to  explore  the  possibility  of  finding  an  Indian 
compromise; but the Indian ambassador reconfirmed their position over the issue, 
and therefore that Mujib should have been included in all negotiations295.
As a consequence of the Pakistani decisions, since mid-August the priorities of 
the  Indian  government  had become two:  first,  having  the  Armed  and  the  Mukti  
Bahini forces  ready  for  a  war  by  winter  time296;  and  second,  to  work  at  the 
international level to definitively avoid the UN involvement in East Pakistan, and for 
presenting East Pakistan's crisis under humanitarian dimensions capable of justifying 
the military intervention of New Delhi.
Therefore, New Delhi by late August ordered the Commander in Chief of the 
Indian Army, Gen. S. F. H. J. Manekshaw, to prepare for military action. Gen. J. 
Singh Aurora was in charge of the operations, and by the end of September along the 
East border seven Indian divisions were ready, together with one infantry brigade and 
two Mukti Bahini brigades297. By November reserves of the Indian Army were called, 
while  the  training  of  the  new  conscripts  was  undercut  to  have  more  operative 
divisions298.  Moreover,  the  same  tactics  of  the  Mukti  Bahini  were  significantly 
modified: first, as already underlined, a Five Party Consultative Committee was set 
up on 8th September to broaden the political base of the Government of Bangladesh 
in  exile  in  Calcutta,  and  to  coordinate  the  actions  of  the  Bengali  forces299;  and 
second, the Indian military forces provided a higher support for the  Mukti Bahini's 
294Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 711–713.
295Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 221.
296The best time to launch a military campaign was indeed winter time, as already highlighted by the  
chief of the Army forces in the discussion he had with Mrs. Gandhi in late March. The monsoon 
season would be over, the terrain dry enough to allow military manoeuvres in East Pakistan, and 
the passes in the Himalayas, through which a Chinese attack could have been eventually launched,  
closed by the snow. Moreover, the  Mukti Bahini would finally have been ready to support the 
military operations. 
297Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 225.
298Interview with Gen. K. M. Shergill, held in New Delhi on 21st December 2011.
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operations, resulting in a general collapse of the local authority outside large urban 
areas in East Pakistan by the end of September300.  Furthermore, India restated its 
position  again  at  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  held  in  the  fall, 
refusing  to  recognise  the  crisis  as  an  Indo-Pakistan  problem.  On  that  occasion 
Pakistan  accused  India  of  interference  again,  and  called  for  the  dispatch  of  UN 
forces. Although the situation was similar to the one in July at the ECOSOC meeting, 
by this time all decisions at the UN had been prevented by the Soviets, who since the 
end of August had declared their opposition to holding a Security Council meeting 
over the East Pakistan issue301.
Nevertheless, Moscow's attitude remained cautious in its support for India until 
the  beginning  of  October,  in  order  not  to  precipitate  the  transformation  of  the 
situation into a  war,  but to  continue to  search for  a  political  solution.  Therefore, 
Moscow limited its actions taking an uncritical position over the Indian behaviour 
both at the conference of the  Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU)  on 10th September, 
and on the occasion provided by the joint communication signed at the and of the 
visit of the King of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. Moreover, both Prime Minister 
Kosygin,  during Mrs.  Gandhi’s visit  to Moscow in late  September,  and president 
Podgorny, in his surprise stop in New Delhi on 1st October, restated the view that the 
problem had  to  be  solved  through  peaceful  means,  continuing  to  refer  to  “East 
Pakistan”, and not as “East Bengal” as the Indians had done since March302. Again on 
9th October the Soviets renewed their preference towards a peaceful resolution of the 
South Asian crisis in occasion of the Soviet-Algerian joint communication released 
after the visit of Kosygin to Algeria, where they called for the respect the of “national 
unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and India” and urged a peaceful resolution 
of the issue303. The Soviet approach was also similar to the American one, interesting 
as well to enhance the process of détente with the Soviet Union and to press India 
and Pakistan to reduce the risk of a war. American secretary of state Rogers and the 
300Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 226.
301The Statesman, 20th August 1971.
302Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” Asian Survey 13, no. 5 (May 1973): 
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Soviet foreign ministry Gromkyo during a meeting in New York on 30th September 
indeed agreed that war was “not a solution”304.
On 8th October 1971 India, willing to impress the world opinion, made its last 
concessions to Pakistan: the Foreign Minister Swaran Singh clarified that India did 
not consider the independence of Bangladesh as the only solution, and stated that 
“the  Indian  stand  had  always  been  based  on  the  need  for  a  political  solution 
acceptable  to  the  already  elected  representative  of  Bangladesh”305.  As  noted  by 
Jackson, this opening was probably made under Soviet pressure, and was intended as 
the  last  option  to  reverse  the  course  of  events.  Evidence  of  this  was that  exiled 
political  leaders  of  Bangladesh  expressed  different  opinions  from  New  Delhi, 
restating their commitment to complete independence306. The Pakistani answer came 
soon after: on 12th October President Yahya released a declaration that did not take 
into consideration restarting negotiations with Mujib and the AL members in exile. 
On the contrary, the Pakistani president underlined the efforts he had made to work 
for a political solution307, and accused India of preparing its Army for a war, calling 
again for the intervention of the UN forces along the borders308. Even more serious 
than his speech, Yahya ordered to move the military forces along the borders both in 
the East  and in  the West  of  Pakistan.  Therefore,  New Delhi  ordered its  army to 
position not only along the East border, where it had been for some time, but also to 
the West. The  Mukti Bahini reacted by launching a specific campaign against the 
304Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 83.
305Times of India, 9th and 10th October 1971.
306The Statesman, 9th October 1971. In reality a faction of the government of Bangladesh in exile, 
led by its foreign minister K. M. Ahmed, supported the official position stated by the Ministry 
Swaran  Singh  and  took  contact  with  the  US  Consul  General  in  Calcutta  for  exploring  the 
possibilities  of  finding  a  political  settlement  with  Pakistan.  Although  Yahya  suggested  the 
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East  Pakistani  by-elections  scheduled  for  December,  killing  a  series  of  political 
figures that had agreed to participate.
As events progressed, the support of the Soviet Union for India became more 
explicit:  Pravda on 16th October commented saying “certain representatives of the 
Pakistani military administration” that “continued fomenting tension and preventing 
the  normalization  of  the  situation”.  On  17th October  Yahya  Khan  called  for  a 
withdrawal of troops. Few days later he was supported by the UN General Secretary 
who also declared UN forces at the disposal of the two countries with regards to the 
risk of war. Since it was not a real concession for India, Indians did not change its 
position,  and  refused  to  withdraw309.  Instead,  Pakistan  warmly  welcomed  the 
proposal of the General Secretary of the UN, and invited U. Thant to make a visit to 
the subcontinent. However, New Delhi began to support the operations of the Mukti  
Bahini with the artillery, and the air forces use310. This triggered a tougher response 
by the Pakistani Army and several attacks took place along the border especially 
from the beginning of November. The Indian decision to raise military efforts was 
probably made with  two aims  in  mind:  on  the  one  hand,  to  prove  the  effective 
capabilities of the  Mukti Bahini311; and on the other to force Islamabad to take the 
initiative for officially opening the hostilities.  As a  consequence of  the increased 
tensions, India and the Soviet Union agreed that mutual consultation was needed by 
that time. On 22nd October the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister,  Nikolai  Firyubin, 
arrived in Delhi to discuss the implications of article nine of the Treaty signed in 
August. On 27th the two parts declared to agree on their assessment of the South 
Asian situation312, and on 28th October Foreign Minister Swaran Singh informed the 
country (and the whole world) of the Soviet Union’s “total support” of India. In the 
following days Soviet Air Marshal P. S. Koutakhov went to New Delhi to discuss the 
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shipments of weapons required by India that then began in early November313.
Moreover, in that period, Mrs. Gandhi left India to embark on a three week tour 
around the Western states with the aim of underlining the dramatic situation India 
was facing, and also the fact that India, despite the signature of the Treaty with the 
Soviet  Union,  was  still  interested  in  keeping  cordial  relations  with  the  West, 
especially with Great Britain and France. In all the speeches she gave, Indira Gandhi 
underlined  the  fact  that  the  refugees,  who  were  by  then  9,5  million314,  was  an 
unsustainable problem for India, and that the only acceptable solution to the crisis 
was a  negotiation between Mujib  and the Pakistani  authorities.  From Vienna the 
Indian Prime Minister indicated again New Delhi’s opposition to the stationing of the 
UN  observers  along  the  borders315.  On  31st October  from London,  Mrs.  Gandhi 
restated  her  opinion  that  the  proposal  of  U.  Thant  was  not  acceptable  since  it 
equalized  the  two  countries  and  did  not  recognize  the  major  responsibility  of 
Pakistan; and restated the fact that India was still loyal to its long policy of Non-
alignment316. In all the European capitals, and especially in London that was reluctant 
to see India fall under exclusive Soviet influence, Indira Gandhi made a considerable 
impression, and received warm welcome and expressions of comprehension317.
In November the tour brought Mrs. Gandhi to the United States for the meeting 
with president Nixon already planned during the summer. The meeting turned out to 
be unfriendly, tense and strained. According to Kux, all the parts later described it as 
a  “dialogue  of  the  deaf”,  where  personal  dislikes  clearly  came  out  and  did  not 
helping  the  actors  to  find  an  acceptable  solution318.  Nixon  perceived  the 
determination of Indira Gandhi to solve the situation at any cost, but since the United 
States had no intentions to significantly intervene and to press Pakistan to accept a 
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political  solution including the government of Bangladesh319,  the meeting did not 
produce tangible results320. Nevertheless, at the diplomatic level the tour in the West 
did not turn out to be a waste of time for India: it had a significant effect on the  
world’s  opinion  that  carefully  followed  it,  especially  in  the  United  States321. 
Moreover, after that tour Indira Gandhi was able to state she had done everything in 
her power to solve the issue. On 13th November in a letter written to Nixon Indira 
Gandhi indeed restated India's position declaring the situation “untenable”322.
The Chinese factor was of course kept in high consideration during the fall of 
1971 by both India323 and Pakistan. Interested in reducing the possibilities of friction 
with  China,  during  the  fall  India  gave  signs  of  distension  that  were  carefully 
publicised by Beijing,  such as the message pronounced by Indira Gandhi on 25 th 
October when the People's Republic of China officially entered the United Nations, 
inheriting  the  seat  that,  until  that  moment,  had  been  held  by Taiwan.  The small 
improvements in bilateral relations were then reinforced by Beijing's declaration of 
its willingness to receive an Indian ping-pong team324. These developments caused 
Pakistan  to  worry  even  more  about  the  partial  support  China  had  declared  to 
Islamabad earlier in April in the letter from Chou Enlai. In fact, from the declassified 
documents it is clear that China was not interested in getting involved in the Indo-
Pakistani conflict and to risk a war with the Soviet Union: first, the Prime Minister 
Chou Enlai considered East Pakistan's situation as “already unable to be saved in the 
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Pakistan  and  the  Government  of  Bangladesh  in  exile,  without  significant  variations.  Jackson, 
South  Asian  Crisis,  207–211.  According  to  Jackson,  American  ambassador  Keating  indirectly 
confirmed the fact that no specific moves were made by the United States to press Pakistan after 
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fall of 1971”325; second, during the meeting  Chou Enlai had with Kissinger in late 
October, in which the agenda of Nixon's visit in 1972 was discussed again in all its 
details,  Nixon's  advisor  indeed  reported  that  the  Chinese  were  standing  behind 
Pakistan with “less passion” than in the previous July, and that he had the perception 
that in case of war China would be in an “awkward position”326.
Therefore, in order to understand the Chinese position, to boost the morale of 
Pakistani, and to press Beijing to make a public statement declaring their support for 
Islamabad, President Yahya Khan sent a delegation to personally test the situation327. 
Bhutto was the head of the official delegation composed by the Foreign Secretary, 
and by the Commanders in Chief of the Army, Air and Navy forces, though he did 
not hold at that time any specific political position. The mission was preceded by 
some statements made by President Yahya that, full of hope, declared to Newsweek 
on 31st October to have China's support in case of war. Despite the warm welcome 
given to the delegation,  the meeting was disappointing for Pakistan,  and no joint 
statement  followed.  Beijing  did  not  move  from its  previous  position,  and  on  7th 
November restated that “our Pakistani friend may rest assured that should Pakistan 
be  subjected  to  foreign  aggression  the  Chinese  government  and  people  will,  as 
always, resolutely support the Pakistani government and people in their struggle to 
defend their state sovereignty and national independence”328. Again no reference to 
the  unity or  integrity of Pakistan was made. To react to this failure Bhutto tried to 
covert it, releasing a declaration that depicted the meeting as a “complete success”, 
without being controverted by the Chinese329. However, on 10th November the Indian 
government,  which  had  carefully  followed  the  Pakistani  visit  to  China,  finally 
declared that there was no indication that China would intervene on Pakistan's side. 
Even more significant, New Delhi decided to move several Indian divisions from the 
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Himalayan front to the border with East Pakistan330.
In  the meantime,  the situation in  East  Pakistan had become characterised by 
several military engagements between Indian and Pakistani forces, in which Indian 
troops were alleged to have crossed the border331.  This situation alarmed the UN 
General Secretary that on 15th November decided to launch the United Nations East 
Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO), even if it did not have any formal supporting 
resolution released by a UN organ and “solely on the base of President Yahya Khan's 
acceptance  of  U.  Thant's  offer  of  humanitarian  assistance”332.  However,  the  UN 
mission did not last: after two days the head of the UNEPRO headquarters, Paul-
Marc Henry, warned he was facing so many difficulties due to the opposition of the 
Mukti  Bahini  that  the  effectiveness  and  conduct  of  the  operations  was  unsure333. 
Attacks on the UNEPRO personnel and facilities led Henry to suspend operations in 
a week for the scarce security conditions334. After 20th November the clashes became 
more  significant  between  the  Indian  and  Pakistani  armed  forces,  and  the  Indian 
troops did not began to withdraw after their operations beyond the border335. It is 
interesting  to  note  that  even  on  this  occasion,  as  typical  in  the  Indian  decision-
making process,  decisions  were  taken by the Prime Minister  and her  advisers  in 
autonomy, neither informing the Cabinet, nor reuniting the PAC to discuss336. Indira 
Gandhi only gave an account of the affair to the Parliament on 24th November, and 
soon after a spokesman from the Indian government made it public that instructions 
to cross the border for defending operations had been given to the military forces. On 
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30th  November Indian Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, reassured the international 
community  that  Indian  troops  were  not  permitted  to  penetrate  more  than  13-16 
kilometres337. Despite India justifying its operation as defensive, it was clear it was 
escalating tension in order to provoke Pakistan to begin the war. Since the last week 
of November New Delhi  and the government  of  Bangladesh also worked on the 
creation of a joint military command to coordinate the actions of the Indian Army 
and of the Mukthi Bahini led by Gen. Osmani in preparation of the conflict.  The 
agreement was signed on 3rd December by Mrs. Gandhi and the Bangladeshi Prime 
Minister  Tajauddin.  It  was  intended  to  be  a  political  recognition  of  the  role  the 
government of Bangladesh had in the crisis338. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  new  Indian  military  strategy,  on  23rd November 
Pakistan had already proclaimed a state of emergency. Significantly, on the previous 
day the Chinese government, alarmed, sent a message to the White House through 
the Gen. Vernon Walters military attaché in Paris asking Washington to exercise more 
pressure  over  the  Pakistani  government  to  prevent  further  deterioration  of  the 
situation339. Sensing the risk of war, the Chinese were probably trying to transmit 
their concern to the United States, the only state that had sustained Pakistan until that 
time and could thus press it to accept negotiating with the AL and Mujib. However, 
the  American  reaction  was  not  to  put  pressure  on  Pakistan.  Instead,  Washington 
contacted  the  Chinese  envoy  in  New  York,  Huang  Hua,  for  discussing  China's 
intentions  concerning  how  to  act  in  the  Security  Council  in  case  of  war:  Hua 
reassured Kissinger of the Chinese support to the Pakistani and American position340. 
Moreover, on 25th president Nixon wrote to all the principal actors, Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, president Yahya Khan, and to Prime Minister Kosygin, proposing a 
limited withdrawal  in order to de-escalate the situation341.  The call  did not  affect 
India since the Indian Prime Minister stated that the country could not “hold” the 
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situation  any longer342.  Therefore,  on 1st December  the  White  House  clarified  its 
unwillingness to press Pakistan again, announcing instead the suspension of all the 
licences for arms exports to India, which was then followed on 6th December (after 
the  beginning  of  the  third  Indo-Pakistani  war),  by  the  decision  to  suspend  all 
economic  assistance  to  India  for  a  value  of  $87,6  million343.  This  fact  led  Mrs. 
Gandhi  to  polemically  respond at  a  meeting  of  Congress  workers  in  New Delhi 
stating that “The times had passed when any nation sitting 3.000 or 4.000 miles away 
could give orders to Indians on the basis of their colour superiority to do as they 
wish. India has changed and she is no more a country of slaves. Today we will do 
what is best for our national interest and not what these so-called big nations would 
like us to do”344. 
  6.  The  third  Indo-Pakistani  war  and  the  emergence  of  
Bangladesh
New  Delhi  succeeded  in  provoking  a  Pakistani  attack  on  3rd December,  when 
Pakistan ordered its air forces in West Pakistan to launch several attacks on the north-
western major Indian air bases345. This date is generally recognised as the beginning 
of the third Indo-Pakistani war, and because of the air strikes Pakistan is generally 
considered  responsible  for  starting  the  conflict346.  Demonstrating  their  support  to 
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343Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 105.
344Mankekar, Pakistan Cut to Size, 34.
345Dixit reported that D. P. Dhar commented on the news of the Pakistani attack saying: “The fool  
has done exactly what one had expected”. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 89.
346Bayley, “India,” 93.
135
India, the Soviets came to the point of defining it as an “unprovoked aggression”347. 
However,  analysing  the  events  it  would  be  much more  accurate  to  consider  21st 
November  as  the  starting  date  of  the  hostilities,  since  Indian  troops  on  that  day 
crossed  the  border  and  occupied  without  withdrawing  from Pakistani  territories. 
Apart from this, the war could be divided into two phases: the first one until 10 th 
December, during which India clearly demonstrated its military superiority; and the 
second, that  lasted until  17th December when,  after  the Eastern Command of  the 
Pakistani Army surrendered, and the Indian declaration of a unilateral cease-fire for 
the West frontier, President Yahya Khan accepted the cease-fire, during which global 
powers interfered in the conflict.
  6.1 The military campaign until 10th December 1971
On 4th December, when Indira Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram were back in Delhi after 
their  stay in other Indian cities where they had been at  the time of the Pakistani 
attack, the PAC was reunited and the military strategy to follow was discussed by the 
Indian leadership. According to Mankekar348, and Jacob349 military plans had already 
been decided by July 1971 and they were just briefly reconsidered on that occasion. 
Although the Defence Minister expressed his opinion on launching a larger attack on 
the  West  front  too,  Indira  Gandhi  and  the  other  advisers  of  the  Prime  Minister 
rebuffed it, choosing instead to fight an offensive war only at the Eastern front350. 
Here the strategy was to bypass the Pakistani forces concentrated in the principal 
East Pakistan centres, and trying to reach Dacca as soon as possible. In the West 
instead, only two special offensive operations were planned with the aim to deter a 
Pakistani advance: first, the occupation of some small but strategic sections of the 
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Pakistani side of Kashmir; and second, the occupation of a strategic area in Sind 
where all the major communication lines of Pakistan passed351. The political direction 
for  military  operation  was  restricted  to  the  Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi,  P.  N. 
Haksar, and D. P. Dhar. Operational guidance was given to Gen. Manekshaw, Chief 
of the Army Staff, and the Air and Navy Chiefs, P. C. Lal and Admiral Nanda352. 
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul instead took care of 
the situation at the UN. Indian Army, Air, and Navy forces were more numerous, 
better equipped, and more mobile than the Pakistani forces353.
Therefore, on 5th December India launched its offensive in the East in order to 
conquer Dacca, where the Pakistani Eastern Command was located, while the small 
operations  for  the  West  were  started354.  In  the  following  days  India  officially 
legitimised the government of Bangladesh in exile in Calcutta. The disposition of 
forces on the ground was in favour of India in the East, whereas in the West the two 
contending forces were equal355. The Pakistani forces in the East also had to face the 
hostility  of  the  population356,  and  the  fact  they  were  already  weakened  both 
physically and morally by several months of occupation. Moreover, the defections of 
Bengali from military ranks resulted in a handicap for the Pakistani forces, especially 
in the Air Force where Bengali were largely represented. On the contrary, the East 
Indian troops were facilitated by the fact that the Mukti Bahini knew the territories 
well and supported them in the key operations, and that local the population of East 
Pakistan  often  welcomed  them357.  However,  East  Pakistan  had  a  territory  that 
facilitated defensive fighting, and the same strategic operations made by the Mukti  
Bahini forces during summer and in the previous months did not facilitate operations 
since the major communication facilities had been damaged by their terrorist attacks. 
Pakistan instead fought the war with the idea that the “defence of the east is in 
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the west”: occupying Indian territories in the west was the goal, in order to trade 
them later for the eastern territories, considered almost impossible to protect358. In 
fact, since the fall of 1971 Islamabad had been conscious of the fact that defending 
East Pakistan would have been an almost impossible task359. The leading general of 
the Eastern Command, Gen. A. A. K. Niazi, had already drafted the first military 
plans for the resistance of the Pakistani Army in the East in May. These plans were 
reviewed at the commanders' conference in June in Rawalpindi, and the final version 
was issued by July. According to these plans the goal of the East was to keep the 
enemy troops involved to the maximum, in order not to allow them to shift to the 
West,  and to  “keep  regular  troops  in  certain  designated  towns,  which  had to  be 
defended by them as fortresses or strong points”360. The plan however turned out to 
be  impossible,  since  defending  the  designated  fortresses  directly  implied  leaving 
corridors open for the enemy to reach Dacca361. 
The air attack of 3rd December had limited effects: few Indian air forces were 
hit362. In a few days India took complete control of the skies363, and the Pakistani 
troops  resented  both  the  East  and West  for  the  scarce  air  support  for  the  whole 
duration of the conflict. Although on the western front the air attack of 3rd December 
was also supported by ground operations in Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan364, these 
advances were stopped during the first days of fighting by the Indian Army by 10 th 
December. In fact, in Kashmir, Indian forces launched several small and successful 
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attacks that allowed them to assume the control of those strategic territories that they 
retained until the war end365. Furthermore, in Punjab and Rajasthan the Indian army 
stopped  the  advancement  of  Pakistan,  and  by  8th December  was  controlling  the 
territories close to the crucial roads that connected North and South Pakistan, and 
occupying  several  areas  in  Sind366.  At  the  naval  level  Indian  forces  completely 
dominated the scene from the beginning, especially supporting operations in the west 
against the Karachi harbour, and the oil installations that left the air force without 
refuelling367. Moreover, by 10th December the defence in the East was already close 
to collapse.
Surely the highly centralised Pakistani decision making process, which did not 
involve the civilian representatives, and that was just  circumscribed to the Army, 
rather than to the Air Forces and the Navy, did not help either368.  Moreover, during 
the war the communications between East and West became inefficient and difficult: 
this  did  not  facilitate  the  decision-making  process,  as  copies  of  the  official 
documents of the contact between the military headquarters in West Pakistan and the 
Commanders  in  the  East  presented  in  the  report  of  the  Hamoodur  Rahmana 
Commission  clearly  demonstrate369.  President  Yahya  Khan  and  the  military 
headquarters  indeed  communicated  to  the  East  only  through  two  channels:  the 
civilian Governor Malik and his military adviser, Gen. Rao Farman Ali Khan, or the 
Commanding General of the Eastern Command and martial law administration, Gen 
Niazi. However, even before the war contacts between Yahya and the Army in the 
East  were  not  very good:  in  November  Yahya  was  described  as  “isolated”  from 
events in Pakistan by his advisers, and the Pakistan Army in the East had achieved 
almost “autonomous control of the province”370. The scarce efficiency and quality of 
the line of communication between the East and the West can explain at least two 
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developments that did not favour Pakistan during the war: the late Pakistan's reaction 
to the Indian decision allowing its troop to invade East Pakistan; and the strange case 
of the declaration of a cease-fire by the Eastern commander on 9 th December. In fact, 
when  India  decided  to  increase  the  level  of  fighting  in  the  East  after  21 st 
November371, the headquarters in Islamabad downplayed the alarm report sent by the 
commanders in the East372, and opted for waiting without declaring war to India. It is 
probable that President Yahya Khan and his military advisers evaluated that it was 
not in Pakistan's interests to declare war, and that it was better to hope that the UN or 
the  United  States  could  dissuade  India  from  attacking.  However,  this  was  an 
erroneous  conclusion  because  nothing  was  done  at  the  international  level.  Thus, 
Pakistan waited until 30th November before ordering the Army to prepare to attack 
India, and on 3rd December when it finally decided to attack it, paradoxically became 
the one perceived as the aggressor373.
Moreover, another example of the lack of communication between Yahya Khan 
and the political and military headquarters in Dacca was the cease-fire, which was 
presented and then withdrawn by the Eastern Command on 9th December to the UN. 
This  event  happened  as  a  consequence  of  the  answer  Yayhya  Khan provided  in 
several messages sent on 7th and 9th December by Governor Malik and Gen. Niazi. In 
those  messages  Malik  and  Niazi  were  informed  of  the  need  to  find  a  political 
settlement for East Pakistan due to the dramatic situation of the Pakistani troops in 
the East, which had been defined as “extremely critical” and hopeless374. President 
Yahya Khan, who, according to the American Ambassador Farland, seemed resigned 
about the future of the Pakistani troops in the East375, on the same day answered by 
371Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 321.
372“Signal G-1104 from the Commander to the Chief of General Staff, dated 21st November 1971”, 
in Government of Pakistan, “Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report,” 95.
373Sisson and Rose reported that the decision was taken after a meeting on the 30th of November 
with Bhutto urging the  president  to  take  some measures  to  modify the  unacceptable  situation 
Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 230.
374“Signal  A-6905 from the  Governor  to  the  President  of  Pakistan,  dated  7th  December  1971”,  
“Signal G-1255 from Commander to Chief of General Staff, date on 9th December 1971 ”, and  
“Signal A-1660 1971 from Governor to the President of Pakistan, dated 9th December 1971”, in 
Government of Pakistan, “Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report,” 101–102, 104–105.
375“Memorandum for Nixon sent by Kissinger, dated 9th December”, in Shankar, Nixon, Indira and 
India: Politics and Beyond, 289.
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giving Malik's “good sense and judgement” the power to settle the situation376, and 
also  ordering  Gen.  Niazi  to  accept  the  decisions  Malik  would  have  taken377. 
However, both the two signals launched by Yahya Khan were really vague, leaving 
room for  misinterpretation.  Governor  Malik  and  Gen.  Niazi  interpreted  them as 
permission to find a political solution to the entire question of East Pakistan, even if 
Yahya's signals were just referring to the specific military situation in Dacca, about 
which  Governor  Malik  had  telexed  the  President  on  9th December.  Whatever 
President Yahya wanted to say, Gen. Niazi and Governor Malik decided to write a 
proposal for a cease-fire and sent it to the UN representative Paul-Mark Henry in 
Dacca. Their proposal, signed by Gen. Farman Ali, however, not only recommended 
an immediate cease-fire, but also the return of the elected representatives of East 
Pakistan  to  rule  the  civilian  government  of  Dacca378.  It  was  then  a  profoundly 
irritated President who confirmed in his reply the fact that he did not devolve them 
the power to decide about the entire future of East Pakistan379. Thus the Pakistani 
president urged the Governor to modify the cease-fire proposal (that would probably 
have been accepted by New Delhi, since it did not ask for an immediate withdrawal 
of  forces  as  a  required  point  of  the  cease-fire),  cancelling  the  reference  to  any 
political settlement of the situation, and to immediately inform the UN of the error. 
As a result, it is clear that Pakistan after just a few days of hostilities, was in a 
dramatic position: in the East the Commander of the Army was almost convinced of 
the inevitability to surrender; while in the West no territories were captured as the 
strategy formulated at the beginning of the conflict would have required. However, 
on 10th December the  American decision to  send a  nuclear  aircraft-carrier  to  the 
Indian Ocean threatened India with the possibility that an international escalation of 
the hostilities could have taken place, internationalizing the conflict.
376“Signal  G-0001  from  President  to  Governor,  dated  9th  December  1971”,  in  Government  of 
Pakistan, “Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report,” 106.
377“Signal 1-10237 from Chief of the General Staff to Commander, dated 10th December 1971”, in 
ibid., 111.
378“Signal A-7107 from Governor to President of Pakistan, dated 10th December 1971”, in ibid., 
107–108.
379“Signal G-0002 from President to Governor, dated 10th December 1971”, in ibid., 110–111.
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  6.2 The influence of the UN and global powers' during the 1971 war
On 10th December an event took place that risked escalating the explosive situation in 
South Asia into a global war. The Nixon administration ordered the naval task-force 
74, led by the nuclear aircraft-carrier Enterprise, of the Seventh Fleet detached in the 
seas close to South Vietnam, to enter the Bay of Bengal with the official order of 
rescuing the Americans trapped in Dacca. This order appeared more of an excuse 
rather  than  an  effective  operation  goal.  In  fact,  not  only  were  the  Americans 
evacuated by the British Royal Air Force by 12th December, but the same documents 
with the memorandum of the discussion held in the White House380 confirmed that 
the decision was taken for two reasons: first, to deter India to continue the war after 
the fall of Dacca in the western sector, and second, to urge the Soviet Union to press 
India as well. This decision was indeed the outcome of discussions held from 6 th to 
9th December  in  Washington,  in  which  the  Nixon  administration  analysed  two 
specific  CIA reports  that  considered an Indian attack on West Pakistan  as highly 
probable381.  According  to  Kissinger,  this  was  the  reflection  of  the  long  standing 
Nixon posture in favour of Pakistan over the South Asian crisis, and the result of the 
consideration that if Washington did nothing, then the Soviets, the Chinese and all 
the other countries would no longer have respected them382. As a confirmation of the 
symbolic nature of the gesture, the American task-force for logistic reasons arrived in 
380“WSAG Meeting – South Asia, dated 12th December 1971”, in Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India:  
Politics and Beyond, 298–299.
381“Memorandum CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, dated 9th December 1971”, in ibid., 286–288, 
and 307–318. Even if the State Department opinion was that the CIA reports had little credibility,  
Nixon judged them as credible (FRUS, Volume E7, Files 168) and pressed the State Department to  
take some initiatives in support of Pakistan and against India. Dallek,  Nixon and Kissinger, 341. 
On this see: Nicholas and Oldenburg, Bangladesh; Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of 
Pakistan,  1971”;  Van  Hollen,  “The  Tilt  Policy  Revisited”.  The  Nixon  administration’s  “tilt” 
towards Pakistan became the target of the critic since it was clear evidence of the high (for some 
even too high) concentration of power in the foreign policy decision-making process. The criticism 
was  again  taken  up  when  documents  of  the  White  House  and  of  the  State  Department  were  
declassified due to the fact  that  they confirmed precedent thesis,  and revealed further  specific 
details, such as the vulgar language used by Nixon and Kissinger to refer to the Indians, defined 
often as “bastards”, and Indira Gandhi as, “the bitch”, or Bhutto as the “elitist son of a bitch”.  
Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 340.
382Kissinger, White House Years, 898. “Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Nixon 
held on 7th December”, in FRUS, Vol. E7, No. 165.
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the Bay of Bengal only after the end of the third Indo-Pakistan war383. However, in 
addition  to  the  decision  to  send task  74,  the  Nixon administration  contacted  the 
Chinese in New York and the Soviet to propose an immediate cease-fire, and the 
withdrawal of troops384.  The Nixon administration indeed feared that  the Chinese 
would also have made some aggressive moves to reinforce the American gesture of 
sending the Enterprise385. In that case the risk of a Soviet retaliation would have been 
greater. But the Chinese on 11th took a conciliatory position: they affirmed that the 
emergence  of  Bangladesh at  that  time was a  foregone conclusion,  and agreed to 
sustain  American  actions  at  the  UN  calling  for  a  cease-fire,  and  for  a  mutual 
withdrawal of troops386. The Chinese only raised their voices after the surrender of 
the East Commander on 16th to press India not to continue the war387. 
Instead, as a reaction to the American decision to send task force 74, New Delhi, 
in accordance to the Indo-Soviet Treaty, called Moscow for consultation388. While D. 
P. Dhar was sent to Moscow on 11th,  on 12th  the Soviet deputy Foreign Ministers 
Firyubin and Kuznetsov went to New Delhi for consultations, where they remained 
until the end of the war389. In addition, the Soviet Ambassador in India, N. M. Pegov, 
on 13th December reassured India that they would “not allow the seventh fleet to 
intervene”390. Lastly, the Soviet Union also symbolically reinforced their small naval 
forces located in the Indian Ocean, already strengthened through the dispatch of a 
first naval task group from Vladivostok on 6th December, with a second task force 
383Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” 301.
384Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 232–233.
385In  reality  a  CIA report  sent  on  7th  December  over  China’s  options  in  the  war  had  clearly 
summarised that China was not ready to intervene due to the fact that there were no troops ready 
along the  Tibetan  border,  and  that  only small  actions  to  divert  attention  were  probable.  See: 
“Intelligence Memorandum of CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, dated 7th December”,  in ibid., 
282–285. However, the Nixon and Kissinger administration continued to consider a Chinese attack 
possible until the 11th of December. Moreover, in a following conversation with Kissinger Prime 
Minister Chou declared that China would have intervened only if the Soviet Union reacted to the  
sending of the American fleet. See: “Memorandum of conversation held in Beijing, dated 20th July 
1972”, in ibid., 199–211.
386Shankar,  Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 235; Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the 
Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” 1114.
387Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 195.
388Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 218.
389Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 107.
390The Daily Tribune, 10th January 1972. 
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that entered the Indian Ocean only after the end of the hostilities391.  However, in 
those  days  both  the  Soviets  and  the  Indians  also  made  conciliatory  moves  to 
downplay  international  tensions:  to  cancel  all  the  American  fears,  India  on  12 th 
December  replied  through its  Foreign  Minister  Swaran Singh  that  “India  has  no 
territorial  ambitions  in  Bangladesh  or  West  Pakistan”392.  Furthermore,  Moscow 
reassured the United States, sending on 14th a handwritten memorandum stating that 
Indians had no intentions to seize West Pakistan's territory393. 
Although Kissinger expressed his opinion that the sending of the Enterprise had 
put pressure over the Soviets (and in turn India) to end the war in the West394, there is 
no clear indication of it395. As stated it seems that India, after the first discussions at 
the beginning of December, had never considered the option to continue the war in 
the  West.  The fact  that  Indian  military forces  were  largely deployed in  the  East 
prevented New Delhi from seriously thinking about it, as well as the international 
opposition of China, the Soviet Union and the United States. The only goal India 
would have had to continue the war was to try solving the Kashmir question by 
force. However, it is probable that after having occupied some strategic position in 
that area, which could have helped New Delhi later at the peace conference to try to 
find a favourable compromise over the Kashmir issue, India did not feel the necessity 
to  risk  internationalising  the  war.  What  is  certain  is  that  the  American  decision 
contributed to further erode Indo-American relations, as it is possible to discern from 
the letters exchanged between the Indian Prime Minister and the President of the 
391Warner, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” 301.
392Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 129. The fact that there were no plans to continue the war in the West 
also became clear with the declassified Indian documents. See: “Letter of Haksar to the Prime 
Minister, dated 9th December 1971”, and “Draft letter from Prime Minister to president Kosygin, 
dated 10th December 1971”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 173, NMML Archives, 
New Delhi. Moreover, even the Soviets warned India to end the hostility after the surrender in the 
East, demonstrating their intention to not tolerate the continuation of the war on the west front.  
See: “Note of Haksar to the PAC, dated 13th December 1971”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 174, 
NMML Archives, New Delhi.
393Kissinger, White House Years, 912.
394Ibid., 913.
395As already cited, several critics were raised to the Nixon administration for its approach to the 
South Asian crisis of 1971, and for its decision to send task-force 74. See for example: Nicholas 
and Oldenburg, Bangladesh; Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited”; Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger.
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United States. In a letter sent on 15th December, in which Indira Gandhi reassured 
India's intention not to continue the war in the west, New Delhi accused the United 
States of having allowed during 1971 the East Pakistan crisis to rise and to end in  
war396.  This  letter  triggered  in  turn  a  harsh  reply  of  Nixon  that  refused  all  the 
accusations and instead considered India as the least interested in a political solution, 
but rather in war397. The only clear direct effect that the American decision had was 
to  embolden the government  in Pakistan to  order  the Eastern Commander  on 9th 
December to continue resistance since something would have changed398. 
Instead, the debate at the UN did not produce any insightful results during the 
1971 war, although the possibility that the Soviet Union could not support India for 
the duration of the war was probably one of the major concerns of New Delhi, due to 
the superiority of the Indian troops in the East, and to the fact that China during the 
whole of the conflict did not demonstrate any intention to intervene399. Moscow did 
not want to affect its international position supporting India too much. The process of 
détente with the United States could have suffered from this decision, as well as the 
Soviet relations with the Islamic states, and also with other third world countries. 
This was the principle factor that had put pressure on India to accomplish its goals in 
the military operations as quickly as possible400. The debate at the Security Council 
and General Assembly was clearly vibrant: in the space of two weeks 24 resolutions 
were presented by singular states, or coalitions401. The two most debated were those 
396“Letter  from Prime Minister  Indira Gandhi  to  President  Richard Nixon dated  15th December 
1971”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 173, NMML Archives, New Delhi; see also: 
Khan, The American Papers, 743–745.
397Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 305–306.
398“Signal G-0011 from Chief of Staff to Commander, dated 11th December 1971”, in Government 
of Pakistan, “Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report,” 113–114. It is interesting to note that in 
both the messages dated 5th and 11th December President Yahya Khan gave assurance of the 
Chinese intervention as if it had already been announced, and therefore already happening. See: 
“Signal G-0235 from Chief of General Staff to Commander”, and “Signal G-0011 from Chief of 
Staff  to  Commander”,  in  ibid.,  97–98,  and  113–114.  These  of  course  were  groundless  and 
fraudulent messages sent with the aim to embolden his troops to resist.
399Beijing did not move its troops along the border, or next to those passes that were not completely 
blocked by the snow, such as the Sikkim-Tibet and the Ladakh-Tibet ones. Sisson and Rose, War 
and Secession, 216. 
400“Letter from Haksar to the Prime Minister Gandhi ,dated 13 th  December 1971”, in P. N. Haksar 
private papers, III inst., f. n. 174, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
401Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 95–96.
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proposed by the United States,  and by the Soviet Union. The principal questions 
raised were three: the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Pakistani territories; the 
withdrawal of Pakistan from East Pakistan; and the issue related to the participation 
at the session of the government in exile of Bangladesh. China always voted with the 
majority against the Soviets. The Soviet Union supported India for the whole time, 
using its veto power for two resolutions on 5th, and on 6th December402. The only 
resolution that was approved by the General Assembly was the one proposed by 
Somalia on 6th December that requested a cease fire and a withdrawal of troops and 
that finally gave legal support to the UNEPRO activities which had already been 
launched  in  mid-November,  and  later  suspended  by  U.  Thant403.  However,  the 
Security Council did not approve it due to the Soviet veto, and it remained at the 
recommendatory level without therefore bringing any relief to the situation, but only 
renaming  the  suspended  UNEPRO activities  as  UNROD  (United  Nations  Relief 
Operations in Dacca) that began to take care of the coordination of the international 
relief operations in that city only404. The resolution that seriously worried India was 
the one presented by Poland that called for the direct transferral of power in East 
Pakistan to the representatives elected in 1970, and the withdrawal of all  troops. 
However, Pakistan did not support the resolution, and it did not pass405. India was 
relieved by that outcome that would have required another Soviet veto. India would 
have indeed lost the opportunity (by that time certain) to win a war against Pakistan, 
and would have been prevented to assist in the moderate AL forces to establish their 
402Britain and France supported the position of the United States, even if they opted to abstain when 
resolutions that did not ask for a political solution of the crisis, or were requiring only a mere 
withdrawal of forces were raised. Jackson,  South Asian Crisis, 127–128. France already on the 
18th of November,  with a  letter  sent  by President  Pompidou to President Yahya,  had pressed 
Pakistan to accept discussions for a political solution with Mujib and the leaders of the AL. See: 
“Telegram from America Ambassador in Paris”, in Khan, The American Papers, 724–725.
403Gottlieb, “The United Nations and Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in India-Pakistan,” 362–
364.
404See the UN archives available at  http://archives.un.org/ARMS/sites/ARMS/uploads/files/Finding
%20Aids/Missions/ag-055%20UNEPRO.pdf (retrieved on the 18th of September 2012).
405Sisson and Rose’s account of the fact was that Bhutto, despite President Yahya decision, decided  
not  to  approve  the  resolution.  Sisson  and  Rose,  War  and  Secession,  307.  It  seems  possible, 
however, that Bhutto acted in that way since he realised that a military defeat would have reduced  
the military junta’s authority. This could have helped him to assume political power in Pakistan.
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control over the new state of Bangladesh. It was just after the end of the war, on 21st 
December  that  the  Security  Council  finally  passed  a  resolution  demanding  the 
continuation of the cease-fire until the withdrawal of troops had been completed, and 
called both sides to treat prisoners of war according to the Geneva Convention of 
1949406. 
The  development  of  the  international  situation,  where  the  United  States  and 
China did not put efforts into modifying the military results, and the UN did not 
reach the consensus on their proposal of a cease-fire, led President Yahya on 14 th to 
send a message to Gen. Niazi that stated: “You have fought a heroic battle against 
overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you and the world full of admiration. I 
have done all that is humanly possible to find an acceptable solution to the problem. 
You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible 
nor will it  serve any useful purpose. It will only lead to further loss of lives and 
destruction”407.  Therefore,  Gen. Farman Ali and Gen. Niazi immediately prepared 
plans for a surrender that was communicated to the Indians through the Americans on 
15th December. Later on 16th December the cease-fire was officially accepted by both 
parties in a ceremony held at the Ramna Race Course in Dacca. The following day 
India declared a unilateral cease-fire also for the West frontier, that was accepted 
immediately by the Pakistani headquarters, with the endorsement of all the global 
powers. 
406Ibid., 219.
407“Signal G-0013”, in Government of Pakistan, “Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report,” 117.
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  7. The Indian victory and the following developments in South  
Asia
The 1971 Indo-Pakistani war marked the beginning of another era for Pakistan and 
Bangladesh,  while  India's  status  in  the  region increased since it  gained from the 
division of Pakistan and from the emergence of the Bangladeshi state guided by a 
friendly government. At the international level, the United States verbally recognised 
the new hegemonic position of India in South Asia,  and from the following year 
began to make some efforts to try to improve the strained relations with New Delhi. 
On the contrary, the Soviet Union became in the eyes of Indian a trustable friendly 
power, enhancing its influence over the region, without however reducing India to a 
client state.
  7.1 The emergence of Bangladesh and of a new Pakistan
Another  era  began for  the Bengali  people:  the Government  of  Bangladesh set  in 
Dacca on 20th December, and on 9th January 1972, after a short stop in New Delhi 
where he met Indira Gandhi408, Mujib Rahman (after nine months in prison) returned 
as  the  new  acclaimed  president  of  Bangladesh.  Nevertheless,  the  situation  in 
Bangladesh  remained  explosive  in  for  the  following  months.  For  example,  the 
discovery of almost 200 bodies of Bengali professionals and intellectuals killed by 
the Pakistani forces during the last days of the war spread anger among the Bengali 
people409. The same Indian Army in some cases acted as an occupying more than a 
liberating force, stealing goods and weapons410. However, the complex operation for 
408Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 126.
409New York Times, 20th December 1971.
410Dixit, Liberation and Beyond, 122.
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the return of the Bengali refugees, who had escaped to India during the year, soon 
started  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  It  was  successfully  concluded  with  the 
assistance of the Mukti Bahini by 19th March 1972, when the Indian Army effectively 
left the country411. Moreover, during the same day, a 25 year  Treaty of Friendship,  
Cooperation  and  Peace was  signed  by  India  that  established  and  regulated  the 
bilateral relations between the two states. However, the political life in Bangladesh 
remained crossed by several internal rivalries among political factions and parties, 
and in 1975 a military coup killed Mujib Rahman, changing yet again the history of 
this country412.
Instead, in what remained of Pakistan at the end of the third Indo-Pakistani war, 
President Yahya Khan resigned from all  the military and political  charges after a 
threatened  mutiny  of  some  large  sections  of  the  Pakistani  military  forces.  The 
presidency and the position of martial law administrator were given to Bhutto, with 
the indication of forming a civilian government413. Moreover, the peace negotiations 
between India and Pakistan were held in Simla during the summer of 1972 and were 
concluded on 2nd July when the President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the 
Indian  Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  signed  an  agreement  that  laid  down  the 
principles on which the relations between the two countries should be regulated in 
the following years. The conference had a bilateral character, differently from the one 
that followed the 1965 war, and it was called to try and settle the Kashmir issue; the 
repatriation process of the prisoners of war and of minorities that had been created by 
the 1971 war; and the withdrawal of the Indian troops from the occupied territories in 
West Pakistan still retained by India from the end of the conflict. The negotiations 
were  conducted  by  the  Foreign  Minister  Aziz  Ahmed  that  led  the  Pakistani 
delegation, and by P. N. Haksar who substituted D. P. Dhar who had fallen sick some 
411Mukherji, “The Great Migration of 1971,” 449–451.
412For length reasons it is not possible to consider here the complex domestic political dynamics that  
Bangladesh had to face after the emergence. On this topic see, for example: Lawrence Ziring,  
Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); 
Lifschultz and Bird, Bangladesh, the Unfinished Revolution; Dixit, Liberation and Beyond.
413Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 428–430.
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days before the conference in the Indian city of Simla414. The Indian decision-making 
process  was  again,  as  already underlined  in  this  chapter,  limited  to  the  few key 
advisers  of  the  Prime  Minister  that  formulated  the  strategy  in  almost  complete 
autonomy. The PAC and the Indian Parliament were informed only after the signature 
of the Simla Agreement  415. At the conference the two countries agreed to restore 
communication  and  trade.  On  one  hand,  India  agreed  to  return  the  occupied 
territories, to collaborate for the return of minorities and prisoners of war even if it 
was declared necessary to involve Bangladesh in the process, which wanted to have 
some Pakistani war prisoners detained by India to put them on trial for crimes against 
humanity. On the other hand, Pakistan subscribed to settle all its disputes with India 
from that moment onwards, including Kashmir, by peaceful and “bilateral” means416, 
satisfying India. Indeed, one of the first Indian goals at the conference was to cancel 
the possibility that Pakistan could in the future call a referendum regarding the status 
of the disputed territory of Kashmir, which despite the UN’s suggestions had not 
been held since 1949417. In order to reach this, the Indian delegation in Simla opted 
for a soft line, refusing to impose a unilateral solution of the issue that would have 
humiliated Pakistan418. The aim was to second Pakistan that argued that it was not 
possible for them to accept a definitive solution of the Kashmir issue in Simla: the 
military groups in Islamabad would not have accepted such “political” humiliation in 
the wave of  the  military defeat,  and would probably have  dismissed  the  civilian 
government led by Bhutto419. As a consequence of Pakistan accepting to resolve all 
future problems with India on bilateral bases from that moment and onwards, India 
thus decided to withdraw from the areas it occupied in Kashmir, Sind, and Punjab 
414Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 190.
415“Letter from a member of the parliament to the Prime Minister, dated 19th July 1972”, in Haksar 
papers, III inst., f. n. 238; and “Letter from Haksar to Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, dated  
11th July 1972”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 181, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
416Kux, India and the United States, 309.
417Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London and New 
York: I.B.Tauris, 2010).
418P. N. Haksar explained the Indian decision making reference to the European history and to the 
error  made  at  the  “Versailles  accord”  where  the  beaten  were  humiliated  and  pushed  to  seek 
revenge: “Letter of Haksar to Rajni Patel dated July 1972”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 181, 
NMML Archives, New Delhi.
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during  the  war,  and  to  collaborate  for  the  return  of  prisoners  of  war.  This  also 
allowed Pakistan to  be able  to  celebrate  the agreement  as  a  success,  since India 
returned the territories and agreed to give back the prisoners of war, without Pakistan 
having to sign a no-pact war, nor to accept a final solution for Kashmir420. As a result, 
Pakistan and India in the Simla agreement recognised the 1949 UN cease-fire line as 
the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir that defines the exact border between them421. 
Both states agreed not to “alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and 
legal interpretations” and to “refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of 
this  line”422.  Although, as already mentioned, no written reference was made to a 
definitive solution of the Kashmir issue, Bhutto and Gandhi also verbally agreed to 
commit their government to finding it one the months to follow. 
By the 22nd of October New Delhi and Islamabad jointly announced that the 
LOC had been traced and recognised by both the two parts, and by the end of 1972 
the Indian Army completed the withdrawal of its troops from the Pakistani territories. 
As the next paragraph will show, the repatriation of the prisoners of war was a bit 
more complex but was solved however by 1974. The only positive development for 
India in the following years over the specific question of Kashmir, was that after the 
Simla agreement the United States shifted ground in their approach over the issue, 
and made no more reference to the UN plebiscite, but demonstrated to be open to 
support a possible solution made in agreement with India and Pakistan423. However, 
the Kashmir issue remained unsolved and it  affected India and Pakistan relations 
419This perception is confirmed by the internal Indian documents that during the first months of 1972 
evaluated Bhutto was under strong military pressure for the question of the territories occupied by 
India and the prisoners of war. A letter sent by A. S. Chib, Joint Secretary at the Pakistan section,  
dated 3rd March 1972 informed indeed the Prime Minister about the changes that occurred in the  
Pakistani Army: the old guard loyal to Yahya Khan was moved away and a new cohesive group of  
young officers was organised around Gen. Tikka Khan. On this see: in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 
234; “Note on Indian Army sent to Haksar, dated 3rd March 1972”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 
235,  NMML Archives,  New  Delhi;  and  the  “Joint  Intelligent  Paper  No.  30  (73),  dated  7 th 
November 1973”, in MEA, PP (JS) 4/2/74, National Archives, New Delhi.
420Talbot, Pakistan, 237.
421Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 191.
422“The Simla Agreement signed on 1st July 1972 by Bhutto and Gandhi”, in P. N. Haksar private 
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later,  especially  since  the  Nineties  and  onward,  when  tensions  along  the  border 
erupted again. When this happened several voices in India attacked and criticised the 
Simla agreement  and the policy undertaken by India's  government  accusing it  of 
having lost the political momentum to solve that specific issue424. Needless to say, 
these critics of course were favoured by the same kind of Indira Gandhi’s decision-
making process that did not consult the Parliament nor the Cabinet; and by the fact 
that despite the promises exchanged at Simla, Bhutto and Gandhi in the following 
years did not find any final settlement regarding Kashmir425. 
After the Simla agreement the question of the repatriation of a large number of 
Pakistani  prisoners  of  war  (around  93.000  people,  of  which  86.000  military 
personnel)426 captured by the Indian Army and moved to jails and detention centres in 
India,  was discussed by India and Pakistan at  the bilateral  level in the following 
years.  The solution of this  issue took a long time since Bangladesh claimed 195 
prisoners  of  war,  especially  top  ranks,  to  put  on  trial  for  war  crimes.  However, 
Pakistan officially recognised the existence of the government of Bangladesh only 
later, in 1974, and therefore the negotiations over this issue remained blocked until 
that  time,  during which Pakistan raised an international  campaign against  India's 
violation  of  the  Geneva  Convention.  In  addition,  the  question  was  further 
complicated by the issue of minorities:  on the one hand, like the Non-Bengali  in 
Bangladesh who wanted to go to Pakistan, and the Bengali in Pakistan that wanted to 
go  to  Bangladesh427.  Among  the  non-Bengali  in  Bangladesh  there  were  around 
260.000  Bihari  who  collaborated  with  the  Pakistani  authorities  during  the  last 
months, and who after the war wanted to migrate to Pakistan to avoid revenge, and to 
escape  from  the  camps  where  they  were  confined  by  the  new  Bangladeshi 
424See for example: Dhar,  Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy, 187–230 and 
Gupta (Indian Express, 17th December 2011). The general impression that Simla is considered as a 
lost occasion for India emerged from almost all the interviews the author made in New Delhi in the 
fall of 2011.
425Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 189–224.
426“Letter from Defence Secretary to Haksar, dated 1st March 1972”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, 
III inst. f. n. 179, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
427Antara  Datta,  “The  Repatriation  of  1973  and  the  Re-making  of  Modern  South  Asia,” 
Contemporary South Asia 19, no. 1 (2011): 62–64.
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government428. On the other hand, in Pakistan there were around 150.000 – 190.000 
Bengali  that  showed intentions  to  go back to  Bangladesh,  but  their  position was 
delicate.  In  fact,  since  they  had  remained  in  West  Pakistan  during  the  war,  the 
Bengali  who instead  fought  for  the  liberation  war  questioned their  loyalty429.  To 
complicate the problem even more, Pakistan was reluctant to accept the return of the 
Non-Bengali population from Bangladesh430. The decisive step was finally made on 
28th August 1973 when an international agreement was finally signed in New Delhi 
by India and Pakistan, with the external participation of Bangladesh, paving the way 
for the solution of the complex situation431. The question was then completely solved 
by 1974 when Pakistan recognised Bangladesh and all the prisoners of war and the 
minorities were repatriated432.
  7.2 India in the South Asian region and in the world
At the end of 1971 India could argue to have obtained some important results in its 
foreign policy thanks to its deployment of a military strategy to confront the crisis of 
East Pakistan. New Delhi indeed had victoriously supported the Bengali liberation 
movement for the whole time, and solved the critical issue of the refugees that had 
poured into its territories during that year. Moreover, in favour of India's reputation, 
the same military strategy followed by India led the 1971 war to be depicted in the 
428Howard S. Levie, “The Indo-Pakistani Agreement of August 28, 1973,” The American Journal of  
International Law 68, no. 1 (January 1, 1974): 95–97.
429Datta, “The Repatriation of 1973 and the Re-making of Modern South Asia,” 67.
430“Summary of  discussion between Foreign  Minister  Swaran  Singh and Haksar,  dated 3 rd  April 
1973”,  in  Haksar  papers,  I&II  inst.,  f.  n.  31;  and  “Copy of  the  Pakistan's  government  aide 
mémoire,  dated  25th May 1973”,  in  P.  N.  Haksar  private  papers,  I&II  inst.,  f.  n.  31,  NMML 
Archives, New Delhi.
431Datta, “The Repatriation of 1973 and the Re-making of Modern South Asia.”
432In reality the question of the repatriation of the Non-Bengali was not completely solved in 1973. 
Pakistan accepted only 83,000 people of the 260,000. Those who remained in Bangladesh were not 
recognised as Bangladeshi citizens, and continued to live in temporary camps. Not surprisingly 
some of them left Bangladesh in the following years fleeing illegally to Pakistan through India and 
Nepal, while some other official repatriation turns were only organised in 1974, 1975, 1977, and 
1979. Ibid., 70.
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manuals of international law as the first conflict fought for humanitarian reasons in 
world  history,  and  not  as  an  unjustified  aggression433.  India  with  its  military 
campaign in  East  Pakistan  solved the  question of  those training  camps that  East 
Pakistan had set up in its territory to drill the North-East rebels, like the Naga and 
Mizo, destroying them during the East Pakistan campaign434.  The military victory 
also had positive effects  at  the political  level:  firstly,  Indira  Gandhi reached “the 
zenith of her power and glory”435,  and she was celebrated as “Durga”,  the Hindu 
goddess of war, in the Parliament by the opposition, and by  The Economist  as the 
“Empress of India”; and secondly, it partly favoured the Congress party's victory at 
the state elections in the spring of 1972. Even if to do this New Delhi had to accept 
signing a formal agreement with the Soviet Union, it is possible to argue that the 
gains were greater than the losses. In fact, although Moscow finally recognised its 
influence over India, New Delhi did not become a client state of the Soviet Union. 
Soviet military centres were not built on Indian Territory, and military exercises were 
not held in the following years436. India did not feel obliged to positively answer to 
the Soviet proposals of collective security, like for example the one President Leonid 
Brezhnev proposed in 1973 during a visit to India437. On the contrary, the agreement 
with  Moscow  allowed  New  Delhi  to  solve  the  problematic  question  of  the 
intervention of the UN forces in the East Pakistan crisis, to face more confidently the 
sending  of  the  American  nuclear  aircraft-carrier  to  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  and  to 
formalise and reinforce the strict relationship already set up in the previous years on 
the military and economic field with its major economic and military partner438.
In  addition  to  this,  the military strategy adopted by New Delhi  to  face East 
Pakistan's  crisis  and  the  signature  of  the  Indo-Soviet  Treaty did  not  prevent  the 
433Simón Chesterman, Just War Or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71.
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improvement of the Indo-American relations in the following years. Although the 
tense and hostile personal relations between Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi, and the same 
course  of  events,  critically  challenged  the  following  relations  between  the  two 
countries, the United States could not allow India only to be partner to the Soviets, 
and soon after the war the discussion to re-launch bilateral relations began. Facing 
criticism at home for his handling of the South Asian crisis of 1971439, in 1972 Nixon 
had  already made  an  important  opening,  appointing  Daniel  Patrick  Moynihan,  a 
democrat, as the new ambassador in India440. Moreover, during 1972-3 the American 
Embassy and Consulate demonstrated their  concrete interest  in warming relations 
with India searching to enlarge contact with the Indian government441. Similarly India 
showed a lot of interest in ameliorating relations with the United States from 1972442, 
and the same Indira Gandhi in 1972 made some accommodative gestures to the US 
stating:  “we  do  not  believe  in  permanent  estrangement”443.  As  evidence  of  the 
improved  relations,  in  1974  a  significant  gesture  was  made  by  the  Nixon 
administration: the problem of the rupees held by the United States had largely been 
solved. This issue was created by the fact that since 1954, when the Public Law 480 
was enacted by the Congress,  the Indians had paid for the American food aid in 
rupees,  and  not  in  dollars.  Although  the  rupees  would  have  been  used  for  the 
expenditures of the American Embassy and Consulate in India, the sum held by the 
United States had become enormous by 1972, reaching the sum of $ 3 billion, and 
439As already mentioned before, the Nixon administration had to face domestic criticism about its  
moral failure to condemn the violence perpetuated by the Pakistani military junta in East Pakistan,  
and  about  its  decision  to  send  task-force  74.  The  latter  was  judged by many as  a  risky and 
unnecessary gesture that could have transformed a regional and confined dispute into a potentially 
global conflict. Kux, India and the United States, 307. 
440Ibid., 309.
441 “Note of the Intelligence Bureau sent by Joint Secretary to Prime Minister Office, dated 19 th 
September 1972”, in P. N. Haksar papers, I&II inst., f. n. 55, NMML Archives, New Delhi; and 
“Telegram sent by Joint Secretary Teja to all heads of missions on Indo-American relations, dated 
18th December 1972”, in MEA, AMS, WII/103/4/73-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
442 “Record of the discourse of Foreign Minister in Lok Sabha dated 30 th November 1972”, in MEA, 
AMS, WII/103/4/73-I,  and “Letter of Deputy Director, AMS, to Foreign Minister and Director,  
dated 27th November 1972”, in MEA, AMS, WII/103/4/73-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
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transforming itself  into an important political problem444.  Therefore,  paradoxically 
(considering the level of estrangement reached during the 1971 war) it was the Nixon 
administration that on 18th February 1974 signed an agreement to give back $ 2,2 
billion of the rupees as a grant, solving thus the Rupee Deal, and paving the way for 
Indians to ask for the resumption of aid445.
In  addition,  the  military  strategy  successfully  adopted  by  India  changed  the 
perception of India's power position in South Asia, in New Delhi, and elsewhere. 
Several declassified Indian documents indeed underlined the fact that after the 1971 
war India had been recognised as the undoubted major power in South Asia by both 
China446, and the United States447. However, even if the victory over Pakistan in the 
1971 war  surely boosted  the  power  of  India  in  the  region,  in  order  to  correctly 
comprehend the relation of power in South Asia it is important to underline three 
factors. Firstly, India won the East Pakistan military campaign, and not that of the 
western sector. In fact, as an expert  in Pakistan's policy has recognised, who has 
argued that “the primary responsibility [of the partition of Pakistan] lay in Islamabad 
– chauvinism had compounded folly in the dangerous denial of Bengali democratic 
urges”448, the fall of East Pakistan in November 1971 was almost certain. Instead, a 
war on the western sector would have been a completely different event. In the West 
444Kux, India and the United States, 312–314.
445Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 214–218.
446“Letter by the Joint Secretary of RAW, K. S. Nair, to Cabinet on Pakistan's intentions dated 30 th 
March 1972”, in Haksar papers, III inst., f. n. 231, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
447See, for example: American Assistant Secretary Sisco who recognised India as the stronger player  
of South Asia on 12th March 1973 in on of his intervention at the American Congress, reported in: 
“Telegram from Indian Embassy in Washington to New Delhi, dated 13th March 1973”, in MAE, 
AMS, WII/109/1/73-I; also American Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near and Middle East and 
South Asian Affairs, Alfred Antherton, recognised India as the major power of South Asia. In fact, 
he announced that the United States would have refrained in arming Pakistan to keep the military 
balance with India as  they had done before 1971. This is  reported in:  “Telegram from Indian 
Embassy in Washington to New Delhi, dated 28th February 1975”, in MEA, PP(JS) WII/4/3/74. 
The recognition of India's new position was also made by both the British Prime Minister, and by 
the  American  President  during  a  bilateral  meeting.  For  this  see:  “Telegram from Rasgotra  to 
foreign  secretary  dated  3rd  February  1973”,  in  MEA,  AMS,  WII/103/4/73-I.  Lastly,  similar 
recognition was also granted by Warren Christopher, American Department Secretary, in: “Letter 
from N. Dayal, Counsellor of Indian Embassy in the United States, to Indrajit Singh, Department 
Secretary in MEA, New Delhi, dated 31st July 1977”, in MEA, AMS, WII/104/28/77, National 
Archives, New Delhi.
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the forces were balanced449, and India would not have easily won in 1971. Secondly, 
the loss of the eastern wing did not weaken it as much as it seemed with a superficial 
glance: since 1972 the new smaller Pakistan was easier to defend, and did not have to 
invest  resources  in  the  development  of  the  East,  as  it  had  begun  to  do  from 
1965/1966, though just in a partial way450. Finally, as an effect of its defeat, Pakistan 
embarked on project to arm itself.  First,  the new Pakistani president, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto,  as  soon as  January 1972 declared  his  intention  to  equip Pakistan  with a 
nuclear bomb: his declaration was to contrast the supremacy of India in South Asia 
and to recover his country from the defeat, even at the cost of having to “eat leaves, 
or go hungry”451. Second, Bhutto also supported the military plans of re-arming in 
order to bring them back to the same level of military equity as India like they were 
before the 1971 war, even if India already had the upper hand452. In order to do that 
Pakistan turned to China and to the Arab world to obtain military sales and aid453, 
therefore, investing in rebuilding Pakistan's navy and air forces that had almost been 
completely destroyed during the conflict454.  Despite all  these factors, the fact that 
Pakistan felt the necessity to become a nuclear power, and to produce a nuclear bomb 
in order to overcome India's superior position of strength, is a clear signal that New 
Delhi had sufficiently demonstrated its superiority to Islamabad through the military 
strategy undertaken in 1971.
At this point, it is only possible to identify two long-term negative consequences 
for India from the military strategy it undertook in 1971. First, the American and the 
Soviet  naval  task  forces  remained  in  the  Indian  Ocean  for  some  time  after  the 
449Interview with Gen. Shergill, hold in New Delhi on 21st December 2011.
450Rahman, East and West Pakistan, 32–36.
451Talbot, Pakistan, 238.
452R. Rikhye, “Assessing Pakistan’s Military Expansion Since 1971,” Economic and Political Weekly 
24, no. 8 (February 25, 1989): 395–398.
453“Letter of  Under Secretary R. K. Kapur to Joint  Secretary (PP) dated May 1975”, and “Joint 
Intelligence Report, dated 24th February 1976”, in MEA, PP(JS) /4/3/74, National Archives, New 
Delhi.
454See for example: “Letter of Gen. Manekshaw to Haksar dated the 3 rd of March 1972”, in P. N. 
Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 235; “Letter by Joint Secretary of RAW, K. S. Nair, to Cabinet 
Secretariat  on Pakistan's intentions dated on the 30th of March 1972”,  in P. N. Haksar private 
papers, III inst., f. n. 231; and “Letter of Haksar to Prime Minister dated on the 25th of April 1971”, 
in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 180, NMML Archives, New Delhi.
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cessation of the hostilities between India and Pakistan. This gave the United States a 
stronger argument about the need to build an American military bases on the island 
of Diego Garcia, which had been under British control since before 1968455. This fact 
obviously led both India and China to blame the naval presence of the two super 
powers456. However, this would have taken place in any case, since the future of the 
British  base  of  Diego Garcia  had not  been determined before  1971.  The second 
negative  consequence  can  instead  be  identified  at  the  level  of  domestic  policy. 
Indeed, it is possible to argue that the victory of the 1971 war may have reinforced 
the  personal  tendency of  Indira  Gandhi  to  rule  concentrating  all  the  powers  and 
decision in her hands, and in those of the small coterie of her advisers. In 1975 this 
aspect resulted in Indira Gandhi suspending India's democratic policy to impose her 
dictatorial  power,  significantly  weakening  the  democratic  character  of  India's 
institutions.
  8. Conclusion
From the analysis developed so far, it  is possible to argue that during 1971 India 
successfully  implemented  its  foreign  policy enlarging its  power  inside  the  South 
Asian region. New Delhi seized the opportunity that emerged from the eruption of 
the East Pakistan crisis, offering both hospitality and support to the Bengali forces 
that were challenging the authority of the Pakistani military junta of Islamabad. This 
455On the question of the strategic control of the Indian Ocean see, for example: Barry Buzan, A Sea 
of Troubles?: Sources of Dispute in the New Ocean Regime (London: International Institute for 
Strategic  Studies,  1978).  W.  K.  Andersen,  “Soviets  in  the  Indian  Ocean:  Much  Ado  About 
Something–But What?,”  Asian Survey 24, no. 9 (1984):  910–930; On the naval strategy India 
followed after 1971 see: Marcus B. Zinger, “The Development of Indian Naval Strategy Since 
1971,” Contemporary South Asia 2, no. 3 (1993): 335–359.
456Peking Review, 14th January 1972.
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decision put India in a difficult position during May 1971, when millions of Bengali 
crossed the border with India to find shelter from the violence, and created several 
problems  for  India  at  the  economic,  social,  and  political  level.  However,  this 
development did not modify India's stance. New Delhi instead increased its political 
and military support for the Bengali guerrilla groups, and raised its voice towards the 
great powers and the international community to press Pakistan to stop the violence 
and  to  find  a  political  solution  with  the  Bengali  forces.  Nevertheless,  the 
international  community  did  not  react  as  India  would  have  liked.  Instead,  it 
supported Pakistan's proposal to send UN forces into East Pakistan to facilitate, at 
least in theory, the refugees' return. India opposed this option since New Delhi would 
have preferred the international community to oblige Islamabad to discuss with the 
Bengali political forces – that had formed the Government of Bangladesh in exile – 
in order to solve the refugee burden once and for all. Despite the Pakistani attempts 
to assume a much more conciliatory posture at the formal level, in fact, in June the 
refugee influx did not show signs of reversing, or at least of ending. Thus, New Delhi 
had begun to consider the option of resorting to war to solve the refugee situation: 
this  rendered  the  UN  involvement  undesired  by  New  Delhi.  However,  the 
international community threatened to bring the issue to the UN Security Council, 
obliging  India  to  seek  the  support  of  one  of  the  big  powers  and  escape  its 
isolationism. This led New Delhi to seriously consider the possibility of signing a 
military treaty with the Soviet Union. In addition, in July even the parallel evolution 
of  the  Sino-American  normalisation  of  relations  pressed  India  to  secure  Soviet 
support in case of an escalation of the war with Pakistan: the news of Kissinger’s 
secret visit to Beijing during his official visit to Pakistan indeed alarmed New Delhi. 
India began to fear that the new axis among Washington-Islamabad-Beijing could 
influence the American or Chinese approach towards a possible Indo-Pakistan war, 
leading  them  to  intervene  in  defence  of  Pakistan.  The  same  posture  the  Nixon 
administration had adopted since March, and kept during July, seemed to confirm 
this thesis. All these factors led India to exploit the Cold War dynamics in its favour 
and  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Cooperation that  Moscow  had  been 
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proposing to New Delhi since 1969. This was the strategic step that allowed India to 
adopt  a  military  strategy to  solve  the  problem of  the  Bengali  refugees,  without 
worrying  too  much  about  the  international  community's  reactions,  or  that  of  the 
United States. During the fall tensions grew along the borders with Pakistan. India 
started a serious diplomatic campaign to better promote its position regarding the 
East Pakistan crisis to the world. At the end of November, New Delhi authorised its 
troops to cross the borders with East Pakistan. This provoked Pakistan, who on 3 rd 
December reacted by launching an air strike attack, after which an open war was 
declared. During the conflict India demonstrated its complete military superiority in 
the Eastern front, and resisted to the Pakistani attacks in the Western sector. During 
the final days, tensions rose at the international level: in fact, the United States took 
the  decision  to  send  a  nuclear  aircraft  carrier  to  the  Bay of  Bengal  in  order  to 
demonstrate its power and symbolically reassure Pakistan of the fact that they would 
not allow India to continue the war in the West sector. The day after the Eastern 
Pakistan Commander surrendered,  New Delhi declared a unilateral  cease-fire that 
definitively  ended  the  war.  Therefore,  Pakistan  was  separated,  and  a  new  state, 
Bangladesh, emerged from the ashes of East Pakistan led by those Bengali forces that 
India supported in their fight. Moreover, after a few months the issue of the refugees 
was  solved  and  they  returned  to  their  homes,  and  by  the  summer  of  1972  all  
possibilities for Pakistan to call for a UN plebiscite over the status of Kashmir were 
cancelled. 
As a result, it is now possible to argue that during 1971 India reinforced its status 
of power in the South Asia region, becoming its undoubted hegemony. In fact, India 
implemented  its  strategy  and  successfully  reached  its  objectives  through  the 
exploitation of the Cold War rivalries in its favour, reinforcing its relations with the 
Soviet  Union,  without  damaging  those  with  the  United  States  too  much.  Before 
concluding, two more points should be considered. The first helps to reinforce the 
interpretation that India pursued its power goals during 1971 with realism: in fact, 
the analysis developed in the chapter argues that the Indian political leadership, in 
spite of its socialist inclinations, did not sign the Treaty with the Soviet Union only 
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because of its ideological grounds, but also as the result of a serious rational and 
realistic  evaluation.  The  second,  instead,  is  a  methodological  consideration:  it  is 
crucial to underline the importance of India's archival material. In fact, the Haksar 
papers457 taken from the Archives of the Nehru Memorial and Museum Library, and 
those  collected  at  the  Ministry of  External  Affairs  were of  crucial  importance to 
prove the following considerations. First, the relative secondary influence played by 
the United States. India indeed ceded to the Soviet insistence to come to a military 
alliance already in June 1971, thus before the announcement of the success of the 
Kissinger's trip to China. Second, the Indian documents consulted allow one to argue 
that the international perception of India significantly changed after the end of the 
1971 war, and that India came to be considered as the dominant power in South Asia.
457The fact that the P. N. Haksar private papers were those providing more information in relation to  
the Treaty issue should not be surprising since, as shown in the third paragraph P. N. Haksar was  
one of the key figures that  influenced India's  foreign policy decision-making process in 1971, 
much more than the Ministry of External Affairs.
161
162
  THIRD CHAPTER:
INDIA'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND 
THE IMPACT ON GLOBAL PROLIFERATION
  1. Introduction
Following the victory against Pakistan in 1971, Indira Gandhi's government obtained 
another  important  result  in  1974  by  exploding  a  nuclear  device  near  Pokhran 
(Rajasthan): India was the sixth country in the world to have carried out a nuclear 
explosion.  Although  this  only  came  ten  years  after  the  first  Chinese  test,  the 
technological result had important political significance. The 1974 explosion was a 
demonstration of India's power, not only reinforcing its hegemonic position in the 
South Asian region, but also contributing to establishing itself as an emerging middle 
power at the international level. India becoming the sixth nuclear state in the world 
indeed triggered alarmed reactions especially in the West, which again felt directly 
challenged by the loss of its  technological military superiority.  In answer to this, 
great powers renewed their efforts in establishing more stringent norms on nuclear 
exports in the years that followed.
With the aim of critically analysing how India obtained this technological and 
political success, this chapter will consider the development of the Indian nuclear 
power programme since its establishment in 1948. This historical analysis will help 
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in inferring that the political decision to explode a nuclear device had been taken 
long before Indira Gandhi assumed power in 1971, though she was responsible for 
concretely authorising the detonation of the device in 1974. This chapter will argue 
that  the  preparation  process  for  a  nuclear  blast  was  indeed  initiated  by  Nehru's 
successor,  Lal  Bahadur  Shastri,  as  a  reaction  to  the  first  Chinese  nuclear  device 
detonation in 1964, two years after the Indians were defeated by China. However, 
this chapter will also infer that the basis on which Shastri's decision was made had 
been posed even earlier, during the Nehruvian period.
Therefore, the second paragraph of this chapter will, first of all, briefly focus on 
the legal framework on which the Indian nuclear power programme was established 
in 1948, highlighting the high level of secrecy and autonomy that it was granted. The 
same nuclear  power  strategy formulated  by  the  chairman  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission, Homi Bhabha, will be commented on, together with the analysis of the 
posture towards nuclear disarmament adopted by India. This analysis will show that 
India assumed an ambivalent posture: on one hand it declared its complete adversity 
towards  nuclear  weapons,  and  established  several  different  international 
collaborations  in  the  civilian  field;  on  the  other,  it  refused  to  sign  those  non-
proliferation  initiatives  which  could  have  impeded  its  development  of  a  nuclear 
bomb in the future, thus keeping its nuclear option open. The impact the first Chinese 
nuclear explosion had on India's public opinion will then be analysed. With respect 
to  this,  it  will  be  shown  that  the  Indian  leadership  decided  to  authorise  the 
construction  of  a  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosive without  needing  to  modify  its 
international position over non-proliferation issues. Continuing with the analysis, the 
technical problems the Indian scientific community faced in the second half of the 
Sixties will be considered, in parallel to India's reactions to the emergence of a more 
stringent non-proliferation regime as a consequence of the Chinese explosion. The 
third paragraph will then assess the events from the moment Mrs. Gandhi took power 
in  1971  until  1974.  The  international  collaboration  with  Canada  and  the  United 
States in the nuclear field will therefore be analysed, together with the fact that from 
1971 India had repetitively announced its intentions to explode a peaceful nuclear 
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device as soon as possible. It will also be shown how the international events of the 
East Pakistan crisis contributed to expanding India's public support for exploding a 
nuclear device. Another topic of discussion will be the growing domestic problems 
faced by Mrs. Gandhi’s government after 1973; events that could have induced the 
Prime Minister to authorise the detonation of the nuclear device as soon as declared 
ready by the scientists in order to divert public attention. The second part of the third 
paragraph will then analyse the first reactions to the nuclear explosion triggered in 
India and abroad. As a conclusive paragraph, the forth will analyse the long-term 
effects of the 1974 explosion. It will thus consider the impact it had on the global 
non-proliferation regime, and on the domestic situation in India until 1977. It will 
then consider how, the new non-proliferation regime subsequently impacted India's 
nuclear programme, and how New Delhi reacted to it. Finally, an evaluation of the 
long-term effect the 1974 explosion had on India's nuclear power programme will be 
drafted.
  2. India's nuclear program from 1947 until 1971
The term  nuclear  power is  generally used improperly and often with  a  touch of 
frightening ambiguity. In its most broadly generic definition, access to the world on 
an atomic scale could have multiple meanings: from everyday life with hospital and 
airport x-ray scanners, to electricity production by means of nuclear power plants, as 
well as enrichment technology for fuel production in weapon development programs. 
In India this confusing ambiguity is even more evident than in other countries: as 
proven by its nuclear programme history. This paragraph will trace the development 
of India's nuclear program from the emergence of an Independent India in 1947, until 
the beginning of Indira Gandhi's second government in March 1971. The aim is to 
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present the origins and the main bullet points of programme in order to highlight its 
historical equivocation.
  2.1  India's  legal  framework  and  organization  of  its  decision-making  
process
As a preface to the analysis of India's nuclear programme, it is important to underline 
how decisions had been taken concerning nuclear policy from 1947. Therefore, the 
Indian  legal  framework  regulating  the  nuclear  sector  will  be  briefly  presented, 
depicting two of its most important characteristics. First, giving complete autonomy 
to the institution in charge and forcing it to answer directly to the Prime Minister, it 
enhanced the already highly centralised and personalized foreign policy decision-
making process analysed earlier in the second chapter. Second, by covering all the 
nuclear activities and programme with secrecy, the Indian legal framework made it 
difficult for external powers to access information.
The Atomic  Energy Act  of  1948 regulates  nuclear  research  and activities  in 
India: it  sanctions that the Indian government has complete control of the atomic 
energy sector, thus prohibiting private activity in the field, and making the Indian 
government the owner of all atomic energy matters. The 1948 Act created the legal 
framework on which the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was formed in August 
1948. The AEC was formally put under the control of the Science and Technology 
Ministry with the aim to develop and formulate India's nuclear power programme, to 
train  scientists  and  to  manage  mineral  deposits.  The  fact  that  the  Indian  Prime 
Ministers had historically always covered the position of Minister of Science and 
Technology,  directly  centralised  the  nuclear  programme  control  in  their  hands, 
making them de facto the only institution that could interfere in the AEC activities. It 
is thus not surprising that George Perkovich – author of the most detailed analysis of 
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India's nuclear programme existing up to today – states that: “successive chairmen 
[of the AEC] have exerted extraordinary influence over India's nuclear activities and 
policies”1.
All other Indian governmental bodies only played a passive role. The Political 
Affairs  Committee  (PAC),  which  reunited  the  more  influential  Ministers  of  the 
Cabinet, should have actively participated in the defence and foreign policy decision-
making process, but the Indian Prime Ministers' habit of taking decisions by mainly 
consulting personal advisers, made the influence of this organism minimal. The only 
notable exception was that of Indira Gandhi during her first government (1966-1971) 
who, instead, largely relied on the Cabinet in formulating India's policy towards the 
Non Proliferation Treaty.  Also the Ministry of External Affairs  was generally not 
involved in decisions regarding the testing and development of nuclear technologies, 
although  it  played  an  important  role  in  formulating  India's  position  over  non-
proliferation issues in international fora. Similarly, the Ministry of Defence did not 
have an active role in the formulation of the nuclear programme, though after 1958 
its  Defence  Research  and  Development  Organisation  (DRDO)  worked  as  the 
technological designer and producer of the nuclear explosive devices that the Indian 
government decided to test  in 1974 and 19982.  Furthermore the Finance Minister 
always had a limited role in the development of nuclear policies too, and was only 
consulted when projects and policies proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission 
and  by  the  DRDO  had  to  be  included  in  the  national  budgets.  Coming  to  the 
Parliament, again limitation of power came into play: because of the sole possibility 
of questioning ministers about the programme already formulated, its influence was 
almost irrelevant. Nevertheless as shown later, the development of the Indian nuclear 
programme demonstrates that the public opinion, as well as the opposition parties 
1 George  Perkovich,  India’s  Nuclear  Bomb:  The  Impact  on  Global  Proliferation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 9.
2 Itty Abraham, “India’s ‘Strategic Enclave’: Civilian Scientists and Military Technologies,” Armed 
Forces & Society 18, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 4 This institution was indeed formed in 1958 by the  
merge  of  the  Defence  Science  Organisation  (DSO),  and  the  Technical  Development 
Establishments (TSEs) with the aim of taking care of the production of sensible weapons and 
military  equipment  that  could  not  be  imported.  DRDO  official  website: 
http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/index.jsp?pg=genesis.jsp (retrieved on 15th October 2012). 
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voices, effectively had some influences on the Prime Minister's decisions. Finally, it 
is interesting to note that the Indian Armed Forces also played no role in influencing 
nuclear programmes. To understand this account it is important to remember here 
what has already been underlined in the second chapter: differently from Pakistan's 
case,  the  founders  of  Independent  India  decided  to  give  the  Armed  forces  a 
secondary role only in the decision making process3. The reason was not to allow the 
Army, which during the fight for independence had been loyal to the British until the 
last, to gain prominence in politics and to raise allocations to the defence4. Although 
the defeat in the 1962 war with China triggered major involvement of the Indian 
armed forces in the decision making process relating to foreign policy, this was not in 
the nuclear field.
As  a  consequence,  the  formulation  of  the nuclear  policy  remained  almost 
entirely  restricted  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  AEC  scientists.  The  fact  that 
Jawaharlal  Nehru not  only remained Prime Minister  from Independence until  his 
death in 1964, but also for the whole period the Minister of External Affairs and the 
Minister of Science and Technology, enhanced the centralisation of powers in Prime 
Ministerial hands. Better was the case of Lal Bahadur Shastri (Nehru's successor) and 
of Indira Gandhi, who at least added the role of Minister of Science and Technology 
to their duties as Prime Minister,  and not that of Minister of External Affairs. As a 
consequence,  decision  making  power  over  the  nuclear  field  was almost  totally 
centred  on  the  relationships  between  the  Indian  Prime  Ministers  and  the  AEC 
chairmen.
A second important characteristic of the Indian Atomic Energy Act of 1948 is the 
government's entitlement  to  restrict  information:  “any  information  not  so  far 
published  relating  to  the  theory,  design,  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear 
reactors, or an existing or proposed plant used or proposed to be used for the purpose 
3 Stephen P. Cohen,  The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 173–4.
4 N.  S.  Sisodia  and  Chitrapu  Uday  Bhaskar,  Emerging  India:  Security  and  Foreign  Policy  
Perspectives (New Delhi: Bibliophile South Asia, 2005).
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of  producing,  developing  or  using  atomic  energy”5.  Indian  laws  imposed  more 
secrecy  than  the  British  or  American  legislations  did6,  punishing  any  secrecy 
violation with up to five years imprisonment. This legal framework led the Indian 
government  not  to  keep  written  records  of  any discussions  nor  decisions,  as  the 
officials who participated  in the process testify7. In order to justifying such a high 
level of secrecy in 1948 the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made reference 
to the need to protect India's knowledge and materials from exploitation  by  more 
advanced  countries,  and  to  assure  states  like  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom that in case of cooperation with India, their secrets would be protected8. 
When asked  at the Lok Sabha on 6th April 1948 about the  need  for  the  imposing 
secrecy  even though the peaceful intentions of the programme had been declared 
Nehru interestingly answered: “Somehow we cannot help associating atomic energy 
with war. […] we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war – indeed I 
think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes.  […] Of 
course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious 
sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way”.9 With these 
statements the Indian Prime Minister disclosed the crucial fact that the secrecy would 
have  been  useful  in  the  unfortunate  case  of  India  having  to  resort to  nuclear 
technology for military purposes.
Generally Indian commentaries deny that India's quest for nuclear power  had 
been ambiguous since Nehru's time. Typically it is argued that Nehru only considered 
nuclear  power  for  peaceful  purposes.  For  example,  T.  T.  Poulose  writes  that: 
“Nehru's nuclear decisions were […] deeply rooted in his scientific temper,  [and in 
his] abhorrence of nuclear weapons and nuclear allergy after the supreme tragedy at 
5 B. Banerjee and N. Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 
2008), xi. The Atomic Energy Acts of 1948 and of 1962 can be found in Appendices A8 and A9. 
6 On this see: Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 17.
7 See  the  account  provided  by the  Indian  scientist  Homi Sethna  to  ibid.,  170.  The fact  is  also  
confirmed by Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1979), 145.
8 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 20.
9 Ibid.
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Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki”10.  Instead,  it  was  the  chairman  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission (AEC), Homi Bhabha, the man who gave the dual purpose  (civil and 
military) to India's nuclear program11. According to this interpretation, being the AEC 
research director, and in 1954 also the Department of Atomic Energy Secretary, the 
physicist was able to exploit the unusual institutional freedom for which he could 
develop a nuclear programme leaving the door open to the development of nuclear 
weapons12. The fact that the Indian Prime Minister Nehru had a friendly and strict 
relationship  with  Homi  Bhabha,  and  considered him  to  be the  most reliable 
collaborator,  apparently  gave  him  even  more  freedom  to  develop  the  nuclear 
programme  in  almost  complete  autonomy.  Nevertheless,  to avoid  explaining  the 
reasons why literature had decided to give this vision of the Indian Prime Minister, it 
is crucial to recall the words pronounced by Jawaharlal Nehru in the quote a few 
lines above. In fact, if on one hand Nehru was morally against the use of nuclear 
weapons,  on  the  other  he  was  realist  enough  to  support  the  adoption  of  atomic 
science and technology both for the country's civilian development and defence. His 
words quoted by Dorothy Newman further strengthened this ambivalence: “... I hope 
Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is 
threatened she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal”13. As 
a consequence, it seems more credible to assume that Nehru's mind was clear when it 
came to the decision to support the legal framework that gave such large autonomy to 
the AEC scientists, as well as covering their activities with secrecy.
When the 1962 Atomic Energy Act was voted, the secrecy that covered nuclear 
policies and the centralisation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister  were 
further  reinforced.  This  second  act  concentrated  even  more  power  in  the  AEC, 
making investigating and questioning its activities almost impossible for the other 
10 T. T. Poulose, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” in Perspective of India’s Nuclear Policy (Young Asia, New 
Delhi, 1978), 102.
11 Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-Indian Conflict (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 
1993), 1–4; Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New 
Delhi: Praeger, 1976), 107; Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 106 and 150.
12 Robert S. Anderson, Building Scientific Institutions in India: Saha and Bhabha (Montreal: McGill 
University, 1975), 40.
13 Dorothy Newman, Nehru: The First 60 Years, vol. 2 (New York: John Day, 1965), 264.
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Indian political institutions. Although this aspect had raised diffuse criticism until 
today14, the legal framework has never been modified, neither when the Department 
of Atomic Energy and Space was founded in 1972, nor later. As a result, despite its  
declared  intentions  for  peaceful  purposes,  and  thanks  to  the  highest  secrecy and 
autonomy granted to the institutions in charge, it is possible to argue that the Indian 
nuclear  programme  was  based  on  a  legal  framework  that  exploits  the  necessary 
ambiguity for  making  research  for  both  civilian  and military nuclear  technology 
applications possible.
  2.2  The  Indian  birth  of  the  nuclear  programme  and  the  strategy  
development under Jawaharlal Nehru
Indian policy-makers had already realised the importance of atomic research for the 
economic  and  technological  development  at  the  time  the  Republic  of  India  was 
founded  in  194715.  The  ability  to  master  the  atom meant  modernity,  prosperity, 
national pride and international power at that time. The aim of studying the atom was 
to free India from electrical energy shortages that were identified as major obstacles 
for the  development  of the  Indian industry.  The traditional  sources for electricity 
production used in India, like hydro-power and coal, were indeed only partially able 
to  answer  the  population's needs16.  As  a  consequence,  when  the  nuclear  power 
program was launched in 1948 stress was  put on the  need for  self-reliance: it was 
evaluated that the capability of producing commercial  nuclear power would have 
freed India from oil imports, from more expensive fuel cycle costs, and from the 
14 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 1998),  115–120; Banerjee and Sarma,  Nuclear Power in  
India: A Critical History, 78.
15 Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 25.
16 Still  nowadays  several  areas  of  India  are  depending  on  monsoons  for  sufficiently  providing 
electricity. The unpredictability of Monsoons still cause severe power crisis.
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polluting coal-fired thermal stations17. Nuclear power was therefore identified as the 
crucial  sector  in  which  investing  was important.  Though because  of  its  complex 
nature it required greater efforts with respect to other sources, especially during the 
initial phases of its development.
Homi  Bhabha  actively  worked  to  develop  India's  nuclear  program from the 
foundation  of  the  AEC.  In  November  1954,  the  Indian  nuclear  programme  was 
presented  at  the  conference  on  the  Development  of  Atomic  Energy for  Peaceful 
Purposes, held in New Delhi18. Adopted six years later by the Indian government in 
the Third Five-Year Plan, the plan was based upon the discovery that India had larger 
reserves of thorium than of uranium. According to Indian estimates, nowadays India 
indeed  still  possess  360.000  tonnes  of  thorium (Th-232)19,  and  only  had  scarce 
reserves  of  around  70.000  tonnes  of  uranium  (U-238)20.  This  discovery  directly 
contributed to the formulation of a nuclear programme based on the exploitation of 
the thorium reserves. As a consequence the nuclear strategy was articulated in three 
stages. Each stage would allow an increase in the production of electricity,  while 
exploiting successive reactor technologies to produce the fissile material21 required 
by the next generations. In the first stage, making use of international assistance, 
India would build natural uranium (U-238) fuelled reactors to produce plutonium 
(Pu-239). In the implementation of this simple reactor, heavy-water22 to control the 
reaction was envisaged, together with a close cycle waste reprocessing system to 
separate  the  produced  Pu-239.  In  the  second  stage,  more  sophisticated  types  of 
17 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, 12–3.
18 Ganesan Venkataraman, Bhabha and His Magnificent Obsessions (New Delhi: Universities Press, 
1994), 158.
19 Among other information the atomic number gives an indication on how “reactive” with other  
elements an atom can be. The more reactive the less stable. Therefore more capable of producing 
energetic  chemical  reactions,  but  also  more  dangerous.  In  nature  uranium can  be  found with 
atomic numbers U-238 and U-235, the first being a poor reactive material the latter a very good 
one. Enriching means “distilling” U-235 atoms out of uranium rocks transforming it in a more 
efficient radioactive source suitable for nuclear reactors.
20 See  the  official  Bhabha  Atomic  Research  Centre  (BARC)  website  at: 
http://www.barc.gov.in/about/anushakti_sne.html (retrieved on 16th October 2012). 
21 The fissile material is used to break the atoms for creating neutrons which will then break other 
atoms, thus starting a chain reaction that will produce power, which in turn will be transformed in  
electricity. 
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reactors  called Fast  Breeder  Reactors (FBR) were planned to be used to  process 
Thorium (Th-232), using Pu-239, to produce an isotope of uranium (U-233), more 
efficient for energy production. Besides making use of a control material based on 
sodium that was easier to find (also know as liquid metal), the more advance reactor 
scheme  therefore  exploited  India's  large  resources  of  Thorium to  produce  better 
fissile materials required by the next generation of nuclear reactors. The third and 
final  stage,  implied the use of the so called Breeder  Reactors (BR).  In this  very 
advanced reactor  schema,  making use of  smaller  quantities  of  U-233 as  a  fissile 
material  to  brake  larger  quantities  of  Th-232  atoms  would  have  lead  to  the 
production of more U-233; as the by-product of an efficient fission chain reaction. 
Thus freeing India from the dependency to import uranium from abroad23.
With the aim of freeing India from the necessity of importing, Bhabha's strategy 
was innovative for the times. Only India had followed the path of adopting a national 
nuclear strategy focussed almost entirely on a thorium fuel cycle  until today; other 
states  like  Germany,  the  United  States  and Japan abandoned the  idea  after  short 
studies on the thorium cycle “due to new discovery of uranium deposits and their 
easy availability” during the Seventies24.  The fact that this strategy was feasible is 
demonstrated by recent developments in the field of international nuclear research. 
Over the last fifteen years several programmes have been set up focusing indeed on 
the  development  of  a  thorium fuel  cycle  for  energy  production.  It  was  also  an 
interesting source of energy for other countries25.  Today it is generally recognised 
22 In  nuclear  thermal  power  stations  light  (normal)  or  heavy-water  (enriched  with deuterium) is 
generally  the  element  used  as  a  moderator.  Neutrons  are  subatomic  particles  responsible  for 
igniting  chain  reactions,  thus  nuclear  energy  production.  A moderator  reduces  the  speed  of 
neutrons during the process of nuclear fission (the process of breaking atoms). The main purpose 
is therefore to avoid overheating of the fissile materials, otherwise leading to potential nuclear 
explosions. A combination of graphite control rods and water (in one of the two forms) is used to  
control  nuclear  reactions.  Light  water  is  typically  used  when  enriched  uranium  (U-235)  or 
plutonium (Pu-239) is used as a fissile material; while heavy-water when natural uranium (U-238) 
is the main fuel, due to its major heat-resistance. 
23 It is crucial to note that still today the reactor for the third process is under development.
24 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Thorium Fuel Cycle: Potential Benefits and Challenges” 
(International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  Vienna,  May  2005),  96,  http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TE_1450_web.pdf, (retrieved on 16th October 2012).
25  India, Brazil and Turkey are the countries with the global largest deposits known today. Ibid., 45.
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that “there is probably more energy available for use from thorium in the minerals of 
Earth's crust than from both uranium and fossil fuels”26. In addition to its availability, 
there are also other reasons that make thorium particularly attractive. First, all mined 
(natural)  thorium can be potentially used in  a  reactor,  compared to  just  0,7% of 
natural uranium, and it can produce 40 times the amount of energy  per unit mass 
compared to  natural  uranium27.  Second,  the  International  Atomic  Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in its  report  from  2005 considered the power cycle  technology based on 
thorium (Th-232/U-233)  to  be  better  than  the  one  based  on  uranium (U-235/U-
238/Pu-239) in terms of reduced radioactive waste problems, and risks of accidental 
explosions28. Indeed, thorium produces waste with  a half-life29 that is 10 to 10.000 
times shorter than uranium, and does not sustain chain reactions, therefore stopping 
fission by default when not externally induced30. Lastly,  differently from uranium, 
thorium does not sustain a chain reaction if not continuously primed, thus making an 
accidental  runaway  chain  reaction  improbable31.  As  a  consequence  of  these 
discovered advantages, in 1997 the American Department of Energy began a research 
program on thorium, which includes the IAEA and Russian research institutes. Other 
countries like Germany, Canada and more recently also China, are pursuing the same 
goal32.
Despite  the  innovative  character  and  theoretical  validity  of  the  strategy 
formulated by Bhabha, India's nuclear programme developed slowly and not without 
problems. The first evident problem was its great cost. It required large investments 
even if  justified  as  a  strategic  activity that  was “the 'only chance'  of  raising the 
26 Ayhan Demirbas,  Biohydrogen: For Future Engine Fuel Demands (New York: Springer, 2009), 
36.
27 Ibid., 37.
28 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Thorium Fuel Cycle: Potential Benefits and Challenges,” 
84 (retrieved on 16th October 2012).
29 Half-life means the time it takes for a substance to lose half of its radiologic activity, and thus it  
gives an estimation of how long it can be considered dangerous for human beings.
30 Demirbas, Biohydrogen, 38.
31 Ibid.
32 Takashi Kamei and Saeed Hakami, “Evaluation of Implementation of Thorium Fuel Cycle with 
LWR and MSR,” Progress in Nuclear Energy 53, no. 7 (September 2011): 820–824.
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standard of living in India”, according to Bhabha's words33. Significant percentages 
of the total  research and development expenditures were thus allocated in Indian 
national  budgets  for  atomic  energy:  27%  in  1958/1959,  and  30%  in  1965/6634. 
Nevertheless, New Delhi took decisions that at a later stage resulted suboptimal from 
an economical perspective. Just to mention a few, it was decided to develop heavy-
water  based reactor technology instead of light-water,  trading additional costs  (to 
produce deuterium reach water) with the possibility of using natural uranium fuel (U-
238); or to build small reactors instead of large plants, trading risks and (apparent) 
lower  construction  costs  with  energy  production  efficiency35.  Moreover,  due  to 
technical problems for separating Pu-239 with the closed cycle schema, and to the 
high costs of the plutonium treating process, Bhabha's strategy relented, resulting still 
today in an unaccomplished plan, stuck in its development second stage36. Surely, 
these problems became complicated in the Seventies due to the international export 
control policies pursued by the nuclear supplier states towards India. Common issues 
occur with those states that are pursuing independent nuclear programs outside non-
proliferation regimes, as better explained later on. Besides technical problems of a 
different nature, it is however crucial to point out that in 2012 India only got 2,5% of 
its total electricity generation from nuclear power plants37.
After  this  brief  (but  fundamental)  presentation  of  India's  nuclear  technical 
strategy, the country's approach to non-proliferation issues will be analysed, together 
with its international cooperation in the nuclear sector. The aim at this point is to 
focus the attention on the fact that from 1947 India developed an ambiguous strategy 
allowing the nuclear-weapon development option to remain open, though publicly 
appearing as a champion of disarmament. On one hand, New Delhi argued that its 
nuclear capabilities would have been used for peaceful purposes only, and actively 
33 Statement pronounced by Bhabha, quoted in Roberta Wohlstetter,  The Buddha Similes: Absent-
minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1977), 39.
34 Abraham, “India’s ‘Strategic Enclave’,” 242.
35 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 32.
36 Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 27.
37 See  the  BARC  website  at:  http://www.barc.gov.in/about/anushakti_sne.html (retrieved  on  9th 
November 2012).
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looked for the establishment of international cooperation projects with other more 
technologically  advanced  states.  On  the  other,  India  refused  to  accept  the 
international campaigns set up by states in possession of nuclear weapons since such 
initiatives  were  aimed  to  prevent  other  states  from  acquiring  nuclear  weapons 
technology, rather than to establish a complete nuclear disarmament as advertised.
This ambivalent approach is demonstrated by the actions taken by India from 
1948 onwards. As one of the first  steps, India assumed a critical  position on the 
Baruch Plan: the first international effort towards non-proliferation proposed by the 
United States at the first meeting of the United Nation Atomic Energy Commission 
in 1946. Taking its name from its  author,  Bernard Baruch, the plan proposed the 
creation of an international Atomic Development Authority “to own and operate all 
materials, technologies, and facilities with potential nuclear weapon applications” 38. 
The  aim  of  such  action  was  to  establish  international  controls  preventing  the 
production of nuclear weapons world wide, however promoting the knowledge of 
nuclear technology for peaceful use across nations. According to the plan, the United 
States,  which  in  1946  still  had  an  unbroken  nuclear  monopoly,  would  have 
dismantled their nuclear arsenal after the international controls establishment. Not 
surprisingly  however,  the  Baruch  plan did  not  encounter  positive  reactions:  the 
Soviet Union and Poland officially opposed it at the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission (UNAEC), permanently demising it in 1952. India sided with the Soviet 
Union and Poland, arguing that the international ownership of fissile materials would 
only have been a new dangerous form of colonial strategy by the United States39.
Meanwhile, New Delhi began intense diplomatic work for assuring international 
help for its ambitious nuclear programme. As a consequence, in 1951 and 1952 India 
signed its first  nuclear cooperation agreement with France,  which despite not yet 
being a nuclear weapons state already had an advanced technological knowledge. 
The Indo-French collaboration gave life to a research facility in India at Trombay, 
called Zerlina, which was then used for research scopes by India from 1961, when it 
38 Perkovich,  India’s  Nuclear  Bomb,  21.On  this  see  the  official  American  Department  of  State 
website: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/BaruchPlans.
39 Ibid.
176
went critical,  until 198340. India actively sought contacts establishment with other 
states as well, like Canada, and the United Kingdom, who were also interested in 
collaborating41. As soon as the first international agreements for nuclear cooperation 
were signed by the other nuclear supplier states, and following the Soviet Union first 
nuclear explosion in 1949, and that of the United Kingdom in 1952, the United States 
modified their precedent policy of stringent limitations to nuclear cooperation and 
exports.
The  American  president  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower's  Atoms for  Peace speech, 
pronounced on 8th December 1953 at the UN General Assembly, launched the basis 
for a new American policy based on the international promotion for the peaceful use 
of nuclear technologies. The American president proposed once again to establish an 
international entity, this time called the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
of  the  United  Nations,  which  would  have  been entitled  to  supervise  the  nuclear 
programs of  all  countries  in  order  to  avoid  the spread and acquisition of  atomic 
weapons42. However, as a direct consequence of the new approach, American laws 
were  rewritten:  information  on  certain  civil  technologies  were  thus  declassified, 
while nuclear material exports liberalised at the condition to sign specific bilateral 
agreements assuring the use only for peaceful purposes43. Surely the aim of the new 
more  permissive  American  approach  was  to  allow  the  United  States  and  its 
companies  to  participate  in  the  rising  profitable  activity  of  world  wide  nuclear 
technology, and to race their Soviet and British competitors. 
India gained an advantage with the new relaxed policy, even though the proposal 
of establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency at the United Nation was 
officially criticized by New Delhi. The Indian Prime Minister in his speech at the 
40 Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 31.
41 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial 
State (Zed Books, London and New York, 1998), 78–81.
42 The  speech  is  available  online  on  the  official  Eisenhower  Archives'  website  at:  
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf 
(retrieved on 15th October 2012).
43 Warren H. Donnelly et al.,  Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the International Atomic Energy  
Agency: An Analytical Report Prepared for the Committee on Governmental Operations, United  
States Senate (U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).
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Lok Sabha on 10th May 1954 indeed stated that: since the UN was practically unable 
to  control  non-member  nations  (notably  China),  the  American  plans  could  have 
turned  problematic44.  Once  again  the  establishment  of  an  international  agency 
controlling  the  atomic  industries  around  the  world  was  felt  as  a  new  form  of 
colonialism.  However,  this  did  not  prevent  India  and  the  United  States  from 
exploiting the new relaxed regulation system of the American exportation together. 
As a consequence, in 1955 the United States Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
visited India in order to expand bilateral cooperation and strengthen the American 
influence over atomic energy production for peaceful purposes. After the visit almost 
one  thousand  Indian  scientists  and  engineers  were  sent  to  the  United  States  for 
training on new technologies45, and new bilateral agreements were signed with both 
the United States and Canada.
The  new  American  approach  indeed  resulted  in  a  general  increase  of 
international collaborations in the nuclear research field. In 1955 for example the 
construction of the first  Indian nuclear  reactor  Apsara began thanks to assistance 
from the  United  Kingdom.  Although  Bhabha's  plans  for  the  development  of  the 
Indian national programme on thorium fuel cycle  had already been formulated, the 
Apsara reactor was fuelled with enriched uranium (U-235), and with light water as 
the moderator. This represented a compromise for the Indian strategy since India was 
short  on uranium enrichment  technology.  New Delhi  was thus  obliged to  import 
enriched uranium from the United Kingdom in order to operate the reactor. However, 
the agreement had important  value for India who was interested in acquiring the 
technological knowledge and materials necessary to start commercial nuclear power 
production in the short term. Financial and organizational conditions were all good, 
as demonstrated by the fact that in 1956 Apsara was already built and in operation46.
The agreement for the construction of a second reactor, much larger than Apsara 
and based on a completely different approach, was signed by India on 28th April 1956 
44 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 25.
45 Gary Milhollin, “Stopping the Indian Bomb,” The American Journal of International Law 81, no. 
3 (July 1987): 607–8.
46 Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 30.
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with  Canada.  Later  named  Canadian-Indian  Reactors  United  States  (CIRUS) 
because  of  the  United  States  participation  in  the  provisions  of  heavy-water,  this 
reactor was completed  within four years, in 1960.  The Canadian-Indian agreement 
foresaw Canada building a 40  Mega  Watt reactor in India at its own expense ($24 
million) as part of the Colombo Plan, together with half of the initial natural uranium 
(U-238)  fuel47.  Meanwhile  on  16th March 1956  the  United  States  had  signed  an 
agreement  with  the  Indian  Atomic  Energy Commission  to  provide  the  necessary 
heavy-water  (18,9  metric  tonnes)  for  processing  natural  uranium.  Compared  to 
Apsara, CIRUS was a much better deal for India for two fundamental reasons: first, 
it would have produced the first key element (Pu-239) of the entire Bhabha strategy 
based on thorium;  second,  it  would  have  processed  natural  uranium (U-238) for 
producing plutonium (Pu-239),  allowing India  to  exploit  its  own natural uranium 
reserves,  or  alternatively  to  import  the far  less  expensive  and  more  commonly 
available  natural  uranium.  Not  having  developed  the  capability  to  indigenously 
produce heavy-water until 1962, when the first heavy-water processing plant became 
operative, the necessary quantity of moderator material to put the CIRUS reactor into 
operation was then the only other element that New Delhi had to import.
CIRUS was also important for India for a broader range of reasons. The first 
important aspect is that being based on natural uranium fission, CIRUS produced a 
rather  large  quantity  of  weapons-grade  Pu-239  if  compared  to  other  nuclear 
technologies and fuels, as for example in the case of the U-235 fuelled light water 
reactors like Apsara, which instead produced Pu-240 as a by-product of the nuclear 
reaction, which is not a suitable material for explosive devices48. Therefore, CIRUS 
would have been able to provide India  with  Pu-239, which could have been used 
easily and directly for the fabrication of nuclear explosive devices both for peaceful 
purposes (e.g. mining) or as nuclear weapons. The second crucial issue was that India 
47 The Colombo Plan was an organisation founded on 28th November 1950 in Sri  Lanka among 
Commonwealth  countries.  Its  aim  was  to  foster  international  cooperation  between  richer 
Commonwealth nations and poorer  ones,  especially in the Asia-Pacific  region.  After  1977 the 
organization was opened to other non-Commonwealth countries and was renamed “The Colombo 
Plan Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific”.
48 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 28.
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succeeded in concluding both agreements with Canada and the United States without 
impositions of specific safeguards on the materials provided, nor the reactor, nor the 
spent  fuel;  thus  making  the fabrication  of  a  peaceful  nuclear  explosive,  or  of  a 
nuclear bomb, with spent fuel  possible.  Canadians were simply reassured by India 
declaring the use of CIRUS products for atomic energy peaceful applications only 49. 
Similarly, even the Indo-American agreement only ratified India's promise to use the 
heavy-water for peaceful applications50.
At that time no consensus had yet been reached in the international community 
concerning  how  to  constitute  an  international  body  regulating  the  international 
nuclear cooperation: what later on became the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Analysing the approach adopted by India during the conference on the IAEA 
statute in Geneva, it is possible to argue that obtaining CIRUS without safeguards 
was a great success for India. India's intention to be free to dispose of the enriched 
uranium and plutonium produced by CIRUS indeed clearly came out  in the speech 
Bhabha pronounced in Geneva on 27th September 1956, where he participated as the 
chairman of AEC and secretary of the DAE. In that occasion he said: “We consider it  
to  be the inalienable right  of States  to produce and hold the fissionable material 
required  for  the  peaceful  power  programmes”,  especially  because  developed 
countries, not needing AIEA aid, would not have been subject to those safeguards, 
applied instead to the lesser technological developed states51. Safeguards would have 
effectively limited, or at least restricted, India's complete control over the CIRUS 
reactor and especially its  output52. It is crucial to underline at this point that India's 
point of view at the Geneva conference, which was supported also by many other 
non nuclear countries,  also  influenced the final AIEA statute53. As a consequence, 
this regulation only ensured safeguards on nuclear fuels and on reactor construction, 
49 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, 6.
50 Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 154–6.
51 J. P. Jain, Nuclear India / J.P. Jain. (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974), 44-46.
52 Achin  Vanaik  and  Praful  Bidwai,  “India  and  Pakistan,”  in  Security  with  Nuclear  Weapons?:  
Different Perspectives on National Security, by Regina Cowen Karp (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 261.
53 Available online on the AIEA website: http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html#A1.12 (retrieved on 
16th October 2012).
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but not on the spent fuel produced: a part of which notably included weapon-grade 
materials54. Because of this lack of safeguard specifications, once again, the CIRUS 
plant allowed India to keep the door open on the fabrication of nuclear explosives 
suitable both for peaceful and military applications.
Yet another crucial consideration is that neither the Indo-Canadian agreement, 
nor the Indo-American one prevented India from using the CIRUS spent fuel for 
producing Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs): this resulted in what was officially 
called the Pokhran-I test carried out by India in 1974. It is not so surprising: until at 
least 1964 PNEs were considered by the United States as potentially important for 
civil activity usage, like for example mining. Although criticism on the risks of using 
that  technology  for  military  purposes  had  emerged since  1958,  still  in  1964 
Americans advertised the engineering and scientific advantages of the PNEs at the 
United Nations Conference of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy55. The international 
community continued to recognise PNEs as important peaceful applications for even 
longer,  until  the  Seventies56.  Therefore,  when  during the early Sixties  the United 
States and the international community decided to strengthen safeguards forbidding 
non-nuclear states to conduct PNEs in autonomy, it was too late: India and also other 
countries had already legally acquired nuclear explosive production capabilities.
India's  nuclear  program and its  internationalization  evolved at  a  steady pace 
throughout  the  Sixties.  The  construction  of  a  third  reactor,  called  Phenix,  began 
under  Bhabha's supervision in 1961 in the Trombay area,  and was completed by 
1964.  Built  by  Indians  with  the  technical  support  of  an  American  firm  (Vitro 
International) this  plant  (like  CIRUS)  processed  natural  uranium  (U-238)  for 
producing plutonium (Pu-239); even though in the Sixties it was mainly used for the 
delicate and complex reprocess operation for separating plutonium from the spent 
54 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 28.
55 Kanwal Kishore Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: a Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali 
Prakashan, 1980), 123.
56 The IAEA organised a series of meetings from 1970 to 1976 on the topic of civilian uses of the 
PNEs.  Proceedings  are  printed  in:  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  Peaceful  Nuclear 
Explosions, 5 volumes, Vienna, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1976.
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fuel produced in CIRUS57.
The United States  and Canada had been conscious of  the risks  connected to 
nuclear  proliferation  since  the  beginning of  the  their  collaboration  with  India  on 
nuclear technology in 1956. However, they did not initially insist on imposing severe 
and strict international safeguards over their bilateral collaboration with India during 
the Fifties. As noted by Perkovich,  they were indeed probably more interested in 
acquiring markets for nuclear technology, and to expand their influence in foreign 
countries like India, rather than alienating them58. Thus they allowed Indian scientists 
to train in the United Studies, as well as fostering local projects in India. Declassified 
American  documents  show  that  in  1961  the American  Department  of  State 
considered the  possibility  of favouring  India's  acquisition  of  nuclear  weapons  in 
order to balance the Chinese nuclear programme; an option that, however, was then 
completely  rejected59.  However,  in  1962/1963  Washington  and  Canada  began  to 
significantly alter their position  in  reaction to  the first  French nuclear blast in the 
Algerian desert  in 1960, and  that of  the Soviet Union  in 1961; both violating the 
moratorium against  exploding further nuclear devices that had been decided by the 
great powers to contain nuclear arms race. As a consequence  of those events, the 
United  States  began  to  reformulate  a  more  stringent  non-proliferation  strategy, 
reflected in the new conditions imposed by the United States and Canada to India in 
the early Sixties, as will be shown in the following part.
In  1962  negotiations  for  the  American  construction  of  two  nuclear  power 
reactors in Tarapur  (near Bombay) had  begun in a period were bilateral  relations 
between India and the United States were particularly fertile because of the Sino-
Indian war in the same year. Negotiations were concluded in 1963 under favourable 
financial  conditions  for India60.  However,  as  both  a  consequence  of  the  IAEA 
57 Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 108.
58 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 30.
59 See the “Memorandum from George McGhee, State Department, to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 
dated on 13th September 1961”, and the “Memorandum from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to 
Lucius  Battle,  State  Department  Executive  Secretary,  dated  on  7th  October  1961”,  National 
Security Archives, Washington D. C., quoted in ibid., 52–3.
60 Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, 26.
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foundation  and the  American  development  of  a  more  stringent  approach to  non-
proliferation, the Indo-American agreement, signed in August 1963 in Washington 
was  rigidly  written.  When  enforced  on  25th October  1963,  it  included  IAEA 
safeguards on the entire cycle of the Tarapur power stations, and thus on the fuel, on 
the plants, and also on the by-products of the process61. By 1963 the United States 
had already begun to  impose IAEA safeguard regulations to  all  countries  buying 
nuclear  sources  or  equipment  from  them.  Due  to  India's  refusal  of  the  general 
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, severe regulations were only imposed on the 
Tarapur power stations. Clearly, this precluded India from diverting materials from 
the Tarapur plants for other purposes. In addition to this aspect, the Indo-American 
agreement  of  1963  represented  a  compromise  for  India  for  another  reason:  the 
Tarapur reactors were based on enriched uranium (U-235)  with pure water as  the 
moderator, like  Apsara, diverging again  from Bhabha's original nuclear plans. The 
apparent favourable financial conditions of the agreement and India's willingness to 
have two proven reactors operating in a short time led New Delhi to accept not only 
the limited IAEA safeguards, but especially the American conditions62. According to 
the  agreement,  India  should  have  imported  the  enriched  uranium  only  from the 
United States for the entire life of the plants, thus becoming completely dependent on 
American imports63. This dependency became the greatest irritation factor for Indo-
American relations after India's decision to detonate its first nuclear device in 1974, 
as will be shown  later. Moreover, imports of enriched uranium became extremely 
expensive in the following years, thus revealing the rationale behind the favourable 
financial conditions granted by Washington to New Delhi64. The construction work of 
the two Tarapur reactors began in 1964 and were only completed in 1969, with a one-
year delay due to technical problems.
61 Ibid., 27.
62 When  the  reactor  became  operative,  the  station  produced  the  30%  of  Gujarat’s  and  15%  of 
Maharashtra’s electricity requirements, even if later in the Nineties this became just 10% due to  
the increased electricity production capacity from other sources. Ibid., 22.
63 A. G. Noorani, “Indo-U.S. Nuclear Relations,” Asian Survey 21, no. 4 (April 1, 1981): 399–416.
64 In 1980 the American price for the provision of the enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactors was 
of  $11.1 million,  equal  to  10% of the entire  cost  of  the  construction of  the plant.  Chellaney,  
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On 16th December 1963 India signed another  agreement with Canada.  It was 
more harmonised with the nuclear plans made by Bhabha65. Ottawa started building a 
natural uranium (U-238) reactor moderated with heavy-water in Rajasthan, called the 
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Unit I (RAPS-I), which later went critical in 1972. 
This  time the  heavy-water  moderator  was  provided not  only by Canada  and the 
United States, but also by the Soviet Union, which had signed an agreement with the 
aim of continuing nuclear  cooperation  with  India  begun earlier  in  196166.  As  a 
reflection of the raising consensus over establishing controls on nuclear cooperation 
projects, this new agreement granted Canada the right to inspect the plant of RAPS-I 
in  India. Similarly to  the  agreement  signed with  the  Americans  on  Tarapur,  this 
measure not only assured the heavy-water and the plants would have been used for 
peaceful purposes, but also that by-products of the two reactors would have been 
exclusively used for peaceful applications67. 
In 1963 the development of China's nuclear program began to worry the United 
States, but not only. The Indian defeat in the 1962 war against China had already 
enlarged the  political  consensus  towards  nuclear  weapons among Indian  political 
circles.  In  December  1962  the  Jan  Sangh  party  made  its  first  formal  request  in 
Parliament  explicitly  calling  for  a  revision  of  India's  nuclear  policy  and  for  the 
production of nuclear weapons68. Despite the Indian Prime Minister Nehru officially 
refusing to consider the option, the Jan Sangh continued to advocate in its favour 
during the Lok Sabha debate of 196369. Therefore, the fact that the imminence of a 
Chinese  nuclear  blast could  spur  other  countries  to  develop  a  nuclear  weapons 
programme as well, pushed the United States to actively sponsor a nuclear test ban 
treaty70. The American efforts were only partially successful because of the Soviet 
65 Ashok Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 159.
66 The Statesman, 3rd February 1961.
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68 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 46.
69 Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 108–9.
70 “Memorandum of Secretary of Defence to the President dated 12th February 1963” in Virginia 
Foran, U. S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, Chadwick-Healey, London 1992, no. 
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Union resistance towards a comprehensive ban treaty. Therefore only a Partial Test 
Ban Treaty was signed on 5th August 1963 in Moscow by the representatives of the 
United States, of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union. Making it illegal to 
test nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in water or in outer space, but underground, 
the treaty was also promptly signed by India71. This was the last Indian international 
action made under the direction of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who died on 27th 
May 1964. 
  2.3 Lal Bahadur Shastri and the effects of China's first nuclear blast on  
India's nuclear strategy
Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Jawaharla1 Nehru when the latter died in May 1964. 
Shastri was a man with scarce international experience, a rather poor knowledge on 
foreign affairs when nuclear matters were concerned. In October 1964, long before 
the new Prime Minister could consolidate his position and power, the first Chinese 
explosion  of  a  nuclear  device  shook  the  entire  nuclear  programme  India  had 
developed until that time; therefore urging Shastri to take crucial decisions without 
solid  grounds.  The  Prime  Minister  decided  to  modify  the  long-standing  nuclear 
programme authorising the technological development necessary for India to explode 
a nuclear device for  peaceful purposes. In the following paragraph this important 
shift will be analysed tracing the events from 1964 to 1966, and highlighting how 
beyond this  change India's  nuclear  programme and approach to  non-proliferation 
matters remained as ambiguous as before.
The  first  result  in  India's  nuclear  programme  was  reached  few months  after 
Nehru's  death:  entering  the  first  quantity  of  spent  fuel  in  the  Phenix plutonium 
71 The Treaty is available online on the American Department of State website at: 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm (retrieved on 16th October 2012).
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reprocessing proto-type plant in Trombay72, India officially inaugurated the second 
phase of Bhabha's nuclear strategy in July 1964. Although this made India the fifth 
country in the world able to reprocess plutonium on paper, several problems were 
soon  encountered  in  reality:  the  plant  faced  difficulties  in  the  initial  activity  of 
separating plutonium from the rest of the nuclear waste. It has been reported that 
these problems were partially solved only in 196873. However, despite this positive 
achievement,  India’s  attention  in  1964 was  caught  by the  imminence  of  China's 
detonation which indeed began to trigger the Indian debate74.
When the Chinese blasted a uranium-235 based implosion fission device of 22 
kilotons  on  16th October  1964  in  Lop  Nur,  the  Indian  Prime  Minister officially 
communicated a  shocked reaction the following day in the Lok Sabha75.  On 19th 
October in a radio broadcast Shastri added that such a terrible event would not have 
brought India to emulate China's example76. However, in the following days some 
opposition  leaders,  like  Nath  Pai  of  the  Samyukta  Socialist  Party77,  and  some 
Congress politicians,  like for example the  President of the Delhi Pradesh Congress 
Committee,  Mushtaq  Ahmed,  began to  support  the  idea  of  a shift  in the nuclear 
programme  and  of  equipping India with the same military technology78. Moreover, 
on 24th October  the chairman of  the Atomic Energy Commission,  Homi Bhabha, 
intervened in an All India Radio program, arguing in favour of the deterrent power 
and cheap cost of nuclear weapons79.
It  is  probable  that  this  pressure  coming  from  both  the  Congress  and  the 
opposition parties influenced the Prime Minister, who therefore decided to gather a 
72 Kanwal Kishore Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: a Third World Perspective (Gitanjali Prakashan, 
New Delhi 1980), 39.
73 Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 141.
74 The reference is to the Indian press, where for example, an editorial evaluated the pros and cons of  
the  nuclear  weapons  choice,  in  The  Statesman,  24  August  1964;  while  the  journalist  Inder 
Malhotra already before China's nuclear explosion had called for the necessity to produce Indian 
nuclear weapons, in The Statesman, 9th October 1964.
75 Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 109.
76 Ibid.
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small group of people on 29th October to discuss the Indian reaction. According to 
Perkovich, the External Affairs Minister, the Railway Minister, the Congressman S. 
K. Patil, and Bhabha were the ones who supported the military options, while only 
the  Defence  Minister,  Y.  B.  Chavan,  and  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Minister,  C. 
Subramaniam opposed it80. Therefore, it seems credible that it was on this occasion 
that the Indian governments'  modification of its  nuclear program took place.  The 
option  of  developing the  necessary technology for  exploding nuclear  devices  for 
peaceful  applications  was  thus  chosen  as  the  intermediate  step  India  could  take 
without officially declaring the development of a nuclear arsenal. This latter option 
was probably excluded for its high costs and for its far more controversial character 
that  would  have  triggered  negative  international  reactions.  Instead,  exploding 
peaceful nuclear  devices  would  have  demonstrated  to  the  rest  of  world  India's 
technological capability of firing nuclear devices, and in turn nuclear weapons too.
In  the  following  days  a  debate  also  emerged in  Indian  newspapers:  some 
declared themselves in favour of developing a nuclear arsenal, like Inder Malhotra81, 
and  others,  like  Romesh  Tapar82,  highlighted  India's  great  economic  and  social 
problems, like the food crisis India was facing in those years, as the issues to resolve 
first. On 23rd and 24th November, two days of sharp debate absorbed the Lok Sabha's 
attention, and saw the  Prime Minister intervention in the issue. In his speech the 
Prime Minister restated his position against nuclear proliferation, but also stated: “I 
cannot say that the present policy is deep-rooted, that it cannot set aside, that it can 
never be changed [...] an individual may have a certain static policy [...] but in the 
political field we cannot do so.  [...] If there is a need to amend what we have said 
today, then we will say–all right, let us go ahead and do so”83. With these words he 
therefore opened the possibility to modify the position assumed by the government 
until that time. Shastri made another important announcement some days after,  in 
order  to  face  the continuous  controversies  and  diffused  criticism  about  the 
80 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 70.
81 The Statesman, 30th October 1964.
82 Economic and Political Weekly, 31st October 1964.
83 Shastri, quoted in G. G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book 
Services, 1968), 34.
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government's reticence to order the development of a full nuclear weapons arsenal, 
raised by the opposition parties like the Jan Sangh and the Samyukta Socialist Party, 
and from the same Executive Committee of the Congress Parliamentary Party84. As a 
result, on the 27th November, for the first time, the Indian Prime Minister announced 
India's  consideration  for  the  technological  developments  for  peaceful  nuclear 
explosions, exclusively for mining applications85. These last two speeches were the 
turning  point  in  India's  nuclear  policy:  opening  the  door  for  peaceful  nuclear 
explosions that, as already stated, at the technical level were not much different from 
rudimentary nuclear weapons.
Although this shift toward PNEs was a crucial turning point for India's nuclear 
and political history, it is important to underline that the Indian government did not 
consider  developing  nuclear  weapons:  as clear  evidence  no  plans  for  building  a 
nuclear weapon launch facility were ever formulated. Moreover, opening towards the 
PNE  option  was  included  in  the  ambiguous  approach  India  had  pursued  at  the 
international level until that moment,  without having the need of modifying it too 
much86. From late 1964 India had indeed embarked on an official attempt, which was 
then  continued by the successor of Shastri,  seeking Soviet and American defence 
against the nuclear threat posed by China. Having to resort to nuclear power for self 
defence purposes, Shastri first publicly considered the necessity for such a deterrent 
during his visit  to the United Kingdom in December 1964.  On that occasion the 
Indian  Prime  Minister's  proposal  only  received  mild reactions  from  the  British 
government,  and later only scarce attention by the American government,  and no 
answer from the Soviets87.  The second Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, during which 
Beijing verbally supported Islamabad, and the explosions of other Chinese nuclear 
devices  in  1965 and 1966 further  enhanced New Delhi's  state  of  alarm,  fuelling 
84 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 81.
85 Ibid., 82.
86 Deepa M. Ollapally, “Mixed Motives in India’s Search for Nuclear Status,” Asian Survey 41, no. 6 
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politicians  to call  for  India  to acquire nuclear  weapons88.  The  suspension  of  the 
American aid programme further increased the Indian sense of isolationism, leading 
to an insistent call for international nuclear guarantee. As a result, in his speeches at 
the Lok and Rajya Sabha on 10th and 11th May 1966, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh 
highlighted  the  importance of  an international  multilateral  assurance  provided by 
nuclear powers to non-nuclear states89.  During the spring of  1967, an Indian senior 
civil  servant,  L.  K.  Jha,  was  sent  as  the  Prime  Minister's  personal  envoy  to 
Washington and Moscow to evaluate  the  great powers' dispositions. As a result of 
this insistent effort, in 1967 London officially declared the possibility of creating  a 
structure within  the  UN  that  provided  nuclear  support  to non-nuclear  states. 
However, India refused the British proposal, judging the mechanism too slow to play 
a  concrete role in case of a serious nuclear threat; defining the Soviet or American 
governments  the  only  institutions  capable  of  providing  credible  direct  support90. 
Other clear evidence of this ambiguity is the fact that in 1965 the chairman of the 
AEC, Homi Bhabha, tried to secure American technical support to help India in the 
process  of  acquiring  technological  skills  for  conducting  nuclear  blasts,  as  some 
declassified American documents demonstrate91. From the same American sources it 
is also possible to deduce that the idea of helping India to develop nuclear military 
capabilities was effectively taken into consideration by the American government in 
196492: the clear goal was to counter balance China's power in Asia. However, such 
considerations were definitively rebuffed in 1965 when Washington chose to adopt a 
stricter non-proliferation strategy, as explained in the following paragraph.
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Such a behaviour led commentators, like for example A. G. Noorani, to define 
India's approach as “confuse and inept” on this account93; or to harshly raise criticism 
against the Indian government for its inactivity, like in the case of Itty Abraham94. If 
analysed  in  its  entirety,  India's  approach  to  the  necessity  of  having  Soviet  and 
American nuclear guarantees appeared to be intentionally wavering, and the obvious 
result of the long-standing strategy of ambiguity adopted by New Delhi with respect 
to non-proliferation issues. Feeling threatened by the Chinese nuclear power, India 
wanted to secure on one hand the guarantees of protection from great powers in case 
of a military conflict with China, but on the other wanted to keep the door open for 
developing its own nuclear military technology. As a consequence, it is not surprising 
that after the Chinese blast, New Delhi continued to restate its long standing policy 
of  international  non-alignment,  even  when  calling  for  international  nuclear 
assurance95.
  2.4  The  development  of  India's  nuclear  policy  position  during  Indira  
Gandhi's first government, 1966-1970
To fully understand the development of the Indian position from 1966 to 1971 this 
paragraph will first briefly present the domestic situation and the leadership change 
that took place after the sudden deaths of the Indian Prime Minister and of the AEC 
chairman in 1966, as well as the slow progress of the PNE project until 1968 and the 
controversies  it  arose.  In  parallel,  the  international  developments  in the  non-
proliferation regime generated by the Chinese nuclear explosion of 1964 and India's 
reaction to them will be traced as well.
The sudden deaths of both Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on 11th January 
93 Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” 501.
94 Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, 127.
95 See Foreign Minister's Swaran Singh statements in Hindustan Times, 22nd March, and 22nd May 
1966.
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1966, and AEC chairman Homi Bhabha on 24th January 1966 left India's nuclear 
programme without political and scientific direction. The newly nominated  Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi found herself  taking the rein of the Indian nuclear policy 
alone. The first action Mrs. Gandhi took was naming Homi Sethna, a senior chemical 
engineer working at the Trombay plant, as the new director of the Atomic Energy 
Establishment of Trombay. This was an obvious  choice since Sethna was generally 
considered as the natural successor of Bhabha for that position within that institution.
A controversial  decision  was  instead taken  when  Indira  Gandhi  decided  to 
nominate Vikram Sarabhai, a Cambridge-trained physicist and AEC member, as the 
new chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Despite the high scientific profile 
of the candidate, who had specialised in space research, Sarabhai was not considered 
as  the  natural  successor  of  Bhabha  by  the  scientific  community  working  at 
Trombay96. The new AEC chairman was not only external to the community, but he 
was also  a  declared Gandhian and as  such considered  by Trombay people  to  be 
against nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that Sarabhai, being a scientist, could have 
been totally against the Indian nuclear strategy developed until that moment. It is 
instead very likely that the new AEC chairman did not share the enthusiasm drifting 
in  the  scientific  community  of  Trombay  since  Shastri's authorization  for  a  PNE 
development in late 1964. Ashok Kapur, a political analyser, defined the rationale of 
Indira Ghandi's  decision to nominate Sarabhai, a mere political choice97. According 
to this interpretation, Indira Gandhi named Sarabhai to influence the political games 
and  fortunes  of  her  party in  Gujarat:  obtaining  the  support  of  Sarabhai's  family, 
influential in the state, could have indeed allowed the Congress party to better face 
the political challenge launched by Moraij Desai, who was leading the Congress (O) 
at  the  national  level,  and  who was  a  Gujarati  based  politician98.  The  motivation 
behind this official choice remains unclear still today, because all written documents 
(if any were kept) come under the Indian nuclear policy secrecy. Whatever the reason 
for making him leader of the AEC, the crucial point is that Sarabhai, with his sudden 
96 Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, an Autobiography (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), 75.
97 Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option, 195.
98 Padmanābha Joshī, Vikram Sarabhai, the Man and the Vision (Ahmenabad: Mapin Pub., 1992).
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entrance  as  the  head  of  the  AEC,  probably created  tensions  inside  the  scientific 
community at Trombay. It was no secret that Sarabhai did not share the idea of India 
assuming an aggressive military posture without possessing the necessary means to 
sustain it. In fact, the new AEC chairman made his criticism clear in his speech at the 
press conference on 1st June 1966, when he also underlined the priority of domestic 
considerations, the prohibitive cost of a full-scale development of a nuclear weapon 
programme, and argued that “an atomic bomb explosion is not going to help our 
security”99.
Considering the moderate welcome that the scientific community had reserved 
for Sarabhai,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  new  chairman  was later  accused  of 
suspending  the  PNE project  in  1966.  According  to  the  interviews  and  accounts 
released by some Indian senior scientists like Homi Sethna and Raja Ramanna who 
were working in the Atomic Energy Establishment in Trombay,  Sarabhai's personal 
opposition to the PNE project led him to decide on its suspension in order to freeze 
further funding100. Since no official documentation exists about the Indian decisions 
with regards to that matter, and that Sarabhai died on 30th December 1971, it is not 
possible to know what really happened. However, it is crucial to  remember that K. 
Subrahmanyam, the former Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis 
(IDSA) who had a  personal  relationship  with Sarabahi,  challenges  Ramanna and 
Sethna's  accounts  in  his  memories,  arguing  that  Sarabhai's  personal  inclinations 
towards PNEs were not as negative as reported by them101. Moreover, it is important 
to  consider  that  the Indian  nuclear  programme  was  lagging  behind  the  planned 
developments.  As considered by Shyam Bhatia  and P.  R.  Chari102,  the  optimistic 
declaration released by Homi Bhabha after the first Chinese nuclear explosion, in 
which he had suggested India would be ready to explode a nuclear device in eighteen 
99 Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, 130.
100Kapur,  India’s Nuclear Option, 195; Perkovich,  India’s Nuclear Bomb, 122; Ramanna,  Years of  
Pilgrimage, an Autobiography, 75–6.
101K. Subrahmanyam, “Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964-98: a Personal Recollection,” in Nuclear India, 
by Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1998), 33. 
102P. R. Chari, “Pokharan-I: Personal Recollections,”  Institute of Peaceful and Conflict Studies 80 
(2009): 1.
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months if only wanted,  proved to be unreliable. As a matter of fact, although the 
government had chosen a plutonium based nuclear device, the easiest to build, reality 
shows that in 1966 the availability of plutonium in India was not sufficient to further 
develop the PNE project103. Bhatia indeed affirms that only in 1968 the necessary 
quantity was reached, thus allowing studies on explosive devices to be restored. The 
fact that Ramanna and Sethna did not make any reference to this structural delay of 
the Indian nuclear programme cast doubts on their  accusations that Sarabhai  was 
responsible  for  the  delay  in having  ordering  the  suspension of  the  PNE project. 
Therefore, it seems probable that the scientists preferred to blame Sarabhai to cover 
the  sad  reality  of  the  slow  and  difficult  technological  development  of  the  PNE 
project.
For the same reasons, it is possible to reject another interpretation raised more 
recently  by  Ashok  Kapur:  in  his  book  Pokhran  and  Beyond:  India's  Nuclear  
Behaviour the author claims that the suspension of the PNE project must be ascribed 
to Indira Gandhi104. This hypothesis appears even less credible since Indira Gandhi 
never  officially  repudiated  the  project;  instead  in  1970  she authorised  Indian 
representatives  to  publicly  announce  India's  decision  of  conducting  a  PNE  at 
international conferences, as shown later. Moreover, her personal scarce knowledge 
of nuclear policy and her reliance on her Cabinet to formulate India's position toward 
the Treaty of Non Proliferation also contributed to casting doubt on the possibility of 
Indira Gandhi personally ordering the suspension of the PNE project in 1966105.
The hypothesis  that the Indian scientific  community was simply running late 
103Bhatia,  India’s  Nuclear  Bomb,  141;  Producing instead an  explosive device based  on enriched 
uranium was far more difficult, both at the technological level, and since India did not have the  
possibility to divert it from its plants. Enriched uranium was indeed provided only by the United 
States for the Tarapur plant and it was under IAEA control. Narasimhiah Seshagiri,  The Bomb!:  
Fallout of India’s Nuclear Explosion (New Delhi: Vikas, 1975), 67–68.
104Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond, 138.
105In reality, analysing Indira Gandhi's political career it is possible to argue that she was able to take 
her own independent decisions, like for example about the rupee devaluation, and she had no fear 
of changing her position in politics, as her shift towards the left after the 1967 elections  shows. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  generally  Indira  Gandhi  was  more  focused  on decision 
making to gain political consensus rather than on her personal values. The fact that this news was 
not publicised directly excluded Mrs.  Gandhi from obtaining political  gains  from it,  thus also 
excluding this hypothesis. 
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compared to the plans  announced by Bhabha, and that an official suspension was 
neither ordered by the AEC chairman, nor by the Indian  Prime Minister, is further 
corroborated  by the development  of  India's  international  posture  from 1966 until 
1971. During this period, as the following sections will show, India indeed did not 
show intentions to modifying Shastri's decision to carry out a PNE. It is rather clear 
that India maintained its long-standing ambiguous approach, permitting New Delhi 
to  refuse  the  superpowers'  initiatives  to  reinforce  the  non-proliferation  regime. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of India's position, a brief presentation of the 
superpowers'  will  to  strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation  regime after  China's 
nuclear blast is necessary.
The monopoly of the two main superpowers was broken by the United Kingdom 
exploding its first nuclear device in 1952, by France in 1960, and China in 1964, the 
United States began to be more concerned in preventing other states from equipping 
themselves with nuclear weapons. This led Washington to push for the conclusion of 
an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, in the wave of 
making the climate even more unstable and challenging the already fragile cold war 
deterrent relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. More nuclear-
weapon states would have augmented miscalculation, accidents, tension escalation, 
and nuclear conflict risks, thus reducing security for the whole world. On this basis, 
on 15th June 1965, the UN Disarmament Committee passed the American resolution 
about the  necessity  that  UN  members  would move  at  the  Eighteen  Nation 
Disarmament Conference (ENDC) for formulating a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
treaty106. As a consequence, in late July 1965 the talks on nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation  matters  began  at  the  Eighteen  Nation  Disarmament  Conference 
(ENDC) of the United Nation in Geneva.
International negotiations in Geneva caught the attention of the Indian public 
that began to focus more on the non-proliferation issues, rather than on the necessity 
to  find  a  security  strategy  able  to  respond  to  the  Chinese  challenge.  As  a 
consequence, only a few articles were published during 1966 on the question  as to 
106Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 103.
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whether India had to acquire a nuclear arsenal or not. Not casually, the one published 
by the director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) at that time, 
D. S. Dutt, highlighted the risks India would have  run by beginning an arms race 
with China107. Not even the fact that China in May 1966 tested its first thermonuclear 
explosion,  triggered  particular  reactions  in  India.  Great  domestic  economic  and 
political problems were also occupying India at that time, as already highlighted in 
the  first  chapter,  contributing  to  pushing India's  nuclear  programme  into the 
background.  However,  the  lack  of  public  attention  did  not  prevent  India  from 
pursuing its  commercial  program and to strengthen  international  collaboration.  In 
December 1966 India signed an agreement with the United States and Canada for the 
supply  of  American  plutonium for  research  purposes  108,  while  in  the  following 
month Canada accepted to collaborate for the construction of a second reactor in 
Rajasthan,  RAPS-II109.  Reflecting  the  growing  global  concerns  over  nuclear-
proliferation both the agreements signed included IAEA controls on the use India 
would  have  put  to the  concerned  materials  and  reactors110.  Despite  directly 
experiencing the growing international consensus on non-proliferation, New Delhi's 
approach to the question remained unchanged. The Indian representative in Geneva 
at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), V. Trivedi, restated again 
in 1966 what  had  for years been the position of India: to  demand nuclear weapon 
states eliminating their arsenal first that non-nuclear states had to renounce to acquire 
nuclear  weapons,  and  in  the while  also providing nuclear  security support111.  On 
those occasions  Trivedi  also  informed  the  international  community  of  India's 
opposition to  a  ban that  could have prevented nuclear  explosions,  supporting the 
view that PNEs could indeed be useful also for “economic purposes”112.
However, in 1967 the negotiations in Geneva became more focused on the first 
107Drone Som Dutt, India and the Bomb (New Delhi: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).
108Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 131.
109“Note of the Ministry of External Affairs about the list of Indo-Canadian agreements, undated but  
probably written in 1974” in MEA files, AMS, WII/504/2/74, in National Archives, New Delhi.
110For example, RAPS-I was put only under Canadian inspections, while RAPS-II was under IAEA 
ones. Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond, 162.
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three  articles  of  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty113,  rather  than  on  the  issues  of 
disarmament,  and  of  security  guarantees,  as  the  message  sent  by  the  American 
President Lyndon B. Johnson to the ENDC demonstrates. In this memorandum the 
President  clearly underlined the fact that the United States did not recognise any 
practical differences between a nuclear weapon and a peaceful nuclear explosive, 
restating  again  the  necessity  to  ban  all  the  tests  without  contemplating  vertical 
disarmament114. The non-proliferation test ban treaty saga almost came to an end on 
24th August 1967, when a joint draft treaty was proposed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Notably, the agreement made no reference to security guarantees and 
nuclear disarmament, while instead it made a distinction between the states that had 
exploded a nuclear  device before 1st January 1967 (thus including China),  which 
where then called Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), and the others, named instead Non 
Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). According to the agreement, the first group of 
states  did not  have the right to transfer technology and materials  considered  useful 
for creating nuclear weapons nor explosive devices to the second group; while the 
second kind of states had to accept the safeguards and investigations of the AIEA for 
any nuclear activities aimed at checking any illegal military usage.
Of  course  this  triggered  the  criticism  of  non  nuclear  weapon  states,  like 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden and India, which became even more vocal. Therefore, 
in 1967 the Indian representative Trivedi, restating India's position again, accused the 
nuclear weapons states to have adopted a discriminant and morally unequal approach 
to the question115. Since by that time India's requests were almost unrealistic due to 
negotiations development, the fact that India stressed the disarmament of the nuclear 
weapon states as  a  precondition for signing the NPT, indicates that,  as  noted by 
Bhatia: “New Delhi was preparing the ground for its own ultimate rejection of the 
NPT in order to preserve all its nuclear options, including the development of PNE 
113The final text of the Treaty is available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf (retrieved on 17th 
October 2012).
114Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma, 134.
115Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 134.
196
technology”116. This being New Delhi's main concern, is confirmed by the records of 
the  official,  but  private,  meetings  with  the  Americans  in  which  Indians  directly 
expressed  their opinion117,  and  by  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  Americans in 
evaluating the Indian behaviour at the ENDC118. The fact that on 27th March 1967 the 
new Indian Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla announced at the Lok Sabha that India 
would not accept a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation as had been formulated until 
that time in Geneva seems to have been a direct consequence119. After this decision, 
Indian  representatives did not  however  abandon the conference,  but continued to 
argue for disarmament and international guarantees.
In the following months two specific articles, Article IV and VI, were added in 
order  to  make  reference  to  the  necessity  to  stop  the  nuclear  arms  race,  and  to 
contemplate the need for a full technical cooperation over the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology. Nevertheless, the Indian cabinet unanimously refused to sign120, probably 
also influenced by public opinion polls121. The NPT was endorsed by the General 
Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  in  June  1968,  and  opened  for  signatures  the 
following month. It then came into effect in 1970 with the ratification of 70 states, 
including some of those that had been explicitly against it during 1968, like Sweden, 
Japan and West Germany. Pakistan did not sign the treaty, justifying its decision with 
the argument that India was not a signatory state122.
In  the  meantime,  in  India  by late  1967 the  Atomic  Energy Establishment  in 
Trombay, renamed Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in honour of the father 
of the India's nuclear programme, began to work to solve ongoing problems for the 
construction  of  a  nuclear  explosive,  according  to  the  accounts  of  the  scientists 
116Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 135.
117Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 136.
118“Confidential note sent by Mouser, Department of Near Eastern Affairs and South Asia, dated 8th 
July  1969”  in  Kalyani  Shankar,  Nixon,  Indira  and  India:  Politics  and  Beyond (New  Delhi: 
MacMillan, 2010), 370–372.
119Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 135.
120Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond, 163. According to him the decision was influenced by the reading of 
public opinion polls, which showed a consensus on refusing to sign the treaty.
121Ashis Nandy, “The Bomb, the NPT and the Indian Elites,” Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 
31/33 (1972): 1537–1539.
122India and Pakistan are still today the only countries along with Israel to have not signed the treaty, 
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working there at that time123. Some of the crucial problems to solve were for example 
the plutonium state equation derivation, which explains when it becomes critical and 
thus able to begin a chain reaction, and the realisation of the design for the explosive 
device. Raja Ramanna, together with Rajagopala Chidambaram, later the chairman of 
the  AEC and the  man who presided over  India's  1998 nuclear  explosions,  P.  K. 
Iyengar,  physicist  at  BARC,  and  the  Defence  research  and  Development 
Organisation laboratories began to work on them124. Moreover, in 1970 the scientists 
began to work on the construction of a small experimental Purnima125 reactor to be 
used as a nuclear explosive device, which later became operative in May 1972126. 
According  to  the  BARC  scientists  the  decision,  this  time,  was  taken  with  the 
reluctant  support  of  Sarabhai,  who  did  not  allocate  any  specific  budget  for  the 
project, and did not consult the Prime Minister127. The consensus that was growing 
inside the Indian bureaucratic apparatus is shown by an official  Indian document 
proving that in 1969 a part of the Indian bureaucracy was a fervent supporter of the 
necessity to equip India with nuclear weapons, and to develop missile and submarine 
capabilities to launch medium range nuclear weapons128. This is an important aspect 
since it allows to argue that the decision taken by the Shastri government in 1964 
was supported not only by the following governments, but also by a part of the same 
Indian bureaucratic apparatus.
The new 10-year Indian plan for atomic energy and space research presented in 
1970 called for large investments,  and for the development of space research for 
civilian applications, but did not mention the PNE129. However, in 1970 the new AEC 
chairman  Sarabhai  commissioned  a  study  of  the  cost  of  developing  a  nuclear 
123Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, an Autobiography, 75.
124R. Chidambaram and C. Ganguly, “Plutonium and thorium in the Indian nuclear programme,” 
Current science 70, no. 1 (1996): 25.
125Purmina  is  the acrimonious of  Plutonium Reactor  for  Neutronic investigations in  Multiplying 
Assemblies, and in Hindi means “full moon”.
126Indian Express, 18th May 1994.
127Ibid.
128“Note on Pakistan situation”, undated but probably from 1969 from the analysis of the Pakistani 
situation described in the document, in P. N. Haksar private papers files, III inst., f.  n. 290, in  
NMML, New Delhi. 
129Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, 113–4.
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weapons programme to N. Seshagiri of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 
in order to have an independent opinion. The result of the study was that developing 
a nuclear weapons arsenal would have been too costly for India, but that producing 
and using PNE for engineering purposes was economically possible130.  The study 
provided the basis on which Sarabhai and representatives of the Indian government 
made their interventions for justifying the choice of conducting the PNE. On 2nd May 
1970 the Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, indeed told the Lok Sabha that studies 
about  underground PNEs were ongoing131,  while  on 17th May the AEC chairman 
confirmed that India was not trying to have nuclear weapons, but that it would only 
retain  the  possibility  of  carrying  out  underground  nuclear  tests  for  peaceful 
purposes132. Later, in July 1970 Sarabhai announced that India was almost able to 
conduct underground nuclear explosions, and that exploding a PNE would not have 
been an international violation since New Delhi had not signed the NPT. Lastly, on 
31st August the Indian Prime Minister herself confirmed that technical issues related 
to PNEs were under study by the government133.
The official announcements released in 1970 by the Indian government had two 
consequences. First, it led the public debate during the summer to grow in intensity 
again, dividing between those in favour, like the director of the Termina Ballistic 
Research Laboratory in Chandigarh, Sampooran Singh134, and those against, like the 
head of  the  that  of  IDSA K.  Subrahmanyam's,  who advocated  for  a  much more 
cautious initiative on the line drawn by the Sarabhai plan135. The second even more 
significant consequence, was that the official Indian announcements also alarmed the 
government of the United States. Aware of the probability of India heading towards a 
nuclear explosion, on 16th November 1970 the United States sent an aide-mémoire to 
India in which Washington warned New Delhi that a plutonium nuclear explosion 
130Narasimhiah Seshagiri, The Bomb!: Fallout of India’s Nuclear Explosion (Vikas, 1975), 67-8.
131Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 143.
132Ibid, xi.
133Bhabani Sen Gupta and Cāṇakya Sena, Nuclear Weapons?: Policy Options for India (Delhi: Sage 
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135K. Subrahmanyam, “Options for India,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal 3 
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would have been considered a violation of the Indo-American agreement on nuclear 
cooperation136. However, India answered by rejecting American interpretations of the 
agreements  signed  in  1956  and  1963.  The  Indian  Prime  Minister  informed 
Washington that a PNE would not have meant a legal violation of the Indo-American 
agreements, since the latter did not expressively prohibit PNEs137, as it effectively 
was.
  3. India's nuclear programme in the Seventies and the peaceful  
nuclear explosion in 1974
During the Seventies India continued its technological race to the development of the 
peaceful nuclear device, publicly announcing its intentions to detonate once ready. 
Despite the criticism raised, New Delhi was able to sign another agreement in 1971 
for the continuation of the cooperation with Canada on the two reactors in Rajasthan. 
The 1971 events further fostered an expansion of the domestic consensus concerning 
the  necessity  of  a  nuclear  blast  to  show  national  power  and  technological 
advancement.  As  this  paragraph  will  show,  in  parallel  to  the  resolution  of 
technological  problems  in  1972/1973,  the  Indian  government  faced  a  growing 
domestic political turmoil that had probably contributed to the political decision to 
explode  the  nuclear  device  as  soon  as  scientists  were  ready.  Fired  in  1974,  the 
technological  success  was  also  exploited  for  diverting  the  public  attention  from 
domestic problems, though it triggered also negative international reactions.
136Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, 35.
137Ibid., 36.
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  3.1 Preparations for the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion
During 1971 the awareness that India was heading towards a nuclear explosion grew 
in the West. Indeed, during the summer the Indian Prime Minister again returned to 
the question of nuclear explosions, making a distinction between peaceful nuclear 
explosives and nuclear weapons,  though stating India's  intention  not to  acquire  a 
nuclear weapons arsenal138. In September 1971, the AEC chairman Sarabhai restated 
even  more  clearly  that  Indian  scientists  were  working  on  the  development  of  a 
nuclear explosive at  the Fourth International Conference on the  Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic  Energy  in  Geneva139.  Repeating  the  long-standing  Indian  position  over 
disarmament, Sarabhai seized the opportunity  on that occasion to  remind everyone 
that it was a right his country's to fully explore the potential of nuclear technology for 
peaceful applications, without legally violating international laws.
Notwithstanding  India's  declarations  and  the  growing  concerns of  India's 
partners  like Canada  and  the  United  States,  commercial  interests  prevailed  in 
Geneva. Therefore, a new version of the Trilateral Agreement between India, Canada 
and  the  IAEA was  signed  on  30th September  1971  to  extend  the  international 
collaboration  on  RAPS-I  and  RAPS-II  for  another  5  years, and  to establish  the 
American  provisions  of  heavy-water  conditions  necessary  to  operate  the  Indian 
reprocessing plants140. The only aspect that disclosed Canadian concerns, beyond the 
imposition of IAEA safeguards in place of bilateral ones on RAPS-II, was the letter 
the  Canadian  Prime  Minister  Pierre  Trudeau felt  the  necessity  to  write  to  Indira 
Gandhi on 1st October 1971. In ways similar to the Americans' the year before, that 
letter stated:  “the use of Canadian supplied materials, equipments and facilities in 
India, that is, at CIRUS, RAPP I or RAPP II, or fissile material from these reactors, 
138Times of India, 7th June 1971.
139Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 159.
140It was decided that 460 tonnes of heavy-water would be provided by the United States over the 
following 5 years, but that its use would have been limited exclusively to peaceful purposes in the 
Rajasthan reactor, which was regulated by IAEA safeguards. The new version of the agreement is 
attached to the “Letter from N. Krishnan, Joint Secretary at the UN, to R. Menon, Joint Secretary 
in  MEA,  New Delhi,  dated  26th October  1971”,  in  MEA files,  AMS,  WII/504/6/71,  National 
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for the development of a nuclear explosive device would inevitably call on our part 
for a reassessment of our nuclear co-operation arrangements with India”141. Prime 
Minister Trudeau also reminded them of  the possibility (according to the NTP) for 
India to conduct PNEs with the assistance of a NWS. She responded with a letter to 
the  Canadian  Prime  Minister  dated  12th October  where  she  cordially  refused 
Trudeau's suggestions and argued that there was no need to modify the contents of 
the agreement recently signed in Geneva. Mrs. Gandhi reminded  them  once again 
that India had not signed the NTP, and therefore its rights to conduct in autonomy 
PNEs were still valid142.
Despite India's declaration of  intents,  the  PNE project was only ready to be 
tested by late 1973, when problems that emerged with the production of the neutron 
initiator143 (called Flower) and with the arraying of the polonium were finally solved 
by the scientists144.  As a result, the non-nuclear explosive was  then firstly  tested in 
1973  in  Andhra  Pradesh  by  the  Defence  Research  Development  Organization 
(DRDO) of the Indian Ministry of Defence145, and Pokhran was chosen and prepared 
by the army as the place to detonate the device146. Seshagiri, who was one of the 
scientists working on the PNE project, claims that  Indian scientists were ready  to 
conduct  the  test  by late  1973147.  According  to  him the  moment  was  particularly 
appropriate since the 1973  oil crisis  had just showed the unsustainable situation of 
those states,  among which India,  which were still  largely relying on oil  and coal 
energy, rather than on electricity production from hydrological, thermal or nuclear 
sources148.  The  Indian Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  in  a  conversation  with  the 
American writer Rodney Jones confirmed that: “We did it when the scientists were 
141Wohlstetter, The Buddha Similes: Absent-minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb, 117.
142Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 159–160.
143A modulated neutron initiator is a neutron source capable of producing a burst of neutrons on 
activation. It  is a crucial part of some nuclear weapons, as its role is to "kick-start" the chain  
reaction at the optimal moment when the configuration is prompted critical.
144Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, an Autobiography, 90.
145Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 144.
146Indian Express, 18th May 1994.
147Seshagiri, The Bomb!, 14.
148India’s production of oil is limited by the scarce presence of raw materials. The coal reserves are  
instead larger, but in the Seventies were estimated to be around only 81billion tonnes,  able to 
sustain the energy production for at only 30-40 years. Ibid., 16–23.
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ready”149.
It is interesting to note that while the scientists were working, political interests 
to  test  the device  intensified  for two reasons:  first,  the 1971 events  enlarged the 
political consensus about the necessity to further demonstrate India's power to the 
world; second, domestic political troubles made the government of Indira Gandhi 
even more interested in carrying out the test to divert attention. These two elements 
will be briefly analysed in the following section, in order to better contextualise the 
domestic situation in which the testing of the PNE took place in May 1974.
As already highlighted in the second chapter of this thesis, during 1971 India 
faced the East Pakistan crisis; a fact that contributed to enhancing perceptions of 
insecurity. Despite some overrate the importance of the American symbolic gesture 
of dispatching the nuclear aircraft-carrier150, it is possible to argue that this display of 
power  had  an  important  impact  on  the  Indian  leadership  who  received  the 
confirmation  about  the  necessity  for  demonstrating  India's  nuclear  power  to  the 
world.  As  the  debate  emerged  later  in  the  Indian  parliament  demonstrates,  the 
Enterprise event indeed had a greater impact than when the new Pakistani Prime 
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto announced in 1972 his intention to equip Pakistan with 
nuclear weapons even at the cost of: “eat leaves, or go hungry”151, due to the obvious 
fact that it would have required quite a long time for Pakistan to be ready for the 
production  of  a  nuclear  explosive  device.  The  Indian  press  increased  the 
interventions in favour of nuclear weapons, as the case of Seminar demonstrates: in 
October  1971  an  entire  number  of  the  Indian  monthly  magazine  was  indeed 
dedicated to the issue152. In addition, in 1972 the political pressure to build nuclear 
weapons became even more significant at the Indian Parliament. On 17th March the 
government  was  asked  about  its  strategy  to  counter  the  possibility  that  another 
149Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 175.
150Mariele Merlati,  Gli Stati Uniti tra India e Pakistan: gli anni della presidenza Carter  (Roma: 
Carocci, 2009), 59; Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Hodder, 2010), 105.
151Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Second ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 38.
152Seminar, October 1974, p. 10-13. Almost all the authors, like Major General, D. K. Palit, of the 
Military Academy in Dehra Dun, Romesh Tapar, Major Gen. D. Som Dutt, former director of the  
IDSA, despite slight differences, were in favour of a nuclear weapon in India; with one exception,  
Sugata Dasgupta.
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international  nuclear  blackmail  (as  the  Enterprise) could  be  repeated.  Moreover, 
when the defence budget153 was discussed in May all the parties except for the two 
communist ones called for the necessity to demonstrate India's power through the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons; or at least the demonstration of possessing nuclear 
power  through  peaceful  nuclear  explosions154. On  both  occasions  the  Defence 
Minister, Jagjivan Ram, opposed the pressure and firmly stated India's intention not 
to  develop  a  full-scale  weapon programme155,  but  rather  to  plan  an  underground 
nuclear explosion as soon as possible156.  Again in November 1972, the debate on 
nuclear weapons resurfaced in Parliament, and the government was questioned about 
the progress made in developing nuclear devices for peaceful purposes157.
The developments that took place at the domestic level in 1973 and 1974 also 
provided the Indian political leadership with another reason to finally carry out the 
nuclear  test  in  May 1974:  diverting attention from internal political  problems.  In 
1973  India's government was facing a growing popular discontent triggered by its 
incapacity to carried out the promised socio-economic reforms158. The situation was 
then worsened by unfavourable external factors, like the severe drought of 1972, and 
the 1973 oil crisis explosion, favouring inflation and worsening the financial position 
of India.159. However, the situation worsened even more at the beginning of 1974: in 
January Gujarat erupted in unprecedented mass rioting that forced the imposition of 
153Funding  were  allocated  to  the  Department  of  Atomic  Energy  in  accordance  to  the  10  years 
Sarabhai’ plan: Rs. 105 crores ($141 million) in 1971/1972, and Rs. 126 crores ($163 million) in 
1972/1973. Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 170.
154Link, 7 May 1972. Whoever was was against the development of nuclear weapons before 1971, in 
1972 became favourable, as for example the Swatantra Party.
155Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 169.
156Ibid.
157Ibid., 170.
158Politicians close to the Socialist Forum began to claim for more redistributive policies, as those 
promised by Indira Gandhi during the 1971 electoral campaign, and never realised. Ramashray 
Roy, “India in 1972: Fissure in the Fortress,” Asian Survey 13, no. 2 (1973): 234; The fact that, in 
order to protect her position, the prime minister had promoted politicians with no political base to  
lead state politics in 1972 made these new leaders to became easy targets of internal attacks within 
the Congress, leading to factionalism and to political in turmoil in several states. For example,  
President Rule was imposed in Andhra Pradesh in January 1973, in Orissa in March 1973, in Uttar  
Pradesh in June 1973, and in Gujarat in February 1974. Corruption scandals did not help further 
eroding general mistrust toward politicians and their promises. Bipan Chandra,  In the Name of  
Democracy: JP Movement and the Emergency (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), 23.
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the President’s Rule at first, and then to dissolve the state legislative assembly in 15th 
March 1974160.  Few days later in the state of Bihar,  opposition parties  launched a 
mass agitation  against  the  government,  which  later  assumed  a  national  character 
under  the  guidance of  the  national  Gandhian  leader,  J.  P.  Narayan161.  When  the 
nuclear test was effectively carried out, on 18th May 1974, the largest railway strike 
in the Indian history was  taking place. Railway workers had begun their  national 
strike on 8th May 1974 in order to obtain wages and bonus parity with other workers 
in the public sector, meeting such a high participation to paralyse the country for 
almost  twenty  days.  Furthermore,  when  the  nuclear  device  exploded,  the  Indian 
government  was  violently repressing  the  strike,  arresting  almost  50.000 activists, 
thus  the  justification  of  the  PNE  as  a  diversion  expedient  stands  as  a  found 
hypothesis162.
Therefore,  it  makes  sense  to  argue  that  when the  scientists  informed  the 
government of being ready in late 1973/ early 1974, the government led by Indira 
Gandhi had no reasons to delay the test also due to its growing domestic problems. 
Therefore,  the  opportunity to  kill  two birds  with  one stone  could  have  appeared 
tempting to the Indian Prime Minister, as it often happens in politics when politicians 
try to exploit technological, or foreign policy successes for reinforcing their political 
position in the country.
Therefore, in February 1974 the decision to carry out the test was finally taken. 
As usual with the Indian decision-making process, only few people were involved: 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,  who actually had the last  word;  P.  N. Haksar,  the 
159Prices  of  first  necessity goods  rose  by 13% from 1972 to 1973,  while  in  the  following year 
inflation reached 30%, hitting particularly the poorest  strata of Indian population. Francine R. 
Frankel,  India’s  Political  Economy,  1947-2004:  The  Gradual  Revolution (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 515.
160Ram Joshi, “India in 1974: Growing Political Crisis,” Asian Survey 15, no. 2 (1975): 86.
161Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: 
Pan Macmillan, 2011), 478.
162Also the American intelligence considered domestic politics as one of the political reasons for the 
1974 Indian test. Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 377–379;  For a specific 
analysis of the strike see for example: M. R., “The Fall-Out,”  Economic and Political Weekly 9, 
no. 23 (June 8, 1974): 892–893; Stephen Sherlock, “Railway Workers and Their Unions: Origins 
of 1974 Indian Railways Strike,” Economic and Political Weekly 24, no. 41 (October 14, 1989): 
2311–2322.
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former principal secretary to the Prime Minister; P. N. Dhar, who was the principal 
secretary to the Prime Minister  at  that time;  Dr.  B. D. Nag Chaudhuri,  scientific 
adviser to the defence minister; Homi Sethna, chairman of the AEC after the death of 
Sarabhai on 30th December 1971; and Raja Ramanna, director of the BARC, instead 
of Sethna163.  The Indian defence minister,  Jagjivan Ram, was informed about the 
decision to  explode the nuclear  device only on 8th May 1974,  while  the Foreign 
Minister,  Swaran  Singh,  was  informed  a  mere  48  hours  in  advance164.  Ashok 
Parthasarathy, who was the Prime Minister's scientific advisor in the PMO, reports 
that both P. N. Dhar and P. N. Haksar pledged that the international repercussions 
could  have  been  significant  both  at  the  level  of  the  American  and  Canadian 
cooperation165. However, their opinions were sided by the scientists' euphoria and by 
the pressures Ramanna and Sethna put on the Prime Minister, who clearly made the 
ultimate decision to authorise the test.
  3.2 Pokhran-I and the first national and international reactions
On 18th May 1974 India exploded a nuclear device of 12-kiloton near Pokhran in the 
Rajasthan  desert  107  meters  below ground.  The  experiment  was  named  Smiling 
Buddha, and in literature it is also generally to referred as Pokhran-I, due to the fact 
that in 1998 India carried out other nuclear tests in the same locality. Declaring it as 
peaceful India  maintained  its  long-standing  approach  to  the  nuclear  strategy: 
although possessing the capabilities  of developing a nuclear arsenal, it would have 
refrained from doing that for moral considerations, if not strictly necessary. As this 
paragraph will show,  if  national reactions were of jubilation166, at the international 
level  India  had  to  face  not  only  some  positive  reactions  from  the  non-aligned 
163Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, an Autobiography, 89.
164Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option, 198.
165Ashok Parthasarathy,  At the Core of Technology (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley India, 2007), 
125.
166Chari, “Pokharan-I: Personal Recollections,” 5.
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countries,  but  also  the  strong  and  firm  decision  from  Canada  to  end  all  the 
cooperation  in  the  nuclear  field,  although India had not  legally violated  bilateral 
agreements.  The  government  of  the  United  States  had  a  milder  reaction,  while 
Pakistan responded giving even more impulse to its own nuclear programme.
To confirm the result,  the Prime Minister commented  on  the explosion stating 
that: “This is part of our research and study and we remain deeply committed to the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy.”167, and that, according to the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
that  India  signed  in  1963,  the  experiment  had  been  carried  out  underground168. 
Similarly,  the Atomic Energy Commission confirmed that India did not  intend to 
develop nuclear weapons, and that the  objective of the  peaceful  explosion  was to 
enhance the power status and authority of India at the international level169. Foreign 
secretary,  Kewal  Singh,  also  reassured  the  world  restating  that  India  only  had 
peaceful intentions, and that his country  did: “not  have the economic capability to 
devote  to  military  use”  the  technological  capability  reached170.  The  Indian  press 
reacted with enthusiasm: on 19th May the Times of India was titled “Thrilled Nation 
Lauds Feat”, while the Sunday Standard stated “Monopoly of the Big Five Broken”. 
Similarly, almost all the other major newspapers welcomed the news and celebrated 
the achievement of the AEC as a national result. The nuclear explosion also triggered 
the  positive  reactions  of  those  opposition  parties  which  had been in  favour  of  a 
nuclear explosion for a long time, like the leader of the Jan Sangh L. K. Advani171. As 
a  consequence,  the  nuclear  explosion  also  had some  positive  results for  the 
popularity of the Prime Minister, as some public surveys conducted at the beginning 
of June demonstrate172. Scientist were celebrated by the Indian press as heroes, and 
167Seshagiri, The Bomb!, 7.
168“Record of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi speech at the Lok Sabha on 22nd July 1974, in MEA 
files, AMS, WII/103/27/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
169Washington Post, 19th May 1974. Sen Gupta for example argued that the 1974 explosion was  
carried out to transform India into a regional power,  to support India’s independence from the 
Soviet Union, and to demonstrate India’s power to the United States. Gupta and Sena,  Nuclear  
Weapons?.
170Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond, 397.
171New York Times, 20 May 1974.
172Indian  Institute  of  Public  Opinion,  Monthly  Public  Opinion  Surveys,  19:  8,  1974  cited  in 
Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 180.
207
discussions about the costs went silenced by the words of the Prime Minister who 
highlighted the fact that no specific budget allocation had been made for the PNE173. 
Of course, some were against the action, like for example did George Fernandes, the 
socialist  leader who had led the railway protests against  the government, and the 
Statesman Weekly, which defined the PNE as provocative, and indefensible174.
At  the  international  level  the  first  reactions  to  the  Indian  PNE were  instead 
mixed  and  contrasting.  Telegrams  of  congratulations  expressing  support  to  India 
were  sent  by several  non-aligned countries,  like for  example  Nigeria,  Colombia, 
Argentina,  Panama,  Mexico175.  Positive  comments  were  also  formulated  by 
neighbouring countries Nepal and Bangladesh. This led P. N. Haksar to argue that in 
general the: “non-aligned world as a whole has applauded the competence of  our 
scientists  and  technologists”176.  Also  from the  West  some  voices  were  raised  in 
support  of  the  explosion:  the  warmer  ones came  from France  who  sent  official 
congratulations to India through its Atomic Energy Commission177. Because of the 
adoption  of  a  new international  approach  officially  favourable  to  a  stricter  non-
proliferation  regime,  the  Soviet  Union  could  not  officially  welcome  the  Indian 
explosion, but the fact that it formally accepted the depiction of the blast as peaceful 
was quite important. A further sign of their non-opposition was demonstrated by the 
fact  that  the Indian  Prime Minister  Indira  Gandhi  publicly interpreted  the Soviet 
comments as supportive of India's explosion in her speech released at the Lok Sabha 
on 22nd July 1974178. Also China did not express any formal criticism and initially just 
173Times of India, 28 May 1974. American estimates calculated that the costs of the explosion was 
around $200 million, quite similar to the ones reported by Seshagiri in his book. Seshagiri,  The 
Bomb!,  7  However,  the  official  declaration  of  the  Indian  government  referred  only  to  about 
$400.000. “Telegram from Indian Foreign Secretary, New Delhi to all heads of missions, dated on 
29th May 1974”, in MEA files, AMS, WII/103/20/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
174Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 179 It is interesting to note that in 1998 when India detonated 
five devices without pretending they were “peaceful”, Fernandes was the Defence Minister of the 
Indian government and that he supported the explosions.
175To see all the telegrams expressing support see in MEA, AMS, WII/103/21/74, National Archives, 
New Delhi.
176Parmeshwar  Narain  Haksar,  India’s  Foreign  Policy  and  Its  Problems (New  Delhi:  Patriot 
Publishers, 1989), 193.
177Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 183.
178“Record of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi speech at the Lok Sabha on 22nd July 1974, in MEA 
files, AMS, WII/103/27/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
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remained silent, releasing only some general assurances to Pakistan against India's 
nuclear blackmail in the following months; therefore not directly eroding Sino-Indian 
relations179. Relations between New Delhi and Beijing instead slowly improved in the 
following years, as the demonstrated by the opening of diplomatic relations in 1976, 
which  had  remained  frozen  since  1962.  New  Delhi's  decision  to  appoint  N.  R. 
Narayanan  as  its  ambassador  to  China  on  15th April  1976  was  indeed  soon 
reciprocated by Beijing that sent Chen Chao Yuan as its ambassador to New Delhi180. 
As a result of these slow rapprochements, in 1977 trade relations were also resumed.
However,  elsewhere  reactions  were  far  less  enthusiastic:  as  in  the  case  of 
Canada, the United States, Pakistan, Japan, Sweden and Australia. All these countries 
indeed  officially  equated  the  declared  peaceful  Indian  nuclear  explosion  to  the 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability, and thus blamed India's actions even if in 
quite  different  ways.  Being  conscious  of  the  fact  that  with  high  probability  the 
plutonium utilised by India in the PNE was the one produced in the CIRUS reactor, 
which had been built with Canadian assistance without imposition of any kind of 
safeguards, Canada was the state  that  expressed the strongest  disappointment. On 
22nd May 1974 Canadian Secretary of State Michell Sharp declared India  as a new 
member  of  the  nuclear  club,  since  the  nuclear  explosions  had been  considered 
peaceful181.  As  a  predictable  consequence  all  Canadian  nuclear  aid  was  therefore 
suspended (as well as all the technological cooperation projects to both India and 
Pakistan),  economic  relations  put  under  review,  the  rescheduling  of  India's  debt 
cancelled, and bilateral talks called for July 1974182. The only sector where economic 
assistance was not suspended was the agricultural one, where food aid and fertilizers 
were not discontinued. Canada's reaction was defined as exaggerated by some Indian 
179Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option, 233.
180Norman D.  Palmer,  “India in  1976:  The Politics  of  Depoliticization,”  Asian Survey 17,  no.  2 
(1977): 177.
181The official speech was resumed in “Telegram sent by U. S. Bajpai at the High Commission in 
Ottawa, to Foreign Secretary on 22nd May 1974”, in MEA files, AMS, WII/103/20/74-I, National 
Archives, New Delhi.
182Indian  Express,  21st May  1974;  “Letter  from  Joint  Secretary,  J.  S.  Teja,  to  Indian  Foreign 
Secretary, dated on 2nd July 1974”, in MEA files, AMS, WII/103/20/74-I, National Archives, New 
Delhi.
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commentators183,  since  India  had not  violated any  Indo-Canadian  agreement. 
Moreover, only RAPS-I and RAPS-II  had been put under the IAEA and Canadian 
safeguards. Instead, the CIRUS reactor had not been under international control. As a 
consequence,  in  1974  India  could  have  conducted  underground  PNEs  with  the 
plutonium produced in CIRUS without violating any agreements  nor international 
treaties.
In order to thoroughly understand the Canadian reaction that was to accuse India 
of  betrayal,  two  factors  have  to  be  analysed:  first,  the  domestic  pressures  the 
Canadian government was facing; and second, the fact that Canada was probably 
also trying to hide from its responsibilities. The reaction of the Canadian government 
can be better understood when one considers that the country was in the final period 
of its national election campaign, according to which, elections were fixed for 8 th 
July 1974. The liberal Prime Minister Trudeau was thus particularly vulnerable to 
attacks from the opposition about the liberal policies adopted up until that time in the 
nuclear cooperation with India, and his strong criticism expressed against France not 
signing the NPT184.  Not surprisingly the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, 
and his Secretary of State,  Mitchell  Sharp,  were among those who reacted more 
harshly  to  the  blast185.  The  Prime  Minister  defined  himself  as:  “very,  very 
disappointed”, that India had used Canadian technology: “to explode a bomb”; while 
Foreign  Minister  Sharp  declared  to  be:  “very  distressed  and  concerned”,  by  the 
misuse the Canadian aid by India186.  Although the Foreign Minister Sharp had to 
admit  at  the  beginning  of  June  that  India  did  not  violate  any  agreements  with 
183Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option, 219.
184“Telegram from U. S. Bajpai, HighComm Ottawa, to Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, New Delhi, 
dated  on  25th May 1974”,  and “Telegram from U.  S.  Bajpai,  HighComm Ottawa,  to  Foreign 
Minister, Swaran Singh, New Delhi, dated on 27th May 1974” in MEA files, AMS, WII/103/20/74-
I, National Archives, New Delhi.
185No  further  debate  emerged  after  the  elections,  neither  within  the  liberal  party,  nor  among 
conservatives.  “Letter  from high  commissioner  for  India,  U.  S.  Bajpai,  in  Ottawa  to  foreign 
secretary,  Kewal  Singh,  in  New Delhi,  dated  on  19th December  1974”,  in  MEA files,  AMS; 
WII/103/20/74-II, National Archives, New Delhi.
186“Note of MEA to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, undated, but probably from late June 1974”,  
in MEA files, AMS; WII/103/20/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
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Canada187,  Canadians  repetitively  questioned  India  regarding  which  reactor  the 
plutonium used in the Indian nuclear explosion had come from188.  India officially 
refused to recognise the fact that the plutonium came from the Canadian supplied 
CIRUS reactor, as was actually the case, and they instead argued that it came from 
the  Apsara reactor189. To sustain this version of events, on 1st June 1974 the Indian 
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh made a speech at the High Commission in Ottawa 
where he reminded them that India had not violated international agreements, and 
stated that Canada, the UN and the IAEA had been invited by the Indian chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Sethna, to visit India190. Nonetheless, these 
official  declarations  did  not  convince  Canada:  the  visit  was  refused,  and  the 
government led by Trudeau continued to depict  India's  behaviour  as a “betrayal” 
during the bilateral talks that began in July 1974. At the same time Canada pressed 
the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom  to  strengthen  international  non-
proliferation norms191.
If domestic politics had contributed to the harsh Canadian reaction, it seems also 
evident that Ottawa in its firm and strong reaction tried to officially downplay its 
direct  responsibilities  by  not  forcing  India  to  put  CIRUS  under  international 
safeguards.  Clearly,  economic and commercial interests prevailed over  ideological 
and security  values.  Looked  at  from this  perspective Canada's  moralistic  reaction 
appears to be more formal than substantial. This hypothesis is corroborated by the 
declarations  of  some Canadian  members of the parliament  pronounced a year  after 
India's blast  during the Commonwealth Parliament Meeting on 1st November 1975: 
they justified  Canada's  criticism as  mainly  coming  from the  policy  Ottawa  had 
187 “Report  made by MEA on Canadian  reactions,  dated  20nd July 1974”,  in  MEA files,  AMS, 
WII/103/27/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
188“Telegram from U. S. Bajpai, HighComm Ottawa, to Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, New Delhi, 
dated on 29th May 1974” in MEA files, AMS, WII/103/20/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
189“Telegram from New Delhi to all heads of missions dated on 29 th May 1974”, in MEA files, AMS, 
WII/103/20/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
190“Report  of  the  speech  released  by  the  Indian  Foreign  Minister,  Swaran  Singh,  at  the  High 
Commission of  India in  Ottawa on the  1st June 1974”,  in  MEA files,  AMS, WII/103/20/74-I, 
National Archives, New Delhi.
191“Report  made  by  MEA on  Canadian  reactions,  dated  20nd July  1974”,  in  MEA files,  AMS, 
WII/103/27/74-I, National Archives, New Delhi.
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formally  decided to  adopt  at  the international  level  to  discourage  further  nuclear 
proliferation, rather than as a reaction to India's unexpected betrayal. As a matter of 
fact the conservative Senator Allister Grosart even expressed his personal and total 
understanding for India developing nuclear weapons to face the Chinese threat192, 
while others, like for example the liberal member of the parliament Maurice Dupras, 
showed complete personal indifference with respect to the event193.
Whatever Canada's real motivations were, what is sure is that the suspension of 
the nuclear collaboration with Canada had a considerable cost for India. In a letter 
sent by the Joint Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, J. S. Teja, to the 
Foreign  Secretary  in  New  Delhi,  Kewal  Singh,  indeed  highlighted  the  fact  that 
Canada still had to provide 416 tonnes of heavy-water for RAPS-I and RAPS-II, and 
$16,4 million as a loan in accordance with the agreements signed before 1974194. 
These  provisions  never  took  place,  also  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Indo-Canadian 
collaboration was then definitively ended by Canada in 1976. This created problems 
for India since indigenous production of heavy-water was far from being able  to 
satisfy the needs of the functioning reactors in India in 1974. In fact, although some 
governmental  studies  carried  out  in  1972  claimed  that  by  1979  the  indigenous 
production of heavy-water would have fulfilled requirements, this was not the case: 
the four new enriching water facilities, which had to become operative by 1973-4, 
were de facto completed only in 1978, 1980, and 1985 respectively195. Moreover, the 
ending of Canadian assistance also slowed down the construction of RAPS-II, which 
finally became operative only in 1980196. However, it is also true that the suspension 
of Canadian assistance, as supported by the Indian scientist Seshagiri,  came “at a 
time when Indo-Canadian interaction in the technology was no longer substantial”, 
192“Note from Joint Secretary, J. S. Teja, to Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh, New Delhi, dates 31 st 
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therefore making the form of protest  more symbolic than concrete197.  Indeed, the 
RAPS-II was at a stage that made it possible for Indians to finish it without external 
help, while heavy-water and fuel were available on the international market, even if 
after 1974 they were generally put under IAEA safeguards, as later described.
The official reaction from the government of the United States was not as harsh 
as the Canadian one, especially before the  American  Congress began to officially 
exert  pressure on the  Ford administration  in  1975.  According to  Kux:  “the State 
Department's initial inclination was to criticize the Indian test as a damaging breach 
in the non-proliferation wall”198. However, Kissinger disagreed with the bureaucrats 
and opted for a much milder and neutral wording for officially commenting on the 
event. The necessity to avoid badly influencing Indo-American relations contributed 
to Kissinger's decision; together with the fact that there was no specific leverage on 
which the United States could claim a violation of American agreements199.  As a 
consequence the government of the United States, unlike Canada, decided not to end 
nor suspend their economic assistance to India and confirmed their aid of $29 million 
in June 1974200. In the same month Washington also delivered to India, as promised, 
the enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur reactors.
However,  the reaction of the press was more diverse: for example, Columbia 
Broadcasting simply announced: “Now there are six. India has joined the exclusive 
nuclear club”;  while the  Times expressed its  sadness for the declared non-violent 
India going nuclear; and the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal expressed 
their criticism about the fact that a country as poor as India could become a nuclear 
weapon  state201.  Although  public  opinion  was  largely absorbed by the  Watergate 
scandal which eventually led President Richard Nixon to resign on 9th August 1974, 
the non-proliferation lobby, far stronger among Democrats than Conservatives, began 
197Seshagiri,  The  Bomb!,  8;  Onkar  Marwah,  “India’s  Nuclear  and  Space  Programs:  Intent  and 
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to claim for punishing India as Canada had done. The amendment to the International 
Development  Assistance  Act  that  the  American  Congress  passed  in  August  1974 
should be seen as a direct consequence of the Democratic pressure. It was created to 
assure that  the American representatives at the World Bank would vote against any 
loans  to  those  states  that  had,  and would have,  exploded nuclear  device without 
having signed  the  Non  Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT).  However,  once  again,  the 
American government only partially supported the action:  although the Americans 
generally applied the  measure to India,  they never  pressed other  states  to  do the 
same.  This  legal  measure  therefore  assumed  only  a  partial  symbolic  meaning, 
demonstrated also by its abolition in 1977202.
Nevertheless,  during the summer of 1974 the pressures of the non-proliferation 
lobby203 led the United States'  government to renegotiate with India a new set of 
safeguards and assurances to continue the provision of additional fuel for the Tarapur 
reactors. Through the exchange of several letters, the new Ford administration was 
thus able to reach a new agreement with New Delhi in September: Indians officially 
confirmed that all the material and equipment provided by the United States for the 
Tarapur  power  plants  would  have  been  used  exclusively in  those stations,  and 
nowhere else204. Although not enough to conclude the controversy connected to the 
Tarapur  fuel  provisions,  this  first  step  allowed  the  United  States  to  obtain  the 
reassurance that the Congress was claiming. Another clear example of the  position 
the American administration held towards India was the visit made by the American 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in October 1974. On that occasion he made an 
important  speech at  the  Indian  Council  of  World Affairs  in  which he recognised 
India's  pre-eminence  in  South  Asia  and  wished  the  development  of  a  “mature” 
relationship between the two countries205. According to Perkovich, Kissinger went to 
India with the goal to restrain India from  carrying out other nuclear explosions at 
202Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 184.
203The interdepartmental Under Secretaries Committee, in a National Security Study memorandum 
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least before the NPT Review Conference planned for May 1975, and to ensure India 
would not  export  its  knowledge and nuclear  materials  to  other  countries  without 
following the IAEA regulations206. The American secretary of state also went to India 
with the intention of trying to convince New Delhi to accept the IAEA safeguards for 
all its nuclear reprocessing plants in order to control the production of plutonium. 
Since the latter goal was almost unrealistic, Kissinger was ready to recognise some 
room for the use of plutonium for some: “designated explosives applications”207. That 
this can be considered quite a relaxed and open approach, especially if compared to 
that  of Canada,  is  further  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  Kissinger  offered  its 
congratulations to the Indian Prime Minister for the successful result of the nuclear 
experiment, and called for the opening of peaceful dialogue between the two states208. 
From American declassified documents it seems that in late 1974 India agreed, at 
least, not to export nuclear explosive technology, even if it remained recalcitrant to 
submit all its nuclear activities checking by the IAEA, as the Americans would have 
wished209.
However, shortly after Indo-American bilateral  relations were complicated by 
the American decision to restart their army sales to Pakistan in 1975, and by the 
emergence in the American Congress of a large consensus in strengthening the non-
proliferation  regime,  as  will  be  better  demonstrated  later.  As  it  is  presumable, 
Pakistan reacted with alacrity to India's blast. Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto 
stated that the PNE was a threateningly “fateful development”, and that Pakistan was 
determined not to remain in a position exposed to India's potential blackmail210. As a 
sign of protest Pakistan then cancelled the talks with India scheduled for June 1974 
to  normalize  their  telecommunication  relations,  though  they  were resumed  in 
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September. In order to calm the situation down, Indira Gandhi sent a letter to the 
Pakistani  Prime  Minister  in  which  she  explained  that  India  had no intentions  to 
develop nuclear military capabilities and that India: “remained committed to settle all 
our differences with Pakistan peacefully through bilateral negotiations in accordance 
with the Simla Agreement.”211. Bhutto predictably answered underlying the fact that 
there were no distinctions between a military or a peaceful nuclear experiment, and 
thus requesting international guarantees from nuclear weapon states212. It is possible 
to argue that India's PNE surely had the effect of reinforcing the Pakistani decision to 
acquire nuclear weapons, which had however already been taken two years before, in 
the  wave  of  the  1971  Indo-Pakistani  war  and  of  Bhutto's  rise  to  power213.  New 
nuclear  plans  were  indeed  released  in  Pakistan  in  October  1974,  while  on  18 th 
October a new agreement was signed with France for the construction of a plutonium 
reprocessing plant  in  Chashma214.  At last,  it  is  probable that  India's  nuclear  blast 
contributed indirectly to reinforcing Pakistan's call for a revocation of the American 
ban on conventional military sales; a measure imposed on Islamabad and New Delhi 
during the 1965 war. This  can be confirmed by the letter Bhutto sent to president 
Nixon already on 24th May 1974.  On that occasion,  the Pakistani Prime Minister 
seized the opportunity to threaten the United States with the possibility that Pakistan 
would also have embraced nuclear anarchy, if nuclear weapon states failed to provide 
them  with  nuclear  guarantee  and  protection215.  The  possibility  of  granting the 
removal of the ban to soften Pakistan was considered by the Untied States, as  is 
further confirmed by the State Department's analysis of possible American reactions 
to India's PNE, which in fact suggested to: “ease our arms supply policy to permit the 
enhancement  of  Pakistan's  defensive  capability...  [in  order  to]...  steady  Pak 
nerves”216.  As  a  result,  in  February 1975,  following  Bhutto's official  visit  to  the 
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United States, Pakistan saw the removal of ban on the sale of weapons. The United 
States announced that, in exchange for the guarantee that nuclear weapons would not 
be developed, they were ready to provide $100 million in conventional arms217.
The other states that also officially reacted to India’s PNE were: Australia, whose 
reaction remained however cautious; Japan, which adopted a formal resolution of 
protest against India and cut its bilateral aid218; and Sweden, which instead expressed 
its  serious concerns for horizontal nuclear proliferation. The latter  also seized the 
opportunity to blame the great powers'  behaviour for not  having done enough to 
begin the nuclear disarmament, as sanctioned in the VI Article of the NPT.
  4. The long-term effects of operation Smiling Buddha
Beyond these immediate reactions and effects, India's PNE also had significant long-
term  effects  on  the  international  non-proliferation  regime,  which  was  indeed 
reinforced by the publications of the Zangger committee's understandings, and by the 
foundation of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). As this paragraph will show, the 
effects on the Indian domestic political situation were instead minor, and operation 
Smiling  Buddha could  do  little  to  contain  the  erosion  of  the  popularity  of  the 
government led by Mrs. Gandhi. During 1974 and 1975 the Prime Minister and her 
government became even more challenged by the national protest movement led by 
J. P. Narayan, which was contrasted only in June 1975 through the imposition of the 
national  Emergency laws;  a  measure  that  allowed  the  Prime  Minister  to  assume 
217The offer was not a grant, and had to be paid by Pakistan in cash, as effectively he later did.  
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almost dictatorial  powers. The long-term international effects of the 1974 nuclear 
explosion on India's nuclear programme will be evaluated in the second part of this 
paragraph.
  4.1  The  reinforcement  of  the  non-proliferation  regime  and  the  
deterioration of the domestic political situation in India
International efforts to limit nuclear proliferation were already proceeding on their 
own when India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974. For example, on 3 rd July 
1974, two months after the explosion, on the wake of the Non Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT),  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  reached  an  agreement  to  limit 
underground nuclear  weapon testing beyond a yield of 150 kilotons,  although its 
implementation only began after 31st March 1976219. In 1975 instead the first NPT 
review conference was planned to bring all signatory states together to evaluate the 
treaty  measures  and  objectives.  Nevertheless,  as  argued  by  Perkovich:  “India's 
nuclear test prompted an intensive tightening of the international non-proliferation 
regime”220, especially with respect to the horizontal proliferation.
The first evident reaction towards the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion of May 
1974 was the fact that the Zangger committee221 finally reached an agreement in June 
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1974.  Even  if  a  common  understanding  had  been  reached  in  1972  between  the 
nuclear supplier states, in the months that followed India's PNE the discussions were 
accelerated and brought to a first conclusion. The Zangger committee reached the 
definitive  agreement  over  the  trigger  list of  material  and  equipment  considered 
dangerous because they could be not only for civilian usages, but also to produce a 
nuclear weapon. When those materials were sold IAEA safeguards had to be imposed 
on the purchaser state222. As a consequence, on 22nd August ten member states wrote 
identical letters to the Director General of the IAEA stating their intentions to act in 
accordance  to  the  common  understanding  reached  during  the  meetings  of  the 
Zangger  committee,  thus  promising  not  to  export  the  materials  included  in  the 
trigger  list to  non-nuclear  states  if  the  receiving  state  did  not  accept  IAEA 
safeguards223. The outcome was that the Zangger committee's agreement was then 
published by the IAEA in September 1974 in a document INFCIRC/209224 that was 
circulated among all the state members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
In the document INFCIRC/209 therefore, two memorandum reported the Zangger 
committee's understanding. The first defines the two categories of nuclear material 
that  should  require  the  application  of  the  IAEA safeguards:  natural  or  depleted 
uranium and thorium; and special fissionable material, such as plutonium (Pu-239), 
uranium (U-235), and enriched uranium (U-233). The second memorandum lists the 
plants, equipment, and material that should be subjected to IAEA inspections and 
safeguards,  like  for  example:  “the  nuclear  reactors,  non-nuclear  materials  for 
reactors, reprocessing, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, heavy-water production, 
and  the  conversion  of  uranium  and  plutonium.”225.  The  publication  of  the 
INFCIRC/209 document was an important step even though it was not binding for 
the  IAEA members  or  for  the  Zangger  committee  members.  In  fact,  it  laid  the 
foundation on which future nuclear bilateral  agreements between nuclear supplier 
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states and the non-nuclear states would likely be shaped. Since India exploded its 
first nuclear device only after 1st January 1967 – the date the NPT recognised as the 
divide between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), and Non Nuclear Weapons States 
(NNWS) – it was not recognised by the Zangger committee's understandings as a 
NWS, despite the Indian explosion of May 1974. This of course directly affected 
India's  nuclear  activities  from 1974 onwards  since  all  the  nuclear  supplier  states 
began to require the respect of the Zangger understandings, as later will be shown 
later.
However, India's peaceful nuclear explosion had another more important impact 
on  the  development  of  the  non-proliferation  policies.  The  1974  Indian nuclear 
explosion  indeed  led  the  United  Kingdom and  the  United  States  to  seek  further 
reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime regulated by the NPT and the Zangger 
committee. In order to understand this development, the specific American domestic 
situation  has  to  be  analysed  to  fully  appreciate  the  long terms  effect  of  Smiling 
Buddha.
Despite  the mild reaction of  the American government  to the Indian blast,  a 
small group within the Congress became active in calling for tougher measures to 
correct the previous American policy of promoting nuclear power in the world. What 
was known as the Atoms for peace strategy, became perceived by them as a potential 
great danger for the entire world226. In parallel, the idea that the United States had to 
restrict its policy of nuclear exports began to acquire even more consensus inside the 
State Department, even though the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger continued to 
sustain it227. American declassified documents reveal indeed that in 1975 the United 
States, despite India's announcements against further explosions, considered a second 
Indian nuclear explosion a probable and dangerous step. Such an event would have 
precipitated the Indo-American and Indo-Canadian relations, as well as embolden 
Bhutto's  plans  to  modernize  the  Pakistani  army228.  As  a  consequence  of  the 
contrasting  pressures  made  on  the  one  hand  by  the  Congress  and  the  State 
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Department, and on the other by the Ford administration, in 1975 Washington began 
to  internationally  behave  with  the  clear  intention  of reaching two  goals.  Firstly, 
developing a stricter non-proliferation regime that could impede the Non Nuclear 
Weapon States  recognised by the NPT to continue their  cooperation with certain 
nuclear supplier states.  Like for example France, which until that time had not yet 
begun to require the imposition of the IAEA safeguards on their exports. Secondly, to 
keep  the dialogue  with  India  open,  without  suspending  nuclear  cooperation,  but 
rather trying to press them  to  adhere as much as possible to the new international 
non-proliferation regime.
The first  American strategy mentioned above saw the British and Americans 
making common efforts from as early as 1975 to promote a series of conferences 
about non-proliferation that also included those states such as France, West Germany, 
and Japan, which were not part of the NPT at that time, but nevertheless exported 
nuclear  materials229.  The  aim  was  to  refrain  France  and  West  Germany  from 
continuing the cooperation initiated with Pakistan, North Korea and Brazil, and to 
diminish the risk of horizontal proliferation. In 1975 therefore the United Kingdom – 
which was also the permanent secretariat  of the Zangger committee – invited six 
other  nuclear  suppliers230 to  several  conferences  in  London  to  discuss  how  to 
reinforce the non-proliferation regime231. The meetings of these six nuclear supplier 
states, called the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG or more ironically the London Club), 
contributed to the definition of those guidelines that were later published as IAEA 
Information  Circular  INFRCIRC/254232 in  February  1978.  These  guidelines  were 
almost the same as those identified in the common understandings produced by the 
Zangger committee in 1974, thus including a trigger list of the material that would 
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have required acceptance by the NNWS of the IAEA safeguards on its territory and 
nuclear activities. The only notable difference that justifies the NSG was the fact that 
it included statements in the non-proliferation regime that were not part of the NPT: 
thus precluding NNWS non-signatory states like Pakistan and India, to by-pass the 
IAEA safeguards  buying  nuclear  material  and  technologies  from  non-signatory 
nuclear  supplier  states  from  the  NPT,  like  France  for  instance233.  Since  France 
participated in the NSG and accepted its conditions234, by 1977 the international non-
proliferation regime became significantly more stringent, rendering imports/exports 
of nuclear material, equipment, and technology almost completely controlled by the 
IAEA.  China  indeed  remained  the  only  recognised  Nuclear  Weapon  State  that 
refused the non-proliferation regime until much later. It did, in fact, only sign the 
NPT in 1992, and became a member of the Zangger committee in 1997, and of the 
NSG in 2004. 
Although the United States made efforts to develop the NSG and to make the 
nuclear non-proliferation policies more stringent, the American administrations also 
worked to maintain Indo-American relations, and not to worsen them. It is possible 
to argue, as Perkovich does, that American policies towards India in the wake of the 
1974 PNE reflected the Realpolitik view: expansion of nuclear weapons was in some 
way inevitable in large states like India, and that therefore the United States did not 
want to needlessly erode bilateral relations235. The fact that in a memorandum sent in 
August 1975 by the American State Department to Kissinger that suggested to the 
Secretary of State to approach the issue of the Indian nuclear programme keeping in 
mind that: “our basic policy of not pressuring the [Government Of India] GOI on 
their nuclear explosive program.”, clearly demonstrates this intention236. The letter 
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was sent in preparation for a meeting between the Secretary of State and the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs, Y. B. Chavan, who visited the United States in early 
October 1975. As a consequence, at least until Indira Gandhi remained in power, the 
United States administration did not directly put any specific nor direct pressure on 
India to discontinue its  nuclear weapons programme, even if  not in favour of its 
development.
However, the American administration also had to face the American Congress' 
more incisive anti-proliferation approach.  According to  Brenner,  India's  blast  was 
indeed  a  catalyst  in  transforming:  “official  U.  S.  thinking  about  the  dangers  of 
nuclear  proliferation”237.  As  a  result,  within  a  few years  the  American  Congress 
began to claim safeguards on  all  the nuclear activities of the importer state, going 
thus  far  beyond  international restrictions  adopted  by  the  NSG.  These  pressures 
directly  influenced  the  Ford  administration  that  replaced  the  American  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  with  the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  (NRG).  When 
formed,  this  new  body  decided  to  suspend  the  American  fuel  provisions  to  the 
Tarapur reactors in India, while taking the time to make a deeper analysis of the risks 
attached to the delivery238. Of course this triggered  an annoyed reaction  from India 
that denounced the question as an American violation of the agreement signed in 
1956, according to which Washington had a contractual obligation to supply enriched 
uranium (U-233) to Tarapur reactors in India. As a consequence, during the spring of 
1976 the Indian government, when questioned in Parliament, answered that it was a 
domestic controversy of the United States,  and that it  was waiting to see how it 
would evolve239.  In  1976 the NRC works  were therefore  suspended by the  State 
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Department in order to try solving the situation without  too much damage to Indo-
American relations. It was therefore decided to discuss the issue related to the future 
of the spent fuel produced in Tarapur, which the United States began to demand back, 
directly with the Indian government 240.
The pressures wielded by the Democrats in the Congress pushed, however,  the 
administration to declare in 1976 that the American heavy-water, which had been 
provided to India in 1956, had probably been used by India in the CIRUS reactor for 
producing the plutonium (Pu-239) later utilised in the 1974 PNE241.  This admission 
further triggered heated reactions in the American Congress in June 1976. As a result 
the  Symington  Amendment  for  the  Foreign  Assistance Act  was  approved:  it 
introduced the  concept  of  sanctions  as  punitive  actions  which could  have  taken 
against  states  violating  international  norms  on  nuclear  non-proliferation242.  The 
amendment  indeed  prohibited  American  economic,  and  military  assistance,  and 
export credit to those countries that had acquired, or would have acquired, delivered, 
or  transferred nuclear  technology  without  accepting  IAEA safeguards  on  all its 
facilities243. The amendment became effective only after 4th August 1977, effectively 
forbidding Washington from exporting nuclear material not only to India or Pakistan, 
but also to France, which was also one of the principal targets of the amendment in 
order to avoid its reselling of material to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Amendment left 
a margin of flexibility to the government, since it gave the President of the United 
States the right to to authorise by-passing the law in case vital American interests 
would  be  damaged and the  country concerned provided reliable  guarantees.  This 
effectively had been the  case of  following American exports to India, Pakistan and 
also Israel.
Later  in  1977,  as  a  consequence  of  public  pressure,  the  same  American 
presidential  campaign  saw Gerald  Ford  and  his  challenger  Jimmy Carter  slowly 
240Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation, 52–3.
241Paul F. Power, “The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy,” Asian Survey 19, no. 6 (June 1, 1979): 
580.
242The  Symington  amendment  derives  its  name  from the  Senator  Stuart  Symington.  Perkovich, 
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assuming similar  positions  on  the  non-proliferation  issue,  both  favouring  another 
strengthening  twist  on  controls.  As  an  outcome  during  that  year,  the  American 
government officially became even stricter on nuclear proliferation issues: enacting 
the  Glenn Amendment  to the Foreign Assistant Act in 1977,  India was threatened 
with the stoppage of  all nuclear cooperation in case  they exploded another nuclear 
device244. Only when the new Indian Prime Minister, Moraji Desai, soon after his rise 
to  power,  declared  that  India:  “does  not  consider  any  more  nuclear  explosions 
necessary for peaceful uses”, the fuel provision for Tarapur was restarted245. In 1978 
the Congress continued in its efforts in restricting proliferation risks, and passed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), which merged the Symington and the Glenn 
Amendments  with the  NSG  rules,  and  effectively  required  IAEA  full-scope 
safeguards on all the facilities of the country that imported not only nuclear materials 
and equipment, but also technology from the United States246. Although the NNPA 
gave  eighteen  months  of  time  to  recipient  countries  to  renegotiate  their  bilateral 
agreements with the United States, it immediately reopened the question about fuel 
provisions for Tarapur, transforming it into a legal and political battle between New 
Delhi and Washington. Despite India's refusal of the full-scope safeguards, uranium 
was still supplied both in 1978, thanks to the direct intervention of president Carter, 
and in 1979 because of the same decision made by the NRC247.
Sharply  shifting  the  focus,  the  long-term  effects  of  the  Smiling  Buddha 
experiment  on  the  domestic  Indian  situation  was also  not  as positive  as  Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi probably wished when she authorised the explosion in early 
1974. The benefits of the 1974 PNE were indeed short-lived: even if in May 1974 the 
government  enjoyed  a  slight  growth  of  public  opinion  support,  this  enthusiasm 
244The Glenn Amendment,  which derives  his  name by Senator  John Glenn,  like the Symington, 
empowered the American President to waive the law in case of national interests. Ibid., 343.
245Times of India, 13th July 1977.
246 “Note from Indian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Secretary, dated on 27 th May 1977”, in 
MEA files, AMS, WII/504/3/77-II, National Archives, New Delhi. 
247Noorani,  “Indo-U.S.  Nuclear  Relations”;  Later  France  accepted  to  continue  the  provisions  of 
enriched uranium until 1993, when China became the supplier until India tested others nuclear 
devices in 1998. From 2000 and onwards Moscow is supplying enriched uranium to India, despite 
American criticism. Banerjee and Sarma, Nuclear Power in India: A Critical History, 37.
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quickly vanished by September 1974  248.  Soon after the explosion  Indira Gandhi's 
government saw the domestic problems it had been facing since late 1973 continue to 
worsen. In October 1974 opposition parties, like for example the Jan Sangh, the rival 
wing  of  the  Congress,  and  the  Socialist  party,  indeed  formed  the  National 
Coordination Committee, while J. P. Narayan called instead for a: “total revolution”. 
The protest thus assumed a national character and began to directly challenge the 
national government led by Indira Gandhi249. On 12th June 1975 the powerful position 
held by Mrs. Indira Gandhi was then critically challenged by the Allahabad High 
Court sentence that claimed that her election at the Lok Sabha should be revoked due 
to  supposed corrupt  practices adopted  during the  electoral  campaign in  1971.  In 
reality, the Prime Minister was only found guilty for two minor violations of the law, 
but  these  were  judged  by the  court  as  serious  enough  to  debar  her  from active 
political life for the next six years. Indira Gandhi  still  had the option  of requesting 
that the Supreme Court responded to the Allahabad High Court's sentence; however 
in case her recourse failed, she would have had to resign from her Prime Ministerial 
position.  Considering  these  options,  and evaluating  the  eroded political  situation, 
aggravated by the  defeat of Congress at the Gujarat elections in June 1975, Indira 
Gandhi coldly decided to take no further risks. Therefore, on the evening of the 25th 
June  she  asked  President  Fakhruddin  Ali  Ahmed  to  proclaim  a  national 
Emergency250.  The  President's  signature  marked  the  transformation  of  India's 
democracy in a dictatorial regime.  On the morning of the following day, the Prime 
Minister  and  her  cabinet  authorised  the  arrest  of  a  large  number  of  opposition 
members, and others within the Congress party who were considered hostile to the 
government.  Therefore,  J.  P.  Narayan,  Moraji  Desai  and  thousands  of  other 
248Indian Institute of Public Opinion, Monthly Public Opinion Surveys, 19: 8, May 1974; and Indian 
Institute  of  Public  Opinion,  Monthly  Public  Opinion  Surveys,19:  11,  August  1974  cited  in 
Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 560–563.
249Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 535.
250For  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  domestic  event  it  is  possible  to  consult  for  example:  
Michelguglielmo Torri,  Storia dell’India (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2007), 679–682; Frankel,  India’s  
Political Economy, 1947-2004, 536–580; B. G. Verghese,  First Draft: Witness to the Making of  
Modern India (New Delhi: Tranquebar, 2010); Chandra, In the Name of Democracy; Guha, India 
After Gandhi.
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opponents  were  sentenced to  jail251.  The  proclamation  of  the  Emergency  gave 
unlimited power to the government which suspended fundamental human rights, and 
the authority of the state governments, censured the press, and banned twenty-six 
political organisations. Although the Emergency was officially followed by calls to 
introduce innovative policies to promote social, agricultural and economic  growth, 
the results were quite limited. This ineffectiveness was clearly admitted in late 1976 
when  official  documents  circulated  in  the  Prime  Ministerial Office  urging  the 
government to stop the Emergency period252. When in early 1977 the Prime Minister 
finally agreed to end the Emergency regime, it was too late for Indira to recover from 
popular  hostility.  General  elections  in  March  1977  brought  the  coalition  of  the 
opposition parties to power, clearly punishing Indira Gandhi and the Congress for the 
abuse of power perpetuated during the Emergency.
As  these  events  clearly  demonstrate,  Pokhran-I  only  triggered  temporary 
enthusiastic reactions, but had short-time effects at the domestic level, thus doing 
very little to adverse the erosion of the political popularity of the Indian government. 
Different  instead  was  its  impact  on  the  international  arena:  here  the  entire  non-
proliferation regime was reorganized by concerned great powers and nuclear supplier 
states. What this meant for India and for its nuclear program will be shown in the 
next paragraph.
  4.2 The impact of the new non-proliferation regime on the development of  
India's nuclear programme
In order to highlight the long-term effects of the new non-proliferation regime, this 
paragraph will first provide an analysis of the posture India assumed after the nuclear 
explosion of 1974. By maintaining of the long standing ambiguous Indian approach 
251Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004, 546.
252“Note on general situation in India in 1976”, undated, in Haksar private papers, I & II inst., f. n.  
57, in NMML, New Delhi.
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to  the nuclear  non-proliferation regime,  India's  nuclear  programme  began to  face 
several problems that  slowed its development. As a consequence, it will be shown 
that New  Delhi  opted  to  invest  more  in the  indigenous  development  of  the 
programme, and to diversify its international collaboration thus enlarging its nuclear 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. The only positive outcome of the strengthening 
of the non-proliferation regime was that it also relented Pakistan in acquiring nuclear 
weapons.
Although on 22nd July 1974 the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assured the 
Lok Sabha that India would not: “accept the principle of apartheid in any matters and 
technology is  no  exception”253,  after  the  forced  implementation of  the  new non-
proliferation  regime,  India  and  the  other  NNWSs  found  more  difficulties  in 
continuing their  civilian  nuclear  programme  without  accepting  IAEA safeguards. 
Even if the new non-proliferation regime was strongly accused by India and the other 
non-aligned countries, as an interference in their sovereignty, the situation did not 
change.
India's  approach  to  the  new  international  nuclear  non-proliferation  regime 
remained the same as before the Smiling Buddha operation. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, the government considered the operation to be concrete proof of India's 
capabilities of producing nuclear weapons,  but not a departure from the approach 
India  had  adopted until  that  time  in  regard  to  nuclear  weapons  and  the  non-
proliferation regime254. As a consequence, although the Indian scientists had assumed 
that Pokhran-I would only be the first step of a series of experiments, as had been the 
case for all the other countries that had been considered as Nuclear Weapons State by 
the NPT255, the Indian government led by Indira Gandhi refused to continue to test 
nuclear devices256. This was in accordance with the long-standing Indian position of 
refraining from developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. It has been reported that the 
personal  relationship  between  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  scientists cooled  after 
253Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 187.
254“Telegram  sent  by  American  Ambassador,  Moynihan,  New  Delhi  to  Secretary  of  State,  
Washington, dated on the 19th June 1974”, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents 
on  South  Asia,  1973-1976,  published  by  the  U.  S.  Department  of  State  website 
http://www.state.gov (retrieved on the 12th November 2012).
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Pokhran-I,  and  that  Mrs.  Gandhi  herself  developed moral  doubts  about  nuclear 
weapons257. Raja Ramanna states that after the 1974 explosion: “Mrs. Gandhi said: 
'No more, that's it'”, while Homi Sethna confirms that Indira Gandhi ordered them to 
proceed with other  explosions only after her  approbation,  which ultimately never 
came258. Moreover, during the whole Emergency period the same nuclear topic was 
scarcely considered and analysed by the national press and the Indian public, which 
was  more  focussed  on  the  economic  and  political  domestic  problems  of  the 
country259.
Nevertheless, India did not modify its long standing ambiguous approach toward 
the nuclear issue, and the fact that it refused to sign the NPT, and to accept full-scale 
safeguards on its nuclear facilities, had quite tough repercussions on the development 
of the Indian civilian nuclear programme as well. According to Banerjee and Sarma, 
the  end  of  the  Canadian  cooperation,  and  the  growing  problems  linked  to  the 
American provisions of nuclear fuel “seriously affected the Indian nuclear  power 
programme  making  it  difficult  to  import  necessary  materials  which  stalled  and 
almost killed the nuclear power programme”260.
In order to react to this adverse situation New Delhi strengthened its efforts in 
building  indigenous  nuclear  power  stations  for  producing  electricity  and  heavy-
water,  and  enlarged  its  international  cooperation  with other  states  that  were 
historically  less  important  for  India.  As  a  result,  two  200MW  reactors  were 
indigenously built at the Madras Atomic Energy Establishment (MAPS-I and MAPS-
II) at Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu which became operative in 1984, as well as the two 
reactors  at  Narora  (NAPS-I  and  NAPS-II)  in  Uttar  Pradesh  which  began  their 
255The estimates provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report that in May 
1974, before India exploded its  nuclear  device,  the United States made 744 nuclear  tests,  the 
Soviet  Union  398,  the  United  Kingdom  26,  France  54,  China  15.  “Appendix  8B.  Nuclear  
Explosions, 1945–2009”, p. 6, in SIPRI Yearbook 2010 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 
available  online  at:  http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/08/08B (retrieved  on  17th November 
2012).
256The Hindu, 19th May 1974. Only in 1998 India would have exploded other nuclear devices. 
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operations in 1989261.  In parallel,  New Delhi also turned its attention to its  long-
standing closer ally for the provision of conventional arms, the Soviet Union, which 
had  cooperated  with  India  in  both  the  nuclear  field  (since  1961)262,  and  space 
research  (from  1963/64)263.  In  September  1976  Moscow  agreed to  provide  200 
tonnes of heavy-water,  without  even requiring an immediate  signing of an IAEA 
agreement. As a result, the first 25% of the material was shipped to India by the end 
of the month without imposing safeguards264.  However, soon after, also the Soviets 
began to  press India to accept IAEA safeguards on the reactors where their heavy-
water would have been used.  With no other choice left,  in the summer of 1977 the 
Indian government agreed to accept specific IAEA safeguards on the Soviet heavy-
water provided, thus freeing up Soviet deliveries265. Despite official denial, after that 
date it has also been reported that several tonnes of heavy-water had been illegally 
imported by India from Norway, China and the Soviet Union266.
It is reasonable to argue that the decision taken by New Delhi not to adhere to 
the NPT, and thus not to accept full-scope safeguards contributed to the fact that still 
today nuclear production of energy in India is prominently limited to only 2.5% of 
the total energy consumed in the country267. The only positive outcome India faced 
was that new international controls and limits to nuclear weapons proliferation had 
also hit Pakistan, relenting its nuclear programme268. The new rules set up during the 
1975-1978 meetings of the Nuclear  Supplier  Group especially affected Pakistan's 
261Ibid.
262In 1972 the Soviets had already agreed to sell India 80 tonnes of heavy-water.
263See for example the “Report sent by Captain Al Bery on arms supplies for India, dated on 27 th 
February 1975”, which lamented the high Indian dependency on the Soviet Union supplies, in 
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nuclear  programme.  As a  consequence,  from late  1975 France started to  demand 
more safeguards for the  Chashma reprocessing plant,  which was then indeed put 
under IAEA inspections in February 1976. Moreover, following continuous pressures 
from the  United  States,  offering  Pakistan  aircraft  in  exchange of  the  end of  the 
cooperation269, France finally revoked its cooperation with Pakistan by 1978270. This 
resulted in Islamabad developing its  nuclear programme “underground” from that 
moment  onwards,  renouncing the  production of  nuclear  weapons from the easier 
plutonium path. The enriched uranium path was therefore chosen, since it was less 
easily traced than plutonium by international controls, even if it was technologically 
more complex to produce a nuclear weapon from it271. The switch to the enriched 
uranium technique for producing nuclear weapons was facilitated by the decision 
taken by a Pakistani metallurgist, A. Q. Khan working for a Dutch engineering firm, 
FDO,  a  major  subcontractor  of  the  European  Uranium  Enrichment  Company 
(URENCO), to leave the Netherlands and return to Pakistan. Khan brought with him 
a copy of the plans for the URENCO ultracentrifuge enrichment plant that allowed 
the technological start of enriching uranium plants in Pakistan. In parallel, Islamabad 
also  began  a  massive  clandestine  effort  to  internationally  acquire  the  necessary 
materials and components to build a plant, which was then officially started in July 
1976272.  According  to  American  declassified  documents273,  it  seems  clear  that 
Pakistan approached China in order to acquire the necessary technology for enriching 
uranium and building the explosive device, and that Bhutto's visit to Beijing in May 
1976  was  probably  done  for  this  purpose.  From  recently  declassified  Indian 
documents it is possible to argue that India was also conscious of the crucial role 
China  was  playing  in  helping  and  supporting  the  development  of  the  Pakistani 
269“Letter from First Secretary, K. V. Rajan, in Indian Embassy in Washington to Joins Secretary, 
New Delhi, dated on 22nd April 1977”, in MEA files, AMS, WII/504/3/77-II, National Archives, 
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nuclear  weapons  programme274.  On  24th February  1976  the  Join  Intelligent 
Commission indeed filed a report in which the Chinese involvement in the Pakistani 
program was highlighted, such as the fact that Beijing had already sent 12 scientists 
to Pakistan, and was considered likely to become even more crucial because Beijing 
was the only recognised nuclear power to not officially adhere to the international 
non-proliferation regime275. However, these events did not preclude India's decision 
to relax its relations with China, and with Pakistan during 1976276. Indira Gandhi and 
Bhutto indeed exchanged constructive letters in March and April 1976 with the aim 
of normalising bilateral relations277. This exchange paved the way for the meeting of 
the foreign secretaries in May in Islamabad, when overflights were finally resumed, 
as well as modest trade and train connections.
  5. Conclusion
From the analysis developed so far, it is possible to conclude that by exploding a 
nuclear device in 1974, and becoming the sixth nuclear country in the world, India 
shook the equilibrium of the international system. A clear demonstration of this is the 
tightening of the global non-proliferation regime that took place in the wake of the 
1974 detonation, and the Pakistani decision to strengthen their nuclear programme. 
The analysis carried out shows how the basis of that technological and political result 
274“Report of the Joint Intelligence Commission on nuclear weapons in Pakistan sent to the RAW, IB  
and IM, dated on the 24th February 1976”, in MEA, PP (JS)/4/3/74, National Archives, New Delhi.
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Survey 29, no. 12 (December 1989): 1123–1135.
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had been posed long before Indira Gandhi's second government took power in 1971. 
The option of exploding a nuclear device had in fact been contemplated by the Indian 
leadership since the foundation of the nuclear power programme. When the legal 
framework, on which the nuclear programme had been based, was created in 1948, 
its formulation was thought to assure complete secrecy and large political autonomy 
to the sector. Moreover, the same approach to the question of non-proliferation was 
formulated in a way that allowed India to demonstrate bipolar tendencies: on one 
side,  as  the  champion  of  nuclear  disarmament  and  the  partner  of  international 
cooperation projects, and on the other, as the major international challenger of the 
non-proliferation initiatives proposed by the superpowers, thus permitting India to 
keep its  door open to the nuclear bomb for defence purposes. As a consequence, 
when in late 1964 – following the first Chinese nuclear blast – the Indian government 
authorised the project for a peaceful nuclear device detonation, it did not have to 
reformulate  its  historical  approach  to  nuclear  issues.  Only  technical  delays  and 
problems  prevented  the  Indian  scientific  community  from  completing  their 
preparations before 1974. Meanwhile, the events of 1971 and the war with Pakistan 
contributed to further enlarging the support in India for the detonation that could 
have had demonstrated its power to China and the rest of the world. Finally,  the 
political turmoil that had began to challenge Mrs. Gandhi's government from late 
1972 provided the Prime Minister with another reason for authorising the explosion 
as  soon as  the  scientist  were  ready:  diverting  public  attention  from the  growing 
domestic problems. As a consequence of the 1974 test, the global non-proliferation 
regime was  significantly reinforced in  the  second half  of  the  Seventies.  Thus,  a 
country  like  India,  which  after  the  1974  test  continued  to  refuse  international 
safeguards on all its nuclear activities, saw the slowing down of its nuclear power 
programme. From the analysis developed it is now possible to argue that India in 
1974 further reinforced its power status in the South Asia region, and more in general 
in the international system, even if New Delhi later had to face more problems when 
pursuing its nuclear programme.
Before concluding, two more considerations should be made. The first is that the 
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1974 result should be read in a historical perspective: by exploding a nuclear device 
in 1974, India saw the results of the nuclear strategy born in 1948, when the door 
was carefully left  open for the acquisition of a nuclear device, and of the choice 
made in 1964, when the decision to acquire the technological capability to explode a 
nuclear device was actually taken. The 1974 explosion was then the technological 
and scientific coronation of an effort of ten-years made in order to allow India to 
answer  the  perceived  Chinese  threat.  The  second  is  instead  a  methodological 
consideration. It is crucial to underline the importance of India's archival material 
declassified by fall 2011. In fact the documents of the Ministry of External Affairs 
collected at  the  National Archives in New Delhi have allowed to better  trace the 
developments of the Indo-Canadian relationship after the 1974 explosion, which until 
now had not been considered by literature. Finally, also the Haksar papers collected 
in  the  Nehru  Museum  Memorial  Library  archives  revealed  their  fundamental 
importance: although only a few of them covered the nuclear topic, these revealed 
that  also  inside  the  Indian  bureaucracy  there  existed  a  section  which  vocally 
supported the idea that developing a complete full arsenal of nuclear weapons (a fact 
that until today has not yet been demonstrated through primary sources). 
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  FOURTH CHAPTER:
INDIA AND THE ANNEXATION OF SIKKIM
  1. Introduction
In the same year that India entered the restricted nuclear club, New Delhi was also on 
its  way  to  permanently  solving  another  question  that  had  been  bothering  the 
government since the mid-Sixties: the question of Sikkim. After just a few months, in 
April 1975, the protectorate was annexed to India, becoming the 22nd state of the 
Indian  Union.  The Sikkim merger  was  mainly carried  out  in  response  to  India's 
strategic  and  security  considerations,  and  was  perceived  by  its  small  and  large 
neighbouring states as yet another clear demonstration of power by New Delhi. This 
chapter will show how, in light of new archival sources, it is likely that these events  
were the result of a specific strategy already adopted by India from 1972 and not just  
the consequence of some domestic and internal dynamics in Sikkim, which were 
stoked by India, as has been generally assumed in the most authoritative literature on 
India's  history1.  The  use  of  primary sources  collected  both  at  Indian  and British 
archives are the grounds on which this argument will be supported.
In fact,  it  is  now possible to argue that New Delhi considered the option of 
intervening in the domestic affairs of Sikkim with the intention of endorsing its own 
1 See for  example the account provided by the more authoritative book published about India’s  
contemporary history: Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest  
Democracy (London: Pan Macmillan, 2011), 483–484.
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interests already in 1972, long before the first popular revolts of April 1973. This 
happened  after  the  king  of  Sikkim  attempted  to  gain  more  independence  and 
autonomy for his state from the second half of the Sixties. In less than one year a 
popular revolt then took place in Sikkim, and the Chogyal had to call India for help 
to bring order back to its state. India rapidly intervened, and after bringing Sikkim 
back  to  order  it  began  to  act  as  a  moderator  between  the  monarchy  and  the 
democratic  forces.  Significant  is  the  fact  that  the  agreement  reached  in  May 
maintained  the  Chogyal  as  the  institutional  head  of  state,  but  also  sanctioned  a 
significant increase in the political control India had over the state; therefore almost 
transforming Sikkim into an Indian colony. It is crucial to note that India (being the 
protecting power of Sikkim) denied foreign journalists and observers to enter into 
Sikkim not only during 1973, but also for the entire period that ended with Sikkim's 
merger with India in 1975. When new elections took place in 1974, the pro-Indian 
democratic forces won against the monarchic parties. A Constitution was then drafted 
by an Indian legal adviser, and later enacted by the Sikkim Assembly together with a 
resolution that called for stricter links with India. The Constitution and the resolution 
gave India the necessary power to directly intervene and change Sikkim's status. In 
September 1974 the 35th Amendment of the Indian Constitution was passed by the 
Indian Parliament,  transforming Sikkim into an  Associate State of  India.  In April 
1975  a  referendum was  then  organized  in  a  great  hurry  to  avoid  possible  legal 
troublesome complications, and thus the people of Sikkim were called to vote for, or 
against,  a resolution which abolished the monarchy and called for the state to be 
merged with India. People supported the resolution, and a few days later the Indian 
Parliament enacted the 38th Amendment of the Indian Constitution that transformed 
Sikkim into the 22nd state of India. As a result, the problematic question of Sikkim in 
less than three years was definitively solved by India. New Delhi indeed brought 
under its direct control the small but strategic Himalayan state that connected India to 
Lhasa; succeeding at the same time in depicting the entire affair as the emancipation 
of an enslaved population from its monarchic rule.
In order to trace the events from an historical perspective, the first paragraph will 
236
be dedicated to the presentation of the situation faced by the new government of 
Indira Gandhi after taking power in 1971. Therefore, an introduction of Sikkim and 
of its strategic position will be presented first. Subsequently, a brief analysis of its 
history during the nineteenth century highlighting how Sikkim became a protectorate 
of British India, partially loosing its independence, will follow. This chapter will then 
show how the status of Sikkim remained almost unvaried when Independent India 
emerged  from the  ashes  of  the  British  empire,  and  how  tension  between  the 
government of Sikkim and India grew in the second half of the Sixties due to the 
Chogyal's new ambitions to make Sikkim independent. The third paragraph will then 
present an assessment of the literature covering the events of 1973-1975, which led 
Sikkim to be annexed to India.  It  will  thus be shown how biased and partial  the 
literature produced until today on this topic has been: on one hand, the official Indian 
account, which depicts India as only covering a passive role during the events; and 
on the other, the critical accounts produced by sources linked to the defeated royal 
family  of  Sikkim,  which  instead  accused  India  of  having  engineered  the 
demonstrations of 1973, and later forcibly annexing Sikkim. The fourth paragraph 
will finally present the recent declassified archival documentations. These will cast 
serious  doubts  upon  the  official  version  provided  by  India,  thus  reinforcing  the 
critical  voices. To conclude,  the last  paragraph will  provide an assessment of the 
research done throughout the chapter. 
  2. Sikkim's history until 1971
Sikkim's history until 1971 will briefly be summarized in this paragraph, in order not 
only to present the main characteristics of the Sikkimese state to the reader, but also 
to demonstrate the political relations this state established with British India at first,  
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and with India later. In the first part, the history of Sikkim until the British departure 
from  the  Indian  subcontinent  will  be  considered.  This  will  begin  with  a  brief 
presentation of those geographical aspects that make Sikkim strategically important 
for India,  and of  those sociological  features  that  are  important  to  identify before 
proceeding with an analysis of its political history. After that it will be shown how 
Sikkim had a troubled history of subjugation to  external  powers:  in the ninetieth 
century it had already become a de facto British protectorate. Later, the relations with 
Independent India will be considered. At first it will be shown how the same relation 
Sikkim  had  with  British  India  was  kept  unvaried  also  after  India  became  an 
independent  state  in  1947.  The  analysis  will  continue  underlying  how  Indo-
Sikkimese bilateral relations then eroded during the Sixties, due to the diffusion of 
nationalist aspirations of greater autonomy from India in the royal court of Sikkim. 
This picture will then allow a full understanding of the political developments that 
took place in the Seventies during the second government of Indira Gandhi, when 
Sikkim lost its distinct and separate entity and merged into the Indian Union.
  2.1 Sikkim's formation as a state and its relationship with British India
To understand Sikkim's political history it is of crucial importance to geographically 
place this small Himalayan state. Its strategic position has indeed largely influenced 
the life of his inhabitants for centuries. Geographically, Sikkim2 is situated in Eastern 
Himalayas, while its jurisdiction is the 22nd state of India. It is on the border with the 
Chinese Tibet  Autonomous Region to the north and the east,  with Bhutan to the 
south-east, with the Indian state of West Bengal to the south, and with Nepal to the 
west. It is situated on the south of the Himalayan range, and on the north from west 
to  east  it  is  surrounded by great  mountains  interrupted  only by a  few important 
2 According to the original inhabitants the name “Sikkim” means “Nye-ma-el”, heaven, probably 
due to its northern good pastures and forests. H. G. Joshi, Sikkim: Past and Present (New Delhi: 
Mittal Publications, 2004), 135.
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passes. The Chogla mountains in the east host two important passes to Tibet: Nathu-
La (4.310 metres), and Jelep-La (4.267 metres)3. On the west the col that connects 
Sikkim to Nepal through the Singalila mountain is the Chiabhanjan (3.145 metres). 
Like the other Himalayan states, because of its geographical position Sikkim had 
always  based  its  economic  and  political  stability  on  the  Indo-Tibetan  trade4. 
However, since the Sikkimese route toward Tibet is the easiest and shortest of the 
Himalayas' to connect Lhasa with Calcutta, Sikkim had always had a special strategic 
importance for the entire region, as its history demonstrates.
The second element that is crucial to keep in mind to analyse Sikkim's political 
history is its sociological composition. During the period (the Seventies) on which 
this  analysis  is  going  to  focus,  its  populations  consisted  of  around  200.000 
inhabitants5.  The  population  was,  and  still  is,  divided  into  three  ethnic  groups: 
Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese. The Lepchas are considered the original inhabitants 
of the region. They probably came from Assam, or North Burma in the ancient past. 
In the Seventies they were however a minority, constituting 10% of the population6. 
The Bhutias were the second group to enter the Sikkimese territory from Tibet: of 
Buddhist beliefs, they immigrated during the thirteenth century. They assumed the 
political  control  of  Sikkim,  subjugated  the  Lepchas,  and  converted  them  to 
Buddhism. In the Seventies however they also made up 10% of the people living in 
Sikkim. In fact, by that time the majority of the Sikkimese population (80%) was 
composed of the Nepalese who had begun to settle in Sikkim since the 18 th century. 
Of Hindu religion, in the Seventies they settled as peasants especially in the southern 
part of the state7. As it will be shown, keeping in mind these ethnic and religious 
differences is of crucial importance in order to understand Sikkim's political life and 
history.
3 “La” is a word in Tibetan that means “mountain pass”. Jelep-La is an all season pass, and its name 
means “the lovely low pass”, unlike the Nathu-La which means “the pass of the listening ear”.
4 Alastair Lamb, British India and Tibet: 1766-1910 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1986), 3.
5 In 2011 these had become 607.000. P. Raghunadha Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with  
India (New Delhi: Cosmo, 1978), 2.
6 Ibid.
7 Joshi, Sikkim, 132.
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Very little is known about the history of Sikkim, from its ancient past until more 
recent  times.  According to a legend of Bhutia origin8,  in the seventeenth century 
three Lamas, following the foresight of the Buddhist saint Guru Rinpoche came from 
Tibet to choose a man to crown king (Chogyal) of Sikkim. These Tibetan Buddhist 
Lamas found Phuntsog Namgyal, a descendant of a Tibetan noble (Guru Tashi) in 
Gangtok and made him the Chogyal (divine ruler in Tibetan) of Sikkim at Yoksam in 
1641. According to  legend,  Phuntsog Namgyal  became the spiritual  and political 
leader of the kingdom of Sikkim, converting the majority of the Lepcha population to 
Buddhism and extending his reign to include the Chumbi Valley of Tibet, and the 
Darjeeling district of West Bengal. However, this is only a legend, as the work of the 
academic historian Mullard Saul demonstrates: his book, contesting this narrative, 
proposes a different version about the formation of the state in Sikkim. He claims the 
entire event was not based on a peaceful religious invitation to rule, but rather on 
conquest, alliances, and violent subjugation of the Lepcha population by the Bhutia 
Lamas9.  Nevertheless,  the  important  fact  is  that  by  the  15th century  the  Bhutias 
practically  assumed  the  political  control  over  Sikkim  establishing  a  monarchic 
regime.
The first serious political challenge the Sikkimese monarchy had to face came in 
1706, when the Bhutanese intervened in the war of succession which had erupted 
among the various heirs of the third Chogyal. Instigated by the sister of the Chogyal, 
the neighbouring Bhutanese thus invaded Sikkim10, provoking the escape of the king 
to Tibet. Tibetans then decided to intervene in favour of the Chogyal, and sent an 
official to lead the military campaign against the Bhutanese. This expedition turned 
out successful: the Bhutanese were fought back, and Chador Namgyal re-installed as 
the political leader of Sikkim. In exchange for the help, the Chogyal granted a large 
estate in the west of the kingdom to the Tibetan official who remained to live in 
8 This is briefly presented in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 3.
9 For  a  complete  analysis  of  this  period  see  Saul  Mullard,  Opening  the  Hidden  Land:  State  
Formation and the Construction of Sikkimese History (Leiden: BRILL, 2011), chap. 1–5.
10 Saul Mullard, “The Brag Dkar Pa Family and G.Yang Thang Rdzong: An Example of Internal  
Alliances in Sikkim,” Bulletin of Tibetology 39, no. 2 (2003): 55.
240
Sikkim from that point onwards11.
Seventy years later the status quo was again challenged by the other neighbour 
of  Sikkim,  Nepal,  which  was  expanding  under  the  Gurkha  family.  In  1774  the 
Nepalese were able to conquer at first the province of Limbuana, which although the 
Sikkimese  considered  as  theirs,  had  maintained  its  own  autonomy  until  that 
moment12,  and  in  1788  to  invade  and  occupy  large  portions  of  the  Sikkimese 
territory.  The  Nepalese  actions  were  dictated  by  the  desire  to  monopolise  the 
Himalayan trade, and thus bring the new trade route the Tibetans had opened with 
Sikkim in 1784 under their own control. The clear intention was to by-pass the high 
taxes Nepal imposed on Tibetan traders on the routes it controlled13. The Bhutanese 
first,  and the  Tibetans  later,  came to  help  the  Sikkimese  government  against  the 
Nepalese. However, this was not enough and Tibet had to call for Chinese military 
aid.  China finally intervened in 1792, defeated the Nepalese,  and forced them back 
from Tibet to Nepal. This resulted both in the growth of Chinese power in Tibet, and 
in  an imposition  for Nepal  to pay tributes to China every five years (an obligation 
that  the  Nepal  government  kept  until  1908)14.  Although the  Chinese  intervention 
allowed Sikkim to keep its independence, the Chogyal lost control over the regions 
to the south of the Raman river and to the west of the Tista river, as well as the actual 
Indian Darjeeling district, which remained under the control of Nepal15.
Under  the  reign  of  the  Chogyal  Tsugphud  Namgyal  (1790-1861),  Sikkim 
established its first relations with the British East India Company, which by that time 
was controlling a large part of Bengal. In 1814-1815 the Chogyal decided indeed to 
ally with the British in order to push the Nepalese away from the territories Sikkim 
had lost in the 1788-1792 war16. Allying with Sikkim was also functional to the East 
11 Ibid., 56.
12 Kumar Pradhan,  The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and Consequences of  the Unification of  
Nepal, with Particular Reference to Eastern Nepal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 123.
13 Ibid., 130–1.
14 MR Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York and London: W W Norton & 
Company Incorporated, 1999), 111–112.
15 Mullard, “The Brag Dkar Pa Family and G.Yang Thang Rdzong: An Example of Internal Alliances 
in Sikkim,” 62.
16 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 4.
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India Company, which had begun to appreciate the trade across the Himalayas “as a 
possible source of specie to redress the adverse balance of the China trade”. The East 
India Company began to look with particular interest upon the possibility of using 
the Sikkimese trade route through the Jelep-La and Nathu-La passes to reach Tibet17. 
Their  aim was indeed to  revitalise  the  Indo-Tibetan  trade  that  after  the Chinese-
Nepali war had drastically declined between the subcontinent and Tibet.
Therefore,  in  1814-1816  an  Anglo-Nepali  war  was  fought  and  won  by  the 
British. The territories Sikkim was claiming as its own were returned, even though at 
the cost of some specific conditions. These were formalised in the Treaty of Titalia18 
signed by Sikkim and the British on 10th February 1817. Although Rao argued that: 
“the  Treaty  of  Titalia  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  Sikkim's 
independence”19, it is evident that it was only another political strategy adopted by 
the Chogyal, which was not too divergent from political allegiances established until 
that moment with the Tibetans and Bhutanese. The only news was that the Treaty of 
Titalia sanctioned the loyalty to the British in a written form, differently from the 
previous alliance made by the Chogyal with the Tibetans. As a result, Sikkim lost its 
right to manage in autonomy its relations with Nepal and with its other neighbouring 
states. It was therefore obliged to refer to the arbitration of the British Government 
for all questions or disputes that would have arose. Moreover, as clear evidence of 
the  British  commercial  interests  in  their  campaign  against  Nepal,  the  treaty 
established that Sikkim could no longer increase the taxes on East India Company's 
goods transiting on its territories towards Tibet20.
In 1826, after the assassination of the Prime Minister of Sikkim (Bho-Lod) who 
was a  Lepcha and the maternal  uncle  of the Chogyal,  internal  tensions  began to 
emerge between the Lepcha and Bhutia communities. Until that moment they had 
enjoyed an equal  representation in  the social  and political  life  of  Sikkim21.  As a 
17 Lamb, British India and Tibet, 4.
18 See the text of the Treaty of Titalia (1817) in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 
81–83.
19 Ibid., 5.
20 Ibid., 82.
21 Sprigg, R. K., “1826: The End of an Era in the Social and Political History of Sikkim” (1995): 88.
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result,  numerous Lepcha families  left  Sikkim and found refuge in the Ilam area, 
which was situated beyond the border with Nepal. From there they began making 
incursions  in  Sikkim.  Due  to  their  military  superiority  and  based  their  right  of 
arbitration over border issues, the British intervened again in the dispute in 1828. In 
the  wake  of  these  operations  the  British  became  interested  in  settling  in  the 
Darjeeling area, which was judged as a useful military outpost, trading node, and a 
perfect location for building a sanatorium. Therefore negotiations with the Chogyal 
began. According to some interpretations, in 1835 the right to settle in Darjeeling 
was ceded to the British by Sikkim in exchange for the promise of an annual grant of 
6.000 Rupees22.  However, others argue that the British deceived the Sikkim king, 
falsely promising him some Nepalese territories in exchange for Darjeeling, and that 
Darjeeling was thus annexed by force23. This latter thesis seems confirmed: from that 
moment onwards the relations between the British and the Sikkimese king became 
tense and Darjeeling was transformed into a hub of commercial activities, and almost 
into a proper sovereign state.
Therefore,  Tsugphud Namgyal  started  retaliating  by obstructing  British  trade 
with Tibet on its territories, thus further increasing tensions24. Another cause of strain 
was the fact that some sections of the Sikkimese population began to seek refuge 
from bonded labour in British Darjeeling, which conceded them asylum on the basis 
of the anti-slavery legislation introduced in the British Empire in 183825.  Tension 
then erupted in 1849 when Dr. Arthur Cambpell, the Superintendent of Darjeeling, 
and Dr. Dalton Hooker, a botanist of the British Government of India, were arrested 
by the Chogyal functionaries while trying to enter Tibet without Chogyal's permit. 
Although following a British ultimatum the Government of Sikkim released the two 
functionaries,  the East  India Company seized the opportunity and sent a military 
expedition. This led the Chogyal to cancel the annual 6.000 Rupees promised for 
22 Joshi, Sikkim, 84.
23 Sonam B. Wangyal, Sikkim & Darjeeling: Division & Deception (Bhutan: Phuentosholing, 2002), 
86.
24 Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, Himalayan Triangle: a Historical Survey of British India’s Relations with  
Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan, 1765-1950 (London: British Library, 1988), 180–4.
25 Mullard, Opening the Hidden Land, 34.
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Darjeeling, and the cessation of another area to the British, the Morang district26. In 
1860 the British Government of India launched yet another military expedition in 
order to reassert its control over the Sikkimese territory, and over the commercial 
routes in Sikkim where depredation and kidnapping incidents against British traders 
had increased.  Although the British Government  of India easily won the military 
campaign and occupied Sikkim, they decided not to annex Sikkim based on political, 
military and economic motivations. Indeed, since an annexation could have opened a 
dispute with Tibet  and China,  both of which had historical  friendly and political 
relations with Sikkim, the British decided to avoid such a risk, which would have 
created more problems than advantages for them27. In addition, annexation was not 
necessary: they were able to impose on the Chogyal all the conditions they required 
in a treaty signed in 186128. The small Himalayan state accepted therefore to return 
7.000  Rupees  to  the  British  Government  of  Darjeeling  as  compensation  for  the 
commercial  damage  the  British  claimed  to  have  suffered,  and  to  guarantee  safe 
British trade over  its  territories29.  Second, Sikkim endured the abolishment of all 
restrictions over the circulation of goods and people with British India, only keeping 
customs taxes on goods passing on its territories towards Nepal, Tibet and Bhutan, 
and  the  construction  of  roads  for  enhancing  British  trade.  Third,  Sikkim  even 
renounced to try non-resident British citizens on its own territory when found guilty 
of  violating  Sikkim  laws,  but  to  deliver  them  for  judgement  to  the  British 
Government of India instead. At last, Sikkim's military forces were subdued to the 
British troops, while the highest political charge of Sikkim had to renounce to its 
own  traditional  honorific  title  Chogyal,  and  to  assume  the  title  of  Maharajah30, 
exactly as all the other Indian kings of the Indian subcontinent. This was done in 
order to give the signal to the Sikkimese population of the process of Indianization 
that the British began to impose on Sikkim. As a result, Sikkim became de facto a 
26 Singh, Himalayan Triangle, 187–8.
27 Lamb, British India and Tibet, 80–1.
28 The entire text of the Treaty is reported in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 87–
93.
29 Ibid., 88–89.
30 In the next pages the king of Sikkim will be referred to as Maharajah.
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protectorate of British India.
After 1861 the British also began to internally undermine the Maharajah’s power 
both at socio-political and administrative levels. At first, they started to encourage 
Nepalese settlement in Sikkim to increase the cultivated land to favour the regional 
economic development. Their other intent is clearly revealed by Rishley: “the influx 
of the hereditary enemies of Tibet [Nepalese] is our surest guarantee against a revival 
of Tibetan influence  [in Sikkim]...”31. Depriving the original Sikkimese inhabitants 
from land, and favouring the settlement of Hindu Nepalese in Sikkim, the British 
were  also  able  to  destabilise  the  social  equilibrium in  Sikkim,  and  therefore  to 
weaken the  bases  of  the  Chogyal  authority supported  by the  Lepcha and Bhutia 
communities32.
In parallel  to this  political  strategy,  the British also reinforced the Sikkimese 
infrastructure to further enhance their trade with Tibet33. However, the Tibetans were 
not reconciled with the growing power of British India over Sikkim: in 1886 tensions 
between Sikkim, Tibet and the British exploded again. Supported by the Chogyal of 
Sikkim, Tibetans occupied the Jelep-La pass. As a consequence, in 1888-1890 the 
British launched a military campaign against Tibet and Sikkim. The British pushed 
the Tibetans back, and Chinese troops had to intervene to help Tibet. As a conclusion 
of the hostilities, in 1890 a treaty34 was signed in Darjeeling between China and the 
British. The text established Sikkim's status as a British protectorate, Tibet as a part 
of the Chinese Empire, and the border between the two as the watershed crest of the 
mountain range. Article two in fact stated that the British government had the “direct 
and  exclusive  control  over  the  internal  administration  and  foreign  relations”35. 
Therefore,  the British  nominated  Jean Claude White  the first  Political  Officer  of 
31 Herbert H. Risley, Gazetteer of Sikkim (London: Low Price Publications, 1996), xxi.
32 Singh, Himalayan Triangle, 224.
33 The building of a road to Tibet was begun, as well as that of railways connections to Siliguri. In  
1881 took less than one week to reach Tibet from Calcutta. J. Claude White, Sikkim And Bhutan 
(Delhi: Vivek Publishing House, 1971), 28–29.
34 The entire text of the treaty is reported in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 94–
96.
35 Ibid., 95.
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Sikkim in 1893: from that position he began to act de facto as the ruler of Sikkim36. 
The Maharajah therefore lost political and administrative control over his kingdom, 
maintaining only a mere symbolic role in the political life of his state. Moreover, the 
king lost his right to reside in the Chumbi valley (Tibet). This again was a clear sign 
that Sikkim had to reduce its  political and cultural ties with Tibet. As it  was not 
enough, British also began to interfere in the royal family's internal affairs37.  The 
silent submission of the royal family and of the people of Sikkim clearly testified the 
extent of the British authority in the state. The political officer even continued the 
policy  of  favouring  Nepalese  immigrations  in  order  to  develop  the  area,  and  to 
further diminish Maharajah’s authority over the people of Sikkim38.
Aimed to  fix  the  political  situation  to  enhance  trade  between China  and the 
British,  the  1890  Treaty  was  also  followed  in  1893  by  the  signature  of  the 
Regulations concerning Trade, Communications and Pasturage39. The Regulations 
clearly stated that all parties (not only British and Chinese, but also Sikkimese and 
Tibetans) had to promote trade between British India and Tibet. However, this move 
did not bring the expected results40, and trade remained stagnant due to the Tibetan's 
reluctance. In 1904 a British mission (the Younghusband expedition) was thus sent to 
Tibet in order to appraise the situation. The 1904 mission, born as a commercial one, 
was soon transformed into a military action, ending with the British occupation of 
Lhasa,  and  the  Tibetan  acceptance  of  a  new  Treaty41.  The  agreement  not  only 
imposed what the British had already negotiated with China in 1890, but also the a 
monetary reimbursement of the expedition costs, and the British right to settle and 
36 Pradyumna Prasad Karan and William M. Jenkins, The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim, and 
Nepal (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1963), 59.
37 For example, the Maharajah’s second son, Sidekyong Namgyal, and later Tashi Namgyal, were 
designated by the British as the successors, in opposition to the claims of the eldest son of the 
Maharajah, Tchoda Namgyal. Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 7–8.
38 The Nepalese were indeed Hindu and perceived by the rest of the Sikkimese population (Lepchas 
and Bhutias loyal to the Maharajah) as diverse. Vibha Arora, “Roots and the Route of Secularism 
in Sikkim,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 38 (September 23, 2006): 4069.
39 The entire text of this convention is in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 97–100.
40 Vibha  Arora,  “Routing  the  Commodities  of  the  Empire  Through  Sikkim  (1817-1906)”  (The 
Ferguson  Centre  for  African  and  Asian  Studies,  The  Open  University,  2008),  13, 
http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/ferguson-centre/commodities-of-empire/working-papers/WP09.pdf.
41 The entire text is available in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 101–105.
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patrol trade marts  in the Chumbi valley42.  Although further controversy about the 
validity of this treaty emerged43, the British were able to finally solve the question by 
signing a new Treaty with China in 190644,  following Beijing's reassurance of its 
political control over Tibet45. In 1908 a new convention on the Tibetan trade was 
again signed between British India and China:  British rights  in Tibet  were again 
reconfirmed, even if their travelling rights in Tibet were slightly reduced46.
Although Sikkim's border with Tibet was never contested by Tibet, or China, as 
well  as  by  Sikkim,  or  by  the  British,  another  crucial  Tibetan-British  convention 
created some confusion on British (and thus later Indian) trade rights in Tibet along 
the Sikkimese route: the Conference of Simla, which formally began on 6 th October 
191347.  It  was  a  tripartite  conference  between  Tibet,  Britain  and  China  and  was 
mainly concerned with the aim of fixing the political status of Tibet and its borders 
after the fall of the Qing dynasty, and the new reassertion of Chinese power over 
Tibet48. Even if the negotiations were conducted by all three state representatives, the 
Chinese left the conference refusing to sign the convention. Nevertheless, the British 
and Tibetan delegates decided to sign a declaration recognising new regulations for 
Indo-Tibetan trade, and revising those of 1983 and 1908 slightly in their favour to the 
detriment  of  the  Chinese49.  A line,  later  called  McMahon  line was  also  traced, 
defining Tibetan borders as those marked by the watershed crest of the Himalayan 
42 Even if the official object of the mission was to enhance Indo-Tibetan trade, behind there was also  
the  British  interest  in  checking  the  Russian  influence  over  the  Tibetan  government.  Arora,  
“Routing the Commodities of the Empire Through Sikkim (1817-1906),” 15.
43 Lamb, British India and Tibet, 244–255.
44 The text of the treaty is again entirely reported in Rao,  Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with  
India, 106–108.
45 Alex  McKay,  Tibet  and  the  British  Raj:  The  Frontier  Cadre,  1904-1947 (Richmond  Surrey: 
Routledge, 1997), 33–34.
46 K. Gupta, “Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse: Its Origin and Significance,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 13, no. 16 (April 22, 1978): 697.
47 For further information see Alastair Lamb, The McMahon Line: a Study in the Relations Between  
India,  China,  and  Tibet  1904-1914 (London:  Routledge  & K.  Paul,  1966);  Neville  Maxwell, 
India’s  China  War (Pantheon  Books,  1970);  Neville  Maxwell,  “China  and  India:  The  Un-
Negotiated Dispute,” The China Quarterly no. 43 (July 1, 1970): 47–80; Parshotam Mehra, “India-
China Border: A Review and Critique,” Economic and Political Weekly 17, no. 20 (May 15, 1982): 
834–838;  Abdul  Gafoor  Abdul  Majeed  Noorani,  India-China  Boundary  Problem,  1846-1947:  
History and Diplomacy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
48 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 252–279.
49 Gupta, “Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse,” 698.
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mountains from Burma to Bhutan50. However, according to the Anglo-Chinese treaty 
of 1906 and the Anglo-Russian convention signed in 1907, Tibetans did not have the 
legal right to revise that convention and to define Tibetan borders without Chinese 
authorization51. The fact that the British later recognised in confidential documents 
the validity of the Anglo-Tibetan trade regulations of 1914, and of the McMahon line 
on their official maps published in 1935, generated confusion both with British trade 
rights in Tibet, and with Tibet's borders52. When the British left India in 1947 the 
problems of resolving border issues and trade regulations were therefore inherited by 
the new government of India.
To return to Sikkim's political situation, from 1908 onwards Sikkim developed a 
better relationship with India. In fact, in 1908 a new Political Officer, Sir Charles 
Bell, was appointed. Differently from Whyte, he tried not to impose himself over the 
Sikkimese king. He largely gave back the control of Sikkim's internal affairs to the 
Maharajah, and also tried to diminish sociological tensions in Sikkim, promoting the 
safeguard  of  the  Lepchas  and  Bhutias  rights  in  land  ownership,  for  example53. 
Therefore the new Maharajah (Tashi Namgyal), who ruled from 1914 until  1963, 
enjoyed a far better relation with British India54.
  2.2 Sikkim and Independent India
Following  the  British  departure,  the  political  status  of  Sikkim  was  officially 
sanctioned  on  27th February  1948.  At  that  time,  an  agreement  maintaining  the 
precedent relationship between Sikkim and British India was signed with the new 
government of India. This agreement was reached after the Sikkimese royal family 
50 Michelguglielmo Torri, Storia dell’India (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2007), 652–653.
51 Gupta, “Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse,” 697–8.
52 Ibid., 698–699.
53 Hamlet Bareh, Encyclopaedia of North-East India: Sikkim (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2001), 
58.
54 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 8–9.
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accepted India as the British Indian successor, and that New Delhi on its side agreed 
not to impose the same format on Sikkim it had used with the other princely states 
for their merger with India (e.g. the Instrument of Accession)55. The latter was a clear 
concession made by India, since it was an implicit recognition of Sikkim's special 
status. It was also the first indication that India would not insist to directly annex 
Sikkim, but was instead ready to recognise its special status. As a consequence, in 
1948 Sikkim and India signed a standstill agreement in which they recognised all the 
previous agreements signed between Sikkim and British India as valid, and agreed to 
negotiate a new, more detailed, treaty soon.
However, from 1948 until 1950, when the treaty was finally signed, some other 
actors tried to modify the existing status quo. The Indian freedom movement against 
the British had indeed also triggered a Sikkimese democratic movement especially 
among the Nepalese population, who did not feel represented at all by the Maharajah, 
and wanted to overthrow the Lepchas-Bhutias control, for a more equitable society. 
Several  organizations,  like  the  Praja  Sammelan  of  Temitarku,  Praja  Mandal  of 
Chakhung, Praja Sudhar of Gangtok, and Swatantra Dal had thus been formed in 
different parts if Sikkim during 194656. Their representatives met all together for the 
first time on 7th December 1947 at Gangtok, and decided to give birth to the first 
political party of Sikkim: the Sikkim State Congress (SSC). The political programme 
of the party was based on three main requests: first,  the abolition of landlordism; 
second, the formation of a representative government;  and third,  the accession of 
Sikkim to India57. In 1948 the president of the Sikkim State Congress, Tashi Tsering, 
and  the  party  secretary,  C.  D.  Rai,  thus  went  to  New  Delhi  to  meet  the  Prime 
55 Memorandum of the Government of Sikkim: Claims in respect of Darjeeling, prepared by Sirdar  
D.  K.  Sen  for  the  Sikkim Darbar,  1947,  in  Leo  E.  Rose,  “India  and  Sikkim:  Redefining the 
Relationship,”  Pacific Affairs 42, no. 1 (1969):  33. The instrument of accession was the legal  
instrument that was offered to all the Indian Maharajahs to sign for sanctioning their decision to 
merge their states with India.
56 For more information see: Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim (Delhi: 
Vikas, 1984), 52–54.
57 Sikkim State  Congress’ petition  to  the  Maharajah  of  Sikkim Gangtok  dated  December  1947, 
published  by  Mankind  (New  Delhi),  February  1960  quoted  in  Rao,  Sikkim,  the  Story  of  Its  
Integration with India, 10–11. It is interesting to note that the President of the party was Tashi 
Tsering, a clerk who worked at the dependence of the Indian Political Officer in Sikkim, and who 
had trust in India as a progressive force for Sikkim. Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 52.
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Minister of India at the time, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Deputy Minister of External 
Affairs, B. V. Keskar. On that occasion they restated their requests, and also asked to 
have Sikkim represented in the Indian Parliament58.
In  order  to  face  these  challenging  requests,  the  Maharajah  encouraged  and 
supported the formation of a monarchic political party, the Sikkim National Party 
(SNP),  which  gave  representation  mainly  to  the  minority  Lepcha  and  Bhutia 
communities59. On 30th April 1948 the Sikkim National Party passed a resolution that 
declared  its  strong  opposition  to  Sikkim's  annexation  to  India,  requesting  the 
establishment of equal relations with India, and declaring Sikkim as having more 
cultural affinities with Bhutan and Tibet, than with India for geographical, ethnic and 
religious aspects60. The SNP resolution ended with a crucial phrase, which reminded 
New Delhi  about  Sikkim's  strategic  importance and the need to keep it  satisfied: 
“From India's point of view, a happy Sikkim as a buffer State would be of great 
advantage than an unhappy Sikkim in India  […] which would be a disadvantage, 
indeed a danger to India”61.
Nevertheless, the Sikkim State Congress gained popularity in Sikkim thanks to 
its claim for the abolition of landlordism and democratization. In  the first week of 
February  1949  a  No-rent  campaign was  launched  in  the  country,  during  which 
several exponents of the party were arrested by the Sikkimese authorities. Despite the 
protests, the Maharajah refused the formation of a representative government, and 
called New Delhi for help, who then sent two Indian Army units. Demonstrations, 
however, continued and culminated on 1st May 1949, when around 5.000 agitators 
besieged the  Royal  Palace in  Gangtok62.  On that  occasion the Indian Army then 
intervened dispersing the agitators and brought back calm in Sikkim63. However, by 
58 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 11.
59 When the British left India in 1947, the Bhutias and Lepchas were around 25% of the Sikkimese 
population, while the Nepalese constituted 75%. G. S. Bajpai, China’s Shadow Over Sikkim: The  
Politics of Intimidation (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999), 200.
60 The full text of the resolution is in Mankind (New Delhi), February 1960, cited by Rao, Sikkim,  
the Story of Its Integration with India, 13.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 12.
63 N. Ram, “Sikkim Story: Protection to Absorption,” Social Scientist 3, no. 2 (September 1974): 67.
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that  time  the  demonstration  had  obtained  the  expected  result:  the  Maharajah, 
following  the  Indian  Political  Officer  advice,  asked  the  Sikkim  State  Congress 
president to form a government. Therefore, on 9th May 1949 the government was 
formed  and  Tashi  Tsering  became  the  Sikkim  Chief  Minister.  However,  this 
democratic experiment did not last: the Maharajah, supported by the Political Officer 
and thus by New Delhi, dismissed the government on 7th June 194964.
As a consequence of this act, the government of India and the Maharajah felt 
compelled to rapidly conclude the treaty to define the international status of Sikkim. 
In March 1950 the official public answer from New Delhi to the requests raised by 
the Sikkim State Congress came to keep: “the demand for accession with India in 
abeyance”65.  As  a  result,  in  the  same  month  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs 
announced that a temporary agreement had been reached between the Maharajah and 
the Indian government66: the historical connections between Sikkim and India were 
confirmed, with the only evolution of establishing an elective body in which all the 
people  of  Sikkim would  be  represented.  This  would  have  served the  purpose of 
assisting the Maharajah and the Political Officer in the administrative and political 
management  of  Sikkim's  internal  affairs.  On  the  same  occasion  it  was  also 
announced that a treaty was expected to be signed soon between the government of 
India and the Maharajah to definitively solve all political and legal issues still open. 
This Treaty67 was definitively signed on 5th December 1950. Article two, three and 
four  of  the  treaty  reconfirmed  Sikkim's  status  as  a  protectorate  of  India:  it  had 
autonomy for its domestic affairs, while India was responsible for its external affairs, 
defence and security. As a consequence Sikkim was not allowed to keep any armed 
forces, nor to buy weapons68.  The treaty guaranteed free movement of goods and 
64 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 12.
65 Letter sent by K. R. Pradhan, President of the Sikkim Congress, to Indira Gandhi, President of 
Indian National Congress dated 26th September 1959, quoted in ibid., 11.
66 Press note of the Ministry of External Affairs dated 20th March 1950, full text available in ibid.,  
114–5.
67 For the entire text of the agreement see India Parliament House of the People and India Parliament 
Lok  Sabha,  Foreign  Policy  of  India:  Texts  of  Documents,  1947-59 (New  Delhi:  Lok  Sabha 
Secretariat, 1959), 37–40.
68 Ram, “Sikkim Story,” 67.
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people between the two states.  India had exclusive construction and maintenance 
rights  on communications  lines.  Furthermore,  while  in  article  ten  guaranteed  the 
Sikkimese Maharajah an annual sum of money from New Delhi as long as the treaty 
was  respected,  article  eleven  gave  the  Indian  government  the  right  to  appoint, 
together with the Maharajah, an Indian administrative service officer for the role of 
Dewan who basically had Prime Ministerial powers, since he was in charge of the 
domestic administration of the state.
In order to fully understand the two choices made by New Delhi, to respecting 
the traditional relationship inherited by the British without imposing the Instrument  
of Accession to Sikkim, and not to  exploit  the Sikkim State Congress claims for 
annexing Sikkim, it is crucial to briefly remember the historical situation India was 
facing  at  that  time.  Security  and  political  considerations  around  the  border  area 
suggested caution should be taken. First, the fact that in 1949 Beijing announced its 
intention to liberate Tibet surely convinced India of the necessity to avoid political 
turmoil in Sikkim, alienating the Maharajah and the Lepcha-Bhutia communities69. 
As  a  result,  it  was  probably  considered  better  to  reinforce  the  position  of  the 
Maharajah, rather than erode it with the recognition of the Sikkim State Congress' 
claims  of  annexation,  and  of  an  elective  governmental  body,  although  the 
government of India had indicated otherwise in the temporary agreement of March 
195070.  Consequentially,  an  annexation  of  Sikkim  would  probably  have  created 
negative reactions in  Bhutan and Nepal,  which were both afraid that India could 
annex them after Sikkim as well. This was another scenario New Delhi preferred to 
avoid  in  order  not  to  encourage  political  instability.  Lastly,  the  1948  war  with 
Pakistan for Kashmir probably influenced India to adopt a cautious approach toward 
Sikkim. Similar to Sikkim, Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state that, like all the 
other princely states recognised by British India71, in 1947 had to decide about its 
future. Its choices were: adhering to India in exchange for the recognition of a privy 
69 Rose, “India and Sikkim,” 34.
70 For the press release text of the temporary agreement of March 1950 see: Rao, Sikkim, the Story of  
Its Integration with India, 114–115.
71 These states were numerous, more than 500, and they significantly varied in dimensions and status  
Guha, India After Gandhi, 36.
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pursue72,  merging  with  Pakistan,  or  remaining  independent. If  the  cases  of  the 
Junagadh and Hyderabad princely states – which had respectively decided to join 
Pakistan and remain independent – were firmly solved by New Delhi without leading 
to  serious  problems;  the  case  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir  was  different73.  Without 
entering the age-old problem of Kashmir – which is still considered to be a disputed 
territory between India and Pakistan74 – it is sufficient to remember in this context 
that in October 1947 India and Pakistan fought a war to determine Kashmir's status. 
The conflict ended only on the 1st January 1949 after a cease fire imposed by the UN, 
which  had the effect  of  simply freezing the  respective  military positions  without 
however completely solving the issue75. As a result, it is possible to argue that New 
Delhi did not intend to risk transforming the Sikkimese question into an international 
dispute.  Like Kashmir,  Sikkim was situated on the border  frontier  and had strict 
cultural  and  historical  ties  with  its  neighbouring  states.  Therefore,  as  afore 
mentioned, it was probable that New Delhi did not contest the maintenance of the 
Sikkim  status  as  an  Indian  protectorate,  and  did  not  accept  the  Sikkim  State 
Congress' claims of accession to India in order not to alter what had been sanctioned 
by the British with China and Tibet.
Although India recognised the People's  Republic  of China on 30th December 
1949,  and supported  its  claims for  a  seat  in  the UN instead  of  Taiwan,  bilateral 
tensions had emerged between China and Tibet in reference to the political status of 
Tibet and of the Indo-Tibetan borders. For reasons of military impotence, in 1949 
India decided not to contest China's occupation of Tibet. However, from 1950 the 
Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, began referencing the controversial Simla 
72 In exchange of the signature of the Instrument of Accession, and therefore of the merger of their  
states  as  part  of  India,  the  princes  would  have  retained  their  titles  and  obtained  an  annual 
allowance in perpetuity. The privy purses were cancelled only in 1971 with the 26 th Constitutional 
Amendment proposed by the Indian government of Indira Gandhi.
73 Torri, Storia dell’India, 610–615; Guha, India After Gandhi, 49–56.
74 For a detailed analysis of the question of Kashmir see Victoria Schofield,  Kashmir in Conflict:  
India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010).
75 To solve the Kashmir issue India and Pakistan fought another war in 1965, signed two peace 
treaties (one in Tashkent in 1966, and the other in Simla in 1972, as already mentioned in the  
second  chapter  of  this  thesis),  and  came  close  to  fighting  other  military conflicts  during  the  
Nineties, without however solving the question in a decisive and definitive manner.
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Convention  signed  by  India  and  Tibet  in  1914  in  his  speeches  to  the  Indian 
Parliament, thus implicitly claiming for both the trade rights and border concession 
conceded by the Tibetans to the British on that occasion76. It is interesting to note that 
India in 1950 was still enjoying the extra-territorial rights in Tibet in force as a result 
of that contested agreement77. In the context of the aggressive march of the Chinese 
army into Tibet, in 1950 New Delhi mentioned again the special rights inherited by 
the British in an exchange of letters with Beijing, without however making an open 
reference to the Simla convention of 191478. On 16th November 1950 the Chinese 
answered with an accommodative and generic stand,  de facto postponing the issue. 
As a  consequence,  India seized  the  opportunity to  invade the area  of  Tawang,  a 
territory that was included, according to the  McMahon line, in the Indian territory, 
but that  until  that moment had remained under  direct Tibetan control,  before the 
Chinese could complete their annexation of Tibet79. China neither complained nor 
commented,  though  vigorous  protests  were  raised  by  the  Tibetan  authorities. 
However,  soon  after  having  officially  annexed  Tibet  on  23rd May 1951,  Beijing 
declared  itself  ready  to  refresh  the  question  of  the  Tibetan  borders  and  trade 
regulations with India through peaceful negotiations.
On 31st December 1953 a Sino-Indian conference therefore began in Beijing in 
order to settle at least the question related to the Tibetan trade regulations between 
India and China. The agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region  
of China and India was thus signed on 29th April 1954. It contained in its preamble 
the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as a reflection of the common 
desire for a peaceful co-existence80. According to this treaty India gave up all the 
special trade rights it had assumed after the Simla Conference in 1914, while China 
recognised the Indian Consulate in Lhasa and the trade agencies in Gyantse, Yatung 
76 Gupta, “Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse,” 699.
77 China had repeatedly in 1946 and 1947 for the British construction of roads in the tribal territory in 
the south of the McMahon line. Maxwell, “China and India,” 47.
78 Gupta, “Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibetan Trade and Intercourse,” 699.
79 Srinath  Raghavan,  “Sino-Indian  Boundary  Dispute,  1948-60:  A Reappraisal,”  Economic  and 
Political Weekly 41, no. 36 (September 9, 2006): 3883.
80 These  were:  respect  for  integrity  and  sovereignty;  mutual  non-aggression;  non-interference  in 
internal affairs; equality; and peaceful co-existence.
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and Gartok81.  The border issue was instead not approached on that  occasion,  but 
postponed.  As  shown  later,  the  inability  to  solve  the  question  of  the  borders 
delimitation  in  the  eastern  and  the  north-western  sectors  through  peaceful 
negotiations, brought India and China to military confrontation in 196282. However, 
in  the context  of  the  Sikkimese  border  with Tibet  no claims had been raised  by 
China, nor India, to challenge what had been clearly defined by the Anglo-Chinese 
Treaty of 1890. Moreover, after the Indian recognition of Sikkim as a protectorate in 
1950, China welcomed the Indian Prime Minister Nehru at the Nathu Lal pass in 
1953 with a ceremony during which a plaque was mounted at the pass to mark the 
common border83.
  2.3 Sikkim from the Fifties until 1971
In the early Fifties the Maharajah was able to accommodate the political requests of 
the Sikkimese democratic forces creating a special institutional pattern that allowed 
him (and India) to keep control over the domestic political situation. In the Sixties a 
gradual erosion of the Indo-Sikkimese relations instead took place, due to the new 
Maharajah’s ambitions gain independence. These two developments will be therefore 
analysed in this paragraph with the aim of provide the reader with a clear picture to 
understand the dramatic events of the Seventies.
The solution sanctioned by the 1950 Treaty left the democratic political forces 
81 It was decided that China would have then opened its trade agencies in Calcutta, New Delhi and 
Kalipomg.  India  also  withdrew the  small  military detachment  which  it  had  been  retaining  at  
Gyantse since 1904, accepted to give up the post and telegraph installations it had in Tibet, even if  
the Chinese had made explicit reference only to some passes in the central sector of the border 
(between Nepal and the contested territory of Kashmir).
82 For a detailed analysis of the border question and to the failure of the bilateral negotiation consult:  
Maxwell,  India’s  China  War;  Maxwell,  “China  and  India”;  Mehra,  “India-China  Border”; 
Raghavan, “Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, 1948-60”; Noorani,  India-China Boundary Problem,  
1846-1947; Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990).
83 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 27.
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disappointed.  Their  faith  in  the  new  Independent  India,  as  progressive  and 
democratic agent, was almost definitively lost in Sikkim in 1949-1950. Therefore, 
after 1950 the protests and agitations promoted by the Sikkim State Congress for the 
democratization of the Sikkimese politics began to blame it not only on the Sikkim 
monarchy, but also on India84. The situation was settled in 1953 when the Maharajah 
finally accepted the resumption of the State Council as a representative legislative 
body  of  Sikkim.  A  Constitutional  proclamation  was  therefore  made  by  the 
Maharajah, according to which the State Council was entrusted with the power to 
propose laws for internal state management, which would have been enacted by the 
king. It was made up of eighteen members: twelve elected by the people (six were 
reserved  to  the  Nepalese  community,  and  six  to  Bhutia  and  Lepcha),  and  six 
nominated by the Maharajah, among which also the State Council President85. The 
system inequality was clear: the Nepalese community, which counted around 80% of 
the  Sikkimese  people,  was  given the  same representation  as  to  the  Lepchas  and 
Bhutias, which together were presented only 20%. There was another element that 
further increased criticism from the Sikkim Congress against the complexity of the 
system proposed by the Maharajah: for a candidate to be elected, they not only had to 
secure  a  majority  in  his  community,  but  also  a  minimum  support  from  other 
communities86.  Although the  Nepalese  community requested a  one man one vote 
formula, the Sikkimese elections were held from 1953 until 1973 according on the 
system chosen by the Maharajah. This system also established an Executive Council: 
it included the Dewan in charge of finance and domestic affairs, and four Councillors 
selected by the Maharajah among the Assembly elected members, only charged of 
less crucial subjects, such as education, forest, health, etc87. In reality in 1953 only 
84 EPW, 13th February 1970.
85 For the 1958 elections the number was increased to twenty, adding one elected seat for the monks,  
and one to the number of the appointed ones.  For the 1967 elections the number was further  
increased to twenty-four: eighteen elected, and six nominated. Of the eighteen seats seven were 
reserved to the Nepalese, seven to the Lepchas and Bhutias, one for the monks, one for the Limbus 
(another minority of Tibetans origins), and one for the scheduled castes (generally won by the 
Nepalese community). Bareh, Encyclopaedia of North-East India, 16–17.
86 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 17.
87 Karan and Jenkins, The Himalayan Kingdoms, 74–5.
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two elected members were chosen by the Maharajah Tashi  Namgyal  to form the 
executive body: Sonam Tsering of the party faithful to the king (SNP), and Kashiraj 
Pradhan of the Sikkim State Congress.
As a consequence of the new political formula, the power in Sikkim was still 
retained almost completely by the Maharajah and India's representatives. They kept 
control  of  the  most  important  subjects  of  the  Sikkimese  government  through the 
nomination of the Dewan. The Maharajah maintained the over-representation in the 
State  and in  the  Executive  Councils  of  the  ethnic  groups  loyal  to  him,  assuring 
therefore his authority over the Sikkimese population. However, his personal powers 
were not so great as might appear at a first glance. The Maharajah had to consult the 
Political Officer named by the Indian government for all the important decisions he 
had to take. As a consequence: “if the Council members and the Political Officer 
agreed on any matter, the Maharajah had to accept that”88. As a matter of fact, the 
Indian government  also influenced the nomination of the Dewan.  The Sikkimese 
subjugation to India was then reinforced by the state heavy dependence for economic 
development, and for the administrative service shaped on the Indian pattern89. The 
entire developmental budget was financed by grants, loans,  or subsidies given by 
India, while the same private sector was largely dominated by Indian merchants and 
bankers resident in Sikkim90. In light of the large power held by New Delhi, it is 
therefore  not  surprising  if  the  question  of  Sikkim's  international  status  remained 
ambiguous after the 1950 Treaty signature.  India tried not to mention the special 
status of Sikkim in all official documents. Moreover, until 1967 New Delhi refused 
to  recognise the border  between India and Sikkim as an international frontier  on 
official Indian maps, despite frequent and strong protests coming from Sikkim91.
Domestic political tensions were therefore kept under control by the Maharajah 
and the Indian Political Officer until the Sixties. As a matter of fact, in July 1961 the 
Sikkim Subjects Regulation was promulgated by the Maharajah in accordance with 
88 Bareh, Encyclopaedia of North-East India, 59.
89 Nari Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987), 36.
90 Rose, “India and Sikkim,” 35.
91 Ibid., 36.
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the  Indian  nominated  Political  Officer  to  solve  the  old  issue  of  Sikkimese 
citizenship92. All citizens who could prove they had been living in Sikkim for at least 
fifteen years would have received Sikkim nationality. This was an important step in 
recognising  the  rights  of  the  Nepalese  origin  community,  though  it  still  did  not 
completely satisfy all  the Sikkim State  Congress'  demands93.  The SSC had never 
stopped demanding an electoral system based on the one man one vote formula, and 
for a more democratic system and in 1962, on the occasion of the national elections, 
it even tried to boycott the polls and to launch a non-cooperation movement in case 
the Maharajah did not accept the reduction of the State Council nominated seats, and 
to hand the land distribution regulation to  the Executive Council94.  However,  the 
1962 elections and all domestic issues were then postponed when Chinese troops 
invaded  India  in  the  north-east,  through the  Indian  state  of  Arunachal  Pradesh95. 
When  on  13th November  1962  the  Maharajah  called  the  state  of  a  national 
emergency, all the political parties in Sikkim gave their full support to the Sikkim 
and Indian governmental efforts to defend the state from the possibility of a Chinese 
invasion in Sikkim through Tibet96.
However,  after  1962 relations between Sikkim and New Delhi  had gradually 
eroded: Sikkim's economy significantly suffered due to the closure of the border with 
Tibet, not only because of the Sino-Indian trade collapse, but also the historical trade 
that had been carried between Sikkim and Tibet for centuries. The war stopped the 
traditional practice of the trans-border pasturage of the northern tribes of Bhutias as 
92 Karan and Jenkins, The Himalayan Kingdoms, 63.
93 Leo E. Rose, “The Himalayan Border States: ‘Buffers’ in Transition,” Asian Survey 3, no. 2 
(February 1963): 118.
94 Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 21.
95 As already mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, the 1962 war saw the Chinese victory and 
the humiliation of the Indian Army, without however solving the historical problem of the border  
definition. After 1962 only few small skirmishes took place along the Sikkimese borders in 1964,  
1965, and 1967. However, trade along the border remained banned until 2006.
96 Rose, “The Himalayan Border States,” 119. After the requests formulated by the Maharajah as a 
consequence of the worsening of Sino-Indian relations in 1959, in 1962 the formation of a small 
Sikkimese Army had been allowed by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru. A Sikkim Guard of 280 
soldiers had thus been organised and trained under the supervision of the Indian Army, and posed 
under the direct control of the Maharajah. It allowed Sikkim to directly participate in the defence 
operations carried out in late 1962, when some skirmishes took place along the Nathu-Lal pass.  
Karan and Jenkins, The Himalayan Kingdoms.
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well. This situation led Sikkim's authorities to progressively contest the excise duty 
system  India  imposed  on  the  goods  imported  by  Sikkim  from  1947.  It  was 
considered the cause of the economic dependence of Sikkim on India97.
Moreover, the new king of Sikkim, Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal98, began 
what  appeared  to  be  a  political  program  for  reinforcing  Sikkim's  identity  as  a 
separate state from India, thus annoying India's government further99. For example, 
before his official coronation ceremony on 4th April 1965, Thondup Namgyal decided 
to abandon his Indian status of Maharajah, and to re-adopt the Tibetan version of the 
title  Chogyal.  This  was  only  a  symbolic  gesture,  but  significantly  highlights 
traditional  cultural  link  with  the  Bhutia  and  Tibetan  cultures,  rather  than  India. 
Similarly, Buddhism was declared as the national religion, though only 20% of the 
Sikkimese population was of that faith and almost the 80% was Hindu. Also this 
decision was considered to be aimed at underlining the cultural diversity between 
Sikkim and India100. Furthermore in 1967 efforts were made to promote Sikkimese 
nationality: specific primary school textbooks were printed in which the Sikkimese 
culture, history and languages of the three main state ethnic groups (Lepcha, Bhutia, 
and  Nepali)  were  represented101.  A  national  anthem  was  composed,  creating 
controversies in India102, and lead the Political Officer (Vincent Coelho) to refuse to 
participate in some official ceremonies as a sign of protest. For the same reason he 
also denied a visa for the American Ambassador, who wanted to visit Sikkim in June 
1966103. The national flag became omnipresent after the Chogyal coronation, while a 
new youth organization, the Youth Study Forum, was formed with the support of the 
97 It has been calculated that all the aid India gave to Sikkim from 1953 to 1967 had been balanced  
by the excise duties. Rose, “India and Sikkim,” 43.
98 Palden Thondup succeeded his father when the latter died on 2nd December 1963.
99 At the same time, however, as reported by Rustomji, the Chogyal marrying an American woman 
apparently became more interested in trips abroad, in welcoming foreign visitors to Sikkim, rather 
than keeping close ties with his own people. Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 65–68.
100Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 36.
101Jackie  Hiltz,  “Constructing Sikkimese  National  Identity in  the 1960s and  1970s,”  Bulletin  of  
Tibetology 39, no. 2 (2003): 75–76.
102“Salutary Honours,” Economic and Political Weekly 3, no. 29 (July 20, 1968): 1131–1132.
103“Report on Sikkim, South and South-East Asia Section, joint Foreign Office and Commonwealth 
Office, Research Department, dated on 29th November 1966”, in FCO 37/1181, Political Affairs of 
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royal family and of Chogyal's wife104. The Youth Forum gathered together the young 
nobles of Bhutia and Lepcha origins who were loyal to the Chogyal. They began to 
act as a coterie of advisers and supporters for the royal family's ambitions to have an 
independent Sikkim.
Connected  to  the  promotion  of  a  Sikkimese  nationality,  efforts  to  increase 
worldwide awareness of Sikkim's distinct political entity were also attempted. The 
Youth Study Forum began, for example, to openly call for a revision of the 1950 
treaty, and for Sikkim participation in multi-national programs, such as for example 
the Colombo Plan. The political program of the Chogyal had its supporters. Some 
editorials  of  the  nationalistic  Sikkim newspaper  (Gangtok),  like  those  written  by 
Kaiser Bahadur Thapa,  began,  for example,  to openly request the revision of the 
1950 Treaty, and for recognition of Sikkim from the United Nations Organization105. 
Bhutan was lobbying to be recognised by the UN as an independent state at that time: 
this clearly had a significant impact on the Sikkimese political circles that began to 
consider that option with more attention106. As a consequence, the ambitions Sikkim 
had  to  develop  its  own  international  identity,  independent  from India,  was  then 
shown in some apolitical events by the royal family, like the Maharajah’s coronation 
in 1965 when also foreign dignitaries were invited107. Also the establishment of the 
Sikkim seat  in  the  Asia  Society  in  New  York  in  1966,  the  participation  to  the 
selection of a Buddhist delegation in Soviet Union in 1967, and the sending of a 
104In 1963 the Chogyal married a young ordinary and shy American woman, Mrs. Hope Cooke, who 
he met during one of his trips to India. This international marriage, the first of the royal family of 
Sikkim, which usually married women of Tibetan origins, put a lot of focus on Sikkim from all the 
world.  This  irritated New Delhi  which would have  preferred  a  lower international  profile  for 
Sikkim. Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 76.
105Sikkim, 6th August 1968, quoted in Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 137.
106However,  the  situation  in  Bhutan  was  different:  the  British  always  avoided  interfering  in 
Bhutanese domestic  politics.  Moreover,  the 1949 Treaty signed by Bhutan and India only put 
Bhutan  under  the  protection  of  India,  without  giving  New Delhi  the  power  to  influence  the 
domestic politics of the small state. Its less crucial strategic position clearly explains these political  
differences.  To  gain  a  better  idea  of  the  differences  between  the  two states  see:  Rose,  “The 
Himalayan Border States”; Leo E. Rose, “Bhutan’s External Relations,” Pacific Affairs 47, no. 2 
(July 1, 1974): 192–208.
107Suresh  Kant  Sharma,  Discovery  of  North-East  India:  Geography,  History,  Culture,  Religion,  
Politics,  Sociology, Science,  Education and Economy. Sikkim (New Delhi:  Mittal  Publications, 
2005), 255–258.
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representative at Lima to the World Craft Council in 1968 are events that can be 
related to the royal family's attempt to gain an international status for Sikkim as an 
independent state.
Claims for a revision of the 1950 treaty and for a more independent position of 
Sikkim were  also  directly  formulated  by the  same royal  family of  Sikkim.  Mrs. 
Cooke,  the  young  American  wife  of  the  Sikkimese  king,  also  had  an  important 
influence on him, enhancing and supporting his ambitions to have an independent 
Sikkim. According to a friend of the royal family, Nari Rustomji: “Hope was also 
sowing seeds of discontent in the Prince’s mind as regards his treatment at the hands 
of the Government of India”108. Mrs. Cooke went even further when she published an 
article in the Bulletin of Tibetology in 1966 in which she examined the issue of the 
Darjeeling  grant  to  the  East  India  Company,  questioning  the  validity  of  the 
transaction  in  reference  to  the  traditional  Sikkimese  land-holding  system109.  The 
publication of an article casting doubts on the validity of British India's annexation of 
Darjeeling  clearly  triggered  controversies  in  New Delhi,  and  irritated  the  Indian 
government.  In  the  spring  of  1967  also  the  Chogyal  personally  made  an  open 
reference  for the need  to review the 1950 treaty signed with India. In an interview 
released to  Indian journalists  the Chogyal  expressed his personal  opinion that,  in 
view  of the  changes  that  had  occurred  in  the  meantime,  the  Treaty  had  to  be 
reformulated110. Again in 1968, during the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit 
to  Sikkim,  the  Chogyal  made another  reference  to  such a  claim in  his  welcome 
speech, when he called for Sikkim's “rightful place in the comity of nations”111.
In 1967 claims for the 1950 treaty review also came from the new Executive 
Council of Sikkim, which on 15th June released a joint statement arguing: “[...] It 
needs no emphasis for any one to feel the absolute need of a thorough change in the 
existing provisions  of  the Treaty […] Since Sikkim signed the Treaty with India 
surely it is within her sovereign right to demand the revision of the Treaty as one of 
108Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 79.
109Hope Namgyal, “The Sikkemese Theory of Land-hording and the Darjeeling Grant,”  Bulletin of  
Tibetology 3, no. 2 (1966): 47–59.
110Rose, “India and Sikkim,” 36.
111Sikkim, 9th May 1968, p. 3, cited in ibid.
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the signatories. In fact Sikkim gained her sovereign status on the 15 th August, 1947 
when India achieved her independence from the British Rule. This is evident from 
the fact  that Sikkim does not  figure in  the list  of the Indian union Territories as 
defined in the Constitution of India. Every country has its inherent right to exist and 
maintain its separate identity and, therefore, to review and revise its obligations in 
the wake of changing circumstances”112.  To better understand the value of this joint 
statement,  and  not  to  overrate  it,  it  is  crucial  to  consider  that  among  the  three 
members of the Executive Council signing it there were no exponents of the Sikkim 
National  Congress  (SNC)113. The SNC was the  new multi-ethnic party formed in 
1960 by the defection of some factions from the SSC and the SNP. Struggling for a 
reduction of the Chogyal's powers, a democratization of Sikkim's political life, and of 
the maintenance of good relations with India114, the SNC had won more votes than all 
the parties in the 1967 elections115. As a result, only the minority parties of the SNP 
and  of  the SSC thus openly supported the statement  of the Executive Council  of 
Sikkim. In fact, the SNP had always been pro-Chogyal, whereas, the SSC had lost its 
faith in the progressive role India could have had in bringing democracy to Sikkim 
after 1949,  and had  begun to support Chogyal’s claims for independence, even if 
continuing to press for the democratization of Sikkim’s political system.  Although 
the joint communicate had the support of only the two minority parties, the SNP and 
the SSC, it was a sign that the feeling of the necessity to revise the 1950 Treaty in 
favour  of  greater  independence  of  Sikkim was  diffused  in  some  sections  of  the 
112Sikkim Herald, 16 June 1967, quoted in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 25.
113The three politicians that signed the joint statement were: Netuk Tsering (Sikkim National Party),  
Nahakul  Pradhan  (Sikkim  State  Congress),  and  B.  B.  Gurang  (originally  from the  SNC  but 
expelled  from  the  party  for  his  pro-Chogyal  inclinations).  “Last  Chance  for  Democracy?,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 5, no. 1 (January 3, 1970): 10–11.
114The memorandum sent by the SNC to the Indian Prime Minister on 5th May 1968 demanding 
democratization, clearly demonstrates this stand. “Salutary Honours,” 1131.
115The SNC secured eight seats at the Sikkim State Council (five from the Nepalese constituency, 
two  from  Lepcha  and  Bhutia  ones,  and  one  from  the  general  seat).  The  party  loyal  to  the  
Maharajah, the SNP, won instead only five seats among the Lepchas-Bhutias constituency, and the  
two reserved to the Limbus and the scheduled castes. The seat reserved to the monks went to a 
Lama who was supported by the Sikkim National Party. As a result, the Sikkim State Congress  
emerged as the defeated one: it won only two Nepalese seats. However, thanks to the fact that the  
Chogyal nominated six members in the State Council, the latter remained dominated by the pro-
Chogyal forces. Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 23–25.
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Sikkimese political society.
In  1968  the  first  anti-Indian  demonstration  took  place  in  Sikkim during  the 
Independence Day celebrations116. When Indian guests began to arrive at the Indian 
Residency, some 30 school-children carried out a small anti-Indian parade bringing 
notices  with  slogans  like  “Down  with  Indian  traitors”,  “Down  with  Indian 
Imperialists”,  and “Indian  Army go home”117.  As  reported  by the  Economic  and 
Political  Weekly correspondent  from Gangtok, the Chogyal  could not conceal his 
personal sympathy to the demonstration, which seemed to be organized by his loyal 
Sikkim Youth Forum118. Pressures for punishment were immediately expressed by the 
Indian Political Officer, N. B. Menon, who within a few hours following the event 
had promptly informed New Delhi. Alarmed also by the Sikkim National Congress 
leader, Lendhup Dorji119, India reacted immediately. The Ministry of External Affairs 
Secretary, T. N. Kaul, was sent to investigate the situation in Gangtok. He decided 
that the Chogyal had to publicly take a stance against the event and to punish the its 
authors120. Punitive measures were then taken by the Chogyal against some teachers 
and pupils. This act apparently calmed down New Delhi and maintained relations at a 
good level, although soon after suspicions emerged about the fact that organizers of 
the manifestation (e. g. Sikkim Youth Forum exponents) had not been punished121.
In  1969  another  anti-Indian  demonstration  was  organised  by the  two parties 
closer to the royal family (the SNP, and the SSC) for the visit of the Indian President  
V. V. Giri, planned on 30th March 1969122. Since the visit was cancelled due to the 
floods that had tragically hit Sikkim, further tensions between India and Sikkim were 
averted. However, on the day of the expected visit an article was published in Sikkim, 
the  supposedly  independent  newspaper  behind  which  there  was  the  Chogyal's 
influence.  The  piece  was  calling  for  full  independence  of  the  state,  and  for  the 
116“No Longer Welcome,” Economic and Political Weekly 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1970): 902.
117“On the Wrong Side,” Economic and Political Weekly 3, no. 36 (September 7, 1968): 1358.
118“No Longer Welcome,” 902.
119“End of the Affair?,” Economic and Political Weekly 3, no. 41 (October 12, 1968): 1571.
120Ibid., 1570–1571.
121“No Election for Chogyal ?,” Economic and Political Weekly 4, no. 43 (October 25, 1969): 1695.
122“No Longer Welcome,” 902–903.
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revision of the 1950 treaty and of the system of Indian excise123. Chogyal's ambitions 
to see Sikkim become independent were also hindered on the occasion of the Nepali 
crowned prince's wedding in February 1970. Sikkim was only offered the inferior 
status of government head, instead of the expected head of state, due to the pressures 
exercised by New Delhi over  Kathmandu124. As a consequence, the visibly irritated 
Sikkim  royal  family  decided  to  decline  the  invitation  and  to  send  some 
representatives of the Sikkim government instead125. 
All  these  efforts  for  supporting  an  independent  Sikkim clearly alarmed New 
Delhi.  Nevertheless,  the  Chogyal  did  not  show  the  intelligence  to  promote  a 
democratization of Sikkim, which would also have granted it the support of the SNC. 
Supporting, for example, a constitutional democracy, the Chogyal could have had a 
united and compacted Sikkim under his guidance to face New Delhi regarding the 
question  of  gaining  more  independence.  However,  still  in  the  Seventies,  the 
Sikkimese  king  did  not  show  any  intentions  to  promote  a  democratization  of 
Sikkim's politics. Therefore, he continued to fight a war on two fronts: domestically 
against  the  party  based  on  the  Nepalese  community  (SNC),  which  demanded 
democratization; and internationally against  India,  which did not want  to lose its 
political  control  over  Sikkim126.  Therefore,  although  in  the  1970  elections  the 
Chogyal again managed to obtain an absolute majority in the State Council127, thanks 
123“Letter sent by R. A. Burns, British High Commission in New Delhi, to Miss. T. A. H. Solesby, 
South Asian Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, dated 3 rd July 1970”, in 
FCO 37/532, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 1970, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew 
Gardens, United Kingdom.
124“In the Doldrums,” Economic and Political Weekly 5, no. 16 (April 18, 1970): 659.
125The representative group was formed by two Nepali, and two Lepcha-Bhutia, for that occasion 
nominated “Ministers”. Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 36.
126Indian  intentions  were  clearly  resumed  in:  “Letter  from  I.  J.  N.  Sutherland,  South  Asian 
Department, to Sir. Stanley Tomlison, dated 9th July 1970”, in in FCO 37/532, Political Affairs of 
Sikkim, 1970, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
127The majority of the State Council again remained firmly in the hands of the Chogyal who could  
count on the 7 seats won by the SNC, the four won by the SSC, and on the six seat he directly and 
freely nominated. “Letter from R. A. Burns, British High Commission in New Delhi, to Miss. T. A. 
H. Solesby, South Asian Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, dated on 3th July 1970”, 
in FCO 37/532, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 1970, South Asian Department, National Archives, 
Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
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to  the  unequal  election  system  he  had  devised  in  1953,  and  some  irregular 
practices128, resentment grew in the Sikkim National Congress that could only secure 
five seats, and place its leader, Kazi Lhendup Dorji, in the Executive Council129. The 
decision to not concede a democratization was a big error made by the Chogyal who 
was indeed crucially weakened by the domestic dissent diffused among the Nepalese 
community, as the following paragraph will show.
  3. Sikkim from protectorate to 22nd Indian state (1973-1975): a  
literature review
A consideration of the events leading Sikkim to become the 22nd Indian state will be 
done in the following paragraph. It will be shown how the literature has been deeply 
divided in commenting on the turbulent years from 1973-1975. Following years of 
relative calm, from 1973-1975 the political  situation in Sikkim abruptly changed, 
128The Chogyal rejected several SNC candidates for the Sikkim State Council without that any clear  
explanations being provided. Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 36. He curiously 
decided to reduce the electoral roll used in 1967 when 87.000 people had the right to vote, to only  
50.000, thus reducing the number of Nepali voters.  “Letter from Fowler,  British Deputy High 
Commission in Calcutta, to W. K. Slatcher, British High Commissioner, New Delhi, dated on 6th  
May 1970”, in FCO 37/532, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 1970, South Asian Department, National  
Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
129“A Party for Every Season,” Economic and Political Weekly, October 3, 1970, 1634 The confusing 
and tense situation of Sikkim was well summed up by the High Commissioner in India from New 
Zealand, after his first trip in the state in November 1970. From the report he sent to the Secretary  
of Foreign Affairs in Wellington, and in copy to London, the erosion of Indo-Sikkimese relations 
emerges clearly,  together  with the domestic  tensions between the royal  family,  sided with the 
Lepcha-Bhutia communities, and the Nepalese community. It is interesting to note that the New 
Zealander bureaucrat left Sikkim with the feeling that something would have occurred soon and 
that it was: “likely that rather concede major autonomy India will seek first to assimilate Sikkim”. 
See: “Letter sent by the High Commissioner of New Zeland in New Delhi to the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs of New Zeland in Wellington, copied to South Asian Department in London, dated 
on  1st  November  1970”,  in  FCO  37/532,  Political  Affairs  of  Sikkim,  1970,  South  Asian 
Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
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taking a serious and sudden turn in India's favour, and against the Chogyal. In order 
to understand what actually happened, this paragraph will be devoted to the analysis 
of the 1973-1975 events as reported by literature. This paragraph will highlight how 
the rival accounts provided are biased. Commentators and analysts are split into two 
completely opposite interpretations of the facts. On one hand, the dominant pro-India 
version130 refers to a spontaneous merger of Sikkim with the Indian Union, triggered 
by the violent upsurge of the Sikkimese against its despot. On the other, the anti-
Indian version131 reports of a mere Indian annexation of Sikkim, carried out through 
the fomentation, before, and the exploitation, later, of the conflicts which existed in 
Sikkim between the Sikkimese monarchy, who did not  want to quit power, and the 
people, who instead wanted a political democratization.
  3.1 The events of April 1973 and India's intervention
Before analysing the event, it is important to briefly consider the fact that only a few 
significant events took place in Sikkim from 1971 until spring of 1973. All these 
confirmed the Chogyal's intentions to reduce India's control over Sikkim. In 1972 the 
Chogyal directly assumed all executive power following the Dewan (I. S. Chopra) 
mandate termination132. According to a note sent by the British High Commissioner 
in  New  Delhi,  T.  Garvey,  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Foreign  and 
Commonwealth Office, Alec Douglas-Home, the Chogyal had begun to rely “less on 
the  inchoate  departments  of  state  than  upon  his  Private  Secretaries,  two  black-
130The  Indian  press,  Awadhesh  Coomar  Sinha,  Politics  of  Sikkim:  a  Sociological  Study (Delhi: 
Thomson Press, 1975); Ranjan Gupta, “Sikkim: The Merger with India,”  Asian Survey 15, no. 9 
(September 1975):  786–798;  Rao,  Sikkim,  the Story of  Its  Integration with India;  the  account 
provided by the Indian ex-Chief Executive of Sikkim: Brajbir Saran Das, The Sikkim Saga (New 
Delhi: Vikas, 1983); Bajpai, China’s Shadow Over Sikkim.
131Ram, “Sikkim Story”; the account provided by the Chogyal’s wife: Hope Cooke,  Time Change:  
An  Autobiography (New York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1980);  Datta-Ray,  Smash and  Grab;  the 
account provided by the ex-Dewan and Chogyal’s friend: Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy; 
Jigme N. Kazi, Inside Sikkim, Against the Tide (Gangtok, Sikkim: Hill Media Publications, 1993).
132Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 165.
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gowned, white-cuffed characters called Desapa and Topden, who might have been 
taken straight from 16th century Florence”133, thus openly challenging New Delhi. In 
addition, it had been reported by political opponents of the Chogyal, like the leader 
of the NSC Lendhup Dorij, that the king was actively working on his plans to create 
a  Himalayan  Grand  Federation  among  the  monarchies  of  Nepal,  Sikkim,  and 
Bhutan134. He reported for example about the Chogyal proposal (not successful) of 
marrying his daughter Yangchen to the Bhutan Queen's son in late 1972, with the aim 
of strengthening political ties between Bhutan and Sikkim. Clearly New Delhi could 
only had received both pieces of news with irritation at that time.
During the 1973 elections three parties presented their candidature: the Sikkim 
Janata  Congress135,  the  SNP  and  the  SNC.  Judged  by  British  observers  as  an 
“opportunistic attempt to mix together policies stolen from the other parties”, the 
new  Sikkim  Janata  Congress  (SJC)  rallied  for  the  creation  of  a  constitutional 
monarchy, for the elimination of the parity formula among communities, and for the 
revision of the 1950 Treaty in order to  make Sikkim independent136.  The Sikkim 
National Party (SNP) maintained its pro-Chogyal approach, rallying for the revision 
of the 1950 treaty to have an independent Sikkim at the United Nations Organization, 
and for maintaining the parity formula among communities, which over-represented 
Lepcha and Bhutia minorities137. The Sikkim National Congress led by Kazi Lhendup 
Dorji instead had a clear position against the monarchy and was in favour of closer 
relations  between  Sikkim and India: it campaigned in the name of the abolition of 
133“Note DS NO 04/72 sent by High Commissioner in New Delhi, T. Garvey, to Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Alec Douglas-Home, dated 1972”, 5/7, in FCO 37/982, 
Political  Affairs  of  Sikkim,  1972,  South  Asian  Department,  National  Archives,  Kew Gardens, 
United Kingdom.
134“Letter  from  T.  J.  O'Brien,  British  Embassy  in  Kathmandu,  Nepal,  to  T.  Garvey,  High 
Commissioner  in  New  Delhi,  dated  22nd March  1973”,  in  FCO  37/1181,  Political  Affairs  of 
Sikkim, 1973, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
135This party was formed in August 1972 by the merger among the Janata Party (founded in late  
1969),  the  SSC,  the  Rajya  Praja  Sammelan  of  C.  K.  Pradhan,  and  a  faction  of  the  National 
Congress led by D. B. Tiwari. Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 38.
136“Letter from Philippa Drew, British High Commission in New Delhi, to J. A. Birch, South Asian 
Department, FCO, London, dated on 5th April 1973,1/2, FCO 37/1181, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 
1973, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
137Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 38.
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communal  pattern  for  voting,  for  a  written  constitution,  and  for  strengthening 
relations with India.
Although, the 9th – 14th  March 1973 elections saw an enlargement of the vote 
rolls and 107.000 people had the right to go to the polls, the outcome was a meagre 
40%138. The reason for this was probable due to the irrelevancy of the elections to the 
Sikkimese political life, since the real power was still held by the Chogyal and by the 
government of India. The Sikkim National Party (SNP) emerged as the first national 
party, winning nine seats, while the Sikkim National Congress (SNC) won five seats, 
and the Sikkim Janata  Congress  (SJC) two139.  As a  consequence,  once again  the 
majority in the State Council was controlled by forces loyal to the Chogyal, as well 
as  the  Executive  Council.  In  this  context  the  Chogyal  took another  step  to  try 
diminishing  India's  power  in  Sikkim  further:  rather  then  proceeding  with  the 
nomination of a new Indian Dewan in accordance with New Delhi, who since 1953 
had also been the President of the Sikkim State Council,  on 26 th March 1973  the 
Chogyal appointed Dorji Dahdul, a bureaucrat of the Sikkim government, to assume 
such a position140.
This latter move of the Chogyal passed almost unnoticed and did not provoke 
any specific  dissent  reaction  from India.  The  probable  cause  was  that  when  the 
results were announced the  Sikkim National Congress party and the Sikkim Janata 
Congress immediately began to denounce presumed malpractices and irregularities in 
the poll counting, creating a mounting clamour in Sikkim and catching attention141. 
Their  criticism  was  then  further  fuelled  by  the  Chogyal's  decision  to  not  open 
investigations,  and  by  the  unlucky  decision  to  arrest  on  27th March  the  Janata 
Congress leader, K. C. Pradhan, with allegations of having made a speech that was 
likely to trigger communal tensions142. This latter event flamed reactions among the 
138“Letter from Philippa Drew, British High Commission in New Delhi, to J. A. Birch, South Asian 
Department,  FCO,  London,  dated  on 5th April  1973,1/2,  in  FCO 37/1181,  Political  Affairs  of 
Sikkim, 1973, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
139Ibid.
140Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 38.
141Ibid., 39.
142Ibid., 40.
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leaders of the Sikkim Janata Congress party and the National Congress party: they 
thus formed a joint committee, the Joint Action Committee (JAC), and organised on 
28th March a protest against the alleged electoral irregularities and Pradhan's arrest, 
and  in  favour  of  democratic  reforms.  In  the  following  days  a  sixteen-point 
programme  was  then  formulated  by  the  JAC  calling  for  the  abolition  of  the 
communal  voting  system,  the  introduction  of  political  reforms,  the  Chogyal's 
abdication, and closer relations with India143. Several agitations were thus launched 
by the JAC, while the Indian Political Officer, K. S. Bajpai, tried to bring the parts 
together to negotiate. Nevertheless, in the first days of April it became evident that 
the negotiation attempt had failed. 
On the morning of 4th April people gathered outside Gangtok to try to reach the 
royal  palace.  According to the version reported by Indian newspapers,  eighty-six 
people went on an indefinite fast in front of the Tsuklakhang, the palace monastery;  
while the Sikkimese police began to fire tear-gas shells against the agitators trying to 
surround the royal palace in Gangtok144. The homes of Chogyal supporters in some 
districts were also looted and burnt by the Nepali crowd145. The impulsive son of the 
Chogyal, Tengzing Namgyal, became involved in the strongest shooting episode on 
4th April  when he  was assaulted  by the  crowd while  in  his  jeep in  the  Gangtok 
marketplace, and began to shoot randomly at people to escape, thus fuelling even 
more anger among demonstrators146. Therefore, the Chogyal's birthday celebration, 
planned for  the  4th and  5th of  April,  were  partially  cancelled.  Then,  on  5th April 
Sikkim administration almost collapsed. According to Indian sources: police outposts 
and  administrative  offices  were  indeed  abandoned  and  occupied  by  the 
demonstrators147.
In this chaotic situation it is interesting to note that both parts decided to appeal 
143Ibid.
144“Troubled Protectorate,” Economic and Political Weekly 8, no. 15 (April 14, 1973): 706–707.
145Gupta, “Sikkim,” 790.
146Ram, “Sikkim Story,” 68. This version was confirmed by the same crown prince in a phone call he 
made to one of his friends in Cambridge, reported later by The Times and The Washington Post, in  
which he however assured that none was killed.  The Times, 9th April 1973; and Bernand D.,  
Nossiter “Sikkim king hints of Indian pressure”, The Washington Post, 10th April 1973.
147Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 40.
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to India to bring back order in Sikkim. On one hand, the JAC leaders went to the 
Indian Political Officer to directly demand for the Indian Prime Minister to intervene 
and rescue: “the innocent people of Sikkim from a ruthless repression unleashed by 
the  Darbar  [Sikkim's  government,  alias  the  Chogyal] to  perpetuate  the  feudal 
privileges  against  the  demands  for  democratic  rights”148.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Chogyal  called  New  Delhi  asking  for  help  to  restore  order  in  the  state,  and  to 
reorganize the whole Sikkim administration  149.  The Sikkimese king indeed could 
only count on the small Sikkim Guard (280 soldiers), and the small Sikkimese police 
force.
India seized the opportunity and promptly accepted to take control of Sikkim on 
6th April.  The  Commissioner  of  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation,  B.  S.  Das,  was 
therefore appointed as the Chief Administrator of Sikkim on 9th April 1973. At the 
same time Avtar Singh was promptly sent to Gangtok: he was a senior secretary of 
the Indian External Affairs Ministry who had already served as Political Officer in 
Bhutan and Nepal, known for his inclinations towards the popular political leaders of 
Sikkim150. When the Indian Army and the Central Reserve Police became active in 
Gangtok, the JAC called off its agitations, urging India at the same time to take a 
clear stand against the Chogyal. According to Indian sources, the order was easily 
restored by the Indian Army151. The Indian Deputy Foreign Minister, Surendra Pal 
Singh, summed up the events in Sikkim in the Lok Sabha on 9th April 1973 phrasing 
what happened after the 27th March arrest of the Janata Congress leader Pradhan as 
follows: “[...] the excess of the police which resulted in a large number of casualties 
and mass  upsurge  against  the  Sikkim Darbar  [government  of  Sikkim led  by the 
Chogyal]. Thereafter there were large-scale demonstrations all over Sikkim. Twenty 
thousand  demonstrators  collected  in  Gangtok  demanding  democratic  rights  and 
148The Hindu, 8th April 1973.
149Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 41.
150Rao stated that Avatar Singh was sent to Sikkim on 8th April as a consequence of the troubles. 
Ibid.; The Economic and Political Weekly made out that he went after the 4th April. “Troubled 
Protectorate,” 707. However, declassified British documents, as will later shown, put Singh’s 
arrival in Sikkim before, on 3rd April 1973.
151The Hindu, 10th April 1973.
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demonstrating against the Chogyal regime. Police stations of several important towns 
such as Rangpo, Rhenock, Melli,  Namchi, Geyzing, and Singtam were also taken 
over by the popular leaders and the population under their guidance. As the situation 
in  Sikkim went  out of Chogyal's  control  despite  strong measures adopted by the 
Sikkim Darbar, the Chogyal first made a formal request to the government of India 
for its police stations in Rangpo, Rhanock and Melli to be manned by the Indian 
Army and then to entrust the responsibility for law and order in Gangtok itself to the 
Indian Army. Our acceptance of these requests was widely acclaimed by the masses 
of Sikkim. Finally, with the complete breakdown of law and order all over Sikkim, 
the Chogyal wrote us on the 8th April requesting us to take over the administration of 
the  whole  Sikkim.  He  also  asked  us  for  the  services  of  a  senior  officer  of  the 
Government  of  India  to  be  appointed  as  head  of  Sikkim's  administration. 
Simultaneously, there were repeated demands from the popular leaders and the large 
masses of Sikkim for the Government of India to take over the administration of the 
state. As a response, […], the Government of India had taken over the administration 
of the state and have also deputed a senior officer to function as head of Sikkim's 
administration”152.
Although  it  had  been  reported,  the  speech  attracted  some  unfavourable 
comments  from the  Indian  press  for  its  exaggeration  in  defining  the  event  as  a 
masses upsurge, the majority of Indian newspapers took this version as valid and 
supported the Indian government's position153. No space was given to the version of 
facts provided by the royal family. Therefore, when The Times and The Washington 
Post  published  the  Chogyal's  son  telephone  call  to  a  friend  in  United  Kingdom 
respectively  on  9th and  10th April,  Indian  newspapers,  such  as  for  example  The 
Patriot and  The Hindustan Times  on 11th April, firmly criticised.  The British and 
American newspapers were reporting the crown princes' allegations that the takeover 
152“Telegram  780  from  T.  Garvey,  British  High  Commissioner  in  New  Delhi,  to  South  Asian 
Department in London, dated on 10th April 1973”, in FCO 37/1181, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 
1973, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
153To read a critical article see: “Delhi Faces Test in Sikkim”, The Holiday, 15 th April 1973, which 
warned that the Indian intervention: “will create doubts in the minds of its smaller neighbours and  
serve as a provocation to China”.
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in Sikkim had been deliberately arranged by the Government of India, through the 
infiltration in Sikkim of outsider elements from Darjeeling”154. Thus, for example, on 
17th April  The  Statesman dismissed  such  accuses  stating:  “The  promotion  of  an 
agitation is the last thing a protecting power like India would think of sponsoring”155, 
while  The Times of India wrote: “There is no practical alternative at present to the 
use of New Delhi's  influence and authority to persuade the disparate elements to 
accept a compromise that takes Sikkim towards responsible government”156.
At that time, like in the years that followed, only few voices were publicly raised 
against the version provided by the Indian government and newspapers explaining 
the April 1973 events in Sikkim. The first clear reasons for this is that the entrance in 
Sikkim at that time was restricted by Indian authorities  only to  Indians. Therefore, 
only Indian  journalists  could enter  Sikkim and therefore provide  accounts  of  the 
events there157.  Nevertheless, international criticism came from regional rival states 
of India: China and Pakistan for clear political rivalry reasons firmly and strongly 
protested against India's actions. On 11th April 1973 the  New China News Agency 
published  the  first  official  Chinese  comments  on  Sikkim's  events  stating:  “The 
Government of India sent troops to forcibly take over the administration of Sikkim 
under  the  pretext  of  disturbances  there”158.  Also  Radio  Pakistan  clearly  blamed 
India's actions arguing: “India has now and then created some internal disturbances 
to strengthen its hold over the protectorate”, comparing (even if quite incorrectly) 
what happened in Sikkim to the events of 1971 East Pakistan159.
The second more interesting kind of criticism came from the members of the 
154The Times, 9th April 1973; and Bernard D. Nossiter, “Sikkim king hints of Indian pressure”, The 
Washington Post, 10th April 1973.
155N. J. Nariporia, “One Point of View: No Time or Need for Pussyfooting”, The Stateman, 17th April 
1973.
156Dilip Mukerjee, “Hard Choice in Sikkim: Difficult Task for New Delhi”, The Times of India, 14 th 
April 1973.
157For example, the article of Michael Hornsby “A break in Sikkim's idyllic oblivion”, published by 
The Times, 9th April 1973, clearly recognised that: “It is difficult to be absolutely certain of what is 
happening in Sikkim as it is out of bonds to foreign journalists”. The Washington Post in the article 
of Bernard D. Nossiter “Sikkim king hints of Indian pressure”, 10 th April 1973, also confirms that: 
“India  has  refused  to  permit  any  foreign  correspondents  to  enter  in  the  Kingdom  since  the 
disturbances began last week”.
158Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 42–43.
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Sikkimese royal family. The version provided by the Chogyal's son therefore was 
boldly reaffirmed by the Chogyal's sister, Pema Tsendeum Yapshi Pheunkane, in a 
press  conference  in  Hong  Kong.  On  that  occasion  she  alleged  India  had  used 
unconstitutional  means  to  promote  political  reforms  in  Sikkim,  such  as  bribing 
peasants from Darjeeling to go to Sikkim to create unrest160. Similar accusations were 
later  raised  also  by  the  Chogyal's  half  sister,  Lanzingla  Tashi,  who  claimed  a 
consistent part of the women who demonstrated in Gangtok were not Sikkimese161.
However, after India took up the political and administrative control of Sikkim 
on 10th April 1973, the royal family official statements no more openly challenged 
the Indian version of events. From late April onwards the Chogyal released speeches 
in which India was described as only having exclusively intervened in his help, while 
infiltrations from Darjeeling identified India as being responsible for the unexpected 
violence of the protesters. For example, the crown prince in a press conference in 
New Delhi on 13th April 1973 dismissed the interpretations made by The Times and 
The Washington Post during his telephone conversation, arguing it had instead been 
manipulated 162. Similar declarations were also released by his father in Gangtok on 
two occasions: at  the press conference following the first  negotiation with Indian 
authorities on 11th April 1973 (after India's takeover)163; and in September 1973 when 
he went to meet Indian authorities in New Delhi164. Clearly the royal family did this 
159The English translation of the Urdu broadcasting of Radio Pakistan (Ahmjad Hussa, on 8th April 
1973) was  done by Ashok Chib, Joint Secretary of Pakistan Division  at the Indian Minister of 
External Affairs,  and attached to “Letter from Philippa Drew, British High Commission in New 
Delhi, to J. A. Birch, South Asian Department in London, dated 16 th April 1973”, in FCO 37/1181, 
Political  Affairs  of  Sikkim,  1973,  South  Asian  Department,  National  Archives,  Kew Gardens, 
United Kingdom.
160Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  23rd  April  1973,  26  cited  in  Rao,  Sikkim,  the  Story  of  Its  
Integration with India, 42.
161Far Eastern Economic Review, 21st May 1973, 14-15, cited in ibid.
162“Telegram  807  from  T.  Garvey,  British  High  Commissioner  in  New  Delhi,  to  South  Asian 
Department, London, dated on 14 April 1973”, in FCO 37/1181, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 1973, 
South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
163“Telegram  809  from  T.  Garvey,  British  high  Commissioner  in  New  Delhi,  to  South  Asian 
Department, London, dated on 13th April 1973”, 1/2, in FCO 37/1181, Political Affairs of Sikkim, 
1973, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
164“Letter sent by Philippa Drew, British High Commission in New Delhi, to C. H. Seaward, South 
Asian Department, FCO, London, dated 17 October 1973”, in FCO 37/1181, Political Affairs of 
Sikkim, 1973, South Asian Department, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
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with the aim of not worsening the already precarious situation and of preserving its 
power.
Criticism  against  the  version  provided  by  the  Indian  governments  and 
newspapers were only raised later after Sikkim was definitively absorbed by India in 
1975 and the royal family was dethroned. For example in 1984 an Indian journalist 
friend of the Chogyal, Sunanda Datta-Ray, published a book titled Smash and Grab: 
Annexation of Sikkim, based on the Sikkimese royal family sources165. According to 
Datta-Ray, an agreement was almost reached on 1st April 1973 between the Chogyal 
and the JAC politicians on the one man one vote formula, thus clearly introducing a 
democratization  of  the  1953  electoral  system chosen  by  the  Chogyal.  However, 
Datta-Ray claimed that it was Lendhup Dorji, the leader of the SNC, who suddenly 
(and  suspiciously)  withdrew  the  support  of  his  party  for  the  agreement  without 
credible explanations, and who therefore made negotiations collapsing166. Moreover, 
Datta-Ray argued that people who gathered around Gangtok in early April: “came 
out of fear because households in the south and the west had been threatened with 
reprisals  if  they did  not  each  send at  least  one male  [to  demonstrate  against  the 
Chogyal]. Simple villagers had been told that the royal birthday was being celebrated 
on a grand scale and there would be food […]”; and that they were in total no more 
than  2.000  people,  thus  far  less  than  the  20.000  claimed  by  India167.  Further 
considerations  made  by  Datta-Ray  claim  the  Indian  Army  did  not  immediately 
restore order after the Chogyal's call.  Instead, under the guidance of the Political 
Officer,  K.  S.  Bajpai,  feed  demonstrators  confined  and  dis-uniformed  Sikkimese 
police and encouraged protests until the government of the Sikkim administration 
definitively  collapsed168.  Only  after  10th April  1973,  the  Chief  Administration  of 
Sikkim,  newly  appointed  by  India,  B.  S.  Das,  finally  ordered  the  1.500  Central 
Reserve Policemen, who had arrived from India, and the Indian Army to restore law 
and  order.  Finally,  Datta-Ray quoted  in  another  book  Inside  RAW:  the  Story  of  
165Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab.
166Ibid., 178–179.
167Ibid., 173 and 191.
168Ibid., 188–197.
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India's Secret Service, written by Ashoka Raina and published in 1981169. This text 
suggests that India might have directly arranged the events through its intelligence 
service. Raina's book relied on secret interviews done with people who had served, or 
were  still  serving,  in  the  Indian  intelligence  of  the  Research  and Analysis  Wing 
(RAW), which was the section in charge of the intelligence related to India's external 
relations. Interestingly, Inside RAW argued that the RAW had been closely involved 
in the Sikkim merger with India probably from the beginning of 1972170, and that: 
“RAW agents were dispatched to Gangtok, Mangan, Namchi and Gyalshing, the four 
district headquarters in Sikkim. They slowly gathered operational data required for 
planning the operations in case India was forced to take action. Eighteen months later 
[…], RAW was all set to proceed further if required”171. Raina wrote that: “It was not 
difficult  for  RAW to  reinforce  the  idea,  which  was  already widely prevalent,  of 
getting  rid  of  the  Chogyal.  Select  individuals,  who  were  popular  amongst  their 
respective communities, were asked to further propagate the idea. Funds were made 
available  for  this  purpose [...]”172.  However,  no clear  evidence  were provided by 
Datta-Ray,  or  by  Raina  to  support  their  argumentations.  Raina  recognised  this 
openly: “The extent of their involvement and of the others in bringing it about will 
remain a secret till the archives release documents for public scrutiny”173. These two 
sources of criticism therefore raised the hypothesis that India not only intervened 
when directly called, but had directly arranged and supported (probably through its 
intelligence services) the anti-Chogyal demonstrations of April 1973.
169Asoka Raina,  Inside RAW: The Story of  India’s  Secret  Service (New Delhi:  Vikas,  1981).  To 
contextualise this book it is important to note that it was written after the disputed Emergency 
period (1975-1977), during which RAW forces had been used by the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
to domestically impose an authoritarian regime. After 1977, when another government again took 
democratic power, the RAW, as an institution, came under strong criticism. As a consequence, it is  
likely that Raina’s book was tough with the aim of informing Indians also of the other important 
missions RAW had done.
170Ibid., 64.
171Ibid., 68.
172Ibid., 70.
173Ibid., 74.
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  3.2 Sikkim from 1973 until its merger with India in 1975
Law  and  order  was  restored  by  the  Indian  Army  on  10th April  1973,  but 
demonstrations in favour of the Chogyal were organized by the Sikkim Youth Forum 
with hundreds of people filling the streets crying pro-royal slogans, and supporting 
the  preservation  of  the  monarchy174.  During  the  negotiations  promoted  by  the 
government of India the JAC abandoned the request for the Chogyal's abdication, but 
remained firm on a  fourteen-point  programme that,  among other  issues,  included 
requests for: a written constitution; an electoral system based on one man one vote 
formula with safeguards for minorities; an independent judiciary; the revision of the 
1950 treaty so that “a perpetual and steady friendship could be ensured between India 
and Sikkim”175. On the other hand, the Chogyal accepted to convene a round table 
with the representatives of all Sikkimese parties to pave the way for constitutional 
reforms and for a democratization of the country, in order to save the position of its 
royal family. However, in Sikkim political conflicts did not diminish: according to 
the JAC in May 1973 some Tibetan refugees allegedly began guerrilla actions176; 
while the JAC young sections started to urge the abolition of the monarchy again177. 
In this context, an agreement was finally signed between the Chogyal, the Foreign 
Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Kewal Singh, and the leaders of 
the Sikkim parties on the 8th May 1973.
The agreement provided Sikkim with a legislative body, an Assembly, elected 
every four years on the basis of an adult franchise and of a one man one vote formula 
with  safeguards  for  minorities178.  The  Assembly  was  empowered  to  legislate  on 
economic, home and establishment, finance, land revenue, education, transport, etc. 
As before, the Executive Council was composed of some elected members of the 
Assembly,  and  led  by  a  Chief  Executive  appointed  by  the  Chogyal  after  India 
174“1949, with a Difference,” Economic and Political Weekly, April 21, 1973, 732.
175The Hindu, 14th April, 1973.
176Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 45.
177Ibid.
178For the entire text of the agreement see ibid., 116–120.
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expressed its preference, as had happened with the Dewan before. However, the new 
Chief Executive had greater powers than the Dewan since he could act independently 
in case of an emergency situation. Moreover, any difference of opinion between the 
Chief Executive and the Chogyal had to be referred to the Indian Political Officer 
whose opinion was binding for everyone in Sikkim179. The 8th May agreement also 
enlarged the powers of the Government of India which indeed received direct control 
over: the Judiciary; matters related to the status of the Chogyal and the royal family; 
Indo-Sikkimese relations; and communal harmony, good government, and economic 
and social matters in Sikkim180. Therefore, although Chogyal's power was drastically 
limited by the 8th May 1973 Agreement  – since only the control over the palace 
establishment and the Sikkim Guards was maintained – Sikkim's political forces did 
not gain political freedom. They were even more clearly subjugated to India. Not 
surprisingly,  British functionaries at  the High Commission of New Delhi defined 
Sikkim's new status as being similar to that of an old nineteenth century colony181. 
The agreement also sanctioned that successive elections would have been organised 
according to a formula that gave fifteen seats to the Nepali candidates, fifteen to the 
Bhutias and Lepchas, one to the monks, and one to the scheduled castes on the basis 
of one man one vote, thus finally ending the parity formula among communities182. 
On the basis of the 8th May 1973 agreement, new elections were held from 15th to 
19th April 1974. Under the management of the Electoral Commission of India, and 
although sources based on Indian accounts described elections as fairly conducted183, 
doubts  about  their  real  fairness were raised by some actors.  For  example,  on 7th 
September 1974 Mathew Kurian of the Indian CPI(M) in his speech at the Rajya 
Sabha of the Indian Parliament, highlighted that since four battalions of the Indian 
179Gupta, “Sikkim,” 793.
180Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 118.
181See “Telegram 984 from T. Garvey, British High Commissioner in New Delhi, to South Asian 
Department in London, dated on 11th May 1973”, and “Letter from A. H. Morgan, Deputy High 
Commissioner in Calcutta, to Philippa Drew, High Commission in New Delhi, dated on 3rd July 
1973”,  in  FCO 37/1181,  Political  Affairs  of  Sikkim, 1973,  South Asian Department,  National  
Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
182Gupta, “Sikkim,” 791–792.
183Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 48.
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Central Reserve Police (CRP) were patrolling Sikkim during the elections, forcing 
people from the villages to go to vote, those elections could not be considered as 
unbiased184.  Similarly,  also  Datta-Ray in  his  book  Smash and Grab casts  doubts 
about CRP's intimidations on the Lepcha and Bhutia community, and malpractices185. 
The 1974 elections saw the victory of the Sikkim Congress, which was the new party 
formed by the merger of the Sikkim National Congress (SNC) and Sikkim Janata 
Congress (SJC) in the second half of 1973. The Sikkim Congress won the majority of 
seats (thirty-one out of thirty-two seats) campaigning for a land reform, safeguards 
for minorities, and better relations with India. Its only rival, the old Sikkim National 
Party (SNP), which openly campaigned against India, secured only one seat186.
On 10th May the new Sikkim Assembly was addressed by the Chogyal, and on 
the following day it unanimously adopted a resolution that openly called for further 
strengthening of Indo-Sikkimese relations. The resolution stated: “[...] the Assembly 
resolved and hereby requests the government of India to examine the modalities of 
further  strengthening  India-Sikkim  relationship  as  already  agreed  to  in  the 
Agreement  of  8  May  1973,  signed  between  the  three  parties  and  to  take  the 
immediate steps for Sikkim's participation in the political and economic institutions 
of India”187. The Government of India thus named a constitutional advisor (G. R. 
Rajagopal) to write the new constitution for Sikkim, which was drafted by 20th June 
1974.
This new Constitution, called the Government of Sikkim Bill, largely included all 
the Agreement provisions from the 8th May, although it also introduced some crucial 
innovation. As a matter of fact, the Bill further deprived the Sikkim Assembly of the 
power to legislate over Home, and Finance issues. These were instead given to the 
Indian nominated Chief Executive188. Moreover, the Bill sanctioned the inclusion of 
Sikkim in the political institutions of India, such as the Indian Planning Commission, 
184Ram, “Sikkim Story,” 68.
185Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 209.
186Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 48.
187India and Foreign Review, 15th July 1974, 8, cited in ibid., 49.
188Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 225.
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and  the  Indian  programmes  for  students189.  These  were  significant  changes  that 
would  have  further  increased  the  already large  Indian  power  over  the  state,  and 
reduced Sikkim's sovereignty. They sanctioned far closer relations than ratified in the 
8th May Agreement of 1973, in which it only was called for: “[...] the strengthening 
of Indo-Sikkimese co-operation and inter-relationship”190.
Although  it  had  been  reported  that  the  Sikkimese  king  had  agreed  to  the 
constitution  draft  some  days  earlier,  he  finally  refused  the  Bill  considering  it 
dangerous for Sikkim's sovereignty.  Pro-Indian sources reported that the Chogyal 
ordered  the  Sikkim  Guards  to  impede  Assembly  members  from entering in  the 
Assembly to vote191. However, other sources reported instead that on 19th June 1974 
large strikes were organised by civil servants in Gangtok against the Bill192, and that 
on  20th June  the  situation  was  so  chaotic  that  politicians  could  only  access  the 
Assembly at 10 p.m.  and escorted by the Indian Army and the CRP. Furthermore, 
Datta-Ray contested the fairness of the vote that took place, in light of several issues: 
the fact that the draft Bill was new for the majority of the Assembly members, who 
did not have the opportunity to read it beforehand; and the fact that it was in English, 
thus in a language unknown to the majority of the Assembly members193. However, 
on 20th June 1974 the Sikkim Assembly approved the Bill.
Nevertheless, in order for it to become effective the constitution needed to be 
approved by the Chogyal, who refused to do so. He therefore asked the Political 
Officer, Bajpai, to postpone the Assembly until tensions were eased. On 25th June he 
went  to  New Delhi  to  consult  India's  government,  while  reportedly disorder  and 
violence  continued  in  Gangtok  among  anti-Bill,  and  pro-Bill  demonstrators194. 
189Gupta, “Sikkim,” 795.
190Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 116.
191Ibid., 50.
192Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 223. Also an article “Time for Moderation” in The Hindustan Times, 
3 July 1974, reported the civil servants protests, highlighting the strong pressure made by the Chief 
Executive to get them back to work.
193Ibid., 220–228. Also The Statesman published a letter to the editor sent by Khara Nanda Uprety,  
5th September 1974.
194Datta-Ray reported  that  the  Indian  and  Sikkimese  police,  which  were  both  led  by the  Chief 
Executive, did not intervene to protect violence against the palace and the National Party leaders.  
Ibid., 228–229.
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However,  according  to  Rustomji,  the  Government  of  India  had:  “[...]  already 
irrevocably made up its mind to implement the resolution and that if there were any 
changes to be sought by the Prince in the draft bill, the changes that the Government 
of  India  would  agree  to  would  be  merely  marginal  and  not  affect  the  main 
substance”195. Therefore, the visit to New Delhi resulted in a mere waste of time for 
the Chogyal. Moreover, according to pro-India sources 20.000 people again filled the 
Sikkim streets to protest against the Chogyal's behaviour196. These numbers are not 
completely credible because, like in 1973, no foreign journalists were allowed to 
enter Sikkim and thus to check it197. On 28th June 1974 the Constitutional Bill was 
again reconsidered in the Sikkim Assembly under the guidance of the new Indian 
Chief  Executive,  B.  B.  Lal,  who had taken office in  early 1974198.  Although the 
Assembly approved it once again, this time criticism emerged on the competencies 
transferred from the Assembly to the Chief Executive of the Home,  and Finance 
areas199. To press the Chogyal to accept the Constitution, on the 28th June the Sikkim 
Congress leader, Kazi Lhendup Dorji, and the Chief Executive, also sent a telegram 
to New Delhi requesting the power to pass the Bill in case the Chogyal did not do it 
in 48 hours. A similar telegram was sent also to the Chogyal who was urged to enact 
the  Bill,  and  threatened  him  with  the  intervention  of  the  Indian  government200. 
Quickly returning to Gangtok the Chogyal was left with no other choice but to finally 
accept the Bill. On 4th July 1974 he finally approved it, thus making it effective.
China expressed its criticism about the Sikkim's political developments of the 
summer of 1974 through an article on People's Daily of Beijing entitled “Intolerable 
bullying” where it  was stated: “By subjugating others to intolerable bullying,  the 
Indian expansionists  will  have to  pay for their  rabid evil  doings...”,  and that  the 
constitution bill: “... is in essence designed to deprive Sikkim of its every right of 
195Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 101.
196Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 53. The Indian Express, 27th June 1974.
197Cheng Huang, “The Himalayan Knife-edge”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September 1974.
198Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 55.
199Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 232.
200The Hindu, 30th June 1974.
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independence and reduce it to a colony of India”201.
In August the new Sikkimese executive was then formed, and the leader of the 
Sikkim Congress, Lendhup Dorji,  was sworn as Prime Minister of Sikkim. In the 
meantime, New Delhi proceeded with seeking the “participation and representation 
for the people of Sikkim in the political institutions of India”, as written in section 30 
(c) of the  Government of Sikkim Act. Having received few letters from the Sikkim 
Prime Minister, on 29th August 1974 the India Cabinet felt therefore authorised to 
change the Sikkim status from Protectorate to Associate state of India202. As a result, 
on  3rd September  the  35th Amendment203 to  the  Indian  Constitution  was  then 
introduced to the Indian Parliament. According to that Bill, India would have thus 
assumed the control not only over the external affairs, defence and communication of 
Sikkim, but also social and economic development; while Sikkim would have had 
the right  to elect one member at  both chambers of the Indian Parliament.  On 4th 
September 1974 the Lok Sabha passed the 35th Constitutional Amendment with an 
overwhelming majority of 310 against  7,  while on 8th September the Raja Sabha 
passed the bill with 168 votes against 8204.
In Parliament criticism was raised only by the CPM and the Congress (O). The 
Communists denounced that it would: “cause serious international complications and 
spoil the existing friendly relations between the people of India and Sikkim”, since it 
was  “making  a  farce  of  the  elected  [Sikkimese] Assembly”.  Members  of  the 
Congress (O) underlined that  it  was not correct to  create  a new category for the 
Sikkim status, since it could have triggered secessionist claims from other states of 
India, and that it was a: “constitutional monstrosity” since the Indian Parliament only 
had the right to legislate those territories which were under its control205. Instead, 
exponents of the Jan Sangh urged India not to waste anymore time and to directly 
annex Sikkim to the Indian Union206. Some criticism against the Bill on the lines of 
201Asian Recorder, 1974, 12145, cited in Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 58.
202Ibid., 61.
203The entire text is reported in ibid., 121–126.
204Ibid., 63.
205Interventions quoted in Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 247.
206Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 62–63.
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the Marxist and Congress (O) interventions also emerged in Indian newspapers207. 
Even more authoritative were the doubts expressed by the retired Chief Justice and 
later Vice-President of India, the jurist M. Hidayatullah, about the regularity of the 
management of Sikkim's merger into India sanctioned by the 35th Amendment to the 
Indian Constitution. Hidayatullah argued that: “The Indian Constitution binds India, 
not  Sikkim. What  binds  Sikkim is  the Government  of Sikkim Act  alone and the 
deliberations  and resolutions  of  the  assembly [...]”208.  The  Sikkim Assembly had 
indeed not been involved in the formulation of the 35th Amendment: New Delhi had 
acted autonomously only after having apparently received some written letters from 
the new Prime Minister of Sikkim, Lendhup Dorji. Based on that observation, the 
Indian  judge  continued  stating  that:  “Sikkim  international  distinct  personality  is 
unaffected, and it is a protectorate as before. […] This still continues in spite of the 
events  of  1974  and  the  amendment  of  the  Indian  Constitution”209.  However,  the 
events went in another direction, as will be now shown.
Protests erupted in some neighbour states of India. In Nepal demonstrations took 
place  in  front  of  the  Indian  Embassy,  though  the  Nepalese  political  authorities 
maintained a neutral approach to the question. They indeed underlined that Nepal 
had nothing to do with the Sikkimese events and therefore could only accept the new 
reality,  though  they timidly  added:  “As  Sikkim is  Nepal's  closest  neighbour,  we 
would naturally like it to retain its traditional entity”210. Pakistan instead raised its 
vehement criticism against India's growing hegemonic power in South Asia, trying to 
use  this  event  to  reinforce  its  claims  for  resuming  the  American  arms  sales  to 
Islamabad. Lastly, on 11th September 1974 China announced that it did not recognize 
the change in  status of Sikkim.  Hsinhua,  the news agency,  compared it  with the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  in  1968,  and  described  it  as  an:  “illegal 
207Kachenjunga, “Here We Come”, The Hindustan Times, 30th August 1974. The newspaper also 
published a drawing, called “Autumn Collection”, in which Mrs. Gandhi was represented in a 
traditional Sikkemese dress.
208Quoted in: Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 254.
209Ibid., 255.
210Quoted in: Ibid., 252.
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annexation of Sikkim”211, while  People's Daily denounced the action as a “flagrant 
act of colonial expansion”212.
The gravity of the new developments for his position and for Sikkim's status 
made the Chogyal to not reconcile with the new reality. In the fall of 1974 he indeed 
directly supported the International League for the Right of the Man's appellation to 
the UN Secretary General for investigating the presumed aggression of India against 
Sikkim213. This action enjoyed support from Chinese at the UN214. On 2nd October 
1974 the Indian representative, Rikhi Jaipaul, argued at the same forum that Sikkim 
had been a princely state under the British as all the other princely states that had 
been incorporated in India in 1947. This statement triggered further controversies, 
and indeed the Chogyal, in a message sent to the Government of India, highlighted 
the fact that Sikkim had never been a part of India and had always had a special 
status,  since  it  had  never  signed  the  Instrument  of  Accession like  all  the  other 
princely states had215.
During the autumn some Sikkimese anti-Indian protests also erupted in Sikkim 
and  Darjeeling,  but  they were  generally  harshly repressed  by the  Indian  Central 
Reserve Police (CRP)216. In the spring of 1975, political dissatisfaction emerged even 
more  clearly  among  the  politicians  of  Sikkim.  According  to  Datta-Ray,  eighteen 
members of the Sikkim Assembly gathered on the 12th March 1975 and passed a 
resolution that called for: the return of the Home and establishment,  and Finance 
subjects to the Assembly's control, the reduction of the Chief Executive's role to a 
mere advisor, and the withdrawal from Sikkim of those Indian Special Duty Officers 
in who had arrived after 1973217. However, on 16th March 1975 this resolution was 
declared illegal and unauthorized by Lendhup Dorji, the Prime Minister of Sikkim, 
while K. C. Pradhan, identified as the leader of the movement, was dismissed by the 
211Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 66.
212Reported in: Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 252–253.
213The Times, 1 May 1975, the article reported the letter of Chogyal’s son Wangchuk Namgyal is  
reprinted also in: Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 105–106.
214Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 69.
215Ibid.
216Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 264–265.
217Ibid., 291–292.
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Sikkim Assembly under the Chief Executive's request218. At the judiciary level on 29th 
March 1975 another  challenge was raised to the new situation sanctioned by the 
Constitutional Amendment of September 1974: as a result of a petition filed by the 
Chogyal, a judge of the central court of Gangtok, Tarachand Hariomal, granted an 
injunction that restrained the Sikkim Assembly from electing representatives for the 
Indian  Parliament,  questioning  the  validity  of  the  35th Amendment  to  the  Indian 
Constitution. However, the final decision on the issue was postponed to 28 th April 
1975219. A similar case was also pending in the high court in Delhi, where a petition 
had been deposited on 8th November 1974.
These political and judiciary events clearly highlighted the fact that the special 
status granted by Indian to Sikkim in 1974 could not have been a permanent solution: 
something  had  to  change  to  stabilize  the  situation.  The  question  was:  in  which 
direction? Continuing towards a complete merge of Sikkim with India, or towards an 
independent democratic Sikkim? Rapidly the situation evolved in a way that did not 
give the judiciary course its time, and thus left  behind its  highly biased versions 
again.
On 7th April 1975 one high officer, Yonga, of the Sikkim Guards, which were 
still under the direct control of the Chogyal, was arrested  under the accusation of 
having conspired to kill the Sikkim Congress leader Lendhup Dorji. The day after, he 
apparently  admitted  to  the  police  to  have  led  the  conspiracy  ordered  by  the 
Chogyal220. Here again Indian sources reported that protests took place against the 
Chogyal  in  the  wake  of  the  news,  and  that  the  Palace  Guards  opened  fire  on 
demonstrators. This apparently led to the Chief Executive ordering the disarmament 
of the Guards on 9th April 1975 through a massive intervention by the Indian Army. 
However,  again the royal  family provided a different version: the government of 
India created the farce of the conspiracy against Lendhup Dorji, in order to justify the 
218Ibid., 294–296.
219Ibid., 279.
220Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 72 ; This version however has been challenged 
by Ray-Datta who reports that Yongda had never signed such a document. Datta-Ray, Smash and 
Grab, 8.
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disarmament of the Chogyal, and put him under house arrest221. 
The course of events then precipitated: on 10th April 1975 the Sikkim Assembly 
unanimously  adopted  a  resolution  abolishing  the  institution  of  the  Chogyal  and 
declaring Sikkim as part of India. Again Datta-Ray reports of violence and pressure 
exercised by the Chief Executive to obtain that enactment, even if no Indian press 
article reported it222.  As a consequence of the 10th Sikkim Assembly resolution,  a 
referendum was then organized for the 14th April (only three days later) to consult the 
people of Sikkim on the question of the merger with India. The results of the poll  
showed that the majority of the Sikkimese voters (59.637) were in favour of the 
Resolution,  compared  to  only  1.496  contrary223.  However,  doubts  spontaneously 
arise: why such a rush (72 hours) to organise the referendum? Was it not because of 
the  fear  that  the  judiciary  could  declare  the  35th Amendment  to  the  Indian 
Constitution illegal caused the Indian Chief Executive of Sikkim to opt for such a 
rapid consultation? Of course, Datta-Ray embraces this thesis. He also highlights the 
fact that the referendum asked the people to vote For or Against the abdication of the 
Chogyal and the merger with India as a unified issue, and that it would instead have 
been much fairer having it separated into two different issues224. Similar criticism 
was  also  raised  by  The  Hindustan  Times225.  Yet  again,  the  fact  that  no  foreign 
observers were present, and that the Indian Central Reserve Police and the Indian 
soldiers were supervising the voting, cast even more doubts on the fairness of the 
vote. Lastly, only around 55% of the population who had been accounted as having 
the right to vote for the 1974 elections went to the polls.
Nevertheless, with the results in hand the Sikkim Prime Minister Lendhup Dorji 
went  to New Delhi  to meet  the Indian Prime Minister Indira  Gandhi in order to 
legally organise Sikkim's merger into the Indian Union. On 23rd April 1975 the Lok 
Sabha passed another Amendment to the Indian Constitution (the 38 th) and on 26th 
April the same was also done by the Rajya Sabha. On 16 th May 1975 the Indian 
221Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 8–11.
222Ibid., 301.
223Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 73.
224Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 308.
225“A Merger is Arranged”, The Hindustan Times, 15th April 1975.
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president Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed gave his assent and enacted the 38 th Amendment to 
the Constitution, thus finally transforming Sikkim into the 22nd state of the Republic 
of India. As a consequence B. B. Lal, the Chief Executive of Sikkim became the 
Sikkim Governor from 1974, and all the court cases and injunctions presented to the 
Delhi high court, or to the Sikkim Central Court were dropped. Indeed, clause 3(m) 
of the Amendment states: “Neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have 
jurisdiction  in  respect  of  any  dispute  or  other  matter  arising  out  of  any  treaty, 
agreement,  engagement or other  similar  instrument relating to Sikkim which was 
entered into or executed before the appointed day...”226.
Again nothing could stop the criticism caused by the Chogyal's son Wangchuk 
Namgyal. He sent a letter to The Times, published on 1st May 1975, to protest against 
the  events  claiming  that:  “The  recent  referendum  in  the  country  was  in  effect 
conducted by the Indian Government, and objective commentators have described it 
as a 'farce'”227. On 12th May 1975, in a second letter sent by the prince, India was 
further blamed for not having allowed independent observers into Sikkim, and to 
have handled the referendum issue in too much of a hurry not to arise suspicion228. 
Also the judge Hariomal, after being informed of his dismissal by the Central Court 
of Sikkim, could only comment: “Can society accept foul means for even fair ends 
and allow such an all-important edifice being pulled down in a way so immoral, 
illegal and unethical?”229.
Criticism  resurfaced  later,  when,  after  many  years,  Indian  and  Sikkimese 
politicians  returned  to  the  issue  challenging  the  version  provided  by  the  Indian 
government: for example, the new Indian Prime Minister who took power after the 
fall  of  Indira  Gandhi  in  the  1977  elections,  Moraji  Desai,  made  a  comment 
denouncing the take over of Sikkim by Indira Gandhi's government as a “wrong” 
fact230. Mr. Pradhan, the Sikkimese politician whose arrest had precipitated events in 
1973 and  who,  by that  time,  was  in  the  Sikkimese  opposition  party  Prajatandra 
226Rao, Sikkim, the Story of Its Integration with India, 130 The entire text of the 38th Amendment is 
reported in Ibid., 127-131.
227The Times article of 1st May 1975 as reported in: Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 106.
228The Times, 12th May 1975, article reported in: Ibid., 109.
229Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 320.
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Congress,  after  the  funeral  of  the  Chogyal's  eldest  son,  Tenzing  Namgyal,  also 
contested the fairness of the referendum of 1975 stating that: “the merger was a clear 
instance of annexation”231. At last, the same party that emerged as winning in Sikkim 
in the 1979 elections began to challenge the validity of the merger of Sikkim in India 
made in 1975232.
From the analysis developed so far it is now clear how controversial the events 
that  led  to the  merger  of  Sikkim  with  India  had been.  Until  today  no  official 
documentation had been declassified by the Indian government that could allow for 
the  establishment  of  what  really  happened.  As  already  mentioned  during  this 
paragraph, the fact that foreign journalists were not allowed to enter Sikkim from 
1973 until 1975 had clearly contributed to the formation of two highly rival (and 
biased)  interpretations  of  the  events.  The first  is  the  one provided by the Indian 
government, and supported by the Indian press. It declared India acted only under the 
invocation of the Sikkimese population to save them from the abuses of the Chogyal 
with the sole aim of bringing a democratic political system to Sikkim. The second is 
the one provided by the royal family and by observers who worked in strict contact 
with it, which instead talks about a forced annexation of Sikkim with India.
Therefore, some remarks should be made at this point. First, the fact that the 
Chogyal  resisted  the  democratization  of  Sikkim  did  not  help  the  Sikkimese 
democratic forces to promote democratic political reforms without resorting to India 
for help. They probably realised that only by calling on India they could have had 
some chances for a successful promotion of democracy in Sikkim. On the other side, 
India, already alarmed by the Chogyal's will for an independent Sikkim, was ready to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of Sikkim to reimpose a new more stable and secure 
political solution to the crucial area of Sikkim, which had always been of strategical 
importance  for  India.  The  monarchy's  refusal  of  democratic  reforms  directly 
facilitated New Delhi's job. The latter could indeed depict itself as the  liberator of 
230The Nepali Times, 23rd March 2001, available at: 
http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/35/Nation/9621#.UMH1TIaGfmI, retrieved on 7th December 
1012.
231Rustomji, Sikkim, a Himalayan Tragedy, 125.
232“Sikkimese vote for autonomy”, Daily Telegraph, 15th October 1979.
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Sikkim when it firmly acted to absorb the state under its political control, and to 
depose the Chogyal. As a result, it seems credible that New Delhi did not act as the 
pro-India literature asserts (e.g. as a passive actor who only reacted to the political 
requests raised by the democratic forces of Sikkim). It is instead more credible that 
New Delhi  had  an active  role  in  the  events,  even if  behind the  scenes233.  These 
observations,  which  derived  from  a  careful  analysis  of  the  secondary  literature 
considered until this point, will be also confirmed by the next paragraph where the 
recently declassified archival documents collected in the British and Indian archives 
are considered.
  4. Indian and British archival revelations about India's role
In this paragraph recently declassified Indian and British archival documents will be 
considered. The goal is to produce a historical analysis of the 1973-1975 events more 
objective  and impartial  than  the one provided by the  literature  considered in  the 
previous paragraph. In this context, the research conducted at the Indian  National  
Archives, and in the Archives of the Nehru Museum and Memorial Library (NMML) 
in New Delhi have provided important, even if partial, results. In fact, although a 
large  quantity  of  documents  concerning  the  merger  of  Sikkim with  India  should 
exist, it was only possible to access one document. Nevertheless, this one document 
is of crucial importance: it directly proves the Indian Prime Minister  Indira Gandhi 
and her Principal Secretary seriously considered to intervene in Sikkim in early 1972, 
even if in the shadows, in order to alter the Sikkimese political situation in favour of 
233This  is  also  the  conclusion  formulated  by Ramachandra  Guha  who  in  his  authoritative  book 
argues: “In 1973 some citizens of the kingdom had begun asking for a representative assembly.  
The Chogyal asked the government of India for help in taming the rebellion. Instead, New Delhi  
stoked it further”. Guha, India After Gandhi, 483.
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India. It is significant that this document was found among the private collection of 
P. N. Haksar, the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, at the Archives of 
the  NMML.  None  of  the  official  documents  concerning  Sikkim  were  indeed 
declassified by the Indian government until the fall of 2011, and therefore sent to the 
Indian National Archives. British documents concerning the merger of Sikkim with 
India were instead all declassified and available at the British National Archives in 
Kew  Gardens,  London.  As  will  be  shown,  the  analysis  of  all  these  documents 
reinforces the doubts already expressed earlier, concerning the dominant version of a 
passive  India  only  acting  to  liberate Sikkim,  and  only  merging  it  upon  the 
spontaneous  invitation  of  the  Sikkimese  democratic  forces.  The  primary  sources 
collected thus reinforce the thesis that New Delhi was one of the major actors behind 
the scene that directly arranged the merger.
  4.1 The official Indian note concerning Sikkim, early 1972
The  analysis  proposed  in  this  paragraph  shall  begin  with  the  only  document 
concerning Sikkim collected at the Archives of  the  Nehru Museum and Memorial  
Library in  New Delhi,  India.  The document  in  question  is  a  note  sent  by P.  N. 
Haksar, the Principal Secretary of the Prime Minister, to the Indian Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi on 14th March 1972 considering the political situation in Sikkim. Due 
to the importance of the note's contents, its full text is quoted hereafter: “I try to keep 
track of the goings on in the Ministry of External Affairs. The Foreign Secretary had 
spoken to me about his visit to Sikkim. But I have long felt that we really have no 
policy  in  regard  to  Sikkim  except  to  wait  upon  Chogyal's  varying  moods.  The 
Foreign Secretary says that he found the Chogyal 'ready and willing'  and that he 
found him 'in a chastened mood'. With great respect,  this makes no sense to me. 
There was a time in 1947 when the people of Sikkim were with India. Thereafter, we 
developed great fondness for the Sikkim Darbar and now we wait on his frowns and 
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on his  smiles.  I tried  at  one  to  organise  some serious  thinking about  our  policy 
towards Sikkim. Nothing came out of it. The basis question is: what are the sanctions 
behind 'Permanent association' or 'Protectorate' or anything else? In this later half of 
the twentieth century, a sanction behind any political framework has to be people if 
that  framework is  to  prove durable.  And we have totally alienated the people of 
Sikkim.  […]  We must not delude ourselves.  The Chogyal wants independence,  a 
membership of the United Nations and he is gradually eroding our will. We have 
placed in the Darbar of Sikkim a most unscrupulous adventurer I have ever come 
across in the shade and form of Shri I. S. Chopra. He has no loyalties to anything and 
least of all to his own country. But he was a friend of the Foreign Secretary and has 
always been a smooth operator. Having become the Dewan of Sikkim, he could not 
care less what happened to Indo-Sikkimese relations. My own view is that until such 
time as P.M. has made up her mind, she should not see the Chogyal in order to put a 
seal  to  the  so-called  'Permanent  association'.  In  my view,  we  are  not  so  utterly 
helpless. We can make a new beginning. We can establish contact with the people of 
Sikkim, develop relationships and earn their goodwill and use that as a real lever 
against the vagaries of the Chogyal. If we decide on such a policy, I have no doubts 
that in a space of two years we shall get Chogyal running to us for protection against 
his own people. Otherwise, he will be taking us out for a ride all the time”234.
After the analysis developed in the previous paragraph this note, written by the 
one of the most powerful men during the second government of Indira Gandhi, is 
revealing235. As a matter of fact, it first proves that in 1972 the Indian government 
was highly concerned with the Chogyal's growing ambitions of transforming Sikkim 
234“Letter from P. N. Haksar, Principal Secretary of the Prime Minister, to Prime Minister, dated 14 th 
March 1972”, in P. N. Haksar private papers, III inst., f. n. 179, in Nehru Museum and Memorial 
Library, New Delhi, India.
235As already diffusely explained in the second chapter of this thesis, Haksar was the most powerful 
man after Indira Gandhi in the early Seventies. He was her principal secretary, and he had her 
personal confidence and trust. In order to briefly recall here his role it is crucial to remind that  
Haksar has been considered the “main centre of power and authority” in the Indian government by 
Panhandiker and Merha, and that “his guidance was behind most of the initiatives that Indira took  
to prevail over the Syndicate” in the late Sixties. V. A. Pai Panandiker and Ajay K. Mehra,  The 
Indian Cabinet: a Study in Governance (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), 227; Francine R. 
Frankel,  India’s  Political  Economy,  1947-2004:  The  Gradual  Revolution (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 635.
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into  an  independent  state.  It  then  discloses  that  Haksar  suggested  Indira  Gandhi 
should change the policy followed by India towards Sikkim until that moment, and to 
adopt a much more active political strategy in order to get rid of the challenging 
presence of the Chogyal in a short lapse of time. Interestingly, Haksar proposed to 
fuel  the  Sikkimese  people  against  the  Chogyal  in  order  to  weaken  the  king. 
Considering  how  events  developed  in  1973-1975  this  letter  can  not  be  more 
revealing: the hypothesis of the Chogyal calling India for help materialised much 
earlier than the two years guessed by Haksar as the necessary time to organize the 
popular revolt. In the light of this note what Ashoka Raina wrote in 1981 about the 
role of RAW in Sikkim becomes more credible. Moreover, if a decision like the one 
suggested by Haksar in his note to the Prime Minister had effectively been taken in 
early 1972, some events otherwise difficult to explain become clear. For example, the 
reason why in the summer of 1972 India did not vigorously react when the Chogyal 
personally  assumed  power  over  the  Dewan,  which  until  that  time  had  been 
nominated on the basis of India's suggestions, now becomes evident. Contributing to 
worsening the political unbalances in Sikkim, the Chogyal's decision was welcomed 
by India  because  useful  to  trigger  popular  protests  against  the  monarch,  and to 
precipitate Sikkim into chaos. The latter indeed was the perfect situation to justify 
New Delhi's intervention for re-establishing political order.  Similarly the fact that 
New Delhi did not react when the Chogyal did not nominate a Dewan in consultation 
with India after the 1973 elections, but instead named a Sikkimese functionary to 
preside the new State Council, could be explained with the same logic: the worsening 
of the domestic tensions in Sikkim was welcome by New Delhi because useful to 
justify the following India's intervention as an external peacemaker. Therefore, this 
document directly reinforces the interpretation of New Delhi as not being a mere 
observer of events in 1973-1975, but instead the principal actor.
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  4.2 British archival documents on Sikkim events, 1973-1975
British  documents  concerning  Sikkim and  its  merger  with  India  have  now been 
declassified236. Although these documents are primary sources that can be used to 
understand  what  really  happened  in  Sikkim,  one  has  to  note  that  no  British 
functionary was residing in the small Himalayan state from 1973 to 1975, nor had 
access to it because of the restrictions imposed by India. The analysis of what was 
happening in Sikkim was thus mainly made by the functionaries of the British High 
Commission in New Delhi, and in Calcutta, based on the information that came to 
them through:  the Indian government  and press,  the contacts  with the Sikkimese 
royal family,  and with some important and influential  political  or military people 
who had been personally involved in the events. Nevertheless, these documents are 
of crucial importance since they prove that the British functionaries in India, together 
with the  Foreign and Commonwealth  Office in  London,  nourished strong doubts 
about the version provided by New Delhi. As a matter of fact, on several occasions 
they  questioned  whether  the  hand  of  New  Delhi  was  behind  the  merger. 
Nevertheless,  this  suspicion  had  never  been  officially  expressed  by  the  British 
government,  which  clearly  had  no  political  interest  in  risking  an  erosion  of  its 
relationship with New Delhi. Sikkim for London indeed was only a small state lost in 
the Himalayas and sandwiched by China and India.
Already before the events that brought about the merger of Sikkim with India 
took place, the British evaluation of the political situation in Sikkim – in light of 
Chogyal's ambitions to make Sikkim an independent state – were that India would 
never have allowed such a scenario, but rather it would have evaluated the idea of a 
forced annexation of the small Himalayan state237. The first doubt about the validity 
of the version of the 1973 facts provided by the Indian government and by the Indian 
newspapers is instead raised by M. K. M. Wilford, FCO in London. On 11th April 
1973 he added a hand written comment to a letter sent by I. J. M. Sutherland, South 
Asian Department, the day before, which was reporting Philippa Drew's account of 
236Some of them have already been used in the analysis developed so far to clarify details and facts.
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5th April about the situation in Sikkim based on the news circulating in New Delhi238. 
Wilford's pen added: “What a complicated electoral system. I'm not sure from this 
letter which of the various parties might be said to be Indian oriented thus possibly to 
have  provoked disturbances  in  order  to  appeal  to  India”239.  This  first  part  of  the 
comment  is  explainable  by the fact  that  Drew had given knowledge of  Sikkim's 
political system as granted,  and had only provided specific information about the 
new  party  that  had  entered  the  political  scene  that  year,  the  Janata  Congress. 
However, the fact that Wilford could suspect that protests had been organised with 
the clear  intent of paving the way for an Indian intervention proves London had 
doubts on the version of events provided by India.
That  these  suspicions  were  diffuse  among  the  other  British  functionaries 
working in India is clearly confirmed by the letter of A. H. Morgan, British Deputy 
High Commissioner in Calcutta, who wrote to Philippa Drew, High Commission, in 
New Delhi, on 10th April 1973: “The question on everyone's mind here is of course 
the  extent  to  which  the  Indians  have  orchestrated  the  SNC  [Sikkim  National 
Congress]  and  SJC  [Sikkim  Janata  Congress] campaign.  Sikkim,  as  the  last 
237As a matter of fact, in 1972 in New Delhi the British High Commissioner Terence  Garvey in a 
letter  he  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office  (FCO)  in 
London, Sir Alec Douglas-Home,  in the shadow of Bhutan's acquisition of a seat at the UN in 
1971, evaluated that India could not allow Sikkim's independence for security reasons: “For the 
Indians, the abiding requirement is the maintenance of their military position and any eventual  
political arrangements will have to conform to this […] It would be tidier if Sikkim became part of 
India, but this might be hard to fix at this late stage and it may be that India will eventually be  
drive to grant a form of pseudo-independence on the Bhutanese model”. See: “Note DS NO 04/72 
sent  by High  Commissioner  in  New Delhi,  T.  Garvey,  to  Secretary of  State  for  Foreign  and  
Commonwealth  Office,  Alec  Douglas-Home,  dated  1972”,  1  and  7,  in  FCO 37/982,  Political  
Affairs  of  Sikkim,  1972,  South  Asian  Department,  National  Archives,  Kew  Gardens,  United 
Kingdom.  Similarly  in  late  1972  Philippa  Drew,  a  British  functionary  at  the  British  High 
Commission in New Delhi in charge of analysing Sikkim's political situation, in a letter sent to her  
superiors  stated:  “The  Chogyal  has  shown  no  signs  of  leaning  towards  democracy.  It  would 
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remaining princely state, is an anomaly which the Indians must be tempted to try to 
bring to an end.  […] Some people think the Indians must be behind it all but can 
point little concrete evidence to support their thesis”240.  Again on 10th April  1973 
cables came from the British High Commissioner in New Delhi, Terence Garvey, to 
London reporting the speech pronounced the day before at the lower house of the 
Indian  Parliament  by  Surendra  Pal  Singh,  the  Indian  Deputy  Foreign  Minister, 
regarding the events in Sikkim. On that occasion Garvey's suggested: “Surendra Pal's 
statement contains a certain amount of guff, put in for Lok Sabha's benefit, about the 
masses, etc [...]”241.
Moreover, the same Philippa Drew endorsed such doubts in a letter sent to J. A. 
Birch, South Asian Department in London, on 12th April 1973. On that occasion, 
however, she also added other interesting details about how the Government of India 
directly controlled the Indian press, and therefore the news that was coming from 
Sikkim. In fact, Drew first underlined that: “[...] the GOI [Government of India] has 
told  all  Indian  journalists  to  leave  Sikkim  on  the  grounds  that  since  foreign 
journalists are not allowed in, (Sikkim is a restricted area) Indian journalists had an 
unfair advantage. I have also heard that Kewal Singh called the editors of the main 
dailies  together  on Tuesday and asked them to keep Sikkim off  the front  pages. 
Yesterday's and today's press reveal that his efforts have been successful. All they 
carry is a PTI [the largest news agency of India] backgrounder on Sikkim's history 
that Kewal Singh apparently gave them yesterday”242. She then continued: “As Tony 
Morgan  rightly  points  out  the  crucial  question  concerns  the  extent  of  Indian 
involvement  in  the  riots  and  demonstrations  which  brought  about  the  present 
situation. To the best of our knowledge there is no evidence that the Government of 
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India encouraged or stimulated the demonstrations […] However, the border between 
India  and Sikkim is  not  closed.  Kazi  Lendhup Dorji  himself  lives  in  Darjeeling. 
There is bound to be contact and involvement between the Nepalis in the Darjeeling 
area and their confrères in Sikkim. The former may well have provided both moral 
and material  assistance to  the latter.  At the government level  [between India and 
Sikkim] there may well have been personal incompatibility”, making thus reference 
to the Chogyal's ambitions of seeing Sikkim independent243.
In order to clear doubts about the role played by the Government of India in 
Sikkim's  events,  a  British  diplomatic  functionary  of  the  British  Embassy  in 
Washington,  J.  D.  I.  Boyd,  had  a  meeting  with  Dennis  Kux,  American  State 
Department, on 12th April. He reported that Kux appeared to be recalcitrant to say too 
much, took a neutral position on the issue, and informed that the American State 
Department  had  been  lying  low and  saying  nothing244,  in  order  to  avoid  further 
agitating  public  opinion,  which  was  already  exceptionally  focussed  on  Sikkim's 
events because of the Chogyal's wife being an American citizen245.
In  addition,  British  documents  revealed  that  the  British  Foreign  and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London was contacted soon after the 1973 protests 
in Sikkim by the solicitors of the Sikkimese royal family who also openly blamed 
India for having arranged the protest. On 10th April 1973 I. J. M. Sutherland indeed 
reported to Eric Norris, FCO, about the fact that he had been in touch in the previous  
two days with Deny Rhodes, guardian of the children of the Chogyal of Sikkim, and 
that a meeting on 12th April had been arranged by him to talk with John Dilger, and 
John Balfour, the solicitors of the Sikkim royal family. Sutherland reported that in the 
telephone conversations he had with Mr. Balfour, the latter “had said that, in light of 
his knowledge of India-Sikkim relations, he is suspicious of the Indian government's 
intentions and of their role in the events leading up to the Chogyal's reported request 
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that  the  Indian  government  assume  responsibility  of  the  administration”246. 
Sutherland also reported that Mr. Balfour underlined that all the press reports coming 
from Sikkim derived from Indian sources, and that a degree of censorship applied. 
Moreover, Sutherland informed him that the solicitors were considering addressing a 
letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations on the matter; and that he tried 
to convince them that there was no room for such a call, unless it was not a state, or 
the Chogyal in person to rise it247. Norris confirmed these latter observations writing 
that  he was sure that Sutherland's  comments on the UN's possible recourse were 
absolutely right. However, the possibility the solicitors could raise such a demand led 
the (worried) South Asian Department to consult T. A. Solesby, of the British United 
Nations  Department,  who  added:  “I  fully  agree  that  we  should  try  to  head  Mr. 
Balfour off the UN-Secretary General”, and that another argument used to dissuade 
the  solicitor  was  that  Sikkim's  issue  in  the  Security  Council  could  only  “[...] 
degenerate into a confrontation between the USSR (for India) and China (for Sikkim) 
[...]”,  thus  risking  to  damage  Chogyal's  position248.  In  addition,  the  South  Asian 
Department commissioned a study about the legality of India's actions with respect to 
the 1950 Indo-Sikkimese Treaty:  the study confirmed that  India had not  violated 
international norms, and therefore there were no grounds to challenge the validity of 
New Delhi's action249.  On 13th April 1973 in a letter, Sutherland then informed F. 
Mills  in New Delhi  that  he had talked by phone with the Chogyal's  solicitors in 
London  who:  “expressed  their  conviction  that  the  Indians,  in  taking  over  the 
administration of Sikkim, where deliberately seeking to undermine the Chogyal and 
establish permanent control over Sikkim's internal affairs.”250. However, Sutherland 
underlined the fact that, although they had no evidence to support their thesis, they: 
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“remained convinced that the post-elections disturbances were probably engineered 
by the Government of India and that Indians had for long been looking for an excuse 
to intervene”251.
The head of the South Asian Department in a letter from 13th April 1973 to Mills 
also reported that he clearly informed the solicitors that the British government had 
no intentions of becoming associated with their possible call to the UN to consider 
Sikkim's question. Clearly there was no legal basis to raise such a call, and clearly 
the United Kingdom had no interests in damaging its relations with India like that. 
Similar was also the position taken by London over the question of the publication of 
articles  reporting  the  voice  of  the  Sikkimese  royal  family.  In  fact,  following the 
British newspapers  The Times  had published extracts of the call made by Sikkim's 
crown prince in the United Kingdom to blame India of incorrect behaviour, tensions 
grew both in London, and in the British High Commission in New Delhi. Therefore, 
on  11th April  the  Commissioner  Garvey  wrote  to  London  first  reporting  India's 
reactions  to  the  article  published  by  The  Times,  and  later  urging  a  stop  to  the 
publishing of: “false trail that recent events are an Indian imperialist putsch against 
the  poor  Chogyal,  whose  neck  they  saved”252.  As  a  result,  the  South  Asian 
Department, in London, convened with the British News Department to avoid further 
polemics on the topic and not to erode bilateral relations with New Delhi253.
The British reaction to the proposal made by the Chogyal's solicitors to bring the 
issue to the UN, and to the possibility of other annoying reports being published by 
the British press regarding Sikkim, directly reveal the fact that London wanted to 
remain as neutral as possible on the issue. It is therefore not surprising that when the 
Foreign Office in London received a copy of a public telegram sent by the Chogyal 
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on 9th April to the Indian Prime Minister, in which he accused the Indian Army of 
directly supporting demonstrators in their protests against the palace, he decided to 
keep  it  secret  and  to  deny its  publication.  The  copy of  this  telegram arrived  to 
Sutherland on 18th April 1973 attached to a letter written by John Balfour: it  was 
breaking news since it had not previously receive space in Indian newspapers, though 
it  had been publicly sent254.  Although telling a different version of the facts  with 
respect to the one reported by the government of India and by the Indian press, the 
interesting aspect is that it (today) confirms the accuracy of the version provided by 
Datta-Ray  in  his  book,  in  which  he  also  quoted  some  sections  of  the  same 
telegram255.  Because of its  important content, the telegram in question is reported 
here in its full length: “We are deeply concerned and grieved with the situation in 
Sikkim.  I  have  been  repeatedly  warning  the  government  of  India  of  impeding 
violence led particularly by outside elements which has now become a fact.  Our 
police stations in South West and East Sikkim were attacked and ransacked firearms 
and  wireless  equipment  stolen  police  personnel  and  other  government  beaten 
confined or taken into custody. House of our elder statesman Athing Densapa and 
several other government and private building have been burnt. Government petrol 
depots have been damaged or forcibly taken over. Many Sikkimese and Indian shops 
have been looted supply of food grains fuel and other essentials to Gangtok from 
India has been forcibly stopped by setting up road blocks manned by violent groups 
of agitators at several places. Sikkim police who acquitted themselves admirably in 
Gangtok were disarmed disuniformed and confined to barracks by Indian Army. The 
handing  over  of  the  administration  to  government  of  India  and  the  induction  of 
Indian Army have not resulted in any improvement in the law and order situation so 
far  as  seen from instances of  murder  assault  and forcible  seizure of  government 
vehicles and personnel reported from Gangtok itself thereafter. National party having 
won  elections  under  the  system mutually  agreed  upon  between  us  (sic) we  are 
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perturbed  by  the  news  All  India  Radio  is  putting  up  to  the  world  giving  the 
impression that democratic forces have been suppressed and peaceful demonstrators 
fired upon. The news item that Army is feeding Gangtok is entirely incorrect. In fact 
the Army is feeding the demonstrators only. Such distorted broadcasts are likely to 
mislead  the  people  of  India  and  rest  of  the  world.  Earnestly  request  favour  of 
personal  intervention  in  the  interest  of  abiding  friendship  and  closest  relations 
between  India  and  Sikkim.  With  highest  consideration  and  with  my  warm  and 
personal regards, Chogyal of Sikkim”256.
This  version  of  the  facts  clearly  challenges  the  one  provided  by the  Indian 
government,  and by the Indian press.  The telegram sent by the Chogyal  reported 
indeed that the Indian Army was giving support to the demonstrators instead of to his 
government, and that it arrested the Sikkimese police, thus contributing to throwing 
the country into chaos. Interestingly, no doubts about the truthfulness of the telegram 
was  raised  by the  South  Asian  Department,  while  the  obvious  conclusions  were 
drawn by the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, Alec Douglas-Home, 
in a telegram he sent to the High Commission in New Delhi, to the British Cabinet 
Office and to the South Asian, News, and Research Departments in London where he 
wrote: “The cable's general implication is that the Indians had taken advantage of the 
situation”257. Nevertheless, no official actions were taken by the British government: 
again London had no interest in ruining British-Indian relations for Sikkim; since it 
was so irrelevant at the economic and political level in the international system.
Further details that reinforce doubts about the version provided by the Indian 
authorities were given in a letter sent by T. Garvey, British High Commissioner in 
New  Delhi,  to  Philippa  Drew,  High  Commission,  on  18th April  1973.  Garvey 
informed Drew about a meeting he had had that morning with Avtar Singh, Secretary 
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(West) of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, during which the bureaucrat told 
him that the Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh, had ordered him to go to 
Sikkim on 3rd April 1973 (before the demonstrations already ongoing reached their 
peak on 4th April). The directive was to sort out the situation, though Sikkim was not 
part  of  Singh's  actual  duties258.  Garvey reported  that  Singh said  to  have  reached 
Gangtok  the  day  after  by  helicopter,  finding  ongoing  riots  in  the  market  area. 
However,  Singh  reported  to  Garvey  that  the  reported  20.000  people  was  highly 
exaggerated, and that according to his observation: “he very much doubted whether 
more than 4.000 were ever at any time present and making trouble in Gangtok; and 
he and the GOC had spent some time examining the approach roads to the capital 
without  discovering any serious  concentration of  insurgents”259.  When questioned 
about  the  possibility  India  had  supported  the  organization  of  the  insurgents,  he 
declined  describing  the  possibility  as  fairly  odd,  and  suggested  instead  that  the 
Naxalites were behind it. Reading the letter, Philippa Drew added written comments: 
“Mr.  Rodhes  also  told  me  that  he  could  not  credit  the  figure  of  20.000.  His 
conclusion, however, was that the Indians had exaggerated the extent of the revolt to 
justify their action”. Moreover, she felt the necessity to comment on the concluding 
phrase written by Garvey in the letter where he reported the fact that he had declared 
to Singh to be, as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, “fairly 
sure”  about  the fact  that  India  did  not  play a  part  in  the events.  Philippa  Drew, 
however, contested him adding: “The High Commissioner may have some doubts on 
his 'fairly sure'”260.
These doubts were also confirmed in the letter  sent  from Kathmandu by the 
British  Embassy  on  26th April  1973.  Although  Nepal  had  released  no  official 
declarations until that moment, the British Ambassador reported that the Kathmandu 
District  Committee of  the  All  Nepal  National  Independent  Students'  Union had 
openly  condemned  India's  intervention  comparing  it  to  the  1971  events  in  East 
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Pakistan,  and added:  “I  very much suspect  that  this  reflects  what  most  Nepalese 
actually think” (e.g. Indian intention to annex Sikkim and later maybe also Nepal)261. 
Moreover,  on  30th April  another  letter  was  sent  by A.  H.  Morgan,  British  High 
Commissioner in Calcutta, to inform the British High Commissioner in New Delhi 
that  he  had  met  Major  General  Vohra,  the  Indian  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Eastern 
Command, on 19th April 1973. Morgan reported that the General had commented that 
since  the  Sikkimese  Police  only  had  300  officials,  the  Chogyal  was  practically 
obliged to call India for help when protests began on 4th April, and had no other real 
choice262.  In  the  same  letter  the  Deputy  High  Commissioner  also  reported  some 
reflections he had made with his Japanese counterpart, Mr. Mutoh, in Calcutta during 
the previous days: “On the question of Indian involvement  [in the 1973 protests in 
Sikkim] it was clear that the consensus was now in line with the view reported by 
you and us [likely that there were suspicions but no evidence]. But in his [Mutoh's] 
view,  two questions  needed to be explained before the  Indians  could  be given a 
completely clean slate. The first was why the troubles had built  up to a crisis  so 
quickly and the second was why the Indians had not done anything to dissuade the 
Nepalese living in the areas of Darjeeling and Kalimpong from crossing over into 
Sikkim to join the march on Gangtok”263.  The first observation of Mutoh directly 
confirms the observations made by Rustomji in his book published in 1987. The ex-
Dewan indeed writes that: “Only few months previously [from April 1973 events], 
during my visit in Gangtok, the Prince seemed confident that all was well, and it 
seemed incredible to find a repetition so soon of the distressing events of 1949 anti-
Chogyal demonstrations, a breakdown of the administration throughout the State and 
a request by the Prince to the Government of India to intervene and restore order”, 
without however raising doubts over India's role in the events264.
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Finally, renewed doubts were again raised by British bureaucrat officials with 
regards to the 8th May 1973 Agreement. In a letter sent by Philippa Drew from the 
High Commission in New Delhi to London she indeed directly posed the following 
questions to London: “Do we still believe that the GOI had no hand in the  [1973 
April] disturbances?”,  and  answering  by  herself  stating:  “[...]  we  still  have  no 
evidence of Indian complicity, although there is much cocktail party gossip about 
some kind of low level and unofficial involvement”265.
  5. Conclusion
From the  analysis  developed so far  it  is  now possible  to  argue  that  the  account 
provided by the government of India on the events that led Sikkim to become the 
22nd state of the Indian Union is not sufficiently convincing. The only Indian archival 
document on the Sikkimese issue, which was found in the Indian archives in 2011, 
leads to a different conclusion: already in 1972 India had developed a clear strategy 
to destabilize Sikkim, to weaken the Chogyal, and to pave the way for its military 
and  political  intervention.  Moreover,  the  materials  found  in  the  British  archives 
further reinforce this thesis. It is therein showed how British functionaries have never 
been  convinced  by  the  version  of  the  facts  provided  by  the  Indian  authorities. 
Although  much  remains  to  be  done  in  order  to  provide  an  exhaustive  impartial 
historical account of the events that took place in Sikkim in 1973-1975, the archival 
documentations available today allow a far better picture of what really happened in 
the  small  Himalyan  state  at  that  time.  Only  the  declassification  of  the  Indian 
documents by the government of India would allow for a complete assessment of the 
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events. However, since this is not likely to happen in the near future, the account 
provided in the current chapter is of crucial importance from a historical point of 
view.
Acting  behind  the  scenes,  New Delhi  successfully  handled  what  could  have 
become a dangerous situation in Sikkim for India. The Indian strategy of playing off 
the  monarchy  against  the  political  democratic  forces  of  Sikkim  succeeded.  The 
complicated issue of Sikkim's political future was therefore transformed into black or 
white, where the people of Sikkim had to choose between either independence with 
the  monarchy,  or  democracy  with  India.  Nuances  were  artfully  and  carefully 
excluded, like for example the option for having democracy and at the same time 
also  being  independent  from  India.  Of  course,  the  persisting  opposition  of  the 
Chogyal  to  democratic  reforms  surely  helped  India  in  achieving  its  goal.  The 
strategic state of Sikkim was thus brought under the definite control of India without 
awaking  criticism  from the  international  community,  through  an  operation  that 
nowadays  might  recall some more  recent  and largely controversial  humanitarian 
interventions.
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  CONCLUSION
During Indira Gandhi's second government India emerged as a regional power in 
South Asia. The victory against Pakistan, India's main historical rival in the region, 
was the first demonstration of the new military and political power acquired by New 
Delhi. Result of a strategy adopted by India since March 1971, when the civil war 
erupted  in  East  Pakistan,  the  third  Indo-Pakistani  war  revealed  that  India  was 
prepared  to  exploit  its  neighbours'  weaknesses  in  its  favour.  The explosion  of  a 
nuclear device in 1974 also launched a clear sign of India's technological, political 
and military power in South Asia, and elsewhere. New Delhi was the sixth state in 
the world to demonstrate the capability of exploding an atom bomb and this clearly 
enhanced its  leadership.  Finally,  the  annexation  of  Sikkim  was  the  third 
demonstration of power India made during Indira Gandhi's second government. After 
the ambitions  of  independence  surfaced  within  the  royal  court  of  the  small 
Himalayan state as of the second half of the Sixties, Sikkim in a short lapse of time 
(1973-1975) lost its status  as Indian protectorate and became the 22nd state of the 
Indian  Union,  definitively  renouncing  its  political  autonomy.  This  was  a  clear 
message sent by India to the small states of South Asia: “mind not to adopt policies 
adverse to New Delhi: India will not remain passive and the international community 
will not impede it to act”.
India's rise as  a regional power had its fallouts both in South Asia, and at the 
global level. In the Indian subcontinent it triggered Pakistan's plans to rearm and to 
obtain  an  atom  bomb,  and  diffuse  fear  among  smaller  states.  If  in  Asia  China 
registered the phenomenon without feeling threatened, the Soviet Union was ready to 
welcome,  and  support  India  against  China.  The  contemporary  Sino-American 
rapprochement and the United States' tilt towards Pakistan instead further estranged 
Indo-American relations. However, India's new position of power in Asia could not 
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be ignored by the United States that indeed actively worked  to maintain a cordial 
relationship in spite of everything. In addition, India's explosion of an atom bomb in 
1974 did not pass unnoticed: the United States, the United Kingdom and several 
other states condemned the event and supported strengthening the international non-
proliferation regime,  which later  significantly  delayed the development  of  India's 
civil nuclear programme.
The analysis developed in this doctoral work about India's rise as regional power 
allows the formulation of three conclusive considerations. 
The first is that India became a regional power not by coincidence, but because it 
pursued the assertion of its power with determination. In fact, New Delhi had already 
adopted a strategy of rearming since the Sixties in response to the Chinese perceived 
threat. As result,  the Indian Army was strengthened, and India equipped with the 
nuclear  technology necessary to  explode  an  atom device,  though  ten  years  after 
Beijing. Moreover, India demonstrated to be prepared to exploit the opportunities 
offered by external events, such as, for example, the civil war that erupted in East 
Pakistan.  On that  occasion,  New Delhi  opted  to  sustain  the  Bengali  secessionist 
movement  from the initial phases of the civil war, with the clear intent to weaken 
Pakistan. When the situation worsened and millions of people migrated  to India  to 
escape the violence, New Delhi did not modify its stance. It opted to resort to armed 
conflict in order to solve the situation in its favour, and thus to see an independent 
Bangladesh. Therefore, India was then ready to modify its historical foreign policy of 
non-alignment, and to ally with the Soviet Union in order to balance the American 
support of Pakistan. Finally, also Sikkim's merger with India was not a coincidence. 
Thanks to the Indian and British archival documents it is now possible to argue that 
India  had  formulated  a  clear  strategy  to  destabilize  Sikkim's domestic  political 
situation already in 1972, one year before domestic problems effectively erupted in 
the  small  Himalayan  state.  India's  intent  was  to  create  a  situation  of  chaos  that 
justified New Delhi's intervention as the peacemaker. From that position New Delhi 
would indeed have an easy job in favouring the annexation of the state to India with 
the  promise  of  democratizing  Sikkim's  political  system.  This strategy  was well-
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conceived: Sikkim collapsed into chaos in 1973, India then intervened as mediator 
between the monarchy and democratic political forces, and Sikkim was annexed to 
India in 1975.
The second possible consideration is that the role played by China in influencing 
India's foreign policy was of crucial importance. The actions and policies adopted by 
Beijing  had  the  power  to  significantly  alter  India's  foreign  policy  due  to  the 
antagonist relationship that tied the two Asian giants. The analysis of China's foreign 
policy can allow the access to important information as to how India will develop its 
own foreign policy in future. In fact, India decided to embark on a process of re-
arming after losing the 1962 war against China, and to equip itself with the necessary 
technology for exploding a nuclear device after the first Chinese atom explosion in 
1964. This consideration brings along another important remark: even if literature 
generally overrates the United States' role in influencing India's foreign policy1, their 
role was only secondary. Two examples can support this statement. First, the Indian 
archives revealed that New Delhi decided to accept the Soviet proposal of alliance 
before Nixon's announcement of the success of Kissinger's trip to Beijing, which in 
July 1971 disclosed the Sino-American-Pakistani axe to  the Indians. In fact, New 
Delhi accepted to reconsider the Soviet proposal of alliance already in June 1971. 
The main reason was to ensure Moscow's support in the UN Security Council in 
order not to risk the UN's involvement in the war New Delhi was preparing to fight 
against Pakistan. The announcement of the normalisation of Sino-American relations 
through  Pakistan's  mediation  only  confirmed,  for  India,  the  correctness  of  the 
decision already taken in the previous weeks. Second, also  in the case of India's 
nuclear programme, literature is inclined to overrate the American role in influencing 
1 See for example: Marta R. Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg, Bangladesh: The Birth of a Nation; a  
Handbook  of  Background  Information  and  Documentary  Sources (Madras:  M.  Seshachalam, 
1972); Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South 
Asia,” Asian Survey 20, no. 4 (April 1980): 339–361; Mariele Merlati, Gli Stati Uniti tra India e  
Pakistan: gli anni della presidenza Carter (Roma: Carocci, 2009); Kalyani Shankar, Nixon, Indira  
and  India:  Politics  and  Beyond (New  Delhi:  MacMillan,  2010);  Geoffrey  Warner,  “Nixon, 
Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971,” International Affairs 81, no. 5 (2005): 1097–1118; 
Itty Abraham, “South Asian Events of 1971: New Revelations,”  Economic and Political Weekly 
40, no. 28 (July 9, 2005): 2994–2995.
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New Delhi to explode a nuclear device in 19742. According to this interpretation, 
Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan and the decision to send the nuclear aircraft Enterprise 
to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war were determinant in leading 
India to the decision from exploding the bomb. However, as demonstrated during the 
third chapter of this thesis this was not the case. India had taken such a decision in 
1964 after the first Chinese atomic explosion. Only technical delays prevented India 
to explode the bomb before 1974. Therefore, when in 1974 the scientists declared 
themselves prepared to conduct the first nuclear experiment, New Delhi authorised it 
without hesitation. Nixon's  leaning towards Pakistan and the  Enterprise event only 
invigorated  New  Delhi's  political  awareness  about  the  potential  benefits  of 
demonstrating to the world its ability to detonate a nuclear device, but were not the 
main determinant factors.
The last conclusive remark that is possible to formulate is that India's ascent was 
also influenced by the Cold War dynamics, and by the personal role played by the 
Indian political leadership. The normalisation of Sino-American relationship and the 
Cold War phase of détente indeed in some way facilitated India in emerging as the 
dominant power of South Asia. They offered New Delhi the possibility to balance the 
American tilt towards Pakistan,  and China with an alliance with the Soviet Union, 
and thus to freely pursue its interests in South Asia without being  influenced too 
much by global  considerations.  Lastly,  the Indian political  leadership (formed by 
Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  and  the  small  circle  of  her  advisers)  directly 
contributed  to  India  becoming  the  dominant  power  of  South  Asia.  The  research 
developed so far by  this thesis  indeed permits to argue that Indira Gandhi,  P. N. 
Haksar,  and  the  other  members  of  the  Prime  Minister  Office  indeed  formulated 
India's  foreign  policy personally  and  with  great  autonomy  during  the  period 
analysed.  First,  they  decided  to  pursue  with  determination  some  policies  and 
strategies  already  adopted  by  previous  governments,  such  as  in  the  case  of  the 
nuclear programme. Second, they also formulated new strategies and plans in order 
to affirm and enlarge India's power in South Asia, such as in the case of the secession 
2 See for example: Merlati, Gli Stati Uniti tra India e Pakistan.
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of Bangladesh, and of the destabilization and consecutive annexation of Sikkim to 
India. This confirms the analysis already developed by literature on this  subject3, 
enriches it with other interesting details, and integrates it with the historical analysis 
of the three specific events posed at  the centre  of this  thesis  (e.g.  the 1971 war, 
India's nuclear programme, and Sikkim's annexation).
 
3 Shashi Tharoor, Reasons of State: Political Development and India’s Foreign Policy Under Indira  
Gandhi, 1966-1977 (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House, 1982); Surjit Mansingh,  India’s Search for  
Power: Indira Gandhi’s  Foreign Policy,  1966-1982 (London:  Sage Publications,  1984);  James 
Manor,  “Innovative  Leadership in  Modern  India:  M.  K.  Gandhi,  J.  Nehru  and  I.  Gandhi,”  in 
Innovative Leaders,  by Gabriel  Sheffer (New York: SUNY Press, 1993); Sumit Ganguly, “The 
Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” in Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing Office  
of Prime Minister in India, by James Manor and B. D. Dua (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 
1994), 138–160; Jyotindra Nath Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to  
Yashwant Sinha (New Delhi:  HarperCollins,  2004);  Harish Kapur,  Foreign Policies  Of India’s  
Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2009).
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